Bombay High Court
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH DEPUTY COLLECTOR (LAND ACQUISITION)versusSHRI. DATTARAYA HARI THAKUR AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The court held that the delay was not satisfactorily explained and therefore the application for condonation of delay was rejected.
Summary
The State of Maharashtra filed an interim application seeking condonation of a delay of almost five years in filing an appeal against a Section 18 award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The court examined the applicant’s explanation, noting that the award was passed on 27 December 2018 but no steps were taken until a request for a certified copy in February 2023, leaving a large unexplained gap. Although the COVID‑19 pandemic was considered, the period from December 2018 to March 2020 remained unaccounted for, and the later delay was attributed merely to engaging counsel and paying fees, which the court found insufficient. The court held that the applicant failed to provide a satisfactory reason for the prolonged delay, and therefore could not exercise its discretionary power to condone it. Consequently, the interim application was rejected and the appeal could not be heard on its merits.
Issues considered
- Whether the delay of nearly five years in filing the appeal under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can be condoned.
- Whether the explanations provided by the applicant satisfy the requirement for condonation of delay.
- Whether the appeal can be entertained on its merits after the rejection of the condonation application.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- Land Acquisition Act
- Section 18
- COVID-19 pandemic
- appeal
- procedural delay
Judgment
81-fa-st-3917-2024 with connected.doc
Shabnoor
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 3917 OF 2024
State of Maharashtra Through
SHABNOOR Deputy Collector
AYUB
PATHAN (Land Acquisition) … Appellant
Digitally signed by V/s.
SHABNOOR AYUB
PATHAN Dattataya Hari Thakur & Ors. … Respondents
Date: 2026.09.08
18:11:19 +0530
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 25508 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 16149 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 16152 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 25507 OF 2026
Mr. A.R. Patil, Addl. G.P. for the Appellant/ State.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
P.C.:
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 16149 OF 2024
1. The applicant has filed the present Interim Application
seeking condonation of delay of 4 years and 999 days in preferring
the present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
81-fa-st-3917-2024 with connected.doc
2. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial delay is
stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled
that while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an
application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of
these principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.
3. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5 of
the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 27 December 2018. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 20
February 2023. This factual position itself shows that for a
considerable period after passing of the award, no steps were
taken by the applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory
explanation for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what
prevented the applicant from approaching the Court or taking
necessary steps immediately after pronouncement of the award.
Mere general statements without particulars cannot be treated as
sufficient cause, particularly when the delay runs into several
81-fa-st-3917-2024 with connected.doc
years.
4. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there
is no explanation for the period commencing from December 2018
till March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the
control of the applicant.
5. Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 18 January 2024. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.
81-fa-st-3917-2024 with connected.doc
6. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation
is founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of
the Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies
upon such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present
matter, the explanation furnished remains incomplete.
Consequently, this Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has
been made out for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my
opinion, therefore, the application for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed.
7. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be rejected
and is rejected.
8. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.
9. Accordingly, the First Appeal and all pending Interim
Applications stand disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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