IndiaversusChugoku Marine Paints S PTE Ltd

                                                                       -IA1273-2026.DOC

                                                                                 Santosh

                             IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION


                                 INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1273 OF 2026
                                                  IN
                               ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 1061 OF 2026

                      The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd.             ...Applicant
                      In the matter between
                      The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd.             ...Petitioner
                                      Versus
                      Chugoku Marines Paints S PTE Ltd                 …Respondent
SANTOSH
SUBHASH
KULKARNI              Mr. Satish Chandra Upadhyay, for the Applicant - Petitioner.
Digitally signed by
                      Mr. Jamsheed Master, a/w Rakesh V Misar, i/b RVM Legal, for
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.10.06
                           the Respondent.
22:09:52 +0530


                                               CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                          RESERVED ON: 24th SEPTEMBER, 2026
                                        PRONOUNCED ON: 6th OCTOBER, 2026

                      ORDER:-

                      1.    This is an application for condonation of delay in

                      preferring a petition to set aside an arbitral award dated 30 th

                      June, 2025 passed by the sole arbitrator in Arbitration

                      Application No. 117 of 2021, under the provisions of Section 34

                      of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitration

                      Act, 1996”).

                      2.    Pursuant to a contract dated 1st February, 2018 between

                      the   applicant-petitioner   and    respondent-claimant,      the

                      respondent had supplied marine paints to the applicant’s

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vessels and raised an invoice in the sum of 82,970.28 USD. The

applicant claimed to have credited payment through banking

channels to the account of the respondent maintained with the

Commonwealth Bank of Australia. A dispute arose as the

respondent contended that it had not received the payment. It

then transpired that, the amount so credited was fraudulently

siphoned off and, thus, the matter was reported to the police.

Eventually, the respondent invoked the arbitration leading to

the appointment of a sole arbitrator by this Court.

3.   Upon conclusion of the arbitral process, the sole arbitrator

passed an award on 30 th June, 2025. A signed copy of the said

award was received by the Ms. Rita Joshi, the Advocate for the

applicant on 2nd July, 2025.    The applicant claims that, Ms.

Joshi emailed the said award to a member of the applicant's

legal team, yet, on account of technical issues the email could

be opened on 3rd July, 2025 only. Thus, the applicant received a

copy of the award on 3rd July, 2025.

4.   In the application, it is averred that the statutory period of

three months for challenging the award expired on 3 rd October

2025. A delay of about 30 has occurred in filing the petition on

account of the complexity of the matter involving international

cyber fraud. The applicant, being a public sector undertaking,

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was required to obtain multiple administrative and legal

clearances, including a formal legal opinion and approvals from

the competent authorities. Furthermore, as the applicant was

involved in the organization of the “Indian Maritime Week”,

wherein delegates from 75 countries and the high dignitaries

had participated, there was delay in filing the petition.

5.    The respondent-claimant has resisted the application by

filing an affidavit-in-reply. At the outset, it was controverted that

the award was received by the applicant on 3 rd July, 2025. The

award was, in fact, received by the applicant on 2 nd July, 2025.

If three months period is computed from 2 nd July, 2025, the

filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025 is clearly beyond the

prescribed period of three months and 30 days period, which

can be condoned by the Court.          Secondly, the very factum of

filing of the petition on 3rd November, 2025 was put in contest.

An endeavour was made to demonstrate that there were

apparent inconsistencies in the claim of the applicant as

regards the filing of the petition on 3rd November, 2025. In any

event, even if it is assumed that the award was received by the

applicant on 3rd July, 2025, yet, the filing of the petition on 3 rd

November, 2025 would still be barred by two days.




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6.   The applicant filed an additional affidavit to assert that,

since the further 30 days period expired on 2 nd November, 2025

which was a Court holiday, the filing of the petition on 3 rd

November, 2025 was within the extendable period of 30 days,

and as the applicant has ascribed justifiable reasons, the delay

deserved to be condoned.

7.   I have heard Mr. Satish Upadhyay, the learned Counsel for

the applicant/petitioner, and Mr. Jamsheed Master, the learned

Counsel for the respondent, at some length.            With the

assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused

the material on record.

