Bombay High Court
SHRI SAI VISHRAM CO OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LTD AND ORSversusBEENA HITESH TRIVEDI
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
- Bench
- N JAMADAR
Holding
The Court held that the appellant society satisfies the definition of "promoter" under Section 2(zk) of RERA 2016 and that no substantial question of law arises, leading to dismissal of the appeals.
Summary
The Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority directed Shri Sai Vishram Co‑operative Housing Society and its promoters to pay interest under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) and to make a pre‑deposit under the proviso to Section 43(5). The Society appealed to the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, which held the Society to be a "promoter" within the meaning of Section 2(zk) of RERA, relying on a 2017 MahaRERA circular. The Society challenged this finding, arguing that Supreme Court precedents (Vaidehi Akash Housing, Goregaon Pearl CHSL, Deepak Prabhakar Thakoor) preclude a cooperative society from being deemed a promoter when the original developer’s agreement is terminated. The High Court examined the definition of promoter, the cumulative effect of the development agreements, and the substantial monetary consideration received by the Society, concluding that the Society does satisfy the statutory definition. Finding no substantial question of law, the Court dismissed the appeals and disposed of the interim applications.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant society qualifies as a "promoter" under Section 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.
- Whether the Appellate Tribunal erred in relying on the 2017 MahaRERA circular contrary to binding Supreme Court judgments.
- Whether the appeals raise a substantial question of law warranting judicial review.
- Whether the society is liable to make the pre‑deposit under the proviso to Section 43(5) of RERA 2016.
Legislation cited
- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 — s. 18, 2(zk), 43(5)
Subjects
- RERA
- promoter definition
- Section 18 interest
- pre‑deposit
- real estate appellate tribunal
- cooperative housing society
- civil appellate jurisdiction
Judgment
909 12 13 15-SA148-2026+.DOC
Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 148 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2307 OF 2026
Shri Sai Vishram Co-operative Housing Society
Ltd. and ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Ninad Padmakar Paralkar and ors. …Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 161 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2495 OF 2026
Shri Sai Vishram Co-operative Housing Society
Ltd. and ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Shreya Hitesh Trivedi And Ors …Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 162 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2496 OF 2026
ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
Shri Sai Vishram Co-operative Housing Society
Digitally signed by
Ltd. and ors. ...Applicants
ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
Date: 2026.04.11
18:34:08 +0530
Versus
Beena Hitesh Trivedi And Ors. …Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 164 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2512 OF 2026
Shri Sai Vishram Co-operative Housing Society
Ltd. and ors. ...Applicants
Versus
Meera Padmakar Paralkar Since Deceased
Through LRs. …Respondents
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909 12 13 15-SA148-2026+.DOC
Ms. Kashmira Bharucha, i/b Akshay Pawar, for the Applicants –
Appellants in all IA and SA.
Mr. Mohit Khanna, a/w Harsh B. and Saloni Manjrekar and Gaurav
Gawali, i/b HN Legal, for the Respondents.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
DATED: 8th APRIL, 2026
ORDER:-
1. The learned Counsel for the respondents seeks leave to tender
affidavit-in-reply in SA/148/2026.
2. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the said
affidavit-in-reply be treated as an affidavit-in-reply in the interim
applications for stay in the rest of the appeals.
3. Heard Ms. Kashmira Bharucha, the learned Counsel for the
Appellants, and Mr. Mohit Khanna, the learned Counsel for the
Respondents.
4. These appeals are directed against a common order dated 18 th
December, 2024 passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate
Tribunal in the miscellaneous applications preferred by the appellants in
the appeals assailing the common order dated 20th March, 2025 passed
by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (“the Authority”),
in the complaints filed by the respondents allottees.
5. By a common order dated 20th March, 2025, the Authority
directed the appellant-society (Respondent No.3 therein) and the
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promoters (Respondent Nos.1 and 2 therein) to pay interest under the
provisions of Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016 (“RERA 2016”), construing the appellant also
as a promoter.
6. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal. By the impugned order, the Appellate Tribunal
directed the appellant to deposit the amount in terms of the proviso to
Sub-section (5) of Section 43 of the RERA 2016. The Appellate Tribunal
repelled the contention of the appellant-society that it was not a
promoter within the meaning of Section 2(zk) of the RERA 2016 and,
thus, could not have been saddled with the liability to pay interest
under Section 18 of the RERA 2016.
7. Ms. Kashmira Bharucha, the learned Counsel for the appellant,
would urge that the Appellate Tribunal has committed a manifest error
in law in holding that the appellant is a promoter within the meaning of
Section 2(zk) of the RERA 2016. The Appellate Tribunal, according to
Ms. Bharucha, has completely misconstrued the ratio of the binding
decisions of this Court in the cases of Vaidehi Akash Housing Pvt. Ltd.
vs. New D.N. Nagar Co-op. Housing Society Union Ltd. and Others 1,
Goregaon Pearl CHSL vs. Dr. Seem Mahadev Paryekar & Ors. 2 and
1 2014 SCC Online Bom.5068.
2 2019 SCC Online Bam 3274.
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Deepak Prabhakar Thakoor & Ors Vis. MHADA & Ors. 3, that the
allottees of the erstwhile developer, the development agreement with
whom stands terminated, have no right against the Society and their
remedy is against the erstwhile developer with whom they had privity
of contract. Ms. Bharucha would urge, despite noticing the ratio in the
aforesaid judgments, the Appellate Tribunal committed a grave error in
law in basing its finding on the Circular issued by the MahaRERA dated
4th December 2017. Thus, a substantial question of law as to whether
the Appellate Tribunal could have returned the finding that the
appellant-society is a promoter on the basis of the said Circular in the
face of binding decisions of this Court, arises for consideration.
8. Mr. Mohit Khanna, the learned Counsel for the respondents,
submitted that the appeals do not deserve to be entertained for the
reason that the appellants have already complied with the impugned
order, in part, and had sought time to deposit the balance amount. Even
otherwise, the facts of the case at hand indicate that the appellant
Society has not only ratified the agreement between the erstwhile
developer and new developer but even obtained consideration in the
form of enhanced constructed portion in the project and a substantial
monetary consideration of Rs.3 Crore, in addition thereto. If the recitals
in all the agreements are read in the correct perspective, Mr. Khanna
would urge, it cannot be said that the appellant is not a promoter.
3 2023 SCC Online Bom. 2234.
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9. Mr Khanna invited attention of the Court to the Development
Agreement between the appellant-society and M/s SAAGA Infraprojects
Ltd, the erstwhile developer; Memorandum of Understanding between
M/s SAAGA Infraprojects and M/s AARYADEEP Builders and
Developers, the new developer; the Development Agreement between
the appellant-society and new developers, dated 26 th September 2016;
Supplementary Agreement dated 27th July 2019 executed by and
between the appellant-society and the new developer, and the consent
terms executed between the Plaintiff-society and new developer in
Commercial Suit(L) No. 24609 of 2023, to buttress the submission that
the appellant-society has received a share in the constructed area and a
sum of Rs. 3 Crores by way of corpus funds for the additional area.
10. Taking the Court through the aforesaid ageements, Mr. Khanna
submitted that the appellant-society clearly falls within the definition of
“Promoter” under Section 2(zk) of the RERA 2016.
11. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the persons
who had entered into Agreement with the erstwhile developer, the
development agreement with whom stands terminated, do not have
privity of contract with the society. The agreements executed by the
terminated developer during the subsisting Development Agreement do
not bind the society. Such persons would be required to enforce their
rights and, workout their remedies, qua the erstwhile developer.
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However, where it is demonstrated that under the Development
Agreement, the society has a share in the constructed area or revenue to
be generated out of the sale of the Units in the project, slightly different
considerations come into play. In that case, an investigation into the
nature of the development agreement and the recitals therein to
appreciate the true character of the benefit derived by the society
becomes necessary.
