BAPUSAHEB SHANKAR RAO YADAV AND ANRversusRAMDAS DADASAHEB NIGADE AND ORS

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                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                       WRIT PETITION NO. 10036 OF 2026


                      1. Bapusaheb Shankar Rao Yadav,
                      Aged 58 years, Occupation : Profession
                      Residing at: Chaitanya Hospital, Lonand,
                      Taluka – Khandala, Dist. Satara – 412 521.

                      2. Jayashree Bapusaheb Yadav
                      Aged 55 years, Occupation: Business,
                      Residing at: Chaitanya Hospital, Lonand,
                      Taluka – Khandala, Dist. Satara – 412 521.                 ...Petitioners

                            Versus

                      1. Ramdas Dadasaheb Nigade,
                      Adult, Indian Inhabitant,
                      Having address at: - Saniya Heritage,
                      Saidham, Flat No. 16, “A” wing,
                      4th Floor, Bibewadi, Pune.

                      2. Sunanda Ramdas Nigade,
                      Adult, Occupation: Business,
                      Residing at: Saniya Heritage, Saidham,
                      Flat No. 16, “A” Wing, 4th floor,
                      Bibewadi, Pune – 37.

                      3. Chaitanya Agro Hitech Private Limited,
ARUN
RAMCHANDRA            A Company registered under the Companies
SANKPAL
                      Act, 2013 having address at : Neel Kanth
Digitally signed by
ARUN RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
                      Apartment, Congress Bhavan Road, Pune.                  …Respondents
Date: 2026.08.29
18:03:49 +0530


                      Mr. Devashish Godbole, for the Petitioners.
                      Mr. Chaitanya Nikte, with Swapnil Sangle, i/b Prajit Sahane, for
                            Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

                                                  CORAM :         N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                           RESERVED ON :          12th AUGUST 2026
                                       PRONOUNCED ON :            29th AUGUST 2026

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JUDGMENT :

1.    Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the consent of

the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2.       This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

assails the legality, propriety and correctness of an order dated 24 th

March 2026 passed in Civil MA No. 1064 of 2019 whereby the said

application filed for restoration of Civil MA No. 527 of 2013, preferred

under Section 34 of the Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the

Act, 1996”), came to be rejected.

3.    The backgrounds facts leading to this Petition can be summarised

as under:

3.1   The Petitioners, husband and wife duo, had floated a company,

Chaitanya Agro Hi-Tech Private Limited-Respondent No.3.

3.2   On 1st September 2007, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2-Claimants

entered into an Agreement with the Petitioners to acquire 50% shares of

Respondent    No.3-company      for   an     aggregate   consideration   of

Rs.50,00,000/-. Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.12,50,000/- was

admittedly paid by the Claimants to the Petitioners.

3.3   In the wake of the dispute over the payment of the balance

amount, the Claimants invoked the Arbitration.




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3.4   By an order dated 15th March 2013, Hon’ble Justice P. B. Sawant

(Retd) allowed the claim of the Claimants and directed the Petitioners-

Opponent Nos. 1 and 2 therein, to pay an amount of Rs.53,20,000/-,

comprising principal amount of Rs.28,00,000/-, and Rs.25,20,000/-

being the interest on the said amount at the rate of 18% per annum till

the date of the Award, within a period of two months, failing which the

Petitioners were to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum for the

Award amount of Rs.53,00,000/- from 15th March 2013 till the

realisation. Claimants were further directed to deposit a sum of

Rs.20,00,000/- in the Fixed Deposit in the name of Respondent No.3-

company till the District Industrial Centre (“DIC”) recovered it or

waived the recovery. An option of furnishing a Bank Guarantee in the

sum of Rs.20,00,000/- in lieu of the deposit of the said amount was also

given to the Petitioners.

3.5   The Petitioners filed an Application under Section 34 of the Act,

1996 to set aside the said Award, being MA No. 527 of 2013. However,

it seems, the Petitioners did not diligently prosecute the said

Application.

3.6   On 24th June 2017, the Court directed the parties to file

documents positively by the next date. On 9 th July 2019 as well the

Petitioners did not appear before the Court and, hence, the matter was

posted for dismissal order. Eventually on 1 st August 2019, noting that on


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the previous date, i.e., 9th July 2019, the matter came to be posted for

dismissal order and, yet, neither the Petitioners nor their Advocate

appeared, the learned District Judge dismissed the Application for want

of prosecution.

3.7    On 13th September 2019, the Petitioners preferred an Application

to set aside the said dismissal order and restoration of the Application

to file.

3.8    The learned District Judge was persuaded to reject the

Application observing, inter alia, that no sufficient casue was made out

to set aside the dismissal order and restore the Civil MA No. 527 of

2013 to file. The reasons ascribed in the Application did not constitute a

sufficient cause. In fact, the Petitioners had made incorrect statements

as regards their failure to appear before the Court. Thus, having regard

to the totality of the circumstances, including conduct of the Petitioners,

the District Judge rejected the Application for restoration.

