SHRI. PADMAN DAMODAR BHOIR AND ORS.versusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH PRINCIPAL SECRETARY AND ORS.

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                      Shabnoor
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                       WRIT PETITION NO.10104 OF 2017

                      Padman Damodar Bhoir & Ors.                    … Petitioners
SHABNOOR
AYUB                             V/s.
PATHAN                The State of Maharashtra
Digitally signed by
SHABNOOR AYUB
PATHAN
                      Through Principal Secretary & Ors.             … Respondents
Date: 2026.09.21
17:18:46 +0530
                                                     WITH
                                      CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2897 OF 2017

                      Padman Damodar Bhoir & Ors.                    … Applicants
                                 V/s.
                      The State of Maharashtra
                      Through Principal Secretary & Ors.             … Respondents

                      Mr. A. Kulkarni a/w Vishakha Shelar, for                the
                      Petitioners.
                      Ms. Swati Sagvekar, for Respondent No.4.
                      Mr. Sunil G. Karandikar, for Respondent Nos.5 and 8.
                      Ms. Mamta Srivastav, AGP, for State – Respondent
                      Nos.1 and 2.


                                                    CORAM      : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                    DATED      : SEPTEMBER 21, 2026
                      P.C.:

                      1.      The challenge in the present petition arises from the
                      proceedings initiated under Section 84C of the Maharashtra
                      Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“BT & AL Act”).

                      2.      The petitioners claim their title and interest on the basis of a
                      sale deed executed in the year 1976. It is the specific case of the



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petitioners that the said sale deed was executed without obtaining
the prior permission of the Competent Authority as required under
Section 43 of the BT & AL Act. According to the petitioners, the
Authorities below failed to properly appreciate that the permission
on which the respondents seek to rely was granted only
subsequent to the execution of the sale deed in their favour. The
principal submission, therefore, is that the validity of the
transaction had to be examined with reference to the position
prevailing on the date of its execution and that a subsequent
permission could not validate a transaction which was otherwise
contrary to the statutory requirement.

3.    The petitioners have contended that the subsequent grant of
permission could not have the effect of curing the initial illegality
in the transaction. On this basis, it is submitted that the sale
transaction continued to remain open to challenge under the
provisions of the BT & AL Act and that the authorities were
entitled to exercise the power under Section 84C notwithstanding
the considerable period which had elapsed from the date of the
transaction. The submission, in substance, is that where the
original transaction is alleged to be in breach of a statutory
restriction contained in Section 43, the mere passage of time
cannot confer validity upon such transaction and cannot take away
the statutory power under Section 84C.

4.    I have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of
the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It is apparent from the impugned
orders that the Authorities below have considered the scope and



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ambit of Section 84C and have also examined the applicability of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad
Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71. Upon
such consideration, the Authorities have held that although
Section 84C does not prescribe any specific period of limitation for
exercise of the power, such power cannot be exercised after an
unreasonable lapse of time. The Authorities have taken into
consideration the fact that the predecessors-in-title of the
petitioners were themselves parties to and executants of the sale
transaction. Consequently, the petitioners, claiming through such
predecessors, cannot contend that the relevant transaction was
incapable of being questioned for the entire period during which
the statutory authority remained inactive.

5.   The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is not
merely whether the original transaction suffered from any defect
on account of absence of prior permission under Section 43. The
more immediate question is whether, assuming that such defect
existed, the power under Section 84C could have been exercised
after an unexplained lapse of approximately 35 years. In
considering this question, the decision of the Supreme Court in
Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin (supra) assumes significance. The
Supreme Court considered the earlier decision in State of Gujarat
v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah, Special Writ Application No. 2770 of
1979, wherein the Court had held that the power under Section
84C was required to be exercised within a reasonable period. On
consideration of the statutory scheme and the facts before it, the
Supreme Court held that the suo motu power under Section 84C



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had not been exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable
period.

6.    The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that
the absence of a prescribed period of limitation in the statutory
provision does not confer an unrestricted power upon the
authority to reopen a completed transaction at any point of time.
Exercise of statutory power must bear a reasonable relationship
with the object for which the power has been conferred. A
transaction which has remained undisturbed for a substantial
period of time cannot ordinarily be reopened merely because the
statute does not prescribe a specific period within which the power
is required to be exercised. The requirement of exercise within a
reasonable period is relevant where the transaction has been acted
upon and the parties have altered their position on the basis
thereof.

7.    In the present case, the sale deed was executed in the year
1976, whereas the proceedings under Section 84C came to be
initiated only after a lapse of approximately 35 years. There is no
satisfactory explanation on record for such extraordinary delay.
More importantly, there is no material placed before this Court to
show any circumstance which prevented the competent authority
from examining the transaction at an earlier point of time. The fact
that the predecessors of the petitioners themselves were parties to
the sale transaction is also relevant. The persons through whom
the petitioners claim were aware of the transaction and of the
circumstances in which the sale deed was executed. The
petitioners, therefore, cannot claim a position independent of the



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knowledge and conduct of their predecessors for the purpose of
sustaining a challenge initiated after such an extraordinary lapse of
time.

8.      I am also unable to accept the submission that the alleged
illegality in the original transaction would justify exercise of the
power under Section 84C irrespective of the length of time that
has elapsed. The existence of a statutory power and the manner
and time within which such power is to be exercised are distinct
considerations. Even where the authority is competent to examine
whether a transaction is in breach of Section 43, such power
cannot be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

9.      The contention regarding the subsequent permission also
does not assist the petitioners in overcoming the fundamental
difficulty arising from the enormous delay. Whether such
subsequent permission had the effect of curing the alleged defect
in the original transaction is a matter which may have significance
while examining the transaction on its merits. However, before
such question can be considered, the exercise of power under
Section 84C itself must be shown to have been undertaken within
a reasonable period. In the present case, that threshold
requirement has not been satisfied. The lapse of 35 years is, in the
facts of the present case, wholly disproportionate and remains
unexplained.

10.     No distinguishing circumstance has been brought on record
which would take the present case outside the principle laid down
by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin (supra).




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The factual circumstance which weighs against the petitioners is
that their predecessors were themselves parties to the sale deed
and were aware of the transaction from its inception. The
authorities were, therefore, justified in examining the delay not
merely from the date on which the petitioners acquired their
interest, but from the date on which the transaction itself was
entered into. The petitioners cannot obtain an advantage merely
because they claim through the original parties to the transaction.

11.      In these circumstances, I find that the Authorities below have
correctly applied the principle governing exercise of power under
Section 84C. The conclusion that the proceedings initiated after
approximately 35 years could not be sustained is consistent with
the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The impugned orders do
not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or any perversity
warranting interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this
Court.

12.      For the reasons recorded above, I find no legal infirmity in
the impugned judgment and order passed by the Authorities
below. The challenge raised by the petitioners, therefore, fails. The
writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.

13.      Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stand disposed
of.

                                               (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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