Bombay High Court
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICERversusPARVATI RAMESH MHATRE
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The Court held that the applicant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the prolonged delay, and therefore condonation of delay could not be granted.
Summary
The State of Maharashtra, represented by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, filed an appeal against a Reference Award under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant sought condonation of a delay of five years and 212 days in filing the appeal, citing the Covid‑19 pandemic and procedural hurdles such as engaging counsel and paying court fees. The Court examined the chronology and found that the award was passed on 13 February 2025, yet no substantive steps were taken until a certified copy was sought in August 2024, leaving a large unexplained gap. The Court held that the explanations provided were vague, did not cover the entire period of delay, and were insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a satisfactory cause. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal could not be entertained on its merits. The First Appeal and the related interim applications were therefore disposed of, effectively dismissing the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay of over five years in filing an appeal under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be condoned by the Court.
- Whether the reasons cited, including the Covid‑19 pandemic and ordinary procedural requirements, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
- Whether the appeal can be entertained on its merits after the rejection of the condonation application.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- Land Acquisition Act
- appeal
- interim application
- public policy
Judgment
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Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO.39993 OF 2025
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1440 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1441 OF 2026
The State of Maharashtra Thr. The
Special Land Acquisition Officer … Appellant
V/s.
Krushna Sahdev Mhatre … Respondents
WITH
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 40501 OF 2025
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1436 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1437 OF 2026
Mr. A. R. Patil, for Appellant.
Mr. Kaustubh Patil with Dixit Parmar, for Respondnets
in Parvati Mhatre in Fast-40501/2025.
Ms M. Kakalia, for Respondent in Fast- No.39993/2025.
Ms. Meenaz Kakalia, for Respondent in FA (st)
No.39993/2025.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 1, 2026
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P.C.:
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1436 OF 2026
1. The claimants have already withdrawn the decretal
amount and, therefore, have no objection to condone the delay.
2. Hence, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause
‘b’.
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 40501 OF 2025
3. Admit.
4. Paper book is to be filed within one year.
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1437 OF 2026
5. The State has already withdrawn the decretal amount
along with interest. There shall be interim relief in terms of prayer
clause ‘b’.
6. The application is allowed and disposed of.
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1440 OF 2026
7. The applicant has filed the present Interim Application
No.1440 of 2026, seeking condonation of delay of 5 years and 212
days in preferring the present appeal arising out of the Reference
Award passed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
8. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial
delay is stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
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required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled that
while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an
application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be filed
within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of these
principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.
9. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5
of the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 13 February 2025. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 01
August 2024. This factual position itself shows that for a
considerable period after passing of the award, no steps were taken
by the applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory
explanation for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what
prevented the applicant from approaching the Court or taking
necessary steps immediately after pronouncement of the award.
Mere general statements without particulars cannot be treated as
sufficient cause, particularly when the delay runs into several
years.
10. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
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notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there is
no explanation for the period commencing from April 2018 till
March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the control
of the applicant.
11. Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 11 December 2025. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.
12. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
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provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation is
founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of the
Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies upon
such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present matter,
the explanation furnished remains incomplete. Consequently, this
Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has been made out for
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my opinion, therefore, the
application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed.
13. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be
rejected and is rejected.
14. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal (st) No. 39993 of
2025 cannot be entertained on merits.
15. Accordingly, the present First Appeal as well as Interim
Application No. 1441 of 2026 for stay stand disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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