Bombay High Court
MACROTECH DEVELOPERS LIMITED (NOW LODHA DEVELOPERS LIMITED )versusDILIP KUMAR
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
- Bench
- N JAMADAR
Holding
A defect of denial of natural justice at the first instance cannot be cured on appeal, so the appellate tribunal’s order imposing liability on Respondent No.2 is set aside and the complaints are remanded to the Authority.
Summary
The Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal set aside orders of the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority that had dismissed complaints by homebuyers against Esque Finmark and Macrotech, directing the developers to execute sale agreements and deliver possession. The developers argued they were not parties before the Authority and were denied a hearing, contending that the Tribunal erred in imposing liability on them. The court held that a denial of natural justice at the first-instance cannot be cured by a fair hearing on appeal, citing Supreme Court precedent. Consequently, the Second Appeals were allowed, the Tribunal’s order and the Authority’s orders were quashed, and the complaints were remanded to the Authority for fresh determination with the developers impleaded. The parties were directed to appear before the Authority by 1 July 2026 and the matter was to be decided expeditiously.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellate tribunal can impose liability on a party who was not given an opportunity of hearing before the first‑instance authority.
- Whether denial of natural justice at the initial stage can be cured at the appellate stage.
- Whether the complaints should be remanded to the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority for fresh adjudication.
Subjects
- Real Estate
- RERA
- Natural Justice
- Appellate Jurisdiction
- Privity of Contract
- Remand
- First‑Instance Hearing
- Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority
- Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal
Judgment
2026:BHC-AS:25397
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.5 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.12 OF 2026
Macrotech Developers Ltd. ... Appellant
versus
Dilip Kumar and Ors. … Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO.57 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.38621 OF 2025
Esque Finmark Pvt. Ltd. … Appellant
versus
Surendra Gauri Shankar and Ors. … Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO.52 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.38703 OF 2025
Esque Finmark Pvt. Ltd. … Appellant
versus
Dilip Kumar and Ors. … Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO.6 OF 2026
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.14 OF 2026
Macrotech Developers Ltd. … Appellant
versus
Surendra Gauri Shankar and Ors. … Respondents
Mr. Amogh Singh i/by Mr. Jeet Gandhi, for Appellant in SA Nos.5 and 6 of
2026.
Mr. Vikramjit Garewal with Mr. Rashmin Jain i/by Kanga and Co., for Appellant
in SA No.52 and 57 of 2026 and for Respondent No.2 in SA No.5 of 2026 and
for Respondent No.3 in SA No.6 of 2026.
Mr. Harshad Bhabhade with Ms. Padma Chinta, Ms. Swati Panjwani, Mr.
Dileep Satale, for Respondent No.1 in SA Nos.52 of 2026 and 5 of 2026.
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 1/8
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
Mr. Siddharth Mehta, for Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in SA No.57 of 2026 and 6
of 2026.
CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.
DATE : 17 JUNE 2026
ORDER :
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
2. These Second Appeals are directed against a common judgment and
order dated 25 August 2025 passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate
Appellate Tribunal in Appeal Nos.42024 of 2019 and 42042 of 2019 preferred
by Mr. Dilip Kumar – Respondent No.1 in SA Nos.5 and 52 of 2026 and Mr.
Surendra Gauri Shankar and Anr. - Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in SA Nos.57
and 6 of 2026 (the original complainants), whereby the appeals preferred by
the complainants were partly allowed and the orders dated 23 July 2019 and
16 August 2019 passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority
(‘the Authority’) in the Complaints preferred by the abovenamed complainants
were set aside, and the Appellants - Respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the
Appellate Tribunal were directed to execute and register agreements for sale
in favour of the respective Complainants and deliver possession of the subject
flats upon completion of the project with occupation certificate.
3. The background facts can be summerized, as under :
3.1 Esque Finmark Pvt. Ltd. - Appellant in SA Nos.52 and 57 of 2026
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 2/8
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
(Respondent No.1 before the Appellate Tribunal), acquired ownership over
the land bearing C.S.No.124 (Part) admeasuring 38750 sq. yards,
Kalachowki, Mumbai (the larger land) under registered Deed of Conveyance
dated 14 August 2022. The Respondent No.1 proposed to develop a part of
the larger land under the name and style of ‘Shanti Darshan’ (the project).
3.2 The Complainants booked flats in the said project. Allotment letters
were issued in favour of Complainants : Mr. Dilip Kumar, on 4 May 2005 and
Surendra Gauri Shankar and Rajani Goyal, on 15 October 2005. Respondent
No.1, however, failed to complete the project. Respondent No.1 initially
assigned development rights to M/s. Krona Realities Pvt. Ltd.
After a series of assignments, eventually, Respondent No.1 and others
transferred rights in the said project in favour of Macrotech Developers Ltd. -
Respondent No.2.
3.3 Respondent No.2 launched the projects known as ‘Lodha Venezio’ and
‘Lodha Auzzuro’ on the said larger land. At the time of the enactment of
RERA, since the project was an ongoing project, the complainants lodged
complaints with the Authority seeking the execution of the agreements and
delivery of possession of the apartments in accordance with the terms of the
allotment letters and also for award of compensation.
3.4 Initially Respondent No.2 was not impleaded as party Respondent to
the Complaints before the Authority. However, since the complaints were filed
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25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
with reference to the project number with which the project being developed
by Respondent No.2 were registered, Respondent No.2 appeared before the
Authority.
