Bombay High Court
NAMDEO GANPAT SONAWANEversusDNYANOBA LAXMAN NEWASKAR DECEASED
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
In the absence of specific evidence showing the share of consideration paid, Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act presumes equal ownership, and the appellate court's findings were not liable to be interfered with.
Summary
The appellant claimed a 90% share in a property while the respondent asserted an equal 50% share each. The trial court had declared a 90% share for the appellant based on alleged payment of 90% of the consideration, but the First Appellate Court reversed this, presuming equal ownership under Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellant appealed, arguing that documentary evidence (an account notebook) and oral testimony proved he paid 90% of the consideration, and contended misinterpretation of Sections 45 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The High Court examined the pleadings and found no specific allegation or proof of the proportion of consideration paid by the appellant. It held that, absent such evidence, the statutory presumption of equal interest applies and the notebook evidence was not reliable or admissible. The Court further concluded that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law and that re‑appreciation of evidence was not permissible under Section 100 of the CPC. Consequently, the second appeals were dismissed and the interim applications were declared infructuous.
Issues considered
- Whether the absence of specific evidence on the proportion of consideration paid invokes the presumption of equal ownership under Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
- Whether the account notebook (Exhibit‑78) is admissible as reliable evidence under Sections 34 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- Whether the appeal raises a substantial question of law warranting interference with the First Appellate Court’s findings.
- Whether the appellate court can re‑appreciate evidence under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 100
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 34, 92
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — s. 45
Subjects
- property partition
- share ownership
- Transfer of Property Act
- presumption of equal interest
- evidence admissibility
- appellate jurisdiction
- civil procedure
Judgment
31-SA-787-2024+.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Harshada
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 787 OF 2024
Namdeo Ganpat Sonawane … Appellant
vs.
Dnyanoba Laxman Newaskar (Since … Respondents
deceased through legal heirs) Laxmibai
Dnyanoba Newaskar and Ors.
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.11216 OF 2024
IN
SECOND APPEAL NO. 787 OF 2024
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 281 OF 2026
Namdeo Ganpat Sonawane … Appellant
vs.
Dnyanoba Laxman Newaskar (Since … Respondents
deceased through legal heirs) Laxmibai
Dnyanoba Newaskar and Ors.
Mr. Anil Sakhare a/w. Mr. Atul Damle, Senior Advocates i/by Mr.
Rohan Mirpury for Appellant.
Mr. S. M. Gorwadkar, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Harshal N. Mule,
Advocate i/by N. P. Mule for Respondents.
CORAM : GAURI GODSE, J.
DATED : 31st JULY 2026
ORDER:
1. These second appeals are arising out of two separate suits
filed by both the parties for declaration of the extent of their
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respective shares of ownership in the suit property. The appellant
claims that he has a 90% share in the suit property, and the
respondent claims that both parties have a 50% share each in the
suit property. Second Appeal No.787 of 2024 arises from a suit filed
by the respondent, and Second Appeal No. 281 of 2026 arises from
a suit filed by the present appellant, who claims a 90% share.
2. The appellant filed suit for a declaration that the respondent is
entitled to only 10% share in the suit property. The respondent filed
the suit for partition and separate possession of his 50% share. The
trial court, by separate judgments, dismissed the suit for a 50%
share and directed that he would be entitled to separation of his
10% share. The appellant’s suit was decreed by giving a
declaration that the appellant is the owner of 90% share and the
respondent is the owner of 10% share. In the appellant’s suit, the
trial court granted an injunction that the respondent should not
obstruct the possession of the plaintiff’s share. The respondents’
separate appeals were decided by a common judgment. The First
Appellate Court has dismissed the appellant's suit and decreed the
respondents’ suit by directing partition for equal shares. Thus, the
First Appellate Court held that both parties were entitled to a 50%
share each in the suit property.
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3. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits
that though the sale deed did not refer to the extent of the shares
owned by the parties, appellant had paid consideration to the extent
of 90% and therefore he was entitled to a declaration of 90% share.
He submits that the First Appellate Court has wrongly interpreted
Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and despite the
evidence produced on record, has wrongly drawn an inference in
view of the second part of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882.