8.   Mr. Upadhyay, the learned Counsel for the applicant,

would submit that though the receipt of the copy of the award

by the Advocate of the applicant on 2 nd July, 2025 is not in

dispute, yet, the applicant has placed credible material on

record to show that the copy of the said award sent by email by

Advocate Joshi could only be opened on 3 rd July, 2025. Thus,

the prescribed period of three months for filing the petition

expired on 3rd October, 2025. Consequently, the extendable 30

days period would expire on 2nd November, 2025. Since 2nd

November, 2025 happened to be Sunday, the filing of the

petition on 3rd November, 2025 was within the combined

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prescribed and extendable period. Support was sought to be

drawn from the provisions contained in Section 4 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, whereunder, if the prescribed period

expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or

application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day

when the Court reopens.

9.    Mr. Upadhyay further submitted that in the application for

condonation of delay the applicant has ascribed justifiable

reasons.     Emphasis was laid on the fact that the applicant,

being a public sector undertaking, was required to obtain

approvals from the competent authorities, and the said process

took time.     Secondly, as the applicant was the organizer of

“Indian Maritime Week 2025”, an event of a global scale, the

time and resources of the applicant were employed for the

successful     organization   of   the   said   event.   In   these

circumstances, Mr. Upadhyay would urge, if the delay is not

condoned, the applicant would suffer an irreparable loss as the

applicant has already parted with the amount under invoice.

10.    Per contra, Mr. Master, the learned Counsel for the

respondent, would submit that the application suffers from the

vice of suppression of facts and lack of bona fides. Taking the

Court through the averments in the petition and application,

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the manner of affirmation of the petition and the application

and the assertions therein, Mr. Master would urge that, the

proceeding has been filed by the applicant in a most casual

manner. The very filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025,

according to Mr. Master, is not free from infirmities.

11.   Mr. Master would further urge, even if it is assumed that

the petition was filed on 3 rd November, 2025, yet, on the own

showing of the applicant, the prescribed and the extendable

period of 30 days expired on 2 nd November, 2025. Mr. Master

would submit, once this position is conceded, the petition does

not deserve to be countenanced as the benefit of the provisions

contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be

claimed in respect of the extendable period of 30 days. The

provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963,

come into play only when the prescribed period expires on a day

when the Court is closed.

12.   Mr. Master would urge that, the aforesaid position in law is

no longer res integra.   In a series of judgments, the Supreme

Court has emphasized that, the benefit of the provisions

contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be

claimed where the extendable period of 30 days expires on a day

when the Court is closed. Reliance was placed on the decisions

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in the cases of Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board

vs. Subhash Projects and Marketing Limited1, Bhimashankar

Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Niyamit Limited vs. Walchandnagar

Industries Limited2 and My preferred Transformation and

Hospitality Private Limited vs. M/s. Faridabad Implements

Private Limited3.

13.   The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.

14.   Under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, an

application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made

after three months has elapsed from the date on which the

party making that application has received the arbitral award.

Under the proviso to sub-section (3), the Court may entertain

the application within the further period of 30 days, but not

thereafter, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a

sufficient cause from making the application within the

prescribed period of three months.

15.   It would be contextually relevant to note that, under

Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, after the arbitral

award is made, the Arbitral Tribunal is enjoined to deliver a

signed copy of the arbitral award to each party. A conjoint

1     (2012) 1 SCR 403.
2     (2023) 8 SCC 453.
3     (2025) 1 SCR 729.
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reading of sub-section (5) of Section 31 with Section 34(3) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996, would make it clear that the limitation

prescribed for filing a petition to set aside the award under

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would commence from

the date a signed copy of the arbitral award is delivered to the

party that makes an application for setting aside the same.

16.     In the light of the aforesaid statutory prescription, two

dates assume critical salience. First, the date on which the

signed copy of the arbitral award is delivered to the party, who

files a petition to set aside the said award. Second, the date on

which such petition is filed before the Court.     The first date

assumes importance from the perspective of the commencement

of the period of limitation. The second date is also of immense

significance to ascertain whether the petition is, in fact, filed

within the prescribed period of three months (from the date of

the commencement of the period of limitation) and the

extendable 30 days period (albeit only upon the satisfaction of

the Court), as the Court is denuded of the power to condone the

delay beyond the prescribed period of three months plus 30

days.

