Bombay High Court
PRASAD NARAYAN HONAPversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR
- Decided
- Disposal
- Allowed
Holding
The Court held that no prima facie case of cheating under Section 420 IPC is made out and quashed the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The case involved a partnership firm, Surya Hospital Medical Store, alleging that Surya Hospital Pvt. Ltd. (represented by Dr. Prasad Honap) failed to pay Rs 29.20 lakh for medicines supplied between 2003‑2006 under a Central Government Scheme. A criminal complaint for cheating under Section 420 IPC was filed, and the trial court rejected a discharge application, later confirming the charge. The applicant sought quashal of the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, arguing that the dispute was merely a civil matter of unsettled partnership accounts. The High Court examined the nature of the allegations, finding no evidence of dishonest inducement at the inception of the transaction and noting that the matter was being pursued in a parallel civil suit. Applying Supreme Court precedents on the distinction between breach of contract and cheating, the Court held that no prima facie case of cheating existed and that continuing the criminal prosecution would be an abuse of process. Consequently, the Court exercised its inherent powers to quash the criminal proceedings.
Issues considered
- The allegation of cheating under Section 420 IPC: does the complaint disclose a criminal offence?
- Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 CrPC.
- Whether the dispute is a civil matter of settlement of partnership accounts rather than a criminal offence.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 528
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 156(3), 227, 239, 245, 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 — s. 34, 420
Subjects
- cheating
- Section 420 IPC
- Section 482 CrPC
- civil vs criminal
- partnership dispute
- settlement of accounts
- abuse of process
- commercial transaction
- discharge application
- criminal revision
Judgment
Supriya APL-396-2018.doc
S
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPLICATION 396 OF 2018
1. Dr. Jaising Krishnarao Shinde
Age-63 years, Occ:-Doctor
R/at:- Harmony Housing Society,
ICS Colony, University Road,
Pune-411005 … Applicant
V/s.
1. The State of Maharashtra
(At the instance of Faraskhane Police
Station, Pune.)
2. Surya Hospital Medical Store
Through its Partner
Mr. Ajit Vinayak Ghate
Age-64 years, Occ:- Business
R/o-14C, Sitaram Mansion
326, Shaniwar Peth, Pune-411030 … Respondents
WITH
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 1035 OF 2018
1. Dr. Prasad Narayan Honap,
Age-63 years, Occ:-Medical
Practitioner, R/at:- A-101,
Amod Ankur, Dahanukar
Colony-A, Kothrud,
Pune 411038.
ICS Colony, University Road,
Pune-411005 … Petitioner
Digitally signed
by SUPRIYA
SUPRIYA PRAMOD
JAWARE
PRAMOD Date:
JAWARE 2026.08.10
15:23:05
+0530
V/s.
1. The State of Maharashtra
2. Surya Hospital Medical Store,
Partnership Firm Through
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Its Partner
Shri. Ajit Vinayak Ghate,
Age-64 years, Occ:- Business
R/o-14C, Sitaram Mansion
326, Shaniwar Peth, Pune-411030 … Respondents
______________________
Mr. Manoj Mohite a/w Mr. Chaitanya Pendse for Applicant in APL No. 396 of
2018.
Mr. V. P. Vaze for Petitioner in WP No. 1035 of 2018.
Mrs. Megha Bajoria, A.P.P. for Respondent No.1-State.
Mr. Aniket Nikam a/w Mr. Nihal Mansuri for Respondent No.2.
Mr. S. K. Gore, PSI, Faraskhana Police Station is present.
______________________
CORAM : RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J.
DATE : 27th JULY 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT :-
1) Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
2) By the present Application, under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (For short ‘CrPC’) (now 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the Applicant seek to challenge (i) the
Order dated 9th April 2015 passed by the learned JMFC, 2 nd Court, Pune in
RCC No. 4439 of 2010 whereby the Application seeking discharge filed under
section 239 of CrPC was rejected and (ii) the Order dated 1 st February 2018
passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Criminal Revision Application
No.300 of 2015 confirming the Order dated 9 th April 2015. This Court by
Order dated 10th July 2018 was pleased to grant ad-interim reliefs in terms of
prayer clause (b).
