VIBHA AMIT GUPTAversusMAHARASHTRA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

             Digitally signed
SANTOSH by  SANTOSH
         SUBHASH                                                   -CRA413-2025.DOC
SUBHASH KULKARNI
KULKARNI Date: 2026.06.17
         19:27:16 +0530

                                                                             Santosh

                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 413 OF 2025

       Maharashtra Industrial Development
       Corporation, Having its Regional Of1ce        ...Applicant
       MIDC Mahape, Behind Lokmat Plot, AM-20,
       B-Wing, 3rd Floor, TTC Industrial Area,
       Post: Koparkhairane, Navi Mumbai
             Versus
       Shivam Govendra Singh,
       Age 27 years, Indian Inhabitant,
       Having its address at S.No.56/16/12, Near
       H. P. Petrol Pump, Vashere Village, Sagar
       Wajan Kata, Bhiwandi, Thane,
       Maharashtra 421302                          …Respondent
                                   WITH
                  INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1631 OF 2026
                                      IN
              CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 413 OF 2025

       Vibha Amit Gupta
       In the matter between                                         ...Applicant
       Maharashtra Industrial Development
       Corporation                                                   ...Applicant
             Versus
       Shivam Govendra Singh                                       …Respondent

       Mr. Surel Shah, Senior Advocate, a/w Kinjal Jain and Meet
            Vora, i/b Navdeep Vora & Associates, for the Applicant
            in CRA.
       Ms. Vidya Kamble, through VC, a/w Balasaheb Deshmukh,
            for Respondent No.1.
       Mr. Kunal Chheda, for the Applicant in IA/1631/2026.

                                                     CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                              RESERVED ON: 26th MARCH, 2026
                                           PRONOUNCED ON: 17th JUNE, 2026



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JUDGMENT:


1.    This Revision Application is directed against an order

dated 29th July, 2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge,

Belapur, whereby an application (Exhibit-17) preferred by the

Applicant–Defendant   for   the    rejection   of   the    plaint   in

RCS/180/2025 under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(a) and

(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”) came to be

rejected.


2.    Shorn of superHuities, the background facts can be stated

as under:


2.1   The   Applicant–Defendant     is   a   statutory    corporation

incorporated under the Maharashtra Industrial Development

Act, 1961 (“the Act, 1961”).      The Defendant has established

industrial areas and industrial estate for the growth and

development of the industries in the State of Maharashtra. The

Defendant allots plots/units in the industrial areas/parks

established by it to entrepreneurs for various purposes to

achieve the statutory objectives of planned and industrial

development in the State of Maharashtra. The Defendant is

designated as a Special Planning Authority under Section 40(1A)




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of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“the

MRTP Act, 1966”).


2.2   A plot of land bearing No. PAP-R-497, admeasuring 300 sq.

mtrs. situated at TTC Industrial Area, Mahape, Navi Mumbai

(“the suit premises”) was purportedly allotted to M/s. Reyansh

Hotel and Lodging Boarding. The Respondent-Plaintiff claims,

Nikhil Keshav Patil, one of the partners of the lessee M/s.

Reyansh, gave the suit premises on a leave and licence basis to

the Plaintiff and Mr. Adarsh Kumar Sanjay Kumar Mishra by

executing a registered Leave and Licence Agreement dated 2 nd

May, 2025, for a term of 60 months. The Plaintiff has obtained

the requisite permissions to operate the weighbridge on the suit

premises from the Competent Authorities.


2.3   The Plaintiff asserts, on 16th June, 2025, the Defendant’s

Executive Engineer issued a notice purportedly under Sections

52 and 53(1) of the MRTP Act alleging that the Plaintiff has

illegally constructed weighbridge on the suit premises and

directed the Plaintiff to remove the alleged unauthorized

construction within a period of 32 days from the date of the

receipt of the said notice. On the very day, the Plaintiff avers,

the Deputy Engineer, Sub-Division-II, Mahape MIDC, issued

another notice to the Plaintiff to the effect that Vibha Amit
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                                                             -CRA413-2025.DOC

Gupta      has   made      a        complaint    alleging     unauthorized

construction by the lessee without the permission of MIDC, and

called upon the lessee to stop the construction activity. By the

said notice dated 16th June, 2025, the lessee was called upon to

remove the alleged unauthorized construction within 15 days

thereof.