12. In the instant case, the Appellate Tribunal after considering the
terms of the Development Agreement with the erstwhile developer,
especially Clause 12(p) has drawn an inference that since the additional
constructed area has been agreed to be distributed between the
appellant-society and the developer in the ratio of 50% : 50% there was
an area sharing agreement between the appellant and the erstwhile
developer. Co-relating the said stipulations with the Circular No. 12 of
2017, the Appellate Tribunal has declared that the appellant-society was
a Promoter within the meaning of Section 2(zk) of the RERA 2016.
13. The aforesaid finding is, in a sense, tentative in nature and made
for the purpose of determination of the question as to whether the
appellant-society was also required to make the pre-deposit under
Section 43(5) of the RERA 2016, in its capacity as a promoter. At the
stage of final decision of the Appeals, the said question may be
examined in the fullness it deserves. Thus, at this stage, this Court need
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not elaborately delve into the said question lest it would amount to pre-
judging the Appeals sub-judice before the Appellate Tribunal.
14. Suffice to note that, the definition of “Promoter” under Section
2(zk) is of widest amplitude. Under Clauses (i) to (iv), specified
categories of persons are designated as Promoter. Under Clause (v) any
other person who acts himself as a builder, coloniser, contractor,
developer, estate developer or by any other name or claims to be acting
as the holder of a power of attorney from the owner of the land on
which the building or apartment is constructed or plot is developed for
sale, is also a Promoter. Under Clause (vi) of Section 2(zk), Promoter is
such other person who constructs any building or apartment for sale to
the general public. The Explanation to Clause (vi) further expands the
scope of the definition of Promoter. It provides that, where the person
who constructs or converts a building into apartments or develops a
plot for sale and the person who sells apartments or plots are different
persons, both of them shall be deemed to be the promoters and shall be
jointly libale as such for the discharge of the functions and
responsibilities specified under the Act 2016 and the rule thereunder.
15. In the instant case, the documents executed by and between the
appellant-society and erstwhile developer, between the appellant and
new developer and between the erstwhile developer and new new
deveoper, cannot be read in isolation. There is an element of continuity
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and nexus in these documents. Thus, all these documents may be
required to be read in conjuction with each other to appreciate the real
nature of the bargain among the three alleged promoters.
16. If the recitals in the Develop Agreement between the appellant-
society and the erstwhile developer and between the appellant-society
and the new Developer are construed as a whole it can hardly be
disputed that the appellant-society is entitled to a share in the
additional construction. Under the Supplementary MoU executed
between the appellant-society and the new developer, in consideration
for allowing the developers to utilize the society’s 25% share of the
additional carpet area of constructed flats beyond sancitoned 16 floors,
the society is entitled to corpus amount to be computed as per formula
prescribed therein. It further appears that in the wake of the dispute
between the appellant-society and the new develper, the appellant-
society has agreed to accept a corpus fund of Rs. 3 Crores for the
additonal area as allowed under the Supplementary Agreement dated
27th July 2019.
17. If all these documents are read cumulatively, the view of the
Appellate Tribunal that, in the peculiar facts of the case, the appellant-
society satisfies the definition of the Promoter, albeit for the purpose of
the compliance of the proviso to Section 43(5) of the RERA 2016,
cannot be said to be legally infirm.
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18. Thus, no substantial question of law arises for consideration.
19. I also find substance in the submission of Mr. Khanna that the
appellant-soceity has deposited part of the amount, directed to be
deposited by the Appellate Tribunal, wihtout any demur. A Compliance
Affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant -society affirming that
since it was directed to make the pre-deposit along with the erstwhile
developer and new developer, its liability was only to the extent of 1/3
of the amount of pre-deposit. By an order dated 26 th March 2026, the
Appellate Tribunal repelled the aforesaid contention and directed
appellant-society to deposit the balance amount holding that, the
appeellant-society was also severally liable to make the pre-deposit
along with the erstwhile and new developer. For this reason also, the
Appeals do not deserve to be entertained.
20. The Appeals thus stand dismissed.
21. In view of the dismissal of the Appeals, all Interim Applications
also stand disposed.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
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