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3) Heard Mr. Manoj Mohite, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the Applicant in Criminal Application No. 396 of 2018, Mr. V. P. Vaze for
Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1035 of 2018, Mrs. Megha Bajoria, A.P.P for
Respondent -State, Mr. Aniket Nikam for Respondent No.2. Perused the entire
record.
4) Briefly stated the allegations in the FIR are as under:
4.1) The Respondent No.2/original complainant Surya Hospital
Medical Store is a partnership firm registered on 17 th November 1986. That,
Mr. Ajit V. Ghate, Sanjiv Jamdar, M/s Surya Hospital were the partners of the
firm with a profit sharing ratio of 55%, 35% and 10% respectively. Dr. Prasad
N. Honap (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1035 of 2018) is the original accused
No. 3 and Managing Director of Surya Hospital Pvt. Ltd.
4.2) That, the Respondent No. 2 firm carried out the business of
Medical Shop in the premises of Surya Hospital Pvt. Ltd. i.e. Accused No. 1
from the year 1986 to 2002. The Respondent No. 2 firm was engaged to
supply medicines. From the inception of the partnership i.e. from the year
1986 till 2002, the transactions were carried out with sincerity and honesty.
That, till the year 2002, the Accused No.1 cleared all the bills as raised by the
Respondent No. 2.
4.3) That, for the period of 2003 to 2006, the accused failed to pay the
bills. That, the Applicants informed that, they were facing financial crisis and
did not have sufficient profit. It was therefore decided to implement the
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Central Government Scheme. The Central Government Scheme was
implemented as per alleged understanding and the Respondent No.2 firm
provided the required medicines from the year 2002.
4.4) That, for the period 2003 to 2006 the bills remained outstanding
and the payments were not given by the Accused to the Respondent No.2 firm
for having provided medicines under the C.G.H.S schemes. According to the
Respondent No.2 firm the amount outstanding was to the tune of Rs.
29,20,406/-. The main allegation is that, despite of receiving the amounts
from the scheme under the Central Government, the Accused No.1 did not pay
the aforesaid money. On the basis of these allegations, the complaint came to
be filed before the learned JMFC, 2 nd Court, Pune. The Applicant preferred
discharge Application which was rejected, by an Order dated 9 th April 2015.
The Applicants Criminal Revision Application No. 300 of 2015 has also been
rejected on 1st February 2018 whereby the Order dated 9 th April 2015 was
confirmed.
5) Mr. Manoj Mohite, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Applicant in Criminal Application No. 396 of 2018, submits that:-
5.1) The present dispute is allegedly over an unpaid amount of Rs.
29,20,406/- for the period of 2003 to 2006. This clearly establishes that, the
complaint is related to the settlement of accounts interse between the partners
of the Respondent No.2 firm.
5.2) A Civil Suit No. 929 of 2012 is also filed by the Respondent No.2
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against the Accused for the recovery of said amount of Rs.29,20,406/-. That,
in the said suit the Respondent No.2 firm has claimed an amount of Rs.
98,39,894/-.
5.3) The dispute essentially arose because the Respondent No.2 firm
failed to finalize its own accounts. During the course of the inquiry, statements
from two Chartered Accountants confirmed that the Respondent No.2 firm
had not rendered it’s accounts. A due diligence report and statement by C.A.
Prasant Deo indicated that, while an outstanding amount was shown in the
books of Accused No. 1’s hospital, income from the partnership firm could not
be recognized in the Company’s books specifically for want of accounts of the
firm. Similarly, an Audit Report submitted by C.A. Limaye, who was appointed
by the Company Law Board, clearly disclosed that the Respondent No.2 firm
had not rendered its accounts.
5.4) That, the amount of Rs. 29,20,406/- was due towards the
payment of medicines and the same could not be paid as the accounts had not
been settled. Therefore, there was no intention to cheat Respondent No.2
from the inception of the partnership or otherwise. That, the dispute is purely
of a civil nature and that of settlement of accounts.
5.5) The true nature of dispute is brought out in the plaint wherein
the plaintiff has pleaded that, Surya Hospitals Pvt. Ltd. is not entitled to have
its profits out of its dual position as partner in firm at one end and owner at
other end. The perusal of the complaint indicates that, no offence under
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Section 420 of IPC is made out.