2.4   The Plaintiff, thus, approached the Civil Court seeking a

declaration that the notices issued by the of1cers of the

Defendant were bad in law, illegal, null and void, and the

consequential    reliefs       to    restrain   the     Defendants        from

demolishing or pulling down or removing any structure which

stood over the suit premises in pursuance of the impugned

notices. The Plaintiff alleged that the impugned notices betray a

complete non-application of mind. The notices were issued

without carrying out any prior inspection. There was no

unauthorized construction over the suit premises.                    At the

behest of Vibha Amit Gupta, the applicant in IA/1631/2026, the

Defendant had resorted to arbitrary and illegal action.                   The

notices were thus a nullity.


2.5   The   Defendant      resisted      the    suit.   In    addition,    the

Defendant took out the application seeking rejection of the

plaint contending, inter alia, that the plaint did not disclose any
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cause of action and that the suit was barred by the provisions of

Section 149 of the MRTP Act.


2.6   The Plaintiff contested the application for rejection of the

plaint.


2.7   By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge rejected

the application for rejection of the plaint observing that in view

of the averments in the plaint, it cannot be said that the plaint

did not disclose a cause of action. The learned Civil Judge was

of the view that, in the facts of the case, the bar to the

institution of the suit under Section 149 of the MRTP Act was

not clearly attracted. The issues agitated in the suit warranted

adjudication at the trial.


3.    Being aggrieved, the Defendant has invoked the revisional

jurisdiction.


4.    It would be relevant to note that, Vibha Gupta, at whose

instance, the Deputy Engineer, MIDC, had issued the second

notice dated 16th June, 2025 has 1led IA/1631/2026 seeking

setting   aside   of   the   impugned    order.   The    applicant   in

IA/1631/2026 claims to be carrying on her business of

weighbridge at Plot No. WB/R-4, TTC, MIDC, and in the wake of

unauthorized construction and operation of weighbridge by the

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Plaintiff, she claimed to have lodged the complaint with the

of1cers of MIDC.


5.   I have heard Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate

for the applicant in CRA, Ms. Kamble, the leraned Counsel for

the respondent – Plaintiff and Mr. Chheda, the learned Counsel

for the applicant in IA/1631/2026. The learned Counsel for the

parties took the Court through the pleadings, documents and

material on record.


6.   Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for the

applicant in CRA, submitted that the learned Civil Judge

committed a manifest error in law in rejecting the application for

rejection of the plaint though the interdict contained Section

149 of the MRTP Act was clearly attracted.      It was submitted

that the civil Court’s jurisdiction was completely excluded in

respect of any notice issued by the planning authority under

Section 149 of the Act, 1966.       The Plaintiff has used the

expression that the notices are illegal, bad in law and amount to

nullity as a mantra. No effort has been made to demonstrate as

to how the notices issued by the Defendant are nullity.       The

mere iteration of the expression that the notices are illegal, bad

in law or nullity is not suf1cient to clothe jurisdiction on the

civil Court when the same stands completely excluded by the
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1nality accorded to the orders and the notices by Section 149 of

the MRTP Act, 1966.


7.   Mr. Shah further submitted that, despite the well-settled

position in law having been brought to the notice of the Court,

the learned Judge mechanically rejected the application for

rejection of the plaint. In the process, the learned Judge lost

sight of the fundamental principle that a plaint is required to be

read in a meaningful manner and if, by clever drafting, an

illusion of a cause of action was created, such endeavour must

be nipped in the bud.


8.   To   buttress    the    aforesaid    submission      that   it   was

incumbent upon the Plaintiff to prima facie demonstrate as to

how the notice is bad and illegal and the mere use of the

expression that the notices are bad, illegal and nullity is of no

avail. Mr. Shah placed reliance on the judgments of this Court

in the cases of Sarina Esmeralda Lopez vs. VLay Goverdhandas

Kalantri1, Laxman Barkya Wadkar vs. Mumbai Municipal

Corporation2,   Vandana      Creations     Pvt.   Ltd.    v.   Municipal




1    (2015) 2 Mh.L.J. 603.
2    2011 SCC OnLine Bom 2162.
                                   7/20
                                                   -CRA413-2025.DOC

Corporation    of   Greater   Mumbai3, and     Satish   vs.    Gopal

Ramnarayan Mundhada and ors.4.

9.    Mr. Chheda, the learned Counsel for the intervenor,

supplemented the submissions of Mr. Shah.


10.   Per contra, Ms. Vidya Kamble, the learned Counsel for the

Respondent – Defendant, supported the impugned order. Ms.

Kamble would urge that at the stage of consideration of the

prayer for rejection of the plaint only the averments in the plaint

and the documents annexed thereto are required to be

considered. The defence of the Defendant is not at all germane.

Taking the Court through the averments in the plaint, Ms.