17.     With the aforesaid preface, reverting to the facts of the

case, it is pertinent to note the parties are not at issue over to

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fact that the award was passed on 30 th June, 2025 and its copy

was received on 2nd July, 2025 by Mr. Subodh Shivam for

Advocate Rita Joshi, who represented the applicant before the

Arbitral Tribunal. The applicant, however, asserts that the copy

of the said award forwarded by Advocate Rita Joshi by email

could be opened on 3rd July, 2025 only, on account of technical

issues. Thus, the applicant can be said to have received the

copy of the award on 3rd July, 2025 only. Attention of the Court

was invited to the internal correspondence to substantiate the

said claim.

18.   It is imperative to note that, the applicant acknowledges if

the prescribed period of three months is computed even from 3 rd

July, 2025, it expired on 3rd October, 2025 and the 30 days

extendable period expired on 2nd November, 2025. Since the said

date happened to be a Sunday, the filing of the petition on the

next working day, i.e. 3rd November, 2025, was in order in

accordance with the provisions contained in Section 4 of the

Limitation Act,   1963, is the substance of the claim of the

applicant.

19.   Even if maximum latitude is given to the claim of the

applicant that, it had received the copy of the award from

Advocate Rita Joshi on 3rd July, 2025, and it is accepted at par;

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discounting the objections on behalf of the respondent to the

acceptability of such contention, yet, in view of the settled

position in law that the benefit of the provisions contained in

Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be availed only when

the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed,

and not in respect of the extendable period of 30 days, the

submission     on   behalf   of   the     applicant   does   not    merit

countenance.

20.   Mr. Master was justified in canvassing the submission that

the position is no longer res integra and stands settled by a

series of judgments of the Supreme Court. In the case of Assam

Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), the Supreme

Court   considered    the    precise    submission,    sought      to   be

canvassed by Mr. Upadhyay in this case, premised on the

applicability of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the

Limitation Act, 1963. After adverting to the provisions contained

in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and Section 4 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, the Supreme Court enunciated that in

view of the provisions contained in Section 2(j) of the Limitation

Act, 1963 which defines the term "period of limitation", in the

context of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it becomes

amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application


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for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. The period

of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub-section (3)

of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not “the period of

limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the

purposes of making an application for setting aside arbitral

award is three months. Thus, the period of 30 days beyond

three months which the Court may extend on the sufficient

cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section

(3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 being not the “period of

limitation” or, in other words, “prescribed period”, the provisions

contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are not at

all attracted.

21.   The aforesaid decision has been followed by the Supreme

Court in the case of Bhimashankar Sahakari (supra). In the

case of My preferred Transformation (supra), the Supreme Court

again reiterated that Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies in

relation to the prescribed period of three months and it does not

apply when the condonable period of 30 days expires on a day

when the Court is not working.

22.   In view of the aforesaid legal position, an endeavour of Mr.

Upadhyay to draw support from the provisions contained in

Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be acceded to. Had

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that been the only issue, the matter could have been put to rest.

However, the uncontroverted facts of the case raise another

issue of seminal significance which this Court cannot be

oblivious of, while considering the aspect as to whether the

petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 should be

entertained.

23.   In all fairness to the learned Counsel for the parties, it

must be noted that Mr. Upadhyay adverted to the point which

arises for consideration on a tangent. It was urged that, the

signed copy of the award was not served on the party –

applicant. Mr. Upadhyay, however, did not pursue the said point

further.   Nonetheless, as noted above, the parties are not at

issues over the fact that the award was passed on 30 th June,

2025 and its copy was received by a person on behalf of the

Advocate for the applicant on 2nd July, 2025.

24.   It would be contextually relevant to note that, the copy of

the Minutes of the Meeting (Exhibit-B) was annexed to the

affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the respondent. The said Minutes

of the Meeting, inter alia, records that the award was passed on

that day. It also contains an acknowledgment (on which reliance

was placed by the respondent) that, a copy of the award was

received on 2nd July, 2025 by Mr. Subodh Shivam for Ms. Rita

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Joshi, Advocate. It appears that none had appeared for the

applicant-respondent in the arbitral proceedings on 30 th June,

2025. On that day, Advocate Vaishnavi Tiwari had received the

copy purportedly for the Advocate for the claimant. The Minutes

of the Meeting dated 30th June, 2025 and the acknowledgments

thereon thus make it explicitly clear that the learned sole

arbitrator professed to comply with the mandate contained in

Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 by delivering a signed

copy of the arbitral award to the Advocates for the parties,

under their respective acknowledgments. It does not appear that

the learned sole arbitrator had delivered a signed copy of the

award to each of the parties in any other mode.