3.10 Being aggrieved the Petitioners have preferred this Petition.

4.     I have heard Mr. Devashish Godbole, the learned Counsel for the

Petitioners, and Mr. Chaitanya Nikte, the learned Counsel for the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, at some length. With the assistance of the

learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record.

5.     Mr. Devashish Godbole, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners,

submitted that the learned District Judge has taken a very hyper-


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technical view of the matter. The Application for restoration of the

main Application was filed under 42 days of the dismissal. Thus there

was no lack of bonafide on the part of the Petitioners. The learned

District Judge was swayed by the events that had transpired during the

pendency of MA No. 527 of 2013 and thus lost sight of the justifiability

of the reasons ascribed in the Application.

6.    At any rate, Mr. Godbole would urge, the Petitioner cannot be

made to suffer the consequences of the delay, inadvertence, or for that

matter, negligence on the part of the Advocate to whom the Petitioners-

Applicants had entrusted the brief. Inviting the attention of the Court to

very orders, which were referred to by the learned District Judge in the

impugned order, Mr. Godbole would urge that, on none of the dates the

Advocate appointed by the Petitioners did appear before the Court. In

that view of the matter, according to Mr. Godbole, since it was a case of

inadvertence or negligence on the part of the Advocate, the Petitioners

cannot be made to suffer the adverse consequences on account of the

acts and omissions on the part of the Advocate.

7.    Per contra, Mr. Chaitanya Nikte, the learned Counsel for

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, would submit that the learned District Judge

was fully justified in rejecting the Application for restoration of the

Petition after noticing the conduct of the Petitioners, as emerged from

the record. Secondly, Mr. Nikte would urge, the Application for


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restoration is bereft of any reasons which could be termed as

demonstrating a sufficient cause for non-appearance of the Petitioners.

8.    Mr Nikte would submit, at best, in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the

Application, it was asserted that certain additional documents were

required to be procured for the purposes of hearing. That the

Applicants, being Doctors by profession, were busy in their avocations

and despite adjournments having been sought by the Petitioners, the

Court had dismissed the Application for non prosecution. None of these

reasons, Mr Nikte would urge, qualify as a sufficient cause for non-

appearance on the scheduled date of hearing of the matter when the

matter was already stood over for dismissal order.

9.    I have given careful consideration to the submissions canvassed

across the bar and perused the material on record.

10.   To begin with, it is necessary to keep in view the fact that the

Award in question was passed by Arbitral Tribunal on 15 th March 2013.

The Award is yet to be executed. By the instant Petition the Petitioners

seek restoration of the Application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996

and again put the executability of the Award in contest. This time-lag of

for more than 13 years in the enforcement of the Award passed on 15 th

March 2013 deserves to be borne in mind.

11.   From the perusal of the order dated 1st August 2019, it becomes

evidently clear that MA No. 527 of 2013 was dismissed for the reason


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that there was persistent non-appearance of the Applicants in the said

Application. In fact, on the previous date, i.e., 9 th July 2019, the Court

had directed that the matter be posted for dismissal order, yet, none

appeared for the Petitioners. Thus it can hardly be urged that, the

learned District Judge passed the order dated 1 st August 2019 in a

haste.

12.      This takes me to the pivotal issue of the justifiability of the cause

ascribed by the Petitioners for non- appearance on the date on which

the Application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, came to be dismissed

for want of prosecution.

13.      This Court was anxious to appreciate the reasons ascribed in the

Application to account for non-appearance on 1 st August 2019. The

Court finds the Application for restoration singularly lacked reasons or

the circumstances on account of which the Petitioners could not appear

before the Court on 1st August 2019.

14.      Mr. Nikte was justified in canvassing a submission that, at best,

the assertions in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Application can be construed

as the reasons purportedly ascribed by the Petitioners. They read as

under:

         “2.   It is further submitted that present matter was posted for
         argument however some additional important documents of the
         applicants was not coming from the applicants, which is
         necessary and important for adjudication of matter and to decide
         the controversy.
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      3.    That as the Applicants are Doctor by profession and was
      busy in their hospital for long period of time due to that of there
      was delay to search the documents which are vital to decide the
      matter on merits.
      4.    It is further submitted that it being so Appellants had filed
      the Application and thereby prayed that due to the above said
      reasons Appellants may please be given adjournment, however in
      spite of the same Hon’ble Court pleased to dismiss the said Civil
      MA for non-prosecution”



15.   Even if maximum latitude is given to the Petitioners and the

aforesaid assertions in the Application are construed rather generously

in conformity with the principle of liberal consideration, yet, I am afraid

the aforesaid assertions spell out any reason for non-appearance of the

Petitioners on 1st August 2019. Paragraph 2 simply refers to the fact that

some additional documents were required to be tendered for the

purpose of adjudication but those documents were not forthcoming

from the Petitioners themselves. Paragraph 3 refers to the profession the

Petitioners were engaged in and that caused delay in procuring the

documents. Paragraph 4 adverts to the fact that despite the Application

for adjournment having been filed, the Court had dismissed the

Application for non-prosecution.

