Bombay High Court
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THR. DEPUTY COLLECTOR, RAIGAD AND ANR.versusSHRI KANA CHAHU KENI AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
The court held that the condonation of delay could not be granted as the explanation was insufficient, and therefore the appeal could not be entertained.
Summary
The appellants sought condonation of a delay of 4 years and 351 days in filing a first appeal against a Reference Award passed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The court examined the explanation offered for the delay, noting that the award was passed on 10 May 2018 but a certified copy was only sought on 30 May 2022, and the appeal was filed on 26 June 2023. The court held that the applicant failed to provide a satisfactory reason for the period between April 2018 and March 2020, and that the COVID‑19 pandemic could not account for the entire delay. Consequently, the application for condonation was rejected, and the appeal could not be entertained on its merits. Separate interim applications regarding amendment of pleadings and discharge of a bank guarantee were dealt with, the former being allowed with a four‑week deadline and the latter resulting in the guarantee’s discharge. The judgment emphasizes the strict application of limitation law and the burden on a party to justify any extended delay.
Issues considered
- Whether the delay of 4 years 351 days in filing the appeal can be condoned under the law of limitation.
- Whether the explanation provided for the delay satisfies the requirement of a satisfactory cause.
- Whether the appeal can be entertained on its merits after the rejection of the condonation application.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- Land Acquisition Act
- reference award
- appeal
- COVID-19 pandemic
- bank guarantee
- interim application
Judgment
79-FA(ST)-23444-2023-F.doc
Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 23444 OF 2023
SAYALI
DEEPAK
UPASANI The State of Maharashtra Thr. The
Deputy Collector Raigad & Anr. … Appellants
Digitally signed by
SAYALI DEEPAK V/s.
UPASANI
Date: 2026.09.02
11:29:03 +0530
Shri Kana Chahu Keni And Ors. … Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.12970 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 6615 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.12971 OF 2024
Mr. A. R. Patil, for Appellant.
Ms. Deepa S. Punde with Mr. Sachin S. Punde, for
Claimants.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 1, 2026
P.C.:
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 6615 OF 2026
1. Since the learned Advocate for the respondents, on
instructions to appear on behalf of the legal representatives of
respondent no. 4.
2. The application is allowed in terms of prayer clauses ‘b’
and ‘c’.
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79-FA(ST)-23444-2023-F.doc
3. Necessary amendment is to be carried out within period of
four weeks.
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.12970 OF 2024
4. The applicant has filed the present Interim Application
seeking condonation of delay of 4 years and 351 days in preferring
the present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
5. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial
delay is stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled that
while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an
application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be filed
within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of these
principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.
6. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5
of the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 10 May 2018. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 30
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79-FA(ST)-23444-2023-F.doc
May 2022. This factual position itself shows that for a considerable
period after passing of the award, no steps were taken by the
applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory explanation
for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what prevented the
applicant from approaching the Court or taking necessary steps
immediately after pronouncement of the award. Mere general
statements without particulars cannot be treated as sufficient
cause, particularly when the delay runs into several years.
7. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there is
no explanation for the period commencing from April 2018 till
March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the control
of the applicant.
8. The appeal ultimately came to be filed on 26 June 2023.
Every litigant intending to challenge a judgment is expected to take
necessary steps for engaging an advocate and arranging court fees
within a reasonable period. These are ordinary requirements of
litigation and cannot constitute sufficient cause for condoning a
prolonged delay extending over several years. The application does
not disclose any circumstance showing why these procedural
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requirements could not be completed earlier.
9. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation is
founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of the
Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies upon
such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present matter,
the explanation furnished remains incomplete. Consequently, this
Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has been made out for
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my opinion, therefore, the
application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed.
10. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be
rejected and is rejected.
11. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.12971 OF 2024
12. The condition imposed upon the Claimants requiring
furnishing of a bank guarantee stands modified. Consequently, the
bank guarantee furnished by the Claimants pursuant to the said
condition shall stand discharged and the concerned bank shall
stand released from its obligations under the said bank guarantee.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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