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Bombay High Court

SHRI. PRAVIN SHANTARAM GHAG AND ORSversusTHE COMMISSIONER, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GR. MUMBAI AND ORS

Decided
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The review petition is dismissed as there is no apparent error; Clause 4 does not confer a surviving right of continuance and cannot be raised afresh in review.

Summary

The petitioners, a group of temporary and casual workers of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, sought review of a judgment that denied them any continuing right of employment under Clause 4 of a 2002 circular. They argued that the clause guaranteed their right to remain in post even if they did not exercise the option for regularisation, and that the court had failed to consider this provision. The respondents contended that the clause was never pleaded as a basis of their claim and that a later 2008 policy decision, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, superseded any such right. The Court held that review jurisdiction is limited to correcting apparent errors and does not permit a fresh re‑argument of issues not raised in the original proceedings. It found that Clause 4 does not create an enduring right of continuance and cannot be read in isolation from subsequent policy decisions. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Does Clause 4 of the 27 November 2002 circular create a continuing right of employment for temporary workers that survives later policy decisions?
  • Can a party raise a new argument based on a provision not pleaded in the original proceedings in a review application?
  • Is there an apparent error on the face of the record warranting the exercise of review jurisdiction?

Subjects

  • review jurisdiction
  • circular clause interpretation
  • temporary workers
  • regularisation
  • municipal corporation employment
  • policy harmonisation
  • Supreme Court precedent

Judgment

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                      Shabnoor

                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                       REVIEW PETITION NO. 76 OF 2026
                                                     IN
                                       WRIT PETITION NO. 8783 OF 2024

SHABNOOR
                         1. Pravin Shantaram Ghag
AYUB
PATHAN                   2. Mahesh Shantaram Ghag
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB            3. Rakesh Vitthal Jadhav
PATHAN
Date: 2026.06.17
11:50:24 +0530           4. Ashok Harishchandra Dabhade
                         5. Nilesh Ramchandra Haryan
                         6. Rajesh Ramchandra Haryan
                         7. Santosh Shriram Shelar
                         8. Haresh Shriram Shelar
                         9. Priyanka Prabhakar Ghag
                        10. Santosh Yashwant Salvi
                        11. Vasant Babu Varose
                        12. Santosh Ramchandra Tambe
                        13. Nilesh Dattaram Patkare
                        14. Sandesh Shantaram Salvi
                        15. Arvind Babu Varose
                        16. Anil Ramnath Gound
                        17. Deepak Shyamu Kharat
                        18. Deepak Ganpat Sawant
                        19. Ajay Janardan Ahire
                        20. Arun Waman Thosar
                        21. Chandanshive Prashant Bhimrao
                        22. Pol Roshidas Keru
                        23. Khan Amjad Mehmood




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 24. Solanki Vijay Chhaganlal
 25. Waman Shivram Pawar
 26. Santosh Shivram Pawar
 27. Jangale Sanjay Zilu                             … Petitioners

                          Vs.

     1. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation
        of Greater Mumbai, CST Station, Fort,
        Mumbai 400 001
     2. Ujwala Deshpande, Legal Officer,
        Legal Branch, Municipal Corporation of
        Greater Mumbai, Oppo. CST Station,
        Mumbai 400 001
     3. Smt. Jogi, Education Officer, Education
        Department, Municipal Corporation of
        Greater Mumbai, Dadar Hindu Colony,
        Lakhamshi Nappu Marg, Dadar (East),
        Mumbai 400 014                               … Respondents

Mr. S. C. Naidu a/w Manoj Gujar, Divya Yajurvedi, Pradeep
Kumar i/b C. R. Naidu & Co., for the Petitioners.
Mr. Santosh Parad, for Respondent – BMC.


                 CORAM                 : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                 RESERVED ON           : JUNE 16, 2026

                 PRONOUNCED ON         : JUNE 17, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.      I have gone through the review application filed by the
respondent workers, reasons, and conclusions already recorded in
the main judgment.



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2.    Before looking to the argument based on Clause 4 of Circular
dated 27 November 2002, one thing is required to be kept in mind.
Review jurisdiction is limited in nature. Review is not same as
appeal. In review, Court does not again sit and hear whole dispute
from start as if earlier judgment was never passed. Purpose of
review is confined. Interference can be made only when some
mistake is seen from record, or when some important material
already on record and having bearing on outcome remained not
considered. Merely because another interpretation may be
possible, or another view may be taken, that’s not sufficient
ground for review.