5.6) Learned Advocate Mr. V.P. Vaze appearing for the
Petitioner/original accused No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 1035 of 2018, adopted
the arguments advanced by Mr. Manoj Mohit, the learned senior counsel
appear for the Applicant in Criminal Application No. 396 of 2018.
6) Mr. Aniket Nikam, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent
No.2 in Criminal Application No. 396 of 2018 and Writ Petition No. 1035 of
2018 submits that:-
6.1) That, the contentions and grounds raised by the Petitioner in the
present Application are improbable, incorrect, and denied in totality. The
accused demonstrated dishonest and fraudulent intention by deliberately
omitting Respondent No. 2’s claim and outstanding dues from the hospital’s
2006-2007 balance sheet, as is obtained from the Registrar of Companies. The
outstanding of the Respondent No.2 firm is not reflected in the audited
accounts. Furthermore, Respondent No. 2 was never called or consulted by
Accused No. 1 or Mr. G.Y. Limaye during the finalization of these accounts.
6.2) The Applicant intentionally misled the court by claiming that the
same Chartered Accountant audited the accounts of both parties. In reality,
the audit for Surya Hospital was conducted by one partner of the firm
“Yerwadekar and Ranade,” while the medical store’s audit was conducted by
another partner of the same firm.
6.3) The Complainant and Applicants had a longstanding business
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relationship since 1986, with transaction and volumes increasing substantially
from 2002 onwards. The accused gained the Respondent No.2’s confidence
over time but failed to clear the substantial outstanding dues despite receiving
funds under the concerned Government Scheme. Only clearing a small portion
of the outstanding amount does not absolve the Accused of their liability for
the remaining balance.
6.4) The complaint and material on record disclose a clear prima facie
case of cheating and dishonest intention. Consequently, the Trial Court
directed an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which has already led to the police filing a charge sheet against the
accused.
6.5) That, there is enough material in the chargesheet to demonstrate
a prima facie case against the Applicant. That, the offence of cheating is prima
facie and clearly made out. Ms. Megha Bajoria, the learned APP appearing for
the Respondent-State supports the case of the Respondent No. 2.
7) Before proceeding to consider the matter on merits it would be
necessary to refer certain Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which are
relevant for the issues in the present matter:-
7.1) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs.
Prafulla Kumar Samal, reported in AIR 1979 SC 366 in paragraph 10 has
observed that:-
"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the
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following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power
to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made
out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained
the Court will be, fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a
rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced
before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the
accused
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of the
Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and
experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post office or a mouth-piece
of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the
case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on.
This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roaming
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial"
7.2) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Nayak vs. A.R.
Antulay and Anr. Reported in AIR 1986 SC 2045, while analyzing provisions of
Sections 227, 239 and 245 of Cr.P.C., in unequivocal terms in Para 44 has held
as under:-
"The Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of
Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted
upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted
otherwise than on police report are dealt with in Section 245. The
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three sections contain some what different provisions in regard to
discharge of the accused. Under Section 227, the trial Judge is
required to discharge the accused if he 'considers that there is not
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.’ Obligation to
discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate
considers the charge against the accused to be groundless." The power
to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when "the Magistrate
considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused
has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his
conviction.” It is a fact that Sections 227 and 239 provide for
discharge being ordered before the recording of evidence and the
consideration as to whether charge has to be framed or not is required
to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including documents
and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police
report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the
accused and after affording an opportunity to the two parties to be
heard. The stage for discharge under Section 245, on the other hand,
is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been
taken. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no
scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to
consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a
preliminary one and the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied. In
spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal
position is that if the trial Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is
made out, charge has to be framed."
7.3) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 707 has observed that:-
“10. The trajectory of events narrated earlier would reveal a
continuing business transaction between 2015 and 2017 between
parties. During this period, the 2nd non-applicant supplied coal in
tranches under various invoices with a credit limit of 15 days.
Though the appellant had breached the credit limit and failed to
pay the 2nd non-applicant, the latter continued to supply coal
irrespective of such breach. A sum of Rs. 76,82,883/- became due
and payable.
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14. There is no cavil that in some cases a commercial dispute may
give rise to a criminal offence in addition to a civil cause of action.