3.5 It appears, by an order dated 23 July 2019, purportedly with the
consent of the parties (which complainants later disputed), Respondent No.2
came to be discharged from the complaints by the Authority on the premise
that there was no privity of contract between the complainants and
Respondent No.2. Subsequently, the complaints were dismissed by the
Authority holding, inter alia, that the Respondent No.1 had not registered the
subject project with MAHARERA and the proceedings filed by the allottees
before the High Court were subjudice, and, thus, it would be appropriate to
await the outcome of the said proceedings.
3.5 Being aggrieved, the complainants preferred appeals before the
Appellate Tribunal. The complainants also assailed the order dated 23 July
2019, whereby the Respondent No.2 was discharged from the complaints.
The Appellate Tribunal was persuaded to allow the appeals and set aside
both the orders i.e. the order discharging Respondent No.2 dated 23 July
2019 and, the eventual dismissal of the complaints by an order dated 16
October 2019.
4. Mr. Amogh Singh, learned Counsel for Macrotech - Respondent No.2,
would submit that the Appellate Tribunal has passed the impugned order
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 4/8
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
fastening the liability on the Respondent No.2, though Respondent No.2 was
discharged from the complaints and had no opportunity to participate in the
proceedings before the Authority. Having given consent for dropping the
proceedings against Respondent No.2, it was not open for the complainants
to implead Respondent No.2 as party in appeals, especially when the
complaints were dismissed by the authority. Had the complaints been allowed
by the Authority, Respondent No.2 would not have been made liable as, in
that event, the order could have been passed against Respondent No.1 only.
The Appellate Tribunal was, thus, in error in allowing the appeals qua
Respondent No.2 as well.
5. Learned Counsel for the Complainants initially submitted that the
Respondent No.2 got an efficacious opportunity of hearing before the
Appellate Tribunal, and, therefore, the fact that the Respondent No.2 was not
heard by the Authority, did not cause any prejudice to the Respondent No.2.
6. The situation which, thus, obtains is that, though Respondent No.2 was
not a party to the proceedings before the Authority when the complaints were
heard and decided, yet, Respondent No.2 was impleaded as a party
Respondent before the Appellate Tribunal. The order of discharging
Respondent No.2 was also set aside by the Appellate Tribunal by the
impugned order.
7. In the aforesaid setting of the matter, the appropriate course for the
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 5/8
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
Appellate Tribunal was to remit the complaints back to the Authority to
determine the complaints afresh, after providing an opportunity of hearing to
the Respondent No.2.
8. The submission that the Respondent No.2 got an efficacious
opportunity of hearing before the Appellate Tribunal, though it was not a party
before the Authority, cannot be countenanced as it is well recognized that an
unfair trial before the Court / Authority at the first instance cannot be cured by
a fair hearing before the Appellate Court / Authority. If an efficacious
opportunity of hearing was not given to a party in the court of first instance,
the prejudice thereby caused cannot be remedied by providing an opportunity
of hearing in the appeal. If natural justice is violated at the first instance, the
right of appeal cannot be a panacea. The net effect would be, instead of a fair
trial followed by appeal, there would be, at best, an unfair trial followed by fair
trial.
9. In a recent pronouncement in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and others 1 , a three-Judge Bench of the
Supreme Court considered the question whether denial of natural justice at
the initial stage can be cured by an appellate body. The Supreme Court
enunciated that the provision for an appeal should not rest on the assumption
that the appellate body is infallible. When one party is denied the opportunity
1 (2025) 7 SCC 545
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 6/8
25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
to present their case, the initial decision fails to provide meaningful guidance
to the appellate authority, in achieving a fair and just resolution. The Supreme
Court answered the question as under :
“70. Following the above discussion, it must be
concluded that a defect at the initial stage cannot
generally be cured at the appellate stage. Even in
cases where a “full jurisdiction” may be available at the
appellate stage, the courts must have the discretion to
relegate it to the original stage for an opportunity of
hearing. Therefore, the ex parte decision to set aside
the appellants’ selection stands vitiated.” (emphasis
supplied)
10. In the light of the aforesaid position in law, learned Counsel for the
complainants submitted that the complaints be remanded back to the
Authority for afresh decision.
11. Thus, with the consent of the parties, the following order is passed:
ORDER
(i) The Second Appeals stand allowed.
(ii) The impugned order as well as the orders passed by the
Authority stand quashed and set aside.
(iii) Complaint Nos.56656 and 56663 stand restored to the file of the
Authority.
(iv) Respondent No.2 is permitted to be impleaded as party
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25 sa 5 of 2026-3.doc
Respondent to the said complaints.
(v) The parties shall appear before the Authority on 1 July 2026.
(vi) No separate notice would be required to be issued to the
complainants and Respondents.
(vii) All contentions of all the parties are kept open for consideration
by the Authority. However, Respondent No.2 shall not be entitled to again
agitate the issue of the discharge of the Respondent No.2 from the complaints
purportedly with the consent of the complainants.
(viii) The Authority is requested to make an endeavour to hear and
decide the said complainants afresh, as expeditiously as possible, and
preferably within a period of 60 days from 1 July 2026.
(ix) In view of the disposal of the Second Appeals, Interim
Applications also stand disposed.
(x) No costs.
( N.J.JAMADAR, J. )
SSP (corrected order as per speaking to Minutes of Order dt. 19/06/2026) 8/8
Signed by: S.S.Phadke
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 23/06/2026 11:39:27
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