3.    Law regarding review proceeds on basis that litigation must
stop at some point of time. If every unsuccessful party is allowed to
reopen dispute by bringing fresh argument or by giving different
reading to same material, then proceedings will never attain
finality. Therefore, while exercising review powers, Court is
concerned with seeing whether there exists some apparent error
apparent on the face of record in judgment. Court is not expected
to again appreciate evidence from beginning or revisit findings
merely because one party feels another conclusion was also
possible. Keeping this position in mind, contention raised by
review applicants based upon Clause 4 of Circular dated 27
November 2002 is required to be considered.

4.    Main submission of workmen is based upon Clause 4 of
policy decision dated 27 November 2002. According to them, said
clause creates continuing protection in favour of khada badli,
casual and temporary workers. Their case is that clause provides



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that workers who do not exercise option within prescribed time
under scheme would still continue on same post, though they may
not get benefits available under scheme. On strength of this clause,
it is argued that even if respondents are held not entitled for
regularisation or other benefits under scheme, still they possess
right to continue on posts where they were earlier engaged.
Respondents have argued that policy decision taken in October
2008 nowhere removed Clause 4. According to them, since there is
no provision taking away Clause 4, protection under that clause
continues even thereafter. It is therefore contended that this aspect
was not noticed while deciding main matter and such non
consideration itself gives rise to ground for review.

5.    At first look, submission may appear to carry some force
because Clause 4 does contain words relating to continuation of
certain workers. However, after examining record, I am unable to
accept said contention. First difficulty faced by respondents is that
Clause 4 was never projected before Tribunal as foundation of
their claim in manner in which it is now sought to be projected.

6.    Careful reading of statement of claim, additional statement
of claim, evidence before Tribunal and arguments advanced
therein does not show that Clause 4 was pleaded as source of right
for continuance. Throughout, respondents based their case mainly
on regularisation, absorption, implementation of scheme, parity
with other workers and alleged discrimination. Present argument
stands on different footing. Therefore, Corporation is justified in
saying that respondents are now placing reliance on provision
which was not made centre point of original claim.



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7.    This aspect becomes important because Court decides issues
arising from pleadings and evidence. If point is not properly
pleaded, ordinarily no issue is framed on that point. If there is no
issue, parties do not lead evidence specifically directed towards
that controversy. Consequently, no finding comes to be recorded.
In present matter, there is no specific finding by Tribunal regarding
interpretation or effect of Clause 4. This absence is because Clause
4 was never placed before it in manner now sought to be argued.
Therefore, respondents cannot use review proceedings for creating
fresh foundation after original dispute stands decided.

8.    Review jurisdiction cannot be converted into forum for
rebuilding whole case. Party cannot proceed on one line of
argument during original proceedings and, after losing, search for
another provision and seek reopening of matter on that basis. Such
exercise goes beyond limits of review. In substance, respondents
are seeking fresh adjudication based upon contention which was
not basis of their original claim. Such course cannot be permitted.

9.    There is another aspect also which assumes importance.
Clause 4 cannot be read separately by cutting it away from
remaining parts of scheme and from policy developments. Policy
document must be read as whole. One clause cannot be picked up
and interpreted independently without seeing overall scheme in
which it operates. Scheme of 2002 was framed for dealing with
daily rated workers who were then in service and who fulfilled
conditions prescribed under scheme. Different categories of
workers were contemplated and different conditions were laid
down regarding absorption and regularisation.



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10.   Record further shows that thereafter policy decision came to
be taken in October 2008. This decision was taken after
considering law laid down in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1. Object of that decision was to bring Corporation
policy in line with constitutional requirements relating to public
employment. Decision dealt with regularisation and made clear
that workers who had not fulfilled prescribed conditions, including
required service, would not be granted permanency. It is also
significant that respondents never challenged validity of said 2008
decision. Decision remained operative and continued to govern
field. Once such decision has been taken by competent authority
and remains unchallenged, its effect cannot be ignored while
interpreting earlier circular. Respondents seek to read Clause 4 as
if it continues independently and remains untouched by all later
developments. In my view, such reading is not possible.