16.   The alleged inaction, inadvertence or negligence on the part of

the concerned Advocate, which was sought to be canvassed forcefully

by Mr. Godbole to drive home the point that a litigant should not be

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made to suffer on account of inadvertence and negligence on the part of

the Advocate, is conspicuous by its absence in the Application. The

submissions canvassed before this Court professing to lay the blame on

the door steps of the Advocate is simply not borne out by the assertions

in the Application and thus has no factual foundation.

17.     The law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq

And Anr Vs Munshilal and Anr,1 on which reliance was placed by Mr.

Godbole, is of no assistance to the Petitioners. In that case, the Supreme

Court indeed considered the question whether it was proper that the

party    should   suffer    for   the   inaction,   deliberate   omission,   or

misdemeanour of his agent and observed that the answer obviously was

in the negative. The Supreme Court went on to observe that, the Court

cannot be party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because

his chosen advocate defaulted.

18.     However, in the absence of any foundation in the Application, the

desperate attempt by Mr Godbole to bank upon the aforesaid decision,

in the considered view of this Court, does not merit countenance.

19.     The Supreme Court explained the import of the decision in the

case of Rafiq And Anr (Supra) in a subsequent decision in the case of

Salil Dutta Vs T. M. And M. C. Private Ltd,2 as under:




1       (1981) 2 SCC 788.
2       (1993) 2 SCC 185.
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      “8.   The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
      statements, made within the limits of authority given to
      him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
      party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations,
      the Court may, in the interest of justice, set a side a
      dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the
      negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it
      finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is not
      such abso lute rule that a party can disown its advocate at
      any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be
      recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working
      of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in
      Rafiq must be understood in the facts and circumstances of
      that case and cannot be understood as an absolute
      proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was
      an on-going suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of
      seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal
      filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the
      Court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant
      villager but a private limited company with its head-office at
      Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who
      know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their
      applications were not disposed of before taking up the suit
      for final hewing they felt piqued and refused to appear
      before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics
      as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear
      they 'chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted
      such a stand towards the Court, the defendant has no right
      to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the
      advocate and trying to make it. out as if they were totally
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      unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a
      theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have
      been accepted.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)


20.   This position was reiterated in the case of Rajneesh Kumar Vs Ved

Prakash,3 in the following words:

      “10.   It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the
      head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in
      the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency
      on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence
      and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court.
      Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was
      careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to
      condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to
      be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally
      vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
      initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be
      permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate
      and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)


21.    A profitable reference can be made to the decision in the case of

Nitin Mahadeo Jawale and Ors Vs Bhaskar Mahadeo Mutke, 4 wherein

the Supreme Court has again cautioned against condoning the delay or

setting aside the dismissal order by placing entire blame on the

Advocates. Paragraphs 6 to 8 are material and hence extracted below:

3     2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380.
4     2024 INSC 902.
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             “6. We have noticed over a period of time the growing
             tendency on the part of the litigants in throwing the
             entire blame on the head of the advocate. Not only
             this, we have come across cases where the concerned
             advocate has filed an affidavit in favour of his client(s)
             saying that he was unable to attend the proceedings
             due to some personal reasons difficulties thereby
             facilitating the litigant to get the delay condoned.


             7. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned
             lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot
             be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as
             the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights
             and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial
             proceedings pending in the court initiated at his
             instance.


             8. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to
             throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate
             and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)


22.    In the case at hand, thus the endeavour of Mr. Godbole to seek

restoration of Civil MA No. 527 of 2013 on the ground that there was

inadvertence or negligence on the part of the Advocate cannot be

readily acceded to. On the contrary, on the own showing of the

Petitioners, on the very next day of the dismissal of Civil MA No. 527 of

2013, the concerned Advocate had filed an Application for certified




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copy of the proceeding in the said Civil MA No. 527 of 2013 and the

same Advocate had filed the Application for restoration.

23.   The situation which thus obtains is that the reasons ascribed in

the Application for restoration are not sought to be pressed into service

and one that was sought to be urged before this Court, was not pleaded

before the District Court.

24.   Even otherwise, the Application for restoration, is bereft of any

cause, much less a sufficient cause, for setting aside the dismissal order

and restoration of the Civil MA No. 527 of 2013.

25.   It is true, ordinarily the Court leans in favour of the

determination of the lis on merit rather than on technicalities. However,

the nature of the underlying proceeding cannot be lost sight of. In effect

and substance, the Petitioners seek restoration of an Application to set

aside the Award which has been passed prior to 13 years. The material

on record indicates that the Petitioners did not diligently prosecute the

Application for over five years. Multiple orders were passed by the

District Court to make the Petitioners expeditiously prosecute the said

Application. The Application for restoration is bereft of cause for non-

appearance.

26.   In the backdrop of these facts, this Court is of the considered view

that, the object of the Act, 1996 to achieve inexpensive, expedite and

swift resolution of the disputes, would be completely negated if the


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restoration Application to set aside an Award passed on 15 th March

2013 is entertained at this juncture.

27.   For the forgoing reasons, the Petition deserves to be dismissed.

28.   Hence, the following order:

                                  :ORDER:

             Petition stands dismissed.

             Rule discharged.

             No costs.

                                                [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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