The test to determine whether a case would attract penal
consequences is as follows:—
“Did the offending party make dishonest representation at the
inception of the transaction and induce the other party to part
with property, or act in a manner which but for such
representation, the latter would not have done.”
19. On the contrary, appellant had clarified he had suffered
continuous business setbacks. Due to losses, he was unable to pay
the 2nd non-applicant. He had sold the coal to a brick manufacturer
and suffered losses thereto. Vicissitudes in the commercial market
are well known. Failure to pay due to unfortunate business losses
cannot be clothed with culpability and the process of criminal law
utilized to recover outstanding dues.”
7.4) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika
v. State of Bihar, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 has observed that:-
“6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the
facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence
whatsoever is made out much less offences under Sections
420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petition
against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant
that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs
4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant
out of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that there
is no other allegation in the petition of complaint. It was pointed
out on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently
persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons
may take steps for moving the Consumer Forum in relation to the
claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every breach of contract
would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those
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cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there
was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to
cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating.
In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very
inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons
to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under
Section 420 IPC.”
7.5) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd.
v. State of Kerala, reported in (2015) 8 SCC 293 has observed that:-
“12. From the decisions cited by the appellant, the settled
proposition of law is that every breach of contract would not give
rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of
contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception
played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed
later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In other words for the
purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is
required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a
case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of
the accused to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable
intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no
offence under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 can be said to
have been made out.
13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as
also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be
available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash
a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the
present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there
was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is
a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our
view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The
criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to
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be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The
superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to
serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts
allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an
abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an
error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings.”
7.6) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar, reported in (2000) 4 SCC 168 has observed that:-
“15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the
distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused
at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent
conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere
breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at
the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is
said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is
the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at
the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up
promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the
beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.”
8) I have perused the complaint. Perusal of the complaint indicates
that certain amounts remained to be paid towards the supply of medicines.
The Respondent No.2 and the Accused were partners in the firm. The main
crux of the allegation is that, despite receiving the money under the
Government scheme, the amounts were not paid. Pertinent to note that, in the
complaint there is specific reference made to the fact that, the hospital was
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facing certain financial crisis and therefore it ventured to implement the
Central Government Scheme. In the entire complaint, I find that, there is no
allegation of any misrepresentation and/or dishonest inducement at the
inception, even alleged.
8.1) A bare perusal of the complaint would prima facie indicate that,
the dispute is mainly regarding to the accounts of the partnership firm. It is an
interse dispute between the partners of and for settlement of the accounts.
Perusal of the audit report would also indicate that, what is in dispute is a
settlement of accounts between the partners interse.
8.2) Perusal of the Order dated 9 th April 2015 passed by the learned
JMFC, 2nd Court, Pune indicates that, the discharge application (Order below
Exhibit 20) was rejected on the ground that, the Respondent No.2 had paid an
amount of Rs.4,50,000/- on the representation that the hospital was running
in loss and Rs.2,00,000/- for purchase of shares. In the Order the learned
Magistrate has observed that, the applicant failed to repay the amount and
also failed to provide the promised shares, and therefore a prima facie case of
cheating was made out. The learned Magistrate further observed that the
prosecution mainly revolved around the amount of Rs.4,50,000/- and
2,00,000/- for the purchase of shares and that these two facts are also not
denied by the Accused. In my view, the said order dated 9 th April 2015 is
totally misdirected.
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8.3) Perusal of the complaint would indicate that the main allegation
in the complaint is in respect of the offence of cheating with specific regard to
non-payment of an amount of Rs.29,20,406.55/- for the period of 2003 to
2006. The complaint proceeds on the basis that, the Respondent No.2 was not
paid the amount due for the medicine supplied though the same amount was
received by the accused. The record indicates that, the firm had also not
submitted its accounts as is evident from the Audit report. In my view, it is
thus clearly an issue of settlement of accounts by and between the partners of
a firm interse or a simple case of non-payment under a commercial
transaction. I have noted that, the Respondent No.2 has initiated civil
proceedings in respect of the said amount wherein the amounts have been
claimed along with interest. Prima facie it is a case of settlement of
partnership accounts. The allegations in the complaint, even if accepted as it
is, only show non-payment of money arising out of the partnership
transactions. Mere non-payment of money or breach of the terms of a contract
does not by itself amount to the offence of cheating. Even otherwise, I find
that there is no allegation of dishonest inducement much less an allegation of
dishonest inducement at the very inception. On the contrary, the Respondent
No. 2 in fact admits that, there were no issue in the partnership business till
the year 2004 and that all transactions were conducted honestly and with
sincerity. I have also noted that, the Respondent No.2 has also made a
grievance that, the said medical shop has now been shut down and that the
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hospital has started it’s own medical shop. This probably was the reason to
initiate the present criminal proceedings.