11.   Argument of respondents is that Clause 4 was not expressly
deleted. However, issue is not merely whether there was express
deletion. Real question is whether any enforceable right survives
after later policy came into existence. Merely because a clause
continues to remain in earlier document does not mean that it
creates surviving legal right in all situations irrespective of later
policy decisions. Policies are required to be read harmoniously.
Later decision taken by competent authority, particularly one based
upon binding law declared by Supreme Court, cannot be rendered
ineffective by isolating one clause from earlier circular.

12.   In my opinion, respondents are trying to derive from Clause
4 a much wider right than what clause itself appears to provide.



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Clause may indicate continuation of certain arrangement in some
circumstances. But it does not create everlasting right of
employment. It does not grant permanency. It does not guarantee
indefinite continuation. It nowhere says that future policy
decisions shall not apply. Therefore, even on its own language,
clause does not support interpretation now sought to be placed
upon it.

13.   If interpretation suggested by respondents is accepted, every
temporary arrangement under earlier circular would become
source of permanent rights. Such consequence would not be
consistent with nature of temporary engagement. Respondents
were casual, temporary or khada badli workers. Their engagement
was not against regular appointments made through regular
recruitment process. Therefore, existence of clause referring to
continuation in limited context cannot be elevated into permanent
right overriding all subsequent policy decisions.

14.   I also find considerable force in submission advanced by
Corporation that review applicants are, in effect, attempting to
improve their case after failure in main proceedings. Review is not
meant for that purpose. Jurisdiction exists for correction of
mistakes and omissions. It is not intended to provide fresh route
for obtaining same relief which already stands refused. In present
case, no apparent error on face of record has been demonstrated.
What is sought is fresh interpretation of Clause 4 and fresh
adjudication based upon that interpretation. Such exercise falls
outside scope of review.




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15.   There is one more circumstance which also cannot be
ignored. Even if Clause 4 is examined separately, language used
therein falls much short of creating unconditional right of endless
continuation. At highest, it appears to deal with arrangement
concerning workers who did not exercise their option within
prescribed period. It does not confer any vested right capable of
surviving irrespective of later policy decisions. Therefore, even on
plain reading, clause does not support broad claim now sought to
be advanced by respondents.

16.   When Clause 4 is read together with scheme, policy decision
of 2008, law declared in Umadevi and factual position on record,
no relief can be granted in review application. Respondents have
failed to point out any mistake apparent on face of record.

17.   According to review petitioners, although the point was
raised before the Court, there is no separate and express discussion
upon the said contention in the judgment under review. Merely
because some argument raised by one party is not discussed
separately under different heading, that by itself does not mean
that Court has not considered that argument at all. Judgment is
required to decide dispute and issues arising in matter. It is not
necessary that every argument, every sentence in written
submissions, or every point stated during oral hearing must get
detailed answer in judgment. If reasons recorded in judgment
substantially deal with issue and conclusion reached by Court goes
against that argument, then it cannot be said that point remained
undecided.




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18.   In present case, even if it is assumed that contention based
on Clause 4 was argued during oral hearing and was also
mentioned in written submissions, still question remains whether
absence of separate discussion on that contention amounts to an
error apparent on face of record. In my view, it does not. Judgment
under review proceeded on basis that respondents failed to
establish any enforceable right of continuance, regularisation or
absorption under Scheme of 2002. Court also considered effect of
later policy decision of 2008 and legal principles flowing from
decision in Umadevi. Once those findings were reached,
contention based on Clause 4 stood answered by necessary
implicatio.

19.   It is required to be remembered that review jurisdiction does
not arise merely because one party feels that one of its submissions
should have received more elaborate discussion. Real test is
whether non discussion of that argument has resulted in some
apparent error affecting final conclusion of judgment. Unless
omitted point is of such nature that, if considered, it would have
changed result of case, review cannot be granted. Mere absence of
separate reasoning on every submission is not enough to invoke
review jurisdiction.

20.   For all these reasons, I am unable to hold that respondents
have established any ground warranting exercise of review
jurisdiction. Accordingly, I hold that contention founded upon
Clause 4 of Circular dated 27 November 2002 is without
substance. Review applicants have failed to make out any case for
interference with judgment.



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21.   Review applications therefore deserve rejection and are
accordingly dismissed.



                                        (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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