Bombay High Court
MAHRASHTRA KRISHNA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONversusCHINDHA CHINDU UBHE (DECEASED) THR. LRS. DNYANOBA CHINDU UBHE AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed.
Summary
The Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation filed an appeal against a Reference Award under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but sought to condone a delay of 2,977 days in filing the appeal. The appellant submitted Interim Application No. 11503 seeking condonation, citing the COVID‑19 pandemic and procedural hurdles such as engaging counsel and paying court fees. The Court examined the chronology, noting that the award was passed on 24 March 2017 and no steps were taken until a certified copy was sought in 2024, leaving a three‑year unexplained gap. While acknowledging the pandemic’s impact, the Court found the explanations for the pre‑2020 period and the post‑2022 period insufficient and not beyond the appellant’s control. Consequently, the Court rejected the condonation application, held that the appeal could not be entertained on its merits, and disposed of the related interim applications.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant provided a satisfactory explanation to justify condoning a delay of 2,977 days in filing the appeal.
- Whether the COVID‑19 pandemic and ordinary procedural requirements constitute sufficient cause for condonation of such extensive delay.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- appeal
- Land Acquisition Act
- COVID-19 pandemic
- procedural delay
Judgment
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Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 25906 OF 2025
WITH
Digitally signed
by SAYALI
SAYALI DEEPAK
UPASANI
DEEPAK
UPASANI
Date:
2026.09.09
18:29:02
+0530
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 11503 OF 2025
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 11504 OF 2025
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 160 OF 2026
Maharashtra Krishna Valley
Development Corporation Thr. Its
Executive Engineer … Appellant
V/s.
Chindha Chindu Ubhe (Deceased Thr.
Legal Heris) and Others … Respondents
Mr. Nitin Gaware Patil with Mr. Shivkumar J. with Ms.
R. Nerlikar, for Appellant-Applicant.
Mr. A. R. Patil, Additonal GP for State-Respondent Nos.
2 and 3.
Ms. Amrita Kharkar with Ms. Sayali Bhosale i/b P. H.
Potnis, for Respondent.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
P.C.:
1. Not on board, taken on board.
2. The applicant has filed Interim Application No. 11503 of
2025 seeking condonation of delay of 2977 days in preferring the
present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
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3. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial delay is
stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled
that while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an
application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of
these principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.
4. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5 of
the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 24 March 2017. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed in the
year 2024. This factual position itself shows that for a considerable
period after passing of the award, no steps were taken by the
applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory explanation
for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what prevented the
applicant from approaching the Court or taking necessary steps
immediately after pronouncement of the award. Mere general
statements without particulars cannot be treated as sufficient
cause, particularly when the delay runs into several years.
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5. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there
is no explanation for the period commencing from March 2017 till
March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the
control of the applicant.
6. Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 15 April 2025. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.
7. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
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result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation
is founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of
the Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies
upon such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present
matter, the explanation furnished remains incomplete.
Consequently, this Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has
been made out for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my
opinion, therefore, the application for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed.
8. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be rejected
and is rejected.
9. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.
10. Accordingly, the present First Appeal as well as Interim
Application No. 11504 of 2025 and Interim Application No. 160 of
2026 for stay and extension of time stand disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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