4. He further submits that the appellant had produced
substantial evidence, including documentary evidence in the form of
an account notebook at Exhibit – 78, to show entries made in the
notebook to support his contention that 90% of the consideration
amount was paid by the appellant. He relies upon the findings
recorded by the trial court accepting the entries in the notebook and
the supporting oral evidence to record a finding that appellant had
paid 90% of the share. He submits that oral evidence of appellant’s
witness and the entries in the notebook produced at Exhibit - 78
were correctly interpreted by the trial court to record a finding of fact
that the appellant had paid 90% of the consideration amount.
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the First
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Appellate Court has erred in not appreciating the oral evidence
which supports the entries in the notebook that the appellant had
paid 90% of the consideration amount. He refers to the relevant
findings recorded by both the courts to support his submissions that
there is substantial evidence to prove payment of 90% share by the
appellant. He therefore submits that the second appeal would raise
substantial questions of law on misappreciation of the evidence on
record and not correctly applying the provisions of Section 45 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 92 of the Evidence Act,
1872. He therefore submits that both the second appeals would
require consideration on the aforesaid questions of law.
6. I have perused the judgments, the pleadings and the
evidence. Execution of the sale deed in the joint name of the parties
and the contents of the sale deed are not in dispute. Admittedly, the
document records payment of consideration by the parties without
any particulars regarding the extent of the parties’ shares. Though
there is oral as well as documentary evidence produced on record
by the appellant in support of the contention that he had paid 90% of
the total consideration, a perusal of the plaint shows that there are
no specific pleadings with reference to the manner in which 90% of
the total consideration was paid by the appellant.
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7. With reference to the appellant's pleadings and the
documents on record, the First Appellate Court has referred to the
relevant oral evidence. The First Appellate Court referred to the
admissions given by the appellant and accepted that the recitals in
the sale deed that the consideration amount was paid by both
parties. The First Appellate Court has also referred to the oral as
well as documentary evidence in detail and held that there was no
documentary evidence to show how the amount of consideration
was paid by the appellant to the extent of 90% of the consideration
amount. The First Appellate Court, being the last fact-finding court,
has reappreciated the evidence in detail. With reference to the
findings recorded by the trial court, the oral as well as documentary
evidence is dealt with by the First Appellate Court to conclude that
the notebook at Exhibit - 78 referred to and relied upon by the trial
court cannot be accepted as a reliable piece of evidence to
conclude that the appellant had paid 90% of the total consideration
amount.
8. In view of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
the First Appellate Court has rightly held that, in the absence of any
evidence as to the interest in the fund paid by the respective parties,
it has to be presumed that both parties had equal interest in the
property. In the absence of any particulars pleaded regarding
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payment of 90% of the consideration amount with supporting
satisfactory evidence, the presumption under Section 45 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is correctly applied by the First
Appellate Court. In the absence of any particulars pleaded and
proved, the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court on
Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would not warrant
any interference in this second appeal.
9. The ground raised on the appreciation of the evidence with
reference to the notebook at Exhibit - 78 is concerned, I do not find
any illegality or perversity in the reasons recorded by the First
Appellate Court. The entire documentary and oral evidence is
reappreciated by the First Appellate Court to hold that the notebook
at Exhibit 78 is not an account maintained in due course of business
and its entries do not inspire any confidence. Nothing is shown in
this second appeal as to how the entries would be relevant under
Section 34 of the Evidence Act. The submissions made by relying
upon Section 92 of the Evidence Act are irrelevant, as the sale deed
in the joint name of the parties does not record the extent of the
respective shares, and there is no valid documentary evidence
produced to prove payment of 90% of the consideration by the
appellant. The submissions regarding the oral evidence and the
documentary evidence raised in this second appeal would warrant
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reappreciation of the evidence, which is not permissible under
Section 100 of CPC. Hence, even the said ground would not
warrant any interference as it does not raise any substantial
question of law.
10. The second appeals do not raise any substantial question of
law. Hence, the second appeals are dismissed. Interim applications
are disposed of as infructuous.
(GAURI GODSE, J.)
Digitally signed
by HARSHADA
HARSHADA HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date:
2026.08.12
12:20:53 +0530
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