Bombay High Court
VAISHALI SANJAY BARDEversusSTATE OF GOA THR CHIEF SECRETARY AND 3 ORS
- Disposal
- Disposed of
Holding
The Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 is constitutionally valid and must govern the pending municipal elections, and the election deadline under Article 243U cannot be reset by the ordinance.
Summary
The Bombay High Court examined five writ petitions challenging the Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026, which altered the composition, delimitation and reservation framework for municipal elections. The petitioners argued that the ordinance, promulgated after the terms of eleven municipal councils had expired, violated Article 243U’s mandatory deadline for holding elections and amounted to a colourable exercise of power under Articles 14 and 213. The Court held that Article 243U creates a non‑negotiable constitutional timetable, but a valid statutory amendment does not reset that clock; the ordinance is constitutionally valid and must be applied. Consequently, the petitions seeking to invalidate the ordinance or to apply the pre‑amendment law were dismissed. The Court imposed a compressed timetable for completing the remaining stages of delimitation, reservation, and the election process, ensuring that elections are held by early January 2027.
Issues considered
- The constitutionality of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 under Articles 14, 213 and 243U of the Constitution.
- Whether Article 243U’s deadline for municipal elections can be overridden by a legislative amendment introduced after the election became due.
- The applicability of Article 243ZG’s bar on judicial review of delimitation statutes to the present challenge.
- The propriety of directing the State Election Commission to ignore the ordinance and conduct elections under the pre‑amendment regime.
- The extent of judicial authority to prescribe a timetable for completing the election process under the operative ordinance.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of India — s. Article 14, Article 213, Article 243P(g), Article 243R, Article 243T, Article 243U, Article 243ZA, Article 243ZG
- Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 — s. Section 10, Section 9
- Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 — s. Section 10 (substituted), Section 9(2) (amended)
- Goa Municipalities (Election) Rules, 1969
Subjects
- Constitutional law
- Municipal elections
- Article 243U
- Delimitation
- Reservation
- Ordinance
- Judicial review
- State Election Commission
- Backward Classes
- Election timetable
Judgment
2026:BHC-GOA:1716-DB WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Suzana
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 300 OF 2026
Nimesia Faleiro, aged, 44 years,
H.No. 40, N. D. Naik Road,
Chandrawado, Fatorda, South Goa … Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Goa, Through the
Chief Secretary, Porvorim, Goa
Email: [email protected]
2.The Goa State Election
Commission, Opp. Joggers Park,
Next to BSNL Tower, Altinho,
Panjim, Goa
Email: [email protected]
3.The Director of Municipal
Administration, Department of
Urban Development, Dempo
Tower, 1st Floor, Patto, Panaji,
Goa.
Email: [email protected]
4.Goa State Commission For
Backward Classes, Office at
Altinho, Panaji, Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Siddharth Nunes, Advocate for the Petitioner.
Mr. Devidas J. Pangam, Advocate General with Ms Maria
Simone Judith Correia, Additional Government Advocate for
Respondents No.1 and 3.
Mr. Somnath B. Karpe, Advocate with Mr. Anand Shirodkar,
Advocate for Respondent No.2.
Page 1 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mr. Hanumant D. Naik, Advocate with Ms. Divya Naik and Ms.
Dipti Kambli, Advocates for Respondent No.4.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 1069 OF 2026
Vaishali Sanjay Barde, aged about
38 years, wife of Shri Sanjay Barde,
R/o H.No.59/11, Near Sateri
Temple, Khorlim, Mapusa, Bardez-
Goa, 403507. … Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Goa, Through the Chief
Secretary, Secretariat, Porvorim,
Goa.
2.The Goa State Election
Commission, Through the State
Election Commissioner, Altinho,
Panaji-Goa.
3.The Directorate of Municipal
Administration, Through its
Director, Patto, Panaji-Goa.
4. The Mapusa Municipal Council,
Thr. its Chief Officer, Mapusa,
North-Goa.
5.Goa State Commission For
Backward Classes, Altinho,
Panaji Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Abhijit Gosavi, Advocate with Ms. Krupa Naik and Mr.
Gaurang Kerkar, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Devidas J. Pangam, Advocate General with Mr. Deep D.
Shirodkar, Additional Government Advocate for Respondents
No.1 and 3.
Page 2 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mr. Somnath B. Karpe, Advocate with Ms. Siddhi Parodkar,
Advocate for Respondent No.2.
Mr. Hanumant D. Naik, Advocate with Ms. Divya Naik and Ms.
Dipti Kambli, Advocates for Respondent No.5.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 1073 OF 2026
Shitesh More, Aged 30 years,
Resident of 1/146/ILL, St. Jerome
Wado, Xelpem, Duler, Mapusa,
Goa. … Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Goa, Through the Chief
Secretary, Secretariat, Porvorim,
Goa.
2.Director, Directorate of
Municipal Administration,
Panaji, Goa-403001.
3.Commissioner, State Election
Commissioner, Altinho, Panaji-
Goa.
4.Goa State Commission For
Backward Classes, Altinho,
Panaji Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Chaitanya Padgaonkar, Advocate with Ms. Anushri Naik
Dessai and Mr. Shlok Rai, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Mr. Devidas J. Pangam, Advocate General with Ms. Maria
Simone Judith Correia, Additional Government Advocate for
Respondents No.1 and 2.
Page 3 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mr. Somnath B. Karpe, Advocate with Ms. Samiksha
Vaigankar, Advocate for Respondent No.3.
Mr. Hanumant D. Naik, Advocate with Ms. Divya Naik and Ms.
Dipti Kambli, Advocates for Respondent No.4.
WITH
MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 494 OF 2026
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 1073 OF 2026
1. Damodar Ramnath Naik, son of
Ramnath B. Naik, aged 56 years,
married, businessman, Resident
of Flat No.311, 3rd Floor,
Ashirwad Bldg, Mestabhat,
Margao, South Goa, Goa 403601.
2.Dhananjay Raghuvir Mayekar,
son of Raghuvir Dhananjay
Mayekar, aged 59 years, married,
businessman, Resident of
H.No.134, Malbhat, Behind Sai
Baba Temple, Margao, South
Goa, Goa 403601. … Applicants.
IN
Versus
1. Shitesh More, aged 30 years,
Resident of 1/146/ILL, St.
Jerome Wado, Xelpem, Duler,
Mapusa, Goa. … Petitioner.
Versus
1. State of Goa, Through the Chief
Secretary, Having office at the
Secretariat, Porvorim, Goa -
403521.
Page 4 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
2.Director, Directorate of
Municipal Administration,
Panaji, Goa-403001.
3.Commissioner, State Election
Commissioner, Altinho, Panaji-
Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Shivan Desai, Advocate with Ms. Riya Amonkar, Advocate
for the Applicants.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 1071 OF 2026
Trajano D’Mello, son of Mr. Agricio
D’Mello, married, aged 77 years,
Indian National, National
Spokesperson Trinmool Congress,
R/o: Peddem, Mapusa, Goa. … Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Goa, Through the Chief
Secretary, Secretariat, Porvorim,
Goa.
2.Director, Directorate of
Municipal Administration,
Panaji, Goa-403001.
3.Goa State Election Commission,
Altinho, Panaji-Goa.
4.Goa State Commission For
Backward Classes, Altinho,
Panaji Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Abhijit Gosavi, Advocate with Ms. Krupa Naik, and Mr.
Gaurang Kerkar, Advocates for the Petitioner.
Page 5 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mr. Devidas J. Pangam, Advocate General with Mr. Neehal
Vernekar, Additional Government Advocate for Respondents
No.1 and 2.
Mr. Somnath B. Karpe, Advocate with Mr. Anand Shirodkar and
Ms. Sonali Gaonkar, Advocates for Respondent No.3.
Mr. Hanumant D. Naik, Advocate with Ms. Divya Naik and Ms.
Dipti Kambli, Advocates for Respondent No.4.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 1072 OF 2026
Vallabh P. Prabhudessai, aged 53
years, Resident of House no.326-2,
Near Police Station, Cusmon,
Biptimon, Quepem, South Goa –
403705. … Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Goa, Through the Chief
Secretary, Secretariat, Porvorim,
Goa.
2.Director, Directorate of
Municipal Administration,
Panaji, Goa-403001.
3.The Commissioner, State Election
Commissioner, Altinho, Panaji-
Goa.
4.Goa State Commission For
Backward Classes, Office at
Altinho, Panaji Goa. … Respondents
Mr. Gaurish Agni, Advocate with Mr. Yash Naik, Mr. Kishan
Kavlekar, Mr. Madhav Cuncoliencar, Ms. Ruchika Mishra, Ms.
L. Correia and Ms. Priyadarshani B., Advocates for the Petitioner.
Page 6 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mr. Devidas J. Pangam, Advocate General with Mr. Shubham
Priolkar, Additional Government Advocate for Respondents No.1
and 2.
Mr. Somnath B. Karpe, Advocate with Mr. Anand Shirodkar and
Ms. Riddhi Shirodkar, Advocates for Respondent No.3.
Mr. Hanumant D. Naik, Advocate with Ms. Divya Naik and Ms.
Dipti Kambli, Advocates for Respondent No.4.
CORAM : VALMIKI MENEZES &
HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.
Reserved on : 5th AUGUST 2026.
Pronounced on : 25th AUGUST 2026.
JUDGMENT: (Per HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J.)
1. Registry to waive office objections and register the matters.
2. These Writ Petitions raise an important question concerning the
constitutional obligation to ensure timely elections to Municipal
Councils and the manner in which that obligation is to be fulfilled
when, before the elections could be held, the statutory framework
governing the composition, delimitation and reservation of wards
itself came to be altered by the State Legislature. The controversy has
arisen in relation to the general elections to eleven Municipal Councils
in the State of Goa, which were constituted pursuant to elections held
during March and April 2021 and whose respective terms came to an
end during March, April and May 2026. Article 243U of the
Constitution required the elections for constituting the succeeding
Municipal Councils to be completed before expiry of their respective
duration. The elections, however, could not be held within that period
Page 7 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
and, therefore upon expiry of term the State Government had
appointed Administrators to administer the functioning of these
Municipal Councils.
3. Before the elections to these Municipal Councils could be held, the
Governor of Goa promulgated the Goa Municipalities (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2026 (Ordinance No. 4 of 2026) on 22 April 2026, which
was published in the Official Gazette on 23 April 2026. The Ordinance
brought about amendments to the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 and,
amongst other changes it also altered the statutory regime governing
the composition of Municipal Councils and the exercise of delimitation
and reservation of wards. The intervention of the Ordinance at this
stage assumes significance because, by then, the State Election
Commission had already initiated several preparatory steps towards
holding the ensuing municipal elections under the law as it stood prior
to the amendment.
4. The Petitioners have approached this Court essentially on the premise
that the constitutional command contained in Article 243U could not
have been permitted to remain unfulfilled by introducing a new
statutory exercise at a stage when the elections had already become
due or were shortly to become due. In some of the petitions, the
constitutional validity of the Ordinance itself has been questioned on
the touchstone of Articles 14, 213 and 243U of the Constitution of
India. An alternative case has also been advanced that, even if the
Ordinance is otherwise constitutionally valid, it ought not to be
applied to the elections which, according to the Petitioners, were
required to have been completed under the pre-existing statutory
Page 8 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
regime. The consequential relief sought is that the elections be
conducted within a time-bound period based on the delimitation and
electoral exercise which had already been undertaken before the
Ordinance came into force.
5. One of the Petitions subsequently carried the challenge further when,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the State Election
Commission, on 21 May 2026, declared the earlier process of
delimitation of municipal wards initiated in March 2026 as null and
void. The Petitioner therein has questioned that decision as well and
contends that an exercise which had already substantially progressed
towards holding the elections could not have been abandoned merely
because the statutory regime was subsequently altered.
6. The controversy before us, however, cannot be examined merely by
asking whether the elections ought to have been held before the terms
of the Municipal Councils expired. There can be little debate about the
constitutional command contained in Article 243U of the
Constitution. The more difficult question arises because the elections,
though constitutionally required to have been completed within that
period, were not in fact held and, before they could thereafter be
conducted, the law governing the exercise itself stood amended. The
Court is consequently confronted with the operation of two
constitutional considerations which cannot be examined in isolation.
On the one hand, is the obligation imposed by Article 243U of the
Constitution that democratic governance through an elected
Municipality should not be interrupted by avoidable delay in
conducting elections. On the other, the elections which are ultimately
Page 9 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
held must conform to the other provisions contained in Part IX-A of
the Constitution and to a statutory regime which continues to remain
in force unless its constitutional validity is successfully assailed.
7. It is this circumstance which distinguishes the present controversy
from an ordinary case where elections have been postponed merely
because of executive inaction or administrative delay. The Petitioners
contend that the subsequent legislative intervention cannot be
permitted to defeat a constitutional timetable which had already
become operative. The State, on the other hand, maintains that once
the law has validly been amended, neither the State Election
Commission nor this Court can direct that the elections be conducted
by disregarding that law without first holding the amended provisions
unconstitutional. The State Election Commission is therefore placed
under the simultaneous constitutional obligation of conducting the
elections at the earliest and of conducting them in accordance with the
law which presently governs those elections.
8. The issue, therefore, is not capable of being resolved by treating Article
243U of the Constitution as operating independently of the remaining
constitutional provisions governing municipalities, nor can the
constitutional timetable prescribed by Article 243U of the Constitution
be rendered ineffective merely because a subsequent statutory
exercise requires time for its implementation. The Constitution
requires both commands to operate. The real question before us is
whether, and in what manner, they can be harmonised so that the
amended statutory regime is given its legitimate operation without
Page 10 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
permitting its implementation to result in an indefinite or avoidable
postponement of Election of the Municipal Councils.
9. It is in this background that these Petitions will have to be considered.
Before we proceed to examine the constitutional questions which arise
for determination and the rival submissions advanced before us, it
would be appropriate to notice separately the nature of each petition,
the reliefs sought therein and the material facts on which the
respective Petitioners have approached this Court. Though the
Petitions converge upon the common question concerning the
impending elections to the Municipal Councils and the effect of the
2026 Ordinance upon those elections, the factual foundation and the
reliefs sought in all of them are not identical. Those distinctions
require to be noticed before the common constitutional controversy is
taken up for consideration.