Kamble submitted that the plaint contains adequate assertions

to demonstrate as to how the impugned notices are illegal and

amount to nullity. Banking upon the averments in the plaint,

Ms. Kamble would urge that by no stretch of imagination it can

be said that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.


11.   On the aspect of the bar to the suit under Section 149 of

the Act, 1966, Ms. Kamble strenuously submitted that a bare

perusal of the notices make it ex facie clear that the notices

have been issued in a highhanded and arbitrary manner.


3     2016 SCC OnLine Bom 10708.
4     (2015) 5 Mh.L.J. 463.
                                   8/20
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Ms. Kamble advanced severe criticism in regard to the issue of

two notices on the very day with materially distinct allegations.

The second notice addressed by the Deputy Engineer, MIDC, at

the instance of the intervenor, clearly reveals that the intervenor

was the driving force behind the issue of the peremptory notice.

In these circumstances, the Plaintiff had no other go but to

approach the civil Court.


12.   In view of the provisions contained in Section 40(1A), any

area where Chapter-VI of MIDC Act, 1961 applies or any other

area comprising the Government land is handed over to the

MIDC, established under Section 3 of the MIDC Act, shall be

deemed to be “the noti1ed area” and the MIDC shall be the

Special Planning Authority in respect of such noti1ed area, and

shall be deemed to have been appointed as such under the said

section, for the purposes of the MRTP Act. The impugned 1rst

notice dated 16th June, 2025 was purportedly issued by the

Executive Engineer and Special Planning Authority under

Sections 52 and 53(1) of the MRTP Act, 1966. It was, inter alia,

alleged that it was reported that M/s. Reyansh Hotel and

Lodging Boarding, the addressee, had carried out development

on the MIDC land described in the schedule without requisite

permission under the MRTP Act. The lessee had allegedly

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                                                          -CRA413-2025.DOC

committed     encroachment       and     carried    out    unauthorized

construction of a weighbridge on the suit premises.


13.   Prima facie, the impugned 1rst notice dated 16th June,

2025 appears to have been issued in exercise of the powers

conferred on the Planning Authority under Sections 52 and

53(1) of the MRTP Act, 1966. Thus, the applicability of the

provisions contained in Section 149 of the MRTP Act, 1966,

which excludes the jurisdiction of civil Court by insulating the

orders passed and notices issued by the State Government,

Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development Authority

from any challenge in any suit or legal proceedings, wrenches to

the fore.


14.   Section 149 of the MRTP Act reads as under:

       “149. Finality of orders.— Save as otherwise expressly
       provided in this Act, every order passed or direction issued
       by the State Government or order passed or notice issued by
       any Regional Board, Planning Authority or Development
       Authority under this Act shall be 1nal and shall not be
       questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings.”



15.   A plain reading of Section 149, indicates that the edict of

the legislature is in two parts. By the 1rst part the 1nality is

sought to be clothed to the orders passed or notices issued by

the authorities under the Act, 1966. The second part expressly

excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Court by providing that

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such orders and notices shall not be questioned in any suit or

other legal proceedings.


16.   However, the bar is not absolute, in the sense that,

whatever be the nature of the order or notices, the Civil Court is

precluded from examining the legality and validity of such

orders and notices. It is well recognized that the jurisdiction of

the Civil Courts is construed to be plenary in nature. The

exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be

readily inferred. Even where 1nality is attached to the orders

passed   by    statutory   Tribunals/Authorities,       if    it   can    be

demonstrated that the impugned action/order is in teeth of the

provisions of the enactment under which the action is taken or

order is passed in disregard to the statutory prescription, there

is Hagrant violation of the fundamental principles of judicial

process and principles of natural justice, (wheresoever attracted)

or the action/order is a nullity, the aggrieved party cannot be

precluded     from   invoking   the   civil   Court’s        plenary     and

omnipresent jurisdiction.


17.   In the case of Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 5, the

Supreme Court enunciated that where the statue gives a finality

to the orders of Special Tribunals, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction

5     AIR 1969 SC 78.
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must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do

what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such

provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the

provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or

the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the

fundamental principles of judicial procedure.”


18.   In the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. vs. Hukam Singh6,

after adverting to the previous pronouncements, the Supreme

Court exposited the cases in which, notwithstanding the 1nality

to the orders given by the particular statute, the Civil Court

would retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit

provided the order complained of is a nullity. The observations

in paragraph 10 are instructive and hence extracted below: -

      “10. In the light of the above discussion, the following
      principles may be re- stated:
      (1) If there is express provision in any Special Act
      barring the jurisdiction of a civil court to deal with
      matters speci1ed thereunder the jurisdiction of an
      ordinary civil court shall stand excluded.
      (2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an
      examination of the provisions contained therein lead to
      a conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a
      civil court, the Court would then inquire whether any
      adequate and ef1cacious alternative remedy is provided
      under the Act; if the answer is in the af1rmative, it can
      safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the civil
      court is barred, If however, no such adequate and
      effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion
      of the jurisdiction of civil court cannot be inferred.