8.4) Perusal of the Order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge
dated 1st February 2018 indicates that, the Order proceeds on the basis that,
there was a prima facie evidence as the Applicant and co-accused induced the
complainant to provide/deliver medicines by showing a rosy picture of
permission obtained by them to provide medicines to government servants.
The order proceeds to record that, believing the accused the Respondent No.2
started providing medicines, but did not get funds/payment for the said
transactions. That, the said non-payment of money, amounts to practicing
deception and an intention to cheat. The order fails to consider the pleadings
in the complaint that due to financial crisis at the hospital, Accused met with
the Respondent No.2 in January 2001 to discuss the C.G.H.S. scheme. During
this meeting, it was orally agreed that the Respondent No.2 would supply
medicines for government and corporate patients and the Accused would pay
for the medicines as soon as the hospital received the corresponding funds
from C.G.H.S. or the respective companies. I am of the opinion that, it is not
the case of the Respondent No.2 that any inducement was offered, much less
any dishonest inducement at the time of inception. The Respondent No.2
admits of being informed of the financial crisis. Prima facie, the averments
and observations do not show that the accused had dishonest intention at the
very beginning of the transaction, which is an essential ingredient of the
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offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
8.5) From a perusal of the complaint and facts of the matter, it is clear
that the dispute is essentially regarding the accounts of the partnership firm
and settlement of accounts between the parties.
8.6) Perusal of the financial due diligence review dated 20 th January
2007, would prima facie of indicate that, for the want of accounts of the firm
i.e. Surya Hospital Medical Store for the past few years the income from the
partnership firm had not been recognized in the books of the Hospital. I have
noted that, the report further specifically records that, the accused company
i.e. Surya Hospital Pvt. Ltd. would continue to be liable for the acts of the
firm. Further, the auditor's report dated 22nd October 2007 also reiterates that
of the firm Surya Hospital Medical Store has not rendered any statement of
account and in the absence thereof, companies share in the profit or loss of
the firm could not be considered in the accounts. Here also a specific
observation is made that the company remains liable for the acts of the firm.
8.7) I have noted that, the observations are of independent third
parties. The said observation negate the allegations of cheating. The same
makes it clear that, the dispute is only in respect of settlement of accounts
interse between the parties. It is also not in dispute that the complainant has
already initiated appropriate proceedings before the competent Court for
recovery of the alleged dues. In the aforestated facts, in my view, no case
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under Section 420 of the IPC is made out against the Applicant. The dispute is
purely of a civil nature and arising out of partnership transactions and
settlement of accounts. Their is no allegation of dishonest inducement at the
very inception. The allegation appears to be groundless and totally
misconceived. Perusal of the complaint would indicate that no cases made out
against the accused.
9) In view of the aforesaid discussion and applying the principles
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana &
Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, I am of the
considered opinion that the present case squarely falls within the parameters
enunciated therein. Allowing the prosecution to continue for the alleged
offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC would
result in an abuse of the process of the Court, particularly when the
allegations, viewed in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of the
alleged offences and the dispute is essentially civil in nature.
10) Considering the facts of the present case and for the aforestated
reasons, I am of the considered view that the Applicants have made out a fit
case for this Court to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the
CrPC. The twin conditions for invoking the said jurisdiction stand fully
satisfied, and it becomes imperative to interdict and quash the proceedings to
prevent the abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
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11) I am of the prima facie opinion that, no case is made out under
Section 420 of the IPC. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am
inclined to allow the Application.
12) Hence, I pass the following Order:-
i) The Criminal Application No. 396 of 2018 is allowed in terms of
prayer clause (a).
ii) Writ Petition No. 1035 of 2018 is allowed in terms of prayer
clause (a).
(RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J.)
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