Bombay High Court

THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, RAIGADversusRAMABAI PANDURANG SUTAR SINCE DECEASED THR. LRS. HARISHCHANDRA PANDURANG SUTAR AND ORS.

Decided: 8 September 2026
Disposal: Rejected

Holding

The Court held that the application for condonation of delay could not be allowed as the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the prolonged delay.

Summary

The Executive Engineer, Hetvane Dam Division filed an appeal against a Reference Award under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but delayed filing the appeal for over six years. An interim application was made seeking condonation of this delay, citing various reasons including the COVID‑19 pandemic and procedural hurdles. The Court examined the chronology and found no satisfactory explanation for the initial three‑year gap (April 2017 to March 2020) and deemed the later explanations inadequate. It emphasized that limitation provisions are a matter of public policy and require a complete justification for any delay. Consequently, the application for condonation was rejected, and the appeal could not be entertained on its merits. The First Appeal and a related stay application were disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of six years and five days in filing an appeal against a Section 18 Land Acquisition Award can be condoned.
Whether the explanations provided by the appellant satisfy the requirement of a satisfactory cause for condonation of delay.
Whether the appeal can be entertained on its merits after the rejection of the condonation application.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 18

Subjects

condonation of delay
limitation period
Land Acquisition Act
Section 18
appeal
COVID-19 pandemic
procedural delay

Judgment

73-fa(st)18957-2023.doc

Sayali

Digitally
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
signed by
SAYALI CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SAYALI DEEPAK
DEEPAK UPASANI
UPASANI Date:
2026.09.09
12:19:09
FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 18957 OF 2023
+0530 WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9201 OF 2024
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 9202 OF 2024

The Executive Engineer
Hetvane Dam Division … Appellant
V/s.
Ramabai Pandurang Sutar, deceased
through Lrs & Others … Respondents

Ms. Chaitrali Deshmukh for the Appellant/Applicant.
Mr. A.R. Patil, Additional G.P. for the State.

CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.

DATED : SEPTEMBER 08, 2026
P.C.:

1. The applicant has filed Interim Application No. 9201 of 2024
seeking condonation of delay of 6 years and 5 days in preferring
the present appeal arising out of the Reference Award passed
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. The cause shown for condonation of such substantial delay is
stated in paragraph No. 5 of the application. The Court has
carefully gone through the said pleadings. Since the delay is of an
extraordinary length, the explanation furnished by the applicant is
required to be examined with greater scrutiny. It is well settled
that while a liberal approach may be adopted in considering an

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73-fa(st)18957-2023.doc

application for condonation of delay, such approach cannot
dispense with the requirement of furnishing a satisfactory
explanation covering the entire period of delay. The applicant is
therefore required to place before the Court material indicating
that despite acting with due diligence, the appeal could not be
filed within the prescribed period of limitation. It is in the light of
these principles that the explanation set out in paragraph No. 5 is
required to be assessed.

3. After considering the recitals contained in paragraph No. 5 of
the application and after examining the chronology of events
placed on record, it becomes evident that the impugned judgment
and award came to be passed on 15 April 2017. However, the
application seeking certified copy of the judgment was filed on 5
May 2017. This factual position itself shows that for a considerable
period after passing of the award, no steps were taken by the
applicant. The Court finds that there is no satisfactory explanation
for this period. The pleadings are silent as to what prevented the
applicant from approaching the Court or taking necessary steps
immediately after pronouncement of the award. Mere general
statements without particulars cannot be treated as sufficient
cause, particularly when the delay runs into several years.

4. It is true that the period affected by the Covid Pandemic
deserves due consideration. The Courts have also taken judicial
notice of the difficulties faced by litigants during that period.
Therefore, even if the period from March 2020 till March 2022 is
excluded from consideration the difficulty still remains that there
is no explanation for the period commencing from April 2017 till

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March 2020. The applicant has not disclosed any circumstances
showing sufficient reason which could justify inaction during this
period. In absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to
conclude that the delay occurred due to reasons beyond the
control of the applicant.

5. Even for the period subsequent to March 2022, the
explanation furnished does not inspire confidence. The appeal
ultimately came to be filed on 20 June 2023. Thus, even after
normal functioning of Courts had resumed, there remained a
further period for which justification was required. The reasons
stated are that an advocate was required to be appointed and that
arrangements had to be made for payment of court fees. Such
explanations are of a general nature. Every litigant intending to
challenge a judgment is expected to take necessary steps for
engaging an advocate and arranging court fees within a reasonable
period. These are ordinary requirements of litigation and cannot
constitute sufficient cause for condoning a prolonged delay
extending over several years. The application does not disclose any
circumstance showing why these procedural requirements could
not be completed earlier.

6. The Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may
result in denial of adjudication on merits. However, limitation
provisions cannot be rendered meaningless. The law of limitation
is founded upon public policy. When a party seeks indulgence of
the Court after expiry of the prescribed period, the burden lies
upon such party to satisfactorily explain the delay. In the present
matter, the explanation furnished remains incomplete.

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Consequently, this Court is unable to hold that sufficient cause has
been made out for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. In my
opinion, therefore, the application for condonation of delay cannot
be allowed.

7. The Interim Application accordingly deserves to be rejected
and is rejected.

8. In view of the dismissal of the Interim Application seeking
condonation of delay, the present First Appeal cannot be
entertained on merits.

9. Accordingly, the First Appeal as well as Interim Application
No. 9202 of 2024 for stay stand disposed of.

(AMIT BORKAR, J.)

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