25.   The question that thus wrenches to the fore is, whether

there was compliance of the statutory mandate contained in

Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and, consequently,

the prescribed period of limitation for filing the petition under

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, commenced?

26.   To retain emphasis, few provisions contained in the

Arbitration Act, 1996 deserve to be extracted. Under Section

2(h), a party is defined as under:

      “ 2(h) party means a party to an arbitration agreement;”


27.   Relevant part of Section 31 reads as under:

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      “31.   Form and contents of arbitral award -

      (1)    An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be

      signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.

      ……..

      (5)    After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be

      delivered to each party.”


28.   Section 34, which is subsumed under Chapter VII,

providing for a recourse against an arbitral award, reads as

under:

      “34.   Application for setting aside arbitral award -
      (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be
      made only by an application for setting aside such award in
      accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
      ….
      (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
      three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
      making that application had received the arbitral award or, if
      a request had been made under section 33, from the date on
      which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral
      Tribunal.”


29.   A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions would

indicate that the aspect of receipt of the arbitral award by the

party, within the meaning of Section 2(h), is inextricably

intermingled with the commencement of the prescribed period

of limitation for filing the petition under Section 34(3) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996. The obligation on the Arbitral Tribunal to

deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party is

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required to be read in juxtaposition with the expression “three

months from the date on which the party making that

application had received the arbitral award”. Thus it is the

“receipt” of the arbitral award by the party that starts the clock

of limitation ticking.

30.   Delivery of signed copy of the arbitral award is not only

imperative from the point of view of conveying to the parties as

to how the Arbitral Tribunal has resolved the dispute and why

the Arbitral Tribunal has decided in favour of or against the

party, but also from the point of view of the commencement of

the period of limitation especially in the context of the fact that

beyond the prescribed period of three months and the

extendable period of thirty days, even the Court has no

jurisdiction to permit a party to assail the award by filing a

petition. The service of the signed copy of the arbitral award on

the party is therefore not an empty formality. The delivery of the

signed copy of the arbitral award on a particular day has

serious legal implications. Therefore, the question whether the

signed copy of the arbitral award has in fact been served upon a

party thereto who has assailed the said award, and, if so, when,

is of critical salience.




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31.   A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of

Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors 4,

enunciated that the delivery of an arbitral award under sub-

section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a

matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31

has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings

within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery

of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received”

by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt

by the party of the award set in motion several periods of

limitation   such    as   an   application    for   correction   and

interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1),

an application for making an additional award, and an

application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3). As

this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring

certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right

to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of

limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery

of the copy of award by the tribunal and the receipt thereof by

each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral

proceedings.



4     (2005) 4 SCC 239.
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32.   In the case of State of Maharashtra and Others vs. ARK

Builders Private Limited5, the Supreme Court was confronted

with the following question. "

      “2.    Whether the period of limitation for making an
      application under section 34 of the Arbitration and
      Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter `the Act') for setting aside
      an arbitral award is to be reckoned from the date a copy of
      the award is received by the objector by any means and from
      any source, or it would start running from the date a signed
      copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator?


33.   After an analysis of the provisions contained in the Act,

1996, including Sections 31 and 34, the Supreme Court

enunciated that the expression “party making the application

had received the arbitral award” cannot be read in isolation, and

it must be understood in the light of what is said earlier in

Section 31(5), that requires a signed copy of the award to be

delivered to each party. Reading the two provisions together, it

is quite clear that the limitation prescribed in Section 34(3)

would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award

is delivered to the party making the application for setting the

award aside.

34.   After making a reference to the decision in the case of

Tecco Trichy Engineers and Others (supra), the Supreme Court

reiterated the legal position as under:



5     (2011) 4 SCC 616.
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      “15. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted
      above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation
      prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act would start running
      only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered
      to/received by the party making the application for setting it
      aside under section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the
      issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of
      the order/award is to be communicated, delivered,
      dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties
      concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a
      period of limitation for challenging the order/award in
      question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation
      can only commence from the date on which the order/award
      was received by the party concerned in the manner
      prescribed by the law.
      …...
      17.    In light of the discussions made above we find the
      impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable.
      The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following
      the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers &
      Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Court
      overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely
      the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of
      the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral
      tribunal.”