6     (2002) 6 SCC 416.
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      (3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil court
      is barred expressly or impliedly the court would
      nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and
      adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is
      a nullity.”
                                      (emphasis supplied)



19.   A reference to two more judgments of the Supreme Court

would be apposite.        In the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha v.

Municipal Corporation of Delhi7, the Supreme Court was

dealing with the tenability of the suit in the light of the bar to

the Civil Court’s jurisdiction enshrined under Section 347-E of

the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, which provided that no

Court shall entertain any suit in respect of an order or notice

appealable under Sections 343 or 347-B and that no such order

or notice shall be questioned otherwise than by preferring an

appeal under the said sections. The Supreme Court enunciated

the legal position in the following words:

      “29. It is well known that in most of the cities building regulations
      and bye-laws have been framed, still it has been discovered that
      constructions have been made without any sanction or in
      contravention of the sanctioned plan, and such constructions have
      continued without any intervention. There cannot be two opinions
      that the regulations and bye- laws in respect of buildings, are meant
      to serve the public interest. But at the same time it cannot be held
      that in all circumstances, the authorities entrusted with the
      demolition of unauthorised constructions, have exclusive power, to
      the absolute exclusion of the power of the Court. In some special
      cases where "jurisdictional error" on the part of the Corporation is
      established, a suit shall be maintainable.
      According to us,


7     (1993) 3 SCC 161.
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      (1)    The Court should not ordinarily entertain a suit in connection
      with the proceedings initiated for demolition, by the Commissioner,
      in terms of section 343 (1) of the Corporation Act. The Court should
      direct the persons aggrieved to pursue the remedy before the
      Appellate Tribunal and then before the Administrator in accordance
      with the provisions of the said Act.
      (2)   The Court should entertain a suit questioning the validity of
      an order passed under Section 343 of the Act. only if the Court is of
      Prima facie opinion that the order is nullity in the eyes of law
      because of any "jurisdictional error" in exercise of the power by the
      commissioner or that the order is outside the Act.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)



20.   In the case of Dolhin Padharo Devi vs. Indrajeet Tiwary8,

the Supreme Court, in the context of the bar to the jurisdiction

of the Civil Court incorporated under Section 43 of the Bihar

Land Reforms Act, 1961, postulated that it is 1rmly established

that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with civil right

can be excluded by the legislature, but the statutory provision

in this regard must be express and clear. The bar created under

the relevant provisions of a statute excluding the jurisdiction of

the civil Court cannot however operate in cases where the plea

raised before the civil Court goes to the root of the matter and

could, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order

is a nullity.


21.   In the case of Laxman Barkya Wadkar (supra), on which

reliance was placed by Mr. Shah, a learned Single Judge of this

Court, after adverting to the judicial precedents enunciated that

8     (2008) 14 SCC 508
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notwithstanding the 1nality clause and the clause expressly

ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 149 of

the MRTP Act, 1966, if there is an allegation made in the plaint

that action for issuing notice under Sections 53(1) and 55 of the

Act is a nullity or without jurisdiction, express exclusion of the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court, will not come in the way of the

Civil Court entertaining the civil suit. However, as held by the

Apex Court in the case of Shivkumar Chadha (supra) the Court

will have to be prima facie satis1ed that the action appears to be

a nullity or without jurisdiction. Thus, the bar created by

Section 149 will not apply in a case where the action of issuing

notice under Section 53(1) or Section 55(1) is allegedly to be a

nullity. The suit cannot be dismissed at the threshold on the

ground of bar of Section 149, if there is a case made out in the

plaint that the action of issuing notice under Section 53(1) or

55(1) is a nullity. If the Plaintiff ultimately fails to establish the

plea of nullity on evidence, the suit will be naturally thrown out.


22.   In the case of Vandana Creations (supra), following the

aforesaid judgment in Laxman Barkya Wadkar (supra), it was

reiterated that the only eventuality in which a notice issued

under the MRTP Act can be challenged in the civil Court is by



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prima facie showing that the said notice is a nullity or issued

without jurisdiction.


