Bombay High Court
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, RAIGADversusLAXMIBAI JANARDAN KHATATE AND ORS.
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The Court held that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, and therefore the application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed.
Summary
The Executive Engineer, Hetvane Dam Division filed a first appeal against a Reference Award under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and sought condonation of a four‑year delay in filing the appeal. The appellant submitted Interim Application No. 9011 of 2024, claiming the delay was due to the Covid‑19 pandemic and procedural requirements such as appointing counsel and paying court fees. The Court examined the chronology, noting that no action was taken from the award date (25 January 2019) until August 2020, and that the pandemic only covered a portion of the delay, leaving a substantial unexplained period. The Court held that the explanations provided were vague and insufficient to satisfy the burden of showing cause beyond the appellant’s control. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal could not be entertained on its merits. Both the first appeal and the related interim applications were disposed of.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant’s explanation for a delay of over four years in filing the appeal satisfies the requirement for condonation of delay
- Whether the Covid‑19 pandemic and ordinary procedural steps constitute sufficient cause to extend the limitation period under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- Land Acquisition Act
- appeal
- interim application
- public policy
- Covid-19 pandemic
Judgment
70-fa(st)15161-2023.doc
Sayali
Digitally
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
signed by
SAYALI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SAYALI DEEPAK
DEEPAK UPASANI
UPASANI Date:
2026.09.09
12:19:11
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 15161 OF 2023
+0530 WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9011 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9012 OF 2024
The Executive Engineer
Hetvane Dam Division … Appellant
V/s.
Laxmibai Janardan Khatate, deceased &
Others … Respondents
Ms. Chaitrali Deshmukh for the Appellant/Applicant.
Mr. A.R. Patil, Additional G.P. for the State.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
DATED : SEPTEMBER 08, 2026
P.C.:
1. The applicant has filed Interim Application No. 9011 of 2024
seeking condonation of delay of 4 years and 41 days in preferring
the present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial delay is
stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled
that while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an
1
70-fa(st)15161-2023.doc
application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of
these principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.
3. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5 of
the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 25 January 2019. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 17
August 2020. This factual position itself shows that for a
considerable period after passing of the award, no steps were
taken by the applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory
explanation for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what
prevented the applicant from approaching the Court or taking
necessary steps immediately after pronouncement of the award.
Mere general statements without particulars cannot be treated as
sufficient cause, particularly when the delay runs into several
years.
4. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there
2
70-fa(st)15161-2023.doc
is no explanation for the period commencing from January 2019
till March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the
control of the applicant.
5. Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 5 June 2023. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.
6. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation
is founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of
the Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies
upon such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present
3
70-fa(st)15161-2023.doc
matter, the explanation furnished remains incomplete.
Consequently, this Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has
been made out for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my
opinion, therefore, the application for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed.
7. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be rejected
and is rejected.
8. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.
9. Accordingly, the First Appeal as well as Interim Application
No. 9012 of 2024 for stay stand disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
4
Checking your session…