35.   The decision in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee

and others vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited 6, appears to be

on all four with the facts of the case on hand. In that case also,

the copies of the award duly signed by the learned arbitrator

were received by the Counsel for the respective parties. A

learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had dismissed the

petition under Section 34 on the premise that the expression

“party” under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, would

also include the agent of the party and thus since the award

was received by the Counsel for the respondent therein on 13 th


6     (2012) 9 SCC 496.
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May, 2004, the petition filed on 3 rd February, 2005 was time

barred. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court interfered

with the said order opining that, a copy of the award had to be

delivered to the party itself and service on its Counsel did not

amount to service within the meaning of Section 31(5) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996.

36.   Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that in view

of the authority which a party confers on an Advocate, the term

‘party’ would include the Advocate, to whom the signed copy of

the award is delivered. The Supreme Court repelled the

submission and concurred with the view of the Division Bench

of the Delhi High Court observing inter alia as under:

      “15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on
      behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard
      to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(h) of the
      1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3)
      of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the
      decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
      impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” has
      been amply dealt with in Tecco Trechy Engineers’s case
      (supra) and also in ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra),
      referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an Advocate to act
      and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is
      another for an Advocate to act as the party himself. The
      expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act,
      clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration
      agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so
      as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any
      reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2)
      of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his
      or her agent, or Advocate empowered to act on the basis of a
      Vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with
      Section 31(5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of the
      Arbitral Award on the party himself and not on his Advocate,


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      which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under
      Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act.”
                                             (emphasis supplied)
37.   The aforesaid decisions were referred to by another two-

Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Anilkumar

Jinabhai Patel vs. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel and others 7. In

that case, without deviating from the enunciation of law in the

aforesaid cases, on facts, the Supreme Court found that the

appellant therein had received the copy of the award with an

endorsement for himself and on behalf of his family members

and that constituted, in the attendant circumstances of the said

case, a due service of the copy of the arbitral award on the

parties thereto.

38.   A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Health Care

Medical and Diagnostics Services vs. Amulya Investments 8, has

postulated that the provisions contained in Sections 2(1)(h),

31(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, have been

interpreted to have a mandatory effect, and hence strict and

complete compliance thereof would be necessary.

39.   The legal position which thus emerges is that, the

obligation on the Arbitral Tribunal is to deliver a signed copy of

the arbitral award to each of the parties to the arbitral


7     (2018) 15 SCC 178.
8     Arbitration Appeal No.15397 of 2024.
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proceedings. Delivery of the signed copy of the arbitral award to

an agent, or for that matter even an Advocate, of the party, does

not amount to scrupulous compliance of the mandatory

requirement. The insistence on the scrupulous compliance with

the requirement to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award

stems from the consequences that emanate from the receipt of

the signed copy of the arbitral award by a party.       As strict

timelines are prescribed for initiating further measures, if the

parties desire to initiate such measures, upon receipt of the

signed copy of the arbitral award, any deviation from the

obligation to deliver the signed copy of the award is not

countenanced. The fact that, the aggrieved party somehow

comes in possession of a copy of the arbitral award from any

source is not of material significance. The delivery of a signed

copy of an arbitral award by the arbitrator is the mandate of the

law. There is clear and present risk if any deviation is

countenanced as that would open the arena for assertions and

counter assertions and thereby obfuscate the matter, which is

otherwise clear and unambiguous.

40.   Applying these principles to the facts of the case at hand,

evidently, the learned sole arbitrator did not deliver the signed

copy of the arbitral award to the applicant. Copy of the arbitral


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award was received by Mr. Subodh Shivam on behalf of Ms. Rita

Joshi, Advocate. That did not constitute the discharge of the

statutory obligation to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award

to the party. Resultantly, the period of limitation prescribed for

filing the petition cannot be said to have commenced from 2 nd

July, 2025, in the strict sense of the term. In the absence of

any other credible material to show that the learned arbitrator

delivered the signed copy of the arbitral award at any later point

of time, the presentation of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025

cannot be said to be barred by the limitation, postulated under

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

41.     For the foregoing reasons, the application deserves to be

allowed by making a declaration that the petition filed on 3 rd

November, 2025, is not time barred.

42.     Hence, the following order:

                              :ORDER:

(i)     The application stands allowed.

(ii)    It is declared that the petition filed on 3 rd November, 2025

        is not time-barred.

(iii)   The petition be registered and listed for admission on 14 th

        October, 2026.

                                            [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

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