23.   Undoubtedly, the mere use of the expression that the

impugned order/notice is bad in law, illegal, void or nullity by

itself is of no consequence. Bald and unsubstantiated pleadings

to the effect that the notice is nullity, without anything more,

would not be suf1cient to entertain the suit. The Plaintiff has to

demonstrate prima facie with reference to the material on

record, from either the intrinsic evidence or the attendant

circumstances    that   the   notice   is   a   nullity   or   without

jurisdiction. Lest the object of providing exclusion of the

jurisdiction of the civil Court would be completely defeated and

the Planning Authority, to the notices or orders of which 1nality

is designedly conferred, would be handicapped and restrained in

the discharge of its statutory functions as a Planning Authority.


24.   Mr. Shah is thus justi1ed in canvassing the submission

that the mere use of expressions like “illegal, bad in law, void or

nullity” in the plaint is of no assistance to the plaintiff, who

seeks to assail the order passed or notice issued by the Planning

Authority.   In the case of Sarina Esmeralda Lopez (supra) on

which reliance was placed by Mr. Shah, a learned Single Judge

of this Court enunciated that mere use of the words illegal or
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bad in law without any substantiation would not aid the Plaintiff

to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil Court as the jurisdiction of

the civil Court can now be invoked only if the action is nullity,

on account of their being an error of jurisdiction.


25.   On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the

case, 1rst and foremost, it is necessary to note that the

contention on behalf of the Defendant that the plaint does not

disclose a cause of action is required to be stated to be repelled.

The averments in the plaint if read in juxtaposition with the

documents annexed to the plaint, clearly make out a cause of

action.


26.   On the aspect of the bar of jurisdiction which was pressed

into service with tenacity by Mr. Shah, suf1ce to note that the

two impugned notices work out the retribution of each other.

The   1rst   notice   dated   16th   June,   2025     indicates   that

unauthorized development was in the nature of unauthorized

construction of weighbridge on the suit premises. The lessee

was called upon to demolish the unauthorized structure within

32 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. The second

notice of even date addressed by the Deputy Engineer, tells a

different story. It refers to the fact that a complaint was received

from the intervener, who appears to be a rival weighbridge
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operator. The second notice alleges that the Plaintiff had carried

out unauthorized construction on the suit premises. The

Plaintiff was called upon to stop the construction activity. By the

said   notice,   the   Plaintiff   was   directed   to   remove   the

unauthorized construction within 15 days, failing which action

would be initiated by the Defendant.


27.    The second notice does not disclose, even remotely, the

nature of the unauthorized construction. The second notice also

indicates that the Plaintiff was directed to stop the construction

activity. It implies that the alleged unauthorized construction

was underway when the second notice was issued.


28.    Prima faice, I 1nd substance in the submission of Ms.

Kamble that the two notices of even date are incongruous, to

say the least.   Not only the authorities who issued those two

notices on the same day were different (and thereby bringing to

the fore the issue of jurisdictional competence, especially that of

Deputy Engineer, who issued the second notice) but also the

nature of the alleged unauthorized construction appeared to be

different. The 1rst notice referred to unauthorized construction

of weighbridge. The second notice did not disclose the nature of

the unauthorized construction. In the 1rst notice, the Executive

Engineer merely stated that it was reported to him that the
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lessee had carried out development without permission, without

disclosing the manner in which said unauthorized development

was detected. The second notice, on the contrary, refers to the

complaint lodged by the intervenor. It is interesting to note the

1rst notice gave 32 days to the noticee to remove the

unauthorized development. The second notice gave 15 days.


29.   If the aforesaid discrepancies in the 1rst and second

notices of even date are considered, the submission on behalf of

the Plaintiff that the notices betray non-application of mind and

arbitrary exercise of power appears to be such as to warrant

determination   at   trial.   The   Plaintiff   has   made   adequate

averments in the plaint to assail the legality and validity of the

impugned notices with reference to the apparent discrepancies

therein.


30.   In the aforesaid view of the matter, the learned Civil Judge

has justi1ably returned a 1nding that the bar under Section 149

of the MRTP Act, 1966 may not preclude the Civil Court from

examining the legality and validity of the impugned notices.

Resultanly, this Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, does

not 1nd any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in the

exercise of the jurisdiction by the trial Court. The application,

thus, deserves to be dismissed.
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31.    Hence, the following order:


                            :ORDER:


(i)    The Civil Revision Application stands dismissed.


(ii)   In   view   of   disposal   of   Civil   Revision   Application,

       IA/1631/2026, also stands disposed.




                                            [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

       At this stage, the learned Counsel for the applicant seeks

a direction for expeditious hearing of RCS/180/2025.

       The learned Civil Judge is requested to give due priority to

the hearing of the suit.


                                            [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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