10.Writ Petition No. 1073 of 2026 has been filed by Mr. Shitesh More, a
resident and voter of Mapusa Municipal Council, who states that he is
desirous of contesting the ensuing election to the Mapusa Municipal
Council. The petition was instituted on 27 April 2026, shortly after
promulgation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance,
2026, and directly questions the validity of that Ordinance.
11. The reliefs sought in this petition substantially correspond with the
first three reliefs in Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2026, although this
petition does not contain the subsequent challenge to the State
Election Commission's decision dated 21 May 2026. Since the exact
reliefs define the scope of this petition, they are reproduced below:
Page 11 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
“a) for a Writ of Certiorari or any other Order or Direction in the
nature of Certiorari quashing and setting aside the Goa
Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 for being been ultra
vires of Articles 14, 213, 243U of the Constitution of India; or
b) In the alternate declare that the Impugned Ordinance as
inapplicable to the General Elections of the 11 Municipal councils
whose tenure had already expired prior to its promulgation and
consequently direct the respondents to conduct elections on the
basis of the pre-existing delimitation and electoral framework, in a
time bound manner.
c) For writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to forthwith
initiate and complete the election process to the 11 Municipal
councils in the State of Goa in a time bound manner as may be
prescribed by this Hon’ble Court.
d) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present Writ Petition,
this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the operation and
implementation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2026 consequently directing the Respondents to
forthwith notify the election schedule for the 11 Municipal Councils
without being impeded by the Impugned Ordinance.
e) Ex-parte ad interim relief(s) in terms of prayer clause ‘d’.”
12. The factual foundation of this petition substantially overlaps with the
common background already noticed. What is additionally
emphasised by this Petitioner is the manner in which the municipal
elections had been conducted in the year 2021. He pleads that the
terms of the Municipal Councils had then expired before the elections
were held and that Administrators had been appointed pending the
Page 12 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
election process. The process of delimitation and reservation
subsequently became the subject matter of proceedings before this
Court and the Supreme Court, following which the elections to the
eleven Municipal Councils were ultimately conducted in two phases
during March and April 2021. The Petitioner relies upon this earlier
history to contend that the authorities were fully aware of the
constitutional requirement of planning and completing the next round
of municipal elections before expiry of the succeeding five-year term.
13. The Petitioner further pleads that, notwithstanding this earlier
experience, the election exercise for the present term was not initiated
sufficiently in advance and that, when the tenure of some of the
Municipal Councils expired, Administrators were appointed by
notification dated 31 March 2026 in respect of Bicholim, Curchorem-
Cacora, Canacona, Pernem, Cuncolim and Valpoi Municipal Councils.
According to the Petitioner, the Ordinance which followed on 22 April
2026 introduced a new procedure requiring fresh delimitation,
objections, empirical data and reservation exercises and thereby
created a statutory process which, if followed, would postpone the
elections considerably beyond the constitutional dates on which they
ought to have been completed.
14. A distinct factual circumstance relied upon in this petition is that,
during approximately the same period, other electoral exercises within
the State were undertaken. The Petitioner refers to the Goa Rural Zilla
Panchayat elections held in December 2025, by-elections to vacant
Village Panchayat wards held on 8 March 2026, the general election to
the Corporation of the City of Panaji held in March 2026 and the
Page 13 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
proposed by-election to the Ponda Assembly Constituency. On this
basis, he alleges that the delay in conducting elections to the eleven
Municipal Councils cannot be explained merely by a general inability
of the election machinery to conduct elections during that period.
15. The constitutional challenge in this petition is founded principally upon
four propositions. The Petitioner contends that the Ordinance defeats
the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution by altering the
electoral framework after the elections had become due and that the
timing and consequence of the Ordinance disclose a colourable
exercise of power intended to prolong administration through
appointed Administrators; that the condition of immediate necessity
contemplated by Article 213 of the Constitution is violated ; and that
the amended procedure is manifestly arbitrary because it introduces
substantial periods for completing various stages of the process
without ensuring that the elections themselves are completed within
the constitutional period.
16. The alternative case pleaded by the Petitioner is that, even if the
Ordinance is otherwise valid, it should not govern elections which had
already fallen due before its promulgation. On that footing, the
Petitioner seeks completion of the elections under the pre-existing
delimitation and electoral framework rather than striking down the
amended regime for all future municipal elections.
17. Writ Petition No. 1071 of 2026 has been filed by Mr. Trajano D’Mello.
He states that he is a citizen of India and a resident of the State of Goa
and that he is the National Spokesperson of the Trinamool Congress
Page 14 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Party, and that he has remained actively involved in public and
political life in the State for several decades.
18. The principal relief in this petition is a direction to the Respondents to
forthwith initiate and complete the election process to the eleven
Municipal Councils within a time to be prescribed by this Court. The
challenge to the Ordinance is also raised, followed by an alternative
prayer that the Ordinance should not govern the elections which had
already become due. The prayers in the petition read as follows:—
“a) For writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to forthwith
initiate and complete the election process to the 11 Municipal
councils in the State of Goa in a time bound manner as may be
prescribed by this Hon’ble Court.
b) for a Writ of Certiorari or any other Order or Direction in the
nature of Certiorari quashing and setting aside the Goa
Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 for being ultra vires
of Articles 14, 213, 243U of the Constitution of India; or
c) In the alternate declare that the Impugned Ordinance as
inapplicable to the General Elections of the 11 Municipal councils
whose tenure had already expired prior to its promulgation and
consequently direct the Respondents to conduct elections on the
basis of the pre-existing delimitation and electoral framework, in a
time bound manner.
19. The factual foundation of this petition substantially follows the
common history already noticed and need not be repeated in detail.
Page 15 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
20. The Petitioner additionally pleads that, despite the knowledge of
Elections falling due, the authorities failed to complete the election
process before the expiry of the respective terms and Administrators
again came to be appointed in respect of six Municipal Councils by
notification dated 31 March 2026. His central grievance is that the
Ordinance was promulgated thereafter, at a stage when the
constitutional period for some of the Municipal Councils had already
expired and for the remaining Municipal Councils terms were shortly
to expire. According to him, the new procedure introduced by the
Ordinance would require a fresh exercise of delimitation, collection
of empirical data, reservation, invitation and consideration of
objections, and publication of the requisite notifications, with the
inevitable consequence that the elections would stand postponed for
a substantial further period.
21. What assumes particular significance in this petition, is the emphasis
placed upon the time at which the Ordinance was promulgated. The
Petitioner does not contend that the State Legislature lacks
competence to make a law governing delimitation or reservation of
municipal wards. His pleaded case is that the law, when brought into
force after the constitutional obligation to hold the elections had
already arisen, could not legitimately be used to prolong the failure
to comply with Article 243U of the Constitution. It is on this basis
that he alleges that the impugned exercise constitutes a colourable
exercise of power and a fraud upon the constitutional mandate.
22. The Petitioner has also questioned the invocation of Article 213 of the
Constitution on the ground that the condition requiring
Page 16 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
circumstances which rendered immediate action was absent.
According to him, the impending expiry of the Municipal Councils
was known well in advance and the situation which arose in April
2026 was the result of the authorities having failed to take timely
steps to conduct the elections. He therefore contends that such pre-
existing inaction could not itself furnish the immediate necessity
required for resorting to the Ordinance-making power.
23. The alternative case in this petition proceeds on a narrower footing.
The Petitioner submits that, even if the Ordinance is otherwise held
to be valid, it cannot be made applicable to municipal elections which
had already fallen due prior to its promulgation. He therefore seeks a
direction that these elections be conducted based on the pre-existing
delimitation and electoral framework.
24. Writ Petition No. 300 of 2026 stands on a somewhat different footing
from the Petitions noticed above because it was instituted prior to
promulgation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance,
2026. The Petitioner, Ms. Nimesia Faleiro, was elected in the year
2021 from Ward No. XXIII of the Margao Municipal Council and
states that she intended to contest the ensuing municipal election
which was then expected to be held in April or May 2026.
25. The immediate cause for approaching this Court was the absence of
any notification identifying the wards which would be reserved for
women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward
Classes, as also the wards which would remain open for the general
category. According to the Petitioner, unless this exercise was
Page 17 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
completed sufficiently in advance, a prospective candidate would
have no reasonable opportunity to know the constituency from which
he or she could contest and prepare for the election. She therefore
sought directions requiring publication of the reservation and
rotation of wards well before commencement of the election process.
26. The Petition, however, was not confined to a direction for early
publication of the reservation order. The Petitioner also questioned
certain provisions of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 as they then
stood. In particular, she challenged the proviso to Section 10(1),
which permitted the order concerning delimitation and reservation
to be issued as late as seven days before notification of the general
election. She further challenged that part of Section 10(1) which
required the State Election Commission to act “in consultation with
the Government”, as well as Sections 11(1) and 11(3) insofar as those
provisions prescribed the period within which the list of voters was
to be published before nomination of candidates.
27. Since these challenges were raised independent of the Ordinance and
concern the statutory framework which existed before the present
controversy assumed its subsequent form, it would be appropriate to
reproduce the prayers in full. The Petitioner has prayed as follows:—
“A. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the
Proviso to Section 10(1) of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 (which
was inserted by way of Section 3 of the Goa Municipalities
(Amendment) Act, 2021 (Goa Act 1 of 2021)) is unconstitutional to
the extent that it prescribes that 7 days’ notice is sufficient between
Page 18 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
passing the order under Section 10(1) of the Municipalities Act, 1968
and the date of notification of general elections.
B. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that part of
Section 10(1) of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 (which as amended
by way of Section 3 of Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 2022
(Goa Act 14 of 2022)) is unconstitutional insofar as it uses the words
“in consultation with the Government”.
C. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that part of
Section 11(1) and 11(3) of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 is
unconstitutional insofar as it respectively prescribes only a
minimum of one month and 10 days’ period between the date fixed
for publishing the list of voters and the last date for nomination of
candidates.
D. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant a writ of mandamus and
direct the Respondents to issue / publish the order under Section 10
of the Municipalities Act fixing for the Municipal Council of Margao
the number and the extent of the wards into which the area shall be
divided, and further to specify the seats which are reserved (for
women, SC, ST, OBC, etc.) in such a manner that there is at least a
two month period before the election process commences for the
upcoming 2026 Margao Municipal elections.
E. This Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant a writ of mandamus and
direct the Respondents to formulate a policy / guidelines / norms
for exercising power under Section 10 of the Municipalities Act for
rotation and reservation of seats for municipality elections; OR
ALTERNATELY; this Hon’ble Court lay down guidelines for
exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Municipalities Act for
rotation and reservation of seats for municipality elections.”
Page 19 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
28. The Petitioner relies upon the manner in which reservation
notifications had been issued in earlier municipal elections to
demonstrate why advance publication was necessary. She refers to the
municipal election held in the year 2015, when the reserved wards
were notified only shortly before commencement of the nomination
process. She also refers to the elections held in the year 2021, when
reservation notifications became the subject matter of litigation before
this Court and subsequently before the Supreme Court. According to
her, the experience of these earlier elections showed that publication
of reservation at the last moment not only places candidates at a
disadvantage but also leaves very little time for public scrutiny or
judicial challenge before the election process formally commences.
29. Acting upon this apprehension, the Petitioner addressed a
representation dated 13 February 2026 calling upon the respondents to
declare the reservation and rotation of wards sufficiently in advance.
The State Election Commission replied on 19 February 2026 stating, in
substance, that the election process would be conducted in accordance
with the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 and the applicable Election Rules.
The Petitioner considered this response inadequate because it did not
indicate when the reservation exercise would actually be completed or
published.
30. The challenge to the seven-day proviso was founded upon the
submission that such a short interval between publication of the
reservation order and notification of the election did not provide a
meaningful opportunity either to prospective candidates to organise
their candidature or to affected persons to question the delimitation or
Page 20 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
reservation before the election process commenced. The Petitioner
relied upon the earlier decision of this Court in Dnyaneshwar Narso
Naik v. State of Goa1 to contend that the reservation exercise ought
ordinarily to be completed substantially in advance of the election
notification.
31. The Petitioner also questioned the statutory requirement of
consultation with the Government. Her case was that, once the
constitutional superintendence, direction and control of municipal
elections stood vested in the State Election Commission, a statutory
arrangement which required the Commission to consult the
Government in relation to delimitation and reservation created the
possibility of executive influence over an electoral exercise which ought
to remain within the independent domain of the Commission.
32. Thus, when this petition was instituted, the dispute before the Court
was principally concerned with the timing, transparency and
independence of the delimitation and reservation exercise under the
statutory framework then in force. The subsequent promulgation of
the Ordinance fundamentally altered that framework while the
petition was pending and thereby brought this petition into the larger
group of matters now before us. The original challenge raised by the
Petitioner must nevertheless be kept distinct because it explains both
the circumstances in which the electoral process was already under
judicial consideration before 22 April 2026 and the historical
1
2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3903
Page 21 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
background against which the subsequent amendments came to
operate.
33. Writ Petition No. 1069 of 2026 was also instituted before
promulgation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance,
2026 and, therefore, has to be understood in the statutory setting
which existed at the time when the Petitioner approached this Court.
The Petitioner, Ms. Vaishali Sanjay Barde, is a resident of Khorlim,
Mapusa and describes herself as a prospective woman candidate
intending to contest the forthcoming election to the Mapusa Municipal
Council.
34. The grievance raised by the Petitioner is considerably narrower than
the challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 300 of 2026. She does not, in
the petition as originally filed, seek to invalidate any provision of the
Goa Municipalities Act, 1968. Her case is that the reservation and
rotation of wards for the Mapusa Municipal Council ought to have
been notified sufficiently in advance so that prospective candidates
could know the wards from which they would be eligible to contest and
could accordingly prepare for the election. The petition was
consequently presented on 1 April 2026 seeking a writ of mandamus
for immediate publication of the reservation and rotation notification.
35. Since the relief sought in this Petition is precise and substantially
defines the controversy with which the Petitioner originally
approached this Court, the prayers are reproduced as they appear in
the Petition:—
Page 22 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
“a) To Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ,
directing the Respondents to immediately issue and publish the
notification providing for the reservation and/or rotation of
reserved seats for the wards of the Mapusa Municipal Council.
b) Any other relief this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interest of
justice.
c) Pass such other and further orders as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper.”
36. The Petitioner states that the term of the existing Mapusa Municipal
Council was approaching its end and that the succeeding elected body
was required to assume office upon completion of that term. In
anticipation of the ensuing election, she addressed a representation
dated 4 March 2026 to the Goa State Election Commission requesting
immediate issuance of the notification concerning reservation and
rotation of wards. The State Election Commission replied on 18 March
2026 stating that the election to the Mapusa Municipal Council would
be conducted in accordance with the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 and
the Goa Municipalities (Election) Rules, 1969 as amended from time to
time. The Petitioner contends that this response did not answer the
specific request as to when the reservation notification would actually
be issued.
37. The foundation of the Petitioner's grievance lies in the earlier judicial
consideration of the manner in which reservation notifications had
been issued in municipal and local body elections in Goa. The Petitioner
contend that reservation and rotation ought to be notified sufficiently
in advance of commencement of the election process. She submits that
Page 23 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
notifications concerning delimitation and reservation would be issued
at least three weeks before the election schedule.
38. According to the Petitioner, the object of advance publication is not
merely administrative convenience. She asserts that a prospective
candidate must know the constituency from which he or she can contest
before the election process formally commences and that withholding
the reservation or rotation of wards until the last moment deprives
candidates of a reasonable opportunity to prepare and campaign in the
constituency ultimately allotted to them. She further apprehends that
delayed publication creates uncertainty and gives rise to allegations of
manipulation at the final stage of the electoral exercise.
39. It is important to notice that, when this petition was filed, the
Ordinance which subsequently became the principal subject of
challenge in the other Petitions had not yet been promulgated. The
Petitioner had approached this Court on the footing that the
Respondents were bound to complete the reservation and rotation
exercise under the law then in force and that their failure to do so was
delaying the municipal election. The subsequent legislative change did
not create the original cause of action in this petition. It intervened
while that cause of action was already being examined by the Court and
materially altered the statutory process which the Petitioner had sought
to compel the Respondents to complete.
40. The last of the five Petitions in this group is Writ Petition No. 1072 of
2026 filed by Mr. Vallabh P. Prabhudessai, a resident of Quepem. This
Petition was instituted after promulgation of the Goa Municipalities
Page 24 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 and, apart from questioning the
constitutional validity of the Ordinance and seeking enforcement of the
mandate contained in Article 243U of the Constitution, raises an
additional challenge which assumes some significance in the factual
development of the present proceedings. The Petitioner has specifically
challenged the subsequent decision of the State Election Commission
dated 21 May 2026 by which the delimitation exercise undertaken in
March 2026 was declared null and void. According to the Petitioner,
substantial steps towards holding the elections had already been taken
under the law then prevailing before the Ordinance intervened and the
State Election Commission could not thereafter render that entire
exercise infructuous.
41. In view of this additional challenge, and since the precise nature of the
reliefs sought in each of these Petitions would have a bearing upon the
questions which fall for our consideration, it would be appropriate to
reproduce the substantive prayers made in this petition. They read
thus:—
“A. For a Writ of Certiorari or any other Order or Direction in the
nature of Certiorari quashing and setting aside the Goa
Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 for being been ultra
vires of Articles 14, 213, 243U of the Constitution of India; or
B. In the alternate declare that the Impugned Ordinance as
inapplicable to the General Elections of the 11 Municipal councils
whose tenure had already expired prior to its promulgation and
consequently direct the Respondents to conduct elections on the
basis of the pre-existing delimitation and electoral framework, in a
time bound manner.
Page 25 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
C. For writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to forthwith
initiate and complete the election process to the 11 Municipal
councils in the State of Goa in a time bound manner as may be
prescribed by this Hon’ble Court.
D. For a declaration that the decision of the Goa State Election
Commission, declaring null and void, the entire process of
delimitation of municipal wards initiated in March, 2026 and
rendering the entire delimitation exercise undertaken in fructuous
and as invalid as unconstitutional, ultravires the provisions of the
Constitution of India and The Goa Municipalities Act, and as being
bad in law.”
42. The Petitioner traces the controversy to the previous general elections
to the Municipal Councils held in the year 2021. He refers to the expiry
of the earlier municipal terms, appointment of Administrators, the
subsequent delimitation and reservation exercise, and the litigation
which arose in relation to the reservation notifications concerning
Sanguem, Mormugao, Mapusa, Margao and Quepem Municipal
Councils. The Petitioner states that the elections were eventually held
in two phases, namely on 20 March 2021 in respect of Pernem,
Bicholim, Valpoi, Cuncolim, Curchorem-Cacora and Canacona
Municipal Councils and on 23 April 2021 in respect of the remaining
affected Municipal Councils. He relies upon these circumstances to
contend that the Respondents were fully aware of the period during
which the succeeding municipal terms would expire and consequently
of the constitutional requirement that the next elections be completed
before such expiry.
Page 26 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
43. The immediate factual basis of this petition, however, lies in the steps
which were actually taken by the State Election Commission during
February and March 2026. The Petitioner pleads that, by an order
dated 27 February 2026, the State Election Commission initiated the
process for division of the municipal areas into wards for the general
elections of 2026 and appointed Electoral Registration Officers and
Assistant Electoral Registration Officers. Thereafter, by an order dated
9 March 2026, the Commission adopted the electoral rolls of the
Legislative Assembly as they stood on 1 January 2026 and had been
published on 21 February 2026 for the purpose of division of the
municipal areas into wards. This was followed by an order dated 25
March 2026 fixing the number of councillors to be elected to the eleven
Municipal Councils.
44. The process thereafter proceeded further when the State Election
Commission issued a public notice dated 30 March 2026 informing
the public that the draft extent of the wards into which the respective
municipal areas were proposed to be divided had been kept open for
objections. The Petitioner states that he participated in this exercise as
a voter of Ward No. 8 of the Quepem Municipal Council and, along
with several other residents, submitted objections to the draft ward
plan before the Electoral Registration Officer on 4 April 2026. Thus,
according to the Petitioner, this was not a case where no preparatory
exercise towards the ensuing municipal elections had commenced
before promulgation of the Ordinance. The delimitation exercise had
progressed to the stage where the proposed ward structure had been
placed in the public domain and objections thereto had actually been
received.
Page 27 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
45. While this exercise was underway, the Goa Municipalities
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 was promulgated by the Governor on
22 April 2026 and published in the Official Gazette on 23 April 2026.
The Petitioner contends that the substituted Section 10 introduced an
entirely different statutory sequence under which delimitation was
required to be undertaken afresh, objections and suggestions were to
be invited and considered, empirical data concerning political
backwardness was thereafter to be obtained from the Goa State
Commission for Backward Classes, and the process of reservation was
then required to pass through another stage of draft publication,
objections and final notification before the election could be declared.
It is on this basis that the Petitioner alleges that application of the
amended procedure to elections which had already fallen due would
substantially postpone their conduct and defeat the mandate
contained in Article 243U.
46. The Petitioner has placed particular emphasis upon the events which
followed promulgation of the Ordinance. On 21 May 2026, the State
Election Commission declared the delimitation process initiated in
March 2026 null and void, with the result that the steps taken under
the earlier statutory regime were brought to an end. The Petitioner
questions this decision independently of his challenge to the
Ordinance and contends that the State Election Commission could not
invalidate an electoral exercise which had already progressed
substantially merely because the statutory framework was
subsequently amended.
Page 28 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
47. Insofar as the Quepem Municipal Council itself is concerned, the
Petitioner has also placed on record the notification dated 8 May 2026
by which an Administrator was appointed with effect from 10 May
2026 upon expiry of the term of the elected Municipal Council on 9
May 2026. Significantly, the notification itself records that the general
election to the Quepem and Sanguem Municipal Councils was to be
held in May 2026 and that the Government had approved the proposal
of the State Election Commission to hold those elections during that
month. The Petitioner relies upon this circumstance to contend that
the election was contemplated within the constitutionally prescribed
period before the subsequent statutory developments intervened.
48. The constitutional challenge raised in this petition is therefore
founded upon three connected circumstances. The first is the alleged
failure of the constitutional and statutory authorities to complete the
municipal elections before expiry of the respective terms despite the
mandate contained in Article 243U of the Constitution. The second is
the promulgation of the Ordinance after substantial steps towards the
elections had already been undertaken, which the Petitioner
characterises as a colourable exercise of legislative power and also
challenges on the ground that the circumstances necessary for exercise
of power under Article 213 of the Constitution did not exist. The third
is the subsequent decision of the State Election Commission to
abandon the earlier delimitation exercise and commence the process
under the amended statutory regime.
49. The Petitioner has, however, also formulated an alternative case
which becomes material in view of the nature of the controversy before
us. He submits that even if the Ordinance is otherwise held to be
Page 29 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutionally valid, it ought not to be applied to municipal elections
which had already fallen due before its promulgation and that those
elections should instead be completed based on the pre-existing
delimitation and electoral framework. It is therefore apparent that,
although this petition seeks invalidation of the Ordinance, the ultimate
object sought to be achieved by the Petitioner, even in the alternative,
is the earliest possible restoration of elected municipal bodies in place
of administration through appointed Administrators.
50. During the pendency of Writ Petition No. 1241 of 2026, Miscellaneous
Civil Application No. 1756 of 2026 came to be filed by Mr. Damodar
Ramnath Naik and Mr. Dhananjay Raghuvir Mayekar seeking
permission to intervene in the proceedings. The application was filed
on 29 June 2026 after the challenge to the Goa Municipalities
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 had already been placed before the
Court.
51. The applicants state that they wish to participate in future municipal
elections and contend that the outcome of the present proceedings
would therefore have a direct bearing upon their electoral rights and
candidature. Their intervention is founded upon a perspective which
is materially different from that advanced by the Petitioners
challenging the Ordinance. According to the applicants, the amended
Section 10 provides a statutory mechanism for obtaining empirical
data concerning political backwardness before reservation is made in
favour of the Other Backward Classes. They plead that accurate and
reliable data concerning the representation and political
backwardness of such classes was not adequately available during
Page 30 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
earlier elections and that the procedure introduced by the Ordinance
is intended to remedy that deficiency. They therefore contend that
implementation of the amended statutory regime would promote
transparency and fairness in the reservation process rather than
constitute an impediment to the electoral process.
52. The applicants have further pleaded that, since they belong to the
category which may directly benefit from reservation made on the
basis of the contemporaneous empirical exercise contemplated by the
amended law, any order which sets aside the Ordinance or directs that
the elections be held without giving effect to the amended provisions
would directly affect their interests. It is on this basis that they seek an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings and assist the Court
while considering the challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1241 of
2026.
53. Having noticed the individual Petitions and the reliefs sought therein,
it is now necessary to place on record the subsequent developments
which occurred after the controversy reached this Court. These
developments assume considerable importance because the electoral
process did not remain static during the pendency of the Petitions. The
State Election Commission continued to act under the amended
statutory regime and, by the time the hearing substantially progressed,
several stages contemplated by the amended Sections 9 and 10 of the
Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 had either been completed or had
reached an advanced stage.
Page 31 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
54. The record shows that, immediately after the Ordinance was
published in the Official Gazette on 23 April 2026, the Department of
Urban Development addressed a communication dated 24 April 2026
to the State Election Commission forwarding the Ordinance and
calling upon it to take necessary action in accordance with the
amended provisions. The State Election Commission thereafter
addressed the Directorate of Planning, Statistics and Evaluation on 28
April 2026 seeking municipal-area-wise population figures for the
eleven Municipal Councils in view of the change brought about by the
Ordinance. The requisite population figures, based upon the Census of
2011, were furnished to the Commission on 29 April 2026.
55. The population figures so received became the foundation for the
fresh exercise under amended Section 9 because the Ordinance had
substituted “population” for “voters” and had altered the numerical
benchmark from 2,500 to 3,000 for determining the number of
elected Councillors. On 7 May 2026, the State Election Commission
forwarded the matter to the Government for the consultation required
for fixing the number of elected Councillors under the amended
population-based framework. It was in this setting that the earlier
delimitation exercise undertaken under the unamended law ceased to
be pursued.
56. On 21 May 2026, the State Election Commission formally declared the
earlier process of delimitation of municipal wards initiated in March
2026 to be null and void in view of the amended statutory regime. The
legality of this decision has been specifically questioned in Writ
Petition No. 1572 of 2026. For the purpose of the present narration,
Page 32 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
however, what is material is that, from that date onwards, the
Commission proceeded on the basis that the ensuing elections would
have to be conducted by completing the exercise contemplated by the
amended Sections 9 and 10.
57. The amended Section 10 contemplates a structured sequence. After
the number of wards is fixed under Section 10(1), the State Election
Commission is required to undertake delimitation under Section
10(2). A draft delimitation must then be published under Section 10(3)
inviting objections and suggestions from the public for a period of
thirty days. After considering such objections and completing
consultation with the Government, the final notification of
delimitation is required to be issued. Only thereafter is empirical data
pertaining to political backwardness to be obtained from the Goa State
Commission for Backward Classes under Section 10(4). Upon receipt
of such data, a draft reservation notification is required to be published
under Section 10(5), followed by consideration of objections and
issuance of the final reservation notification under Section 10(6).
Section 10(7) thereafter provides that the election may be declared
after expiry of thirty days from publication of the final reservation
notification.
58. During the hearing, the State Election Commission placed on record
that the stages contemplated by Sections 10(1) and 10(2) had already
been completed and that the draft delimitation contemplated by
Section 10(3) had also been published. The Commission informed the
Court that the statutory period of thirty days for filing objections to the
draft delimitation was then running. It was therefore apparent that the
Page 33 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
controversy had moved substantially beyond the position which
existed when the Petitions were originally instituted.
59. It was in this background that, during the hearing, we called upon the
State Election Commission to place before us a precise stage-wise
statement indicating which periods prescribed by the amended law
were mandatory, which administrative steps could be compressed,
which stages could proceed simultaneously and what was the
minimum period within which the entire exercise could lawfully be
completed. The purpose of seeking this information was not to rewrite
the statutory timetable, but to ascertain whether the outer periods
contemplated by the legislation necessarily had to be exhausted when
the elections had already crossed the constitutional dates
contemplated by Article 243U of the Constitution.
60. The State Election Commission thereafter placed a detailed chart
before the Court. The chart records that the thirty-day period for filing
objections to the draft delimitation is treated by the Commission as a
mandatory statutory period. After expiry of that period, the
Commission states that consideration of objections, finalisation of the
delimitation, consultation with the Government and publication of the
final delimitation notification can, if the consultation process is
completed expeditiously, be concluded within approximately three
weeks.
61. The next stage identified by the State Election Commission concerns
reservation in favour of the Other Backward Classes. Section 10(4)
requires empirical data pertaining to political backwardness to be
Page 34 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
obtained from the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes after
finalisation of delimitation. The State Election Commission fairly
stated in its chart that the time required for this exercise would depend
upon the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes because the
empirical material has to be furnished by that Commission. It was this
stage which initially remained without a definite statutory or
administrative timetable.
62. Once the requisite empirical data is received, the State Election
Commission proposes to publish the draft reservation notification.
The Commission treats the thirty-day period for inviting objections to
the draft reservation as mandatory. It has further estimated that
scrutiny of the objections, consultation with the Government and
publication of the final reservation notification can be completed
within approximately twenty days and consultation on the
Government side is also undertaken without delay.
63. The Commission has thereafter proceeded on the footing that Section
10(7) requires expiry of thirty days from the date of publication of the
final reservation notification before the elections can be declared.
After the election is declared, the actual election programme
comprising nomination, scrutiny, withdrawal, polling and declaration
of result is stated to require approximately twenty-five days.
Significantly, the State Election Commission has stated that, subject to
compliance with the minimum periods identified by it and timely
completion of consultation by the Government, there is no
constitutional or statutory impediment for completing the election
process within the timetable placed before this Court.
Page 35 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
64. The material placed by the State Election Commission also throws
light upon the position which would have obtained had the Ordinance
not intervened. The Commission states that, by 22 April 2026, the
draft delimitation under the then existing law had been prepared and
had been forwarded to the Government for consultation. According to
the Commission, subject to completion of that consultation and the
subsequent reservation exercise, the elections under the earlier regime
could have been concluded by the end of May 2026 or, at the latest,
during the first week of June 2026. We record this statement because
it is relevant to the extent to which the electoral process had
progressed before the change in law, though its legal effect will be
considered separately.
65. As the hearing progressed, it became apparent that the principal
uncertainty in the remaining timetable arose from the exercise
required to be undertaken by the Goa State Commission for Backward
Classes. The Commission was therefore impleaded in Writ Petition
No. 300 of 2026 and was called upon to place its position before this
Court. In the affidavit filed by its Member Secretary, the Commission
states that it is the dedicated Commission required to undertake the
contemporaneous, rigorous and empirical inquiry into the nature and
implications of political backwardness qua local bodies for the purpose
of reservation in favour of the Other Backward Classes.
66. The affidavit of the Backward Classes Commission assumes
importance because it clarifies the material which is already available
with it. The Commission states that the empirical inquiry will be
undertaken on the basis of the Census of 2011 and the survey report
Page 36 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
prepared by the Centre for Development, Planning and Research in
the year 2013 concerning the OBC, SC and ST population in the State
of Goa, including material relating to the eleven Municipal Councils
involved in these proceedings. The Commission thus does not suggest
that the exercise must begin with a fresh census or that no
foundational demographic material presently exists. The affidavit
further records that the Backward Classes Commission had earlier
considered it necessary to await instructions from the Government
and the State Election Commission before commencing the
contemporaneous empirical inquiry because the process of
delimitation was itself undergoing change. It thereafter stated, in view
of what transpired during the hearing before this Court on 4 August
2026, that it would commence the empirical exercise without awaiting
further directions from either the Government or the State Election
Commission and would proceed on the basis of the material already
available with it.
67. The significance of this development is that the empirical inquiry and
the delimitation exercise need not, in every respect, proceed one after
another. The Backward Classes Commission has accepted that
substantial work forming part of the contemporaneous empirical
inquiry can commence on the basis of municipality-wise material
already available with it even before the final ward boundaries are
communicated. The final application of that material to the wards
would necessarily depend upon the delimitation which is ultimately
notified, but the entire empirical exercise need not remain in abeyance
until that stage is reached. We are recording this only as a development
which emerged during the hearing. The constitutional significance of
Page 37 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
simultaneous performance of interdependent electoral functions will
be considered when we deal with the issues arising for determination.
68. There is one aspect of the record concerning the period required by
the Backward Classes Commission which requires care. During
hearing, different estimates were referred to while the precise
methodology and work involved were being examined. The affidavit
ultimately filed by the Commission states that it would require a
minimum period of thirty days for completing the
contemporaneous, rigorous and empirical inquiry in respect of the
eleven Municipalities, subject to availability of adequate staff and
resources. The Commission has also stated that it presently has limited
staff and that additional assistance may have to be provided by the
State whenever required. We shall therefore proceed based on the
period stated by the Commission in its affidavit rather than any earlier
tentative estimate referred to during the hearing.
69. The material placed before us consequently enables the remaining
process to be viewed in identifiable stages rather than as an open-
ended exercise. The statutory objection periods prescribed by the
amended Section 10 remain as provided by the Legislature. The
administrative time required for consideration of objections,
consultation and publication of notifications has been identified by the
State Election Commission and is capable of being undertaken within
compressed periods if the authorities act contemporaneously and with
due expedition. The empirical exercise required for OBC reservation
has also now been assigned a definite period by the Backward Classes
Commission and, more importantly, has already been directed to
Page 38 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
commence without awaiting completion of every remaining stage of
delimitation.
70. These developments have materially altered the practical context in
which the Petitions now fall to be decided. When some of the Petitions
were instituted, the apprehension expressed was that implementation
of the amended Section 10 could postpone the municipal elections for
an indefinite or substantially prolonged period. The record now before
us enables the Court to identify the exact statutory steps which
remains and the authority responsible for each step and the
approximate minimum period within which the administrative
components of those steps can be completed. The constitutional
question, however, remains whether this subsequent progress
sufficiently answers the infraction of Article 243U of the Constitution
and in what manner the Court should ensure that no further avoidable
delay occurs while preserving the operation of the law presently
occupying the field.
71. Before we proceed to record and consider the submissions advanced
on behalf of the State, the State Election Commission, the interveners
and the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes, we think it
appropriate to first notice the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions governing municipal elections, delimitation, reservation
and the duration of Municipalities. This would provide the necessary
framework for considering the rival submissions.
72. Part IX-A of the Constitution was introduced by the Constitution
(Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 with the object of giving
Page 39 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional status to institutions of urban local self-government.
Article 243P of the Constitution contains the definitions applicable to
this Part of the Constitution. Clause (g) defines “population” to mean
the population as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the
relevant figures have been published.
73. Article 243R of the Constitution deals with the composition of
Municipalities and provides that, save as otherwise provided in clause
(2), all seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by
direct election from the territorial constituencies in the municipal area
and, for that purpose, each municipal area shall be divided into
territorial constituencies to be known as wards. The provision reads
thus:—
“243R. Composition of Municipalities.—
(1) Save as provided in clause (2), all the seats in a Municipality
shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the
territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this
purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial
constituencies to be known as wards.”
74. Article 243T of the Constitution deals with reservation of seats in
Municipalities. Clauses (1) and (2) provide for reservation of seats for
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their
population in the municipal area and for reservation of not less than
one-third of such seats for women belonging to those categories.
Clause (3) provides for reservation of not less than one-third of the
total number of seats to be filled by direct election for women. Clause
(6), however, expressly enables the Legislature of a State to make
Page 40 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
provision for reservation of seats or offices of Chairpersons in favour
of backward classes of citizens.
75. Article 243U of the Constitution, which lies at the centre of the present
controversy, prescribes the duration of Municipalities and the time
within which elections are required to be completed. Insofar as
relevant, it provides:—
“243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc.—
(1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for
the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date
appointed for its first meeting and no longer:
Provided that a Municipality shall be given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard before its dissolution.
...
(3) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed,—
(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1);
(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of
its dissolution.”
76. Article 243ZA of the Constitution entrusts the constitutional
responsibility for municipal elections to the State Election
Commission. Clause (1) provides that the superintendence, direction
and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of,
all elections to the Municipalities shall vest in the State Election
Commission referred to in Article 243K of the Constitution. Clause (2),
at the same time, preserves the legislative power of the State
Legislature to make provisions with respect to all matters relating to,
Page 41 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
or in connection with, elections to Municipalities, subject to the
provisions of the Constitution.
77. The constitutional scheme therefore entrusts the conduct of municipal
elections to an independent constitutional authority while leaving it to
the State Legislature to prescribe the statutory framework governing
those elections. The exercise of either power remains subject to the
Constitution and to the mandate contained in Article 243U of the
Constitution that an election to constitute a Municipality shall be
completed before expiry of its five-year duration.
78. It is in the backdrop of these constitutional provisions that Sections 9
and 10 of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 assume significance.
Section 9 deals with the composition of Municipal Councils and the
determination of the number of elected Councillors, whereas Section
10 provides the machinery for division of the municipal area into
wards and reservation of seats. Both provisions underwent material
changes upon promulgation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2026. It would therefore be necessary to notice the
provisions as they stood immediately before the Ordinance and
thereafter the provisions substituted by the Ordinance.
79. Since the controversy substantially turns upon the changes brought
about in Sections 9 and 10 of the Goa Municipalities Act, 1968, it would
be appropriate to notice these provisions as they stood immediately
before promulgation of the Goa Municipalities (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2026 and thereafter the amendments introduced by the
Ordinance.
Page 42 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
80. Position immediately before the Ordinance.
Section 9, insofar as relevant for the present controversy, then read
thus:—
“9. Composition of Councils.—
(1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act, every Council shall
consist of Councillors elected at ward elections;
Provided that—
(1) in every Council, no less than (1/3) seats shall be reserved
for women;
(2) in every Council, seat shall also be reserved for Scheduled
Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class and for
woman belonging to Scheduled Caste, as the case may be, the
Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class as provided in
sub-section (2).
(2) The State Election Commission in consultation with the
Government shall from time to time by an order published in the
Official Gazette fix for each municipal area—
(a) the number of elected Councillors in accordance with the
following table:
(i) ‘A’ Class — The minimum number of elected Councillors
shall be 20, and for every 2500 of the voters in the municipal
area or part thereof above 50,000 there shall be one
additional elected Councillor, so, however, that the total
number of elected Councillors shall not exceed 27;
Page 43 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
(ii) ‘B’ Class — The minimum number of elected Councillor
shall be 12, and for every 2500 of the voters in the municipal
area or part thereof above 10,000 there shall be one
additional elected Councillor, so, however, that the total
number of elected Councillors shall not exceed 20;
(iii) the figure in (i) and (ii) shall be odd, if possible;
(iv) ‘C’ Class — The number of elected Councillors shall be 10.
(b) the number of seats, if any, to be reserved for the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes so that such number shall bear, as
nearly as may be, the same proportion to the number of elected
Councillors as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of the
Scheduled Tribes in the municipal area bears to the total
population of that area and not less than one-third of such seats
shall be reserved for women and such seats shall be allotted by
rotation to different wards in the Council.
(bb) the number of seats, if any, to be reserved for persons
belonging to the category of Other Backward Classes so that
such number shall be twenty seven percent of the number of
seats to be filled in through election in the Council and such seats
shall be allotted by rotation to different wards in the Council.
..
(3) The reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes made by an order under sub-section (2) shall cease to have
effect when the reservation of seats for those Castes and Tribes in
the House of the People ceases to have effect under the Constitution
of India:
Page 44 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall render any person
elected to any such reserved seat ineligible to continue as a
Councillor during the term of office for which he was duly elected
by reason only of the fact that the reservation of seats has so ceased
to have effect.
(4) Every order under sub-section (2) shall take effect for the
purposes of the next general election of the Council immediately
following after the date of the order.”
81. Section 10, as it then stood, provided as follows:—
“10. Division of municipal area into wards and reservation
of wards for women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Other Backward Class.—
(1) The State Election Commission in consultation with the
Government shall from time to time by order published in the
Official Gazette, fix for each municipal area the number and the
extent of the wards into which such area shall be divided. The State
Election Commission in consultation with the Government shall
specify in the order the ward in which a seat is reserved for women
but in so doing he shall ensure that such a seat is reserved from time
to time by rotation in different wards of the municipal area. He
shall by a like order specify the wards in which seats are reserved
for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or the Other Backward
Class, including the seats for offices of Chairperson having regard
to the concentration of population of those Castes, or Tribes, or as
the case may be, of those class, in any particular wards.
Provided that such order shall be issued at least seven days before
the date of notification of the general election.
Page 45 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
(2) Each of the wards shall elect only one Councillor.
(3) Every order issued under sub-section (1) shall take effect for the
purpose of the next general election immediately following the date
of such order.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent women or
persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or
Other Backward Class for whom seats are reserved in any Council,
from standing for election and being elected to any of the seats
which are not reserved.”
Amendments introduced by Ordinance No. 4 of 2026
82. The Goa Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 was
promulgated by the Governor on 22 April 2026 and published in the
Official Gazette on 23 April 2026. The Ordinance expressly provided
that it would come into force at once.
83. Insofar as Section 9 is concerned, the Ordinance did not substitute the
entire provision. It amended Section 9(2)(a) in the following terms:—
“2. Amendment of Section 9.— In Section 9 of the Goa
Municipalities Act, 1968 … in sub-section (2), in Clause (a),—
(i) in item (i),—
(a) for the figures ‘2500’, the figures ‘3000’ shall be substituted;
(b) for the word ‘voters’, the word ‘population’ shall be substituted;
(ii) in item (ii),—
(a) for the figures ‘2500’, the figures ‘3000’ shall be substituted;
Page 46 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
(b) for the word ‘voters’, the word ‘population’ shall be substituted.”
84. Section 10, on the other hand, was substituted in its entirety and
the substituted provision reads thus:—
“10. Division of Municipal areas into wards and
reservation of wards:—
(1) Upon issuance of the order under sub-section (2) of Section 9 the
State Election Commission shall, by order published in the Official
Gazette, fix for each or any municipal area the number of the wards
into which such area shall be divided.
(2) The State Election Commission shall thereafter undertake the
exercise of delimitation of the wards so specified in each or any
Municipal area within a period of 60 days from the date of
publication of the order in the Official Gazette, under sub-section
(1).
(3) The State Election Commission shall prepare a draft of
delimitation of wards with respect to each or any municipal area
and publish it in the Official Gazette inviting objections and
suggestions from the public within a period of 30 days from the date
of publication of draft of delimitation in the Official Gazette. The
written objections and suggestions received in writing shall be
considered by the State Election Commission and a final
notification of delimitation shall be issued by the State Election
Commission in consultation with the Government, in respect of each
or any municipal area within a period of 30 days from the last date
for submitting such objections.
(4) An empirical data pertaining to political backwardness shall be
obtained by the State Election Commission from the Goa State
Page 47 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Commission for Backward Classes in respect of each or any
Municipal area and the wards, based on the final notification of
delimitation issued under sub-section (3).
(5) Upon receipt of the data under sub-section (4) from the Goa
State Commission for Backward Classes the State Election
Commission shall publish a draft of reservation of seats in the
Official Gazette in respect of each or any Municipal area inviting
objections/suggestions from the public within a period of 30 days.
(6) Upon receipt of objections/suggestions in writing and
considering the same the State Election Commission shall publish
the final notification of reservation in the Official Gazette, in
consultation with the Government, with respect to each or any
municipal area, within a period of 30 days from the last date for
submitting such objections.
(7) After expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the final
notification of reservation, the State Election Commission shall
declare elections to each or any of the municipal area.
(8) Each of the ward shall elect only one Councillor.
(9) Every order/notification issued under sub-sections (1), (3) and
(6) shall take effect, for the purpose of the ensuing general election,
immediately following the date of such order.
Explanation: In all cases where objections/suggestions from the
public are invited, the same shall be submitted in writing, however no
opportunity of personal hearing shall be afforded to the parties.
(10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent women or
persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other
Page 48 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Backward Class for whom seats are reserved in any Council, from
standing for election and being elected to any of the seats which are
not reserved.”
85. A comparison of the two statutory Schemes shows the changes which
are material for the present controversy. Section 9 now determines the
number of elected Councillors by reference to population instead of
voters, while increasing the relevant numerical unit from 2,500 to
3,000. The earlier Section 10 contemplated delimitation and
reservation substantially as part of one exercise, whereas the
substituted Section 10 prescribes successive stages of delimitation,
publication of draft delimitation, consideration of objections, final
delimitation, procurement of empirical data pertaining to political
backwardness, draft reservation, objections to reservation and final
reservation before the election can be declared. Specific time
schedules have also been prescribed for several of these stages within
which each exercise is required to be completed and by following what
procedure.
86. Having noticed the constitutional and statutory framework governing
the controversy, we shall now consider the submissions advanced by the
learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners. Though the Petitions
proceed on somewhat different grounds and the reliefs sought are not
identical, the central submission common to them is that the
constitutional mandate contained in Article 243U cannot be defeated or
indefinitely postponed by introducing a legislative measure after the
process for holding the ensuing municipal elections had already
commenced. We shall, however, notice separately the submissions
Page 49 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
advanced in each petition since the challenge has been presented from
different constitutional and factual perspectives.
87. Before doing so, it is necessary to clarify one aspect which emerged
during the hearing. The Petitioners did not dispute the legislative
competence of the State Legislature to enact a law governing the
composition of Municipal Councils, delimitation of wards or
reservation of seats. Their principal challenge was directed against the
manner and point of time at which the new statutory regime was
brought into operation and its consequence upon elections which,
according to them, were constitutionally required to have been
completed before expiry of the existing Municipal Councils. It was
submitted that an otherwise permissible exercise of legislative power
cannot be so employed as to render the command of Article 243U of
the Constitution ineffective.
88. The Petitioners accordingly urged that the controversy is not to be
examined merely by asking whether the State Legislature possesses
legislative competence to amend Sections 9 and 10. According to them,
the Court must examine the actual constitutional consequence of
applying the amended provisions to the elections which had already
become due. Their submission is that if the immediate application of
the Ordinance necessarily results in postponement of those elections
beyond the constitutionally prescribed period, the Court is required to
protect the mandate of Article 243U of the Constitution by issuing
appropriate directions under Article 226.
Page 50 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
89. Mr. Chaitanya Padgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing for the
Petitioners represented by him, submitted that Article 243U embodies
a constitutional command which admits of no postponement on
account of administrative or legislative steps undertaken after the
elections had become due. According to him, the constitutional
obligation was not merely to commence the process of election before
expiry of the respective Municipal Councils but to complete the
elections and ensure constitution of the succeeding elected bodies
before expiry of their five-year tenure. He submitted that the State
Government and the State Election Commission were throughout
aware of the dates on which the respective terms would expire and
were therefore required to undertake every preparatory exercise
sufficiently in advance so that the mandate of Article 243U(3)(a) was
complied with.
90. Learned Counsel submitted that the State Election Commission had
in fact commenced the exercise for holding the elections under the law
then prevailing and that the process had progressed considerably
before the Ordinance was promulgated. The number of Councillors
had been determined, the exercise of delimitation had commenced,
draft wards had been published and objections had been invited.
According to him, there was therefore no factual impediment which
prevented the authorities from completing the remaining exercise and
holding the elections within the constitutionally prescribed period.
The subsequent legislative intervention, according to him, cannot
retrospectively justify the failure to perform a constitutional obligation
which had already arisen.
Page 51 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
91. Mr. Padgaonkar placed considerable reliance upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kishansing Tomar v.
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad2. He submitted that
the Supreme Court has authoritatively held that the five-year duration
prescribed by Article 243U and the requirement that elections be
completed before its expiry are mandatory and that neither revision of
electoral rolls nor other preparatory exercises can ordinarily constitute
a justification for postponing municipal elections. According to him,
once the constitutional authority knows when the tenure of the elected
body will expire, it is obliged to arrange all antecedent statutory
exercises around that immutable constitutional date and not the
constitutional date around the administrative exercise.
92. Learned Counsel then relied upon Suresh Mahajan v. State of
Madhya Pradesh3, to submit that the Supreme Court has carried the
principle in Kishansing Tomar (supra) further and has described the
obligation to hold local body elections within the constitutional period
as inviolable. He emphasised that an ongoing delimitation or
formation of wards cannot ordinarily be invoked as a legitimate
ground for withholding the election programme. His submission was
that what cannot constitutionally be accomplished through executive
inaction cannot be accomplished indirectly by introducing a fresh
statutory process after the election has become due.
93. It was in this context that Mr. Padgaonkar questioned the timing of the
Ordinance. He submitted that the challenge was not founded merely
2
(2006) 8 SCC 352
3
(2022) 12 SCC 770
Page 52 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
upon the proposition that the Legislature could never alter the basis
for determining the number of Councillors or prescribe a different
procedure for delimitation and reservation. His contention was that
the Ordinance was promulgated at a stage when the terms of some of
the Municipal Councils had already expired, the terms of the
remaining Councils were shortly to expire and the State Election
Commission had already undertaken substantial steps under the
existing law. According to him, the immediate application of a new and
substantially longer statutory procedure at that stage necessarily
ensured that compliance with Article 243U became impossible.
94. Learned Counsel submitted that this consequence assumes
importance while examining the exercise of power under Article 213.
He contended that there was no material demonstrating any sudden
or unforeseen circumstance which required the statutory regime to be
altered through an Ordinance at that particular stage. According to
him, if the State considered the existing statutory mechanism
deficient, there was nothing which prevented it from undertaking the
amendment sufficiently in advance. He relied upon the chronology
preceding the Ordinance to contend that unsettling an electoral
exercise which had been underway for a considerable period at the
very stage when the elections were required to be completed called for
a satisfactory constitutional explanation.
95. Mr. Padgaonkar further submitted that the challenge to the Ordinance
was founded upon colourable exercise of power and manifest
arbitrariness. According to him, the Court is entitled, while examining
such a challenge, to consider not merely the form of the legislation but
Page 53 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
its direct effect and consequence. He submitted that the immediate
consequence of the Ordinance was that an election which was
otherwise approaching completion under the existing statutory
framework was abandoned and replaced by an exercise containing
several successive stages extending substantially beyond the expiry of
the elected Municipal Councils. The pleadings themselves characterise
the Ordinance as manifestly arbitrary on account of the procedural
delays introduced while the municipal elections remained overdue.
96. Learned Counsel also addressed the contention that the amendment
was necessary because Section 9 previously determined the number of
Councillors by reference to voters whereas the Ordinance substituted
population. He submitted that this circumstance by itself could not
retrospectively invalidate the electoral exercise already undertaken
under a law which was then valid and operative. According to him, the
Legislature undoubtedly possessed the power to alter the statutory
basis prospectively, but the existence of a legislative preference for a
different basis could not furnish a constitutional justification for
allowing elections already due under Article 243U to remain
indefinitely postponed.
97. Mr. Padgaonkar thereafter dealt with the decisions of the Karnataka
High Court concerning the municipal elections in that State and the
subsequent orders passed by the Supreme Court. He relied upon the
reasoning adopted by the Karnataka High Court to contend that a
legislative amendment introduced after elections had become due
should not be permitted to defeat the mandate of Article 243U and that
the election could be completed under the statutory regime which
Page 54 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
governed when the constitutional obligation arose. At the same time,
he sought to distinguish the subsequent orders of the Supreme Court
concerning Bengaluru on the ground that those proceedings arose
from the peculiar restructuring of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara
Palike and the statutory changes made in that context. He submitted
that those interim orders cannot be understood as laying down a
general proposition that every subsequent legislative intervention
automatically overrides the temporal mandate of Article 243U. The
recorded submissions specifically distinguish the Bengaluru situation
from the present controversy on this basis.
98. Learned Counsel also relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High
Court in Vaibhav Pandey versus State of U.P., Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt.
Urban Development, Civil Secrt. Lok. And Another4 to meet the
contention that reservation and the empirical inquiry concerning
backward classes must necessarily precede the election irrespective of
the resulting delay. He submitted that the constitutional requirements
concerning reservation are undoubtedly required to be observed, but
that the exercise undertaken for that purpose cannot be permitted to
result in an indefinite displacement of elected local government. He
particularly relied upon the reasoning that, notwithstanding the
magnitude of the empirical exercise required for backward-class
reservation, formation of an elected municipal body cannot be
indefinitely delayed in the face of Article 243U.
4
2022 SCC OnLine All 913
Page 55 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
99. Mr. Padgaonkar therefore submitted that Article 243U must remain
the controlling constitutional consideration. According to him,
provisions concerning composition, delimitation and reservation are
required to be harmoniously implemented, but none of those
provisions can be administered in a manner which renders the express
temporal command contained in Article 243U ineffective. He
accordingly urged that this Court should issue a time-bound
mandamus requiring the State Election Commission to proceed with
the elections without permitting the subsequently introduced
statutory exercise to become a justification for continuing
administration of the Municipal Councils through appointed
Administrators.
100. Mr. Padgaonkar then addressed the challenge from the perspective of
Article 213 of the Constitution. He clarified that the Petitioners were
not questioning the legislative competence of the State to amend the
Goa Municipalities Act nor were they contending that the subject
matter of the Ordinance was beyond the legislative field available to
the State. His submission was that the extraordinary power of
promulgating an Ordinance could be exercised only when
circumstances existed which rendered immediate legislative action
necessary and that the existence of such circumstances was open to
judicial scrutiny within the limited parameters recognised by the
Supreme Court.
101. Developing this submission, learned Counsel invited our attention to
the chronology preceding the Ordinance. He submitted that the basis
of 2,500 voters contained in the existing Section 9 had been operating
Page 56 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
for several years, the census figures relied upon by the State were
themselves of 2011, the judgments concerning reservation and the
Triple Test were already in existence and the State Election
Commission had been proceeding with the municipal election exercise
with the knowledge and participation of the State Government for a
considerable period. According to him, when nothing constitutionally
or factually new had arisen immediately before April 2026, the State
was required to disclose what circumstance suddenly necessitated
recourse to Article 213 at a stage when the election process had
substantially progressed and the terms of the Municipal Councils were
either over or were about to expire.
102. In support of this submission, Mr. Padgaonkar relied upon A.K. Roy
v. Union of India And Others 5and the subsequent exposition of the
law governing judicial review of the satisfaction underlying the
exercise of Ordinance-making power. He submitted that the Court was
not being invited to examine the adequacy or sufficiency of the
material upon which such satisfaction was reached. According to him,
the narrower enquiry was whether there existed any relevant
contemporaneous material at all which could demonstrate the
circumstances requiring immediate action at that particular point of
time. He contended that, apart from the affidavit of the Director of
Municipal Administration and the justification subsequently
advanced during the hearing, no material had been placed before the
Court explaining why an Ordinance became immediately necessary
only when the municipal elections had become due. The proposition
5
(1982) 1 SCC 271
Page 57 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
advanced by him was that existence of relevant material is judicially
examinable although its adequacy is not.
103. Learned Counsel further submitted that the challenge on the ground
of colourable exercise of power had specifically been pleaded and was
not an allegation introduced for the first time during oral arguments.
According to him, the expression “fraud on the Constitution”, in this
context, was not employed in the sense of fraud understood in private
law but to contend that a constitutional power had been used as a
device to achieve indirectly a result which could not directly be
achieved consistently with Article 243U. He relied upon the sequence
of events commencing with the preparatory election exercise and
culminating in the promulgation of the Ordinance at what he
described as the eleventh hour to contend that the State was required
to satisfactorily explain why an electoral exercise undertaken over a
substantial period was required to be undone at that stage.
104. Mr. Padgaonkar also submitted that the validity of the Ordinance
could not be examined in isolation from its actual effect upon the
constitutional process. According to him, six Municipal Councils had
already completed their tenure when the Ordinance was brought into
force while the terms of the remaining Councils were shortly thereafter
to expire. The successive periods contemplated by substituted Section
10 made it impossible, even on the date of promulgation of the
Ordinance, to complete the entire exercise before expiry of the
remaining Councils. He therefore submitted that the consequence of
the legislation was not an incidental administrative delay but an
Page 58 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
inevitable postponement of elections beyond the period contemplated
by Article 243U.
105. Considerable argument was also addressed by Mr. Padgaonkar upon
the decisions arising from Karnataka. His submission was that the
decision of the Karnataka High Court rendered by Justice A.S. Oka had
proceeded on the principle that a subsequent legislative intervention
could not be applied so as to defeat elections which had already
become constitutionally due and that the elections concerned could
proceed under the law which governed them before the amendment.
When confronted with the subsequent orders of the Supreme Court,
learned Counsel sought to distinguish the Bengaluru proceedings on
the ground that the municipal structure itself had thereafter
undergone a fundamental statutory reorganisation and fresh
delimitation consequently became unavoidable. He contended that
the indulgence granted in those peculiar circumstances could not be
elevated into a general proposition that every amendment introduced
after elections become due must necessarily restart an existing
electoral process.
106. Insofar as the proceedings concerning Vijayapura were concerned,
learned Counsel maintained that the Karnataka litigation had to be
understood in its successive statutory and procedur1al stages and that
the later orders could not be read as diluting the constitutional
requirement of Article 243U. He ultimately relied upon the Karnataka
decisions for the narrower proposition that a legislative intervention
made during an ongoing electoral process cannot, merely by reason of
Page 59 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
its timing, furnish an unrestricted power to postpone an election
which the Constitution requires to be completed within a fixed period.
107. Mr. Padgaonkar thereafter answered the submission concerning the
requirement of empirical data for reservation of backward classes. He
submitted that the constitutional importance of lawful reservation was
not disputed by the Petitioners. His contention, however, was that an
exercise for collection or updating of empirical material could not be
commenced so belatedly as to become the reason for defeating Article
243U. He emphasised that the Goa State Commission for Backward
Classes was a continuously functioning statutory body and that the
requirement of empirical inquiry for political reservation in local
bodies had not arisen for the first time in April 2026. According to him,
the absence of institutional preparedness could not itself furnish a
constitutional justification for postponing elections.
108. In this context, learned Counsel placed reliance upon Vaibhav
Pandey, (supra). He submitted that even while recognising the
necessity of empirical inquiry for backward-class reservation and the
magnitude of that exercise, the Court had emphasised that
constitution of elected municipal bodies could not indefinitely await
completion of such an exercise because of the mandate contained in
Article 243U. According to him, the requirements of reservation and
timely elections had to be implemented harmoniously, and the former
could not be converted into a ground for extinguishing the latter.
109. Learned Counsel finally submitted that the controversy had to be
examined by maintaining the constitutional hierarchy. Article 243U,
Page 60 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
according to him, fixes the outer constitutional limit within which an
elected municipal body must be succeeded through the electoral
process. A law enacted by the State in exercise of its legislative
competence undoubtedly binds the State Election Commission while
it remains operative, but such law cannot claim an operation which
defeats an express command of the Constitution. His submission
therefore was that the Court could neither treat the delay as a matter
of mere arithmetic nor permit successive statutory periods introduced
by ordinary legislation to effectively enlarge a constitutional timeline.
109A. In further support of the submission that the constitutional obligation
to hold elections cannot ordinarily be postponed on account of a
belated delimitation or reservation exercise, Mr. Padgaonkar relied
upon Beant Kumar v. State of Punjab and others6, and Virendrasinh
Vaghela v. State of Gujarat and others7. He submitted that these
decisions reinforce the principle that preparatory electoral exercises
must be undertaken sufficiently in advance and cannot be permitted
to become a justification for withholding elections which have become
constitutionally due. The controversy in Beant Kumar (supra) itself
concerned whether municipal and local-body elections could be
delayed on account of a pending delimitation exercise.
109B. Learned Counsel also relied upon Parmar Samantsinh Umedsinh v.
State of Gujarat8, while dealing with the constitutional scheme
governing the composition of Municipalities under Articles 243R and
243ZA. He submitted that the judgment recognises the legislative
6
CWP-PIL-142 of 2024, decided on 14 October 2024
7
2015 SCC OnLine Guj 1182
8
(2022) 15 SCC 364
Page 61 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
competence of the State in matters concerning the composition and
structure of Municipalities, but equally makes it clear that such
legislation remains subject to Part IX-A of the Constitution. He
therefore relied upon the decision to contend that the existence of
legislative competence does not answer a challenge founded upon
inconsistency between the operation of a State law and a constitutional
mandate.
109C. On the question of reservation, Mr. Padgaonkar relied upon Naresh
Krishna Gaunekar v. State of Goa9, Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State
of Maharashtra10, and Rahul Ramesh Wagh v. State of
Maharashtra11. He submitted that these authorities recognise, on the
one hand, the constitutional requirement of providing reservation in
accordance with law and, on the other, the necessity of complying with
the Triple Test before providing political reservation for Other
Backward Classes. His submission, however, was that the requirement
of completing the Triple Test cannot be invoked after the elections
have become due as a ground for indefinitely postponing them. The
later orders following Vikas Gawali (supra) expressly reiterate that
elections already due cannot be delayed merely because the Triple Test
remains incomplete.
109D. Mr. Padgaonkar further relied upon the decision of this Court in
Sandeep Vazarkar v. State of Goa and others12, together with the
connected Petitions, for the proposition that elections to local bodies
are required to be completed within the constitutionally prescribed
9
2008 (3) Mh.L.J. 667
10
(2021) 6 SCC 73
11
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2469
12
Writ Petition No.238 of 2022 decided on 28 June 2022
Page 62 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
tenure and that the constitutional responsibility in that regard rests
not merely upon the State Election Commission but also upon the
State and other authorities concerned with the electoral process. The
judgment was specifically included in the compilation relied upon by
him.
109E. Learned Counsel also placed reliance upon State of Goa v. Fouziya
Imtiaz Shaikh13, particularly for the constitutional position of the State
Election Commission under Article 243ZA. According to him, the
decision recognises that the Commission is not powerless when faced
with a constitutional or statutory infraction and may insist upon its
correction before proceeding with the election. He relied upon this
principle to submit that the Commission’s obligation is ultimately to
the Constitution and that it cannot treat an executive or statutory
impediment as sufficient justification for allowing the constitutional
timeline governing elections to remain unfulfilled.
109F. Lastly, Mr. Padgaonkar relied upon the Karnataka decisions in
Vinayak v. State of Karnataka14 , and M.R. Anand v. State of
Karnataka,15. He submitted that these decisions proceeded on the
principle that where municipal elections had already become due, a
subsequent statutory or delimitation exercise could not ordinarily be
permitted to restart the electoral clock and postpone the election
indefinitely. He relied upon them along with the Karnataka line of
cases already noticed above to support his submission that the
13
(2021) 8 SCC 401
14
W.P. No.202474 of 2022 decided on 14 October 2022
15
W.P. No.35 of 2020 decided on 10 December 2020
Page 63 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional due date of an election cannot be displaced merely
because a subsequent legislative or delimitation exercise is introduced.
110. We shall now advert to the submissions advanced by Mr. Gosavi,
learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners in the connected
petition. While adopting the submissions already advanced on the
binding character of Article 243U and the constitutional obligation to
hold elections before expiry of the tenure of the Municipal Councils,
Mr. Gosavi developed the challenge to the Ordinance from a somewhat
different perspective. His principal submission was that the State
could undoubtedly exercise its legislative power in the field of
municipal elections, but such power could not be exercised at a point
of time and in a manner which had the inevitable effect of defeating an
express constitutional command.
111. Mr. Gosavi submitted that Article 243U was not merely a provision
prescribing the ordinary tenure of a Municipality. According to him,
the expression employed by the Constitution that every Municipality
shall continue for five years “and no longer”, read with clause (3),
which requires an election to constitute a Municipality to be completed
before expiry of its duration, constitutes a mandatory constitutional
limitation which neither the executive nor the legislature could
indirectly enlarge. He submitted that the constitutional obligation was
therefore not merely to commence preparations for an election before
expiry of the tenure but to ensure that the election itself was completed
within the period prescribed by the Constitution.
Page 64 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
112. To demonstrate the significance of this constitutional limitation,
learned Counsel drew a comparison between Articles 83(2), 172(1),
243E and 243U. He submitted that the Constitution has consciously
employed substantially similar language while prescribing the
duration of the House of the People, the Legislative Assemblies,
Panchayats and Municipalities. According to him, these provisions
embody the constitutional insistence that democratic institutions
cannot be continued beyond their constitutionally prescribed tenure
merely because some legislative or administrative exercise remains
incomplete. He therefore submitted that an ordinary legislation or an
Ordinance could not accomplish indirectly what the Constitution itself
did not permit directly.
113. It was in this context that Mr. Gosavi described the Ordinance as a
legislative intervention which, although ostensibly concerned with
population-based representation and delimitation, had to be
examined with reference to the point of time at which it was
promulgated and the consequence which necessarily followed from its
implementation. He submitted that if a State could wait until the
election process had substantially progressed and the tenure of the
elected bodies was about to expire and thereafter introduce a new
statutory regime requiring the entire process to be undertaken afresh,
the mandatory character of Article 243U could be rendered ineffective
by successive legislative interventions.
114. Mr. Gosavi was careful to accept that the existence of Article 243U did
not denude the State Legislature of its legislative competence in
relation to municipal elections. When this aspect was specifically put
Page 65 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
to him during the hearing, he accepted that the State continued to
possess the power to legislate even when municipal elections were due.
His submission, however, was that the existence of legislative
competence and the constitutional validity of the manner in which that
competence was exercised were two different questions. According to
him, every exercise of legislative power remained subordinate to the
Constitution and could therefore be examined where its timing and
operation resulted in the frustration of another mandatory
constitutional provision.
115. Mr. Gosavi then carried this submission to Article 213 of the
Constitution. He contended that the present measure was not
legislation enacted in the ordinary course by the State Legislature but
an Ordinance promulgated in exercise of an extraordinary
constitutional power which itself required the existence of
circumstances rendering immediate action necessary. According to
him, therefore, apart from examining the legislative competence of the
State, the Court was entitled to examine whether circumstances
existed which could constitutionally sustain recourse to the
Ordinance-making power at that particular point of time.
116. In support of this proposition, Mr. Gosavi placed considerable reliance
upon the decision of the Constitution Bench in A.K. Roy v. Union of
India (supra) and, more particularly, upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra).
He submitted that the satisfaction contemplated while exercising the
Ordinance-making power does not enjoy absolute immunity from
judicial review. He fairly accepted that the Court would not examine
Page 66 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the adequacy or sufficiency of the material which formed the basis of
such satisfaction, but submitted that the existence of relevant material
and the existence of circumstances requiring immediate legislative
action were themselves matters which could be judicially examined.
117. On the factual application of this principle, Mr. Gosavi submitted that
there was no sudden development immediately preceding the
promulgation of the Ordinance which could explain the necessity for
legislative intervention at that stage. The 2011 census figures were
available for several years. The constitutional provisions governing
Municipalities had remained unchanged. The judicial
pronouncements relied upon by the State were not rendered
immediately before the Ordinance. The State was aware of the dates
on which the terms of the Municipal Councils would expire and was
equally aware that the State Election Commission had already
commenced the preparatory exercise for conducting their elections.
He therefore questioned what circumstance arose only in April 2026
which made immediate recourse to Article 213 necessary.
118. Learned Counsel submitted that this question assumed greater
significance because the electoral exercise had not remained dormant
until promulgation of the Ordinance. According to him, the State
Election Commission had been corresponding with the State
authorities, the relevant information had been supplied by the
Directorate of Municipal Administration and substantial steps
towards delimitation and the ensuing elections had already been
undertaken. The State Government was consequently aware not only
of the impending expiry of the Municipal Councils but also of the stage
Page 67 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
to which the electoral exercise had progressed. It was against this
background that he characterised the introduction of the Ordinance at
the last stage as a colourable exercise of constitutional power.
119. Mr. Gosavi submitted that the expression “fraud on the Constitution”,
as employed by the Petitioners, had to be understood in this
constitutional sense. According to him, the allegation was not one of
personal fraud or individual mala fides against any particular
functionary. The contention was that a constitutional power had been
employed as a device to produce a consequence which the Constitution
prohibited, namely postponement of elections beyond the period
prescribed by Article 243U. He submitted that where an act which
could not constitutionally be accomplished directly was sought to be
achieved through the interposition of ordinary legislation or an
Ordinance, the Court was entitled to examine the substance and effect
of the exercise rather than its form.
120. Mr. Gosavi accordingly submitted that the supremacy of the
Constitution, which constitutes one of the foundational features of the
constitutional structure, would be seriously impaired if an ordinary
law were treated as sufficient justification for non-compliance with an
express constitutional deadline. His criticism of the stand adopted by
the Respondents was that it effectively required the State Election
Commission to follow the subsequently enacted law notwithstanding
that the inevitable consequence of doing so was failure to complete the
elections within the period mandated by Article 243U. According to
him, Article 243ZA undoubtedly requires the State Election
Commission to act in accordance with law, but the law contemplated
Page 68 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
by Article 243ZA itself remains subordinate to the Constitution and
cannot acquire precedence over Article 243U.
121. Learned Counsel then dealt with the practical consequence of
accepting the Respondents' proposition. He submitted that if a
legislative intervention introduced shortly before expiry of an elected
body could itself furnish sufficient justification for restarting the
election process, the constitutional limitation would become
vulnerable to repeated postponement. He illustrated the submission
by referring to the corresponding constitutional provisions prescribing
the tenure of Panchayats, Legislative Assemblies and Parliament and
contended that the constitutional principle could not vary merely
because the present controversy concerned Municipal Councils. His
submission was that the Court must guard against a principle which
would permit an ordinary legislative measure to neutralise a
constitutionally fixed democratic tenure.
122. Mr. Gosavi further submitted that the difficulty could not be answered
by stating that the Ordinance sought to advance another constitutional
objective. He did not dispute the importance of population-based
representation, proper delimitation or constitutionally permissible
reservation. His submission was that these objectives were known to
the State sufficiently in advance and ought to have been pursued in a
manner which enabled their completion without violating Article
243U. According to him, the State could not remain inactive when
sufficient time was available and thereafter rely upon the very exercise
which it belatedly commenced as justification for postponing
constitutionally mandated elections
Page 69 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
123. Mr. Gosavi then demonstrated his submission by reference to the
actual dates on which the terms of the eleven Municipal Councils were
due to expire. He pointed out that the Ordinance was promulgated on
22 April 2026, by which time the terms of several Municipal Councils
had already expired, whereas the terms of the remaining Councils were
to expire shortly thereafter. The record shows that the terms of
Bicholim, Curchorem, Canacona and Pernem Municipal Councils
expired on 31 March 2026, that of Cuncolim on 5 April 2026 and that
of Valpoi on 8 April 2026. The terms of Quepem and Sanguem were to
expire on 9 May 2026, whereas those of Margao, Mormugao and
Mapusa were to expire on 26 May 2026.
124. Learned Counsel submitted that these dates were important because
the constitutional deadline under Article 243U had to be worked
backwards and not forwards. According to him, if the election
programme itself required a minimum period for nominations,
scrutiny, withdrawal, polling and declaration of results, the
preparatory exercise had necessarily to be completed sufficiently
before the last date of the existing Municipal Council. The
constitutional mandate could not, according to him, be understood as
permitting the State Election Commission to wait until the last date of
the tenure and only thereafter commence the election process.
125. Mr. Gosavi submitted that the impossibility became evident upon
comparing these dates with the procedure introduced by substituted
Section 10. The new provision contemplated fixation of wards, an
exercise of delimitation for which a period of sixty days was provided,
publication of draft delimitation followed by thirty days for objections
Page 70 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
and suggestions, consideration of those objections and final
delimitation, procurement of empirical data concerning political
backwardness, publication of draft reservation followed by another
thirty-day objection period, final reservation and thereafter a further
period of thirty days before declaration of the elections. His
submission was that, quite apart from the actual time required for the
empirical inquiry and the election programme, the statutory
architecture introduced on 22 April 2026 made compliance with the
impending constitutional deadlines impossible.
126. According to learned Counsel, this demonstrated an important
distinction between an unforeseen administrative impediment arising
during an election and a statutory scheme which, from the date on
which it was introduced, necessarily carried the election beyond the
constitutional date. He submitted that the present case belonged to the
latter category. The consequence complained of was therefore
inherent in the immediate application of the Ordinance to these eleven
Municipal Councils and was not the result of some subsequent or
unexpected circumstance.
127. Mr. Gosavi also answered the submission that applying the earlier law
to some Municipal Councils and the amended law to others would
create an anomalous situation. He submitted that the relevant
constitutional date for each Municipality was the date on which its
tenure expired and that Article 243U operated independently in
relation to each elected body. According to him, the possibility that
different Municipal Councils might consequently fall to be governed
by different statutory regimes could not override the constitutional
Page 71 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
requirement applicable to each of them. The transcript records his
submission that the true enquiry was when the mandate under Article
243U “kicks in” and that, since the election itself requires time for
completion, the process necessarily has to commence before the
terminal date.
128. Learned Counsel then addressed the State's justification that the
amendment was intended to replace the voters-based criterion by a
population-based criterion and thereby improve the representative
character of Municipal Councils. He submitted that this might explain
the legislative policy underlying the amendment, but it did not answer
the constitutional question concerning its timing. According to him,
there was a fundamental distinction between asking why the
Legislature considered population to be a preferable basis and asking
why that change had to be brought into force by an Ordinance in April
2026 after the election exercise had commenced. His submission was
that the Respondents had substantially answered the former but not
the latter.
129. Mr. Gosavi further submitted that the State could not justify the timing
of the Ordinance by contending that the earlier statutory regime was
constitutionally deficient. He pointed out that municipal elections had
previously been conducted under that regime and that the State itself
had continued to act upon it until immediately before the Ordinance.
According to him, if the earlier provisions were constitutionally valid,
there was no constitutional necessity to abandon an advanced
electoral exercise merely because the Legislature subsequently
considered another method preferable. If, on the other hand, the
Page 72 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
State's case was that the earlier regime was constitutionally
impermissible, it would have to explain how elections had
continuously been conducted under that very regime and why the
supposed defect had remained unattended until the present elections
became due.
130. Learned Counsel clarified, however, that his submission was not that
the Legislature was prohibited from replacing voters with population
or from increasing the numerical benchmark from 2,500 to 3,000. He
accepted that legislative policy may change and that a court cannot
invalidate an amendment merely because the earlier law was also
workable. His submission remained confined to the application of the
newly introduced regime to elections in respect of which the
constitutional obligation under Article 243U had already arisen and,
in several cases, had already been breached.
131. Mr. Gosavi thereafter addressed the Respondents' reliance upon the
presumption of constitutionality attaching to legislation. He accepted
the existence of that presumption but submitted that it could not
answer a demonstrated conflict between the operation of an ordinary
law and an express constitutional mandate. According to him, once the
direct consequence of applying the Ordinance to the ensuing elections
was shown to be postponement beyond Article 243U, the Court was
required to examine the constitutional effect of the measure rather
than terminate the enquiry merely upon the presumption ordinarily
attaching to legislation.
Page 73 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
132. Learned Counsel accordingly urged that the consequence or direct
impact of the impugned measure was a legitimate consideration in
constitutional adjudication. His submission was that constitutional
review cannot be confined to the form in which legislative power has
been exercised where the necessary effect of the measure is to impair
a constitutional limitation. He invoked the supremacy of the
Constitution as the controlling principle and contended that no organ
of the State could employ a power conferred by the Constitution itself
in a manner which rendered another binding constitutional command
ineffective.
133. On the question of relief, Mr. Gosavi submitted that the Court was not
powerless merely because the Ordinance had come into force.
According to him, the primary constitutional obligation was to restore
elected municipal government at the earliest possible point of time. He
therefore urged that the ensuing elections should not be permitted to
remain suspended merely for completion of an exercise introduced
after the constitutional deadlines had arisen and that appropriate
directions ought to be issued to the State Election Commission to
proceed with the elections within a strict and definite period.
134. Mr. Gosavi nevertheless accepted during the course of the discussion
that, so long as the Ordinance remained constitutionally valid and
operative, the Court would have to confront the question whether it
could direct the State Election Commission simply to disregard the
amended statutory provisions. It was in answer to this difficulty that
he maintained his challenge to the Ordinance itself and, in the
alternative, its application to the present round of elections. According
Page 74 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
to him, the constitutional difficulty could not be resolved by
simultaneously upholding the law and directing a constitutional
authority to act contrary to it; the Court would therefore have to
determine the challenge before fashioning the ultimate relief.
135. The submission of Mr. Gosavi, in substance, was therefore that the
case presented two related but distinct constitutional questions. The
first concerned the validity of the exercise of Ordinance-making power
at the stage at which it was exercised. The second concerned the
constitutional consequence of applying the amended statutory regime
to elections which Article 243U required to have already been
completed. He submitted that, whichever route was adopted, the
ultimate constitutional objective had to remain restoration of
democratically elected Municipal Councils without permitting any
further avoidable postponement.
135A. In support of the submissions already noticed above, Mr. Gosavi also
relied upon Naresh Krishna Gaunekar and others v. State of Goa and
others (supra). He referred to the decision in the context of the
statutory and constitutional requirements governing reservation in
elections to local bodies in the State of Goa and submitted that the
exercise of reservation and the electoral process have necessarily to
conform to the constitutional scheme. His reliance upon the decision
was also intended to demonstrate that questions concerning
reservation in local bodies in Goa have previously been subjected to
judicial scrutiny by examining the statutory exercise against the
constitutional requirements governing representative local
government.
Page 75 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
135B. Mr. Gosavi then relied upon Dnyaneshwar Narso Naik v. State of
Goa (supra), in support of his submission concerning the
constitutional obligation to constitute elected local bodies within the
period prescribed by the Constitution. According to him, the
constitutional provisions relating to the duration of local bodies and
the holding of elections are not directory provisions whose observance
can depend upon administrative convenience. He submitted that the
State and the State Election Commission are required to organise their
respective statutory exercises in such a manner that the constitutional
timetable is observed and that an exercise which could and ought to
have been undertaken earlier cannot ordinarily furnish a justification
for postponing an election after it has become due.
135C. Reliance was also placed upon Beant Kumar v. State of Punjab and
others (supra) decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 14
October 2024. Mr. Gosavi submitted that the very issue which arose
before the Court in that case was whether elections to Municipalities,
Municipal Councils, Municipal Corporations and other local bodies
could be delayed because a delimitation exercise remained pending.
He relied upon the decision to reinforce his submission that
delimitation is an exercise which the authorities are required to
anticipate and complete in time and that a pending delimitation
exercise cannot ordinarily be converted into a ground for defeating the
constitutional command requiring timely elections.
Page 76 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
135D. Mr. Gosavi further relied upon Chhaya D/o Jasvantsing Hajari v.
Committee for Scrutiny 16in the course of his challenge to the manner
in which the impugned legislative measure operates upon an electoral
process which, according to the Petitioners, had already substantially
progressed under the pre-existing statutory regime. He submitted that
the Court, while examining the constitutional validity and operation of
legislation, is entitled to consider its real effect and consequence and
cannot confine the inquiry merely to the form in which the legislative
measure has been enacted.
135E. In continuation of the same submission, Mr. Gosavi placed reliance
upon the Constitution Bench decision in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v.
State of Tamil Nadu17. He submitted that the supremacy of the
Constitution constitutes an essential feature of its basic structure and
that the constitutional validity of a legislative measure has ultimately
to be tested by examining its direct impact upon the constitutional
principle which is said to have been infringed. According to him, the
form of the legislative measure is therefore not decisive and its
consequences are relevant where those consequences directly impair
a constitutional mandate.
135F. Applying these principles to the present case, Mr. Gosavi submitted
that the challenge to the Ordinance cannot be answered merely by
saying that the State Legislature possesses legislative competence over
Municipalities or that the Ordinance has been promulgated in exercise
of the constitutional power under Article 213. His submission was that
16
Writ Petition No.4198 of 2005 and Ors. decided on 01.08.2018.
17
(2007) 2 SCC 1
Page 77 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the Court must examine what the Ordinance actually does in the
circumstances in which it was promulgated. According to him, if its
immediate consequence is to render ineffective an electoral exercise
which had substantially progressed, require that exercise to
commence afresh and thereby carry the elections beyond the period
mandated by Article 243U, that consequence forms an integral part of
the constitutional scrutiny of the impugned measure.
135G. These authorities were relied upon by Mr. Gosavi together with
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar18, Suresh Mahajan v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (supra), and Sri M. Shivaraju v. State of
Karnataka19, which we have already noticed while recording his
principal submissions. His cumulative submission was that the power
to promulgate an Ordinance is undoubtedly a constitutional legislative
power, but its exercise remains subject to judicial review on recognised
constitutional grounds and cannot be used in a manner which has the
effect of defeating another express and binding constitutional
command.
136. Mr. Gaurish Agni, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ
Petition No. 1572 of 2026, while adopting the submissions advanced
on the mandatory character of Article 243U, principally directed his
challenge to the consequences which followed after promulgation of
the Ordinance. He submitted that his petition stood on an additional
factual footing because the State Election Commission had, before the
Ordinance came into force, actually undertaken the exercise
18
(2017) 3 SCC 1
19
2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3409
Page 78 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
contemplated by the law then prevailing and had thereafter, on 21 May
2026, declared that entire delimitation exercise null and void.
According to him, the constitutional validity of this subsequent action
of the State Election Commission had to be examined independently
of the wider challenge to the Ordinance.
137. Mr. Agni took us through the steps undertaken before 22 April 2026
and submitted that this was not a case where the authorities had
merely expressed an intention to hold elections. The State Election
Commission had appointed the requisite officers, adopted the relevant
electoral rolls, fixed the number of Councillors, prepared the draft
delimitation and invited objections from the public. The petitioner
himself had participated in the process by submitting objections on 4
April 2026. According to learned Counsel, when the statutory exercise
had reached such an advanced stage, the subsequent decision to
abandon it altogether had a direct bearing upon the constitutional
obligation to complete the elections within time.
138. Learned Counsel submitted that the significance of the earlier exercise
did not depend upon whether every preparatory step constituted a part
of the “election” in the technical sense in which that expression has
been understood for the purpose of the constitutional bar against
judicial interference after commencement of an election. His
contention was narrower. According to him, the earlier steps
demonstrated that the machinery necessary for holding the elections
had already been activated and substantial statutory work had already
been completed. The State could therefore not treat the position
Page 79 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
existing on 22 April 2026 as though the entire electoral exercise had
yet to commence.
139. Mr. Agni placed emphasis upon the decision of this Court in
Dnyaneshwar Narso Naik v. State of Goa (supra) and submitted that
the purpose of requiring delimitation and reservation to be completed
sufficiently before notification of an election was itself to advance the
constitutional value of a free and fair election. According to him,
adequate opportunity for objections to delimitation and reservation
enables grievances to be considered and, if necessary, judicially
examined before the election reaches a stage where interference
becomes constitutionally restricted. The petition specifically proceeds
on this foundation and treats a fair delimitation exercise and sufficient
opportunity for objections as integral to the conduct of a free and fair
election.
140. He therefore submitted that there was no dispute on behalf of the
petitioner about the desirability of a fair delimitation exercise or about
the necessity of making reservations in accordance with constitutional
requirements. The difficulty, according to him, was that these very
objectives had been invoked to abandon an exercise which had already
substantially progressed and to substitute an entirely fresh exercise at
a stage when the constitutional period for holding the elections had
either expired or was about to expire. In his submission, a measure
intended to improve the fairness of an election could not be
implemented in a manner which indefinitely displaced the election
itself.
Page 80 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
141. Mr. Agni then addressed the change brought about in Section 9 by
substituting “population” for “voters”. He submitted that this
amendment had to be understood with some precision. The earlier
Section 9 employed the number of voters for determining the number
of elected Councillors, whereas reservation for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes was already linked to their proportion in the
population of the municipal area. The amendment therefore altered
the statutory basis for determining the strength of the Council, but did
not for the first time introduce population as a concept into the
municipal statutory scheme.
142. Learned Counsel submitted that this distinction assumed importance
in answering the State's contention that the entire pre-Ordinance
electoral exercise had become constitutionally unusable once
population replaced voters. According to him, the mere fact that the
Legislature thereafter considered population to be the preferable basis
for fixing the number of Councillors did not retrospectively render
every action validly undertaken under the earlier law unconstitutional.
He submitted that the State would have to distinguish between the
validity of the legislative policy underlying the amendment and the
necessity of applying that policy by restarting the present elections.
143. Mr. Agni further submitted that the statutory framework itself
continued to use electoral rolls for identifying the persons entitled to
vote even after the amendment. Population and voters therefore
performed different functions within the electoral scheme. According
to him, the State's reliance upon the population-voter distinction could
justify a change in legislative policy, but did not by itself answer why
Page 81 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
an already advanced delimitation exercise had to be nullified when the
constitutional date for completing the elections had already arrived.
144. Learned Counsel also questioned the decision dated 21 May 2026 on
the ground that the State Election Commission had treated the
Ordinance as automatically extinguishing everything done under the
earlier law. His submission was that the Ordinance did not expressly
declare every earlier step null and void nor did it contain a specific
provision invalidating all action already undertaken. According to
him, before abandoning an exercise which had progressed through
publication of draft wards and receipt of objections, the Commission
was required to consider what part of the earlier exercise remained
capable of being preserved or adapted consistently with the amended
law.
145. In this context, Mr. Agni submitted in rejoinder that the Respondents
had proceeded on an unnecessarily absolute proposition that nothing
undertaken before 22 April 2026 could thereafter be utilised.
According to him, even if a fresh determination of the number of
Councillors and consequent adjustment of ward boundaries became
necessary, it did not follow that all administrative material,
geographical work, electoral data and objections already gathered had
to be discarded as though they had never existed. The later stand of
the State Election Commission that the earlier exercise could not be
used because the basic criterion had changed was, according to him,
too broad. The Commission itself subsequently stated that the pre-
Ordinance draft delimitation had already been prepared and
forwarded for consultation before the law changed.
Page 82 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
146. Mr. Agni thereafter dealt with the reservation for backward classes.
He submitted that the requirement of a contemporaneous rigorous
empirical inquiry could not be disputed after the judgments of the
Supreme Court governing political reservation for Other Backward
Classes. His submission, however, was that this requirement was
known much before April 2026 and that the dedicated Commission
could not remain institutionally unprepared until the municipal
elections became due. According to him, if empirical inquiry was a
recurring prerequisite for local-body reservation, the relevant
statutory institutions were required to maintain the necessary
material and undertake all preparatory work capable of being done in
advance.
147. The discussion during the hearing concerning the Goa State
Commission for Backward Classes was relied upon by Mr. Agni to
support this submission. It emerged that the 2011 Census constituted
the last published census and that substantial municipality-wise work
concerning identification of communities and examination of political
backwardness was capable of being undertaken without waiting for the
final ward boundaries. Learned Counsel therefore submitted that
pending delimitation could not justify keeping the entire empirical
exercise in abeyance. The final mapping of the conclusions onto newly
delimited wards might await final delimitation, but the foundational
inquiry could and ought to proceed simultaneously.
148. Mr. Agni submitted that the constitutional significance of this aspect
went beyond the present election. If the dedicated Commission were
permitted to begin its work only after every delimitation exercise was
Page 83 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
finally completed, the same difficulty would recur in every electoral
cycle and Article 243U would repeatedly become vulnerable to
institutional delay. He therefore urged that the functions of the State
Election Commission, the State Government and the Backward
Classes Commission had to be coordinated and, wherever possible,
undertaken contemporaneously instead of sequentially.
149. Learned Counsel also pressed the challenge to the timing of the
Ordinance as pleaded in the petition. He submitted that the petitioner
had specifically pleaded that the Ordinance was promulgated at the
eleventh hour after expiry of the tenure of some Municipal Councils,
after appointment of Administrators and after substantial progress of
the electoral exercise. The petition expressly characterises the measure
as a colourable exercise which, in its operation, prolonged governance
through appointed Administrators instead of elected representatives.
150. Mr. Agni, however, submitted that even independently of any
allegation concerning motive, the admitted chronology was sufficient
to require the Court to examine the constitutional effect of the
Ordinance. According to him, the petitioner's case did not have to
succeed only upon proving personal mala fides. If the objective
operation of the amended procedure necessarily prolonged an existing
breach of Article 243U, that consequence itself required consideration
while moulding constitutional relief.
151. Learned Counsel then addressed the alternative prayer in his petition.
He submitted that if this Court was not persuaded to invalidate the
Ordinance in its entirety, the Court could nevertheless protect Article
Page 84 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
243U by holding that the amended regime should not be applied so as
to unsettle elections which had already become due under the pre-
existing framework. It was on this footing that the petitioner had
expressly sought, in the alternative, a declaration that the Ordinance
was inapplicable to the present general elections and that the elections
be conducted on the basis of the earlier delimitation and electoral
framework. The petition simultaneously seeks a time-bound
mandamus for completion of all eleven municipal elections.
152. In rejoinder to the State's submission that an operative law could
neither be ignored by the State Election Commission nor kept aside by
the Court without first being invalidated, Mr. Agni submitted that the
petitioner's alternative case had to be understood as one of
constitutional harmonisation and not administrative disobedience.
According to him, Article 243ZA(2) itself makes the legislative power
of the State “subject to the provisions of this Constitution”. The State
Election Commission was therefore bound both by the law governing
the election and by the constitutional timeline within which that law
had to operate. The existence of the amended legislation could not be
treated as extinguishing the Commission's independent constitutional
obligation under Article 243ZA read with Article 243U. Article 243ZA
expressly places State legislation concerning municipal elections
subject to the Constitution.
153. Mr. Agni ultimately submitted that the Court was not required to
choose between timely elections and lawful delimitation or
reservation. Both constitutional requirements had to be preserved.
What could not be accepted, according to him, was a construction
Page 85 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
under which every stage provided by the amended law was permitted
to consume its maximum outer period irrespective of the
constitutional default which had already occurred. He therefore urged
that, even if the amended regime were allowed to operate, every
remaining stage should be subjected to the shortest legally permissible
and judicially enforceable timeline so that the constitutional breach
under Article 243U was not perpetuated any further.
154. The submissions of Mr. Agni thus added two dimensions to the
challenge already advanced by the other Petitioners. The first concerns
the legality and consequence of the State Election Commission's
decision dated 21 May 2026 nullifying the earlier delimitation
exercise. The second concerns the obligation of all authorities
participating in delimitation and reservation to act with institutional
preparedness and, wherever legally possible, simultaneously, so that
compliance with one requirement of Part IX-A does not become the
reason for continued non-compliance with another.
154A. In support of his submission concerning the constitutional position
of the State Election Commission and the effect of a statutory
requirement of consultation with the State Government, Mr. Agni
relied upon Pranoy Roy v. State of West Bengal20. He submitted that,
in matters concerning the conduct and scheduling of municipal
elections, the constitutional authority vested with superintendence,
direction and control of elections cannot be reduced to a subordinate
role merely because the governing enactment contemplates
20
2015 SCC OnLine Cal 8823
Page 86 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
consultation with the Government. According to him, where the
constitutional obligation to hold elections within time has arisen, the
process of consultation has to be construed consistently with the
independent constitutional responsibility of the State Election
Commission.
154B. Learned Counsel relied upon the said decision particularly to
contend that consultation cannot be converted into a mechanism by
which the Government effectively controls whether and when an
election should be held. His submission was that the State Election
Commission must retain primacy in the electoral field entrusted to it
by Article 243ZA, although the Commission must undoubtedly
discharge its functions within the framework of a validly enacted law.
The material placed before us concerning the West Bengal litigation
records that the issue there also arose in the context of postponement
of municipal elections on account of restructuring or reconstitution of
municipal bodies.
154C. Mr. Agni also relied upon Dattatray Yedu Thombre v. State of
Maharashtra21, while developing his challenge to the Ordinance as a
colourable exercise of constitutional power. He submitted that the
Ordinance-making power under Article 213 is legislative in character
and is undoubtedly wide within the legislative competence of the State,
but remains a constitutional power which must be exercised
consistently with the limitations inherent in the Constitution.
According to him, an Ordinance cannot be employed as a device for
21
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 4408
Page 87 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
accomplishing indirectly a consequence which would otherwise be
inconsistent with an express constitutional command.
154D. Learned Counsel submitted that the principle of colourable legislation
was relevant in the present case not because any personal mala fides
were attributed to the Governor or to an individual member of the
Government, but because the Court was required to examine the
substance of the legislative exercise and its constitutional
consequence. The petition itself specifically pleads that the Ordinance
constitutes a colourable exercise of power because it was brought into
force after substantial progress had already been made towards the
municipal elections and because its application required the entire
exercise to recommence, thereby continuing administration of the
Municipal Councils through appointed authorities instead of elected
representatives.
154E. Mr. Agni accordingly submitted that Dattatray Yedu Thombre
(supra) had to be read together with the constitutional principles
governing Ordinance-making power and the supremacy of the
Constitution. His contention was not that an Ordinance becomes
invalid merely because its promulgation affects an impending election.
His submission was that where the chronology demonstrates that an
electoral exercise had been undertaken over a considerable period, the
constitutional deadline had arrived and an Ordinance introduced at
that stage necessarily displaced that exercise and postponed the
elections, the Court was entitled to examine whether the extraordinary
constitutional power had been employed in a manner compatible with
Article 243U.
Page 88 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
155. Mr. Devidas Pangam, learned Advocate General appearing for the
State, opposed the Petitions and submitted that the entire challenge
proceeds on an erroneous assumption that Article 243U disables the
State Legislature from altering the statutory framework governing
municipal elections once the tenure of a Municipality is approaching
expiry. According to him, Article 243U undoubtedly contains a
constitutional mandate requiring timely elections, but it neither
suspends the legislative power of the State nor authorises the State
Election Commission or the Court to disregard a law validly brought
into force in exercise of that legislative power.
156. The learned Advocate General submitted at the outset that the
Ordinance is an exercise of legislative power under Article 213 and,
upon promulgation, possesses the same force and effect as an Act of
the State Legislature. He therefore contended that the Ordinance
cannot be treated on the same footing as an executive notification,
administrative instruction or governmental decision. A challenge to
such legislation must satisfy the recognised grounds of constitutional
review, namely want of legislative competence, breach of a
constitutional limitation, violation of fundamental rights or manifest
arbitrariness. The State in its affidavit has specifically taken the
position that none of these grounds has been established in the present
Petitions.
157. Addressing the challenge under Article 213, the learned Advocate
General submitted that the power of the Governor to promulgate an
Ordinance becomes available when the Legislative Assembly is not in
session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which
Page 89 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
render immediate action necessary. He submitted that the sufficiency
or adequacy of the material which led to such satisfaction is not open
to judicial substitution merely because another view of the necessity
or timing may be possible. He further submitted that no personal
motive could be attributed either to the Legislature or to the Governor
for promulgating the Ordinance and that allegations of mala fides
which may furnish a ground against an administrative action cannot,
without much more, invalidate plenary legislation. This is also the
specific stand taken in the affidavit filed by the State.
158. The learned Advocate General did not dispute that the existence of
circumstances relevant to the exercise of the Ordinance-making power
may be examined within the limited scope of judicial review
recognised by the Constitution Bench decisions relied upon by the
Petitioners. His answer, however, was that the material and
circumstances which led to the Ordinance were directly related to the
constitutional requirements governing the composition of
Municipalities, delimitation of wards and reservation of seats.
According to him, once relevant material bearing upon these subjects
existed, the Court could not sit in appeal over the legislative
assessment as to whether the change should have been made earlier,
later or through an Act instead of an Ordinance.
159. Mr. Pangam then submitted that the Ordinance was not enacted for
the purpose of extending the tenure of any Municipality. It does not
amend Article 243U, does not provide for continuation of an elected
Council beyond five years and does not confer any statutory tenure
upon an Administrator inconsistent with the Constitution. According
Page 90 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
to him, what the Ordinance does is to regulate the manner in which
the succeeding Municipal Council is to be constituted by altering the
basis for determining the number of Councillors and by prescribing a
detailed procedure for delimitation and reservation. The fact that
compliance with that procedure requires time cannot, according to
him, convert a law concerning the composition and electoral structure
of Municipalities into a law extending their tenure.
160. The learned Advocate General placed considerable emphasis upon
Article 243ZA(2), which expressly authorises the Legislature of a State,
subject to the Constitution, to make laws with respect to all matters
relating to or connected with elections to Municipalities. His
submission was that the State Election Commission exercises its
constitutional powers under Article 243ZA(1) within the legislative
framework validly enacted under clause (2). So long as such legislation
remains operative and has not been declared unconstitutional, the
State Election Commission is bound to implement it and cannot select
between the earlier and the subsequently enacted statutory regimes
according to its own assessment of which would enable an earlier
election.
161. According to the learned Advocate General, this principle provided
the complete answer to the alternative case advanced by the
Petitioners that the Ordinance may be upheld generally but ignored
for the present electoral cycle. He submitted that there is no
constitutional doctrine under which a law which continues to be valid
can simply be “kept aside” for one election and applied to another.
Either the law suffers from a constitutional infirmity and must be
Page 91 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
invalidated to that extent, or, while it remains valid, every
constitutional and statutory authority is bound to give effect to it.
162. The learned Advocate General therefore strongly questioned the
course adopted by the Karnataka High Court in M. Shivaraju v. State
of Karnataka (supra), where the amended statutory regime was read
down so as not to apply to elections which had already become due.
According to him, the difficulty with that approach was that the
legislation was permitted to remain on the statute book while its
operation was nevertheless excluded from the very elections to which,
according to its terms, it applied. He submitted that such a course
effectively amounted to interfering with the legislation without
holding it unconstitutional.
163. Mr. Pangam submitted that this difficulty was subsequently reflected
in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. He pointed out that the
judgment of the Karnataka High Court which excluded the amended
law from the pending electoral cycle was stayed by the Supreme Court
before the later statutory restructuring of Bengaluru occurred. He
emphasised that the first order of stay was therefore not attributable
to the subsequent division of Bengaluru into several corporations.
Thereafter, when further statutory changes came into force, the
Supreme Court permitted the delimitation and election exercise to
proceed in accordance with the new law and repeatedly extended the
time required for completing that process.
164. The learned Advocate General also referred to the proceedings
concerning Vijayapura and submitted that the Supreme Court
Page 92 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
permitted the State Government and the State Election Commission
to proceed under the amended statutory regime even though the
elections had become due earlier. According to him, these orders were
significant not because they diluted the importance of Article 243U,
but because they demonstrated that a constitutional court, when
confronted with an operative legislative change, did not direct the
Election Commission to disregard that law merely because elections
had earlier become due.
165. On this basis, Mr. Pangam submitted that the Karnataka experience
had to be understood as demonstrating the error in treating Article
243U as automatically freezing the statutory framework on the date on
which the tenure of an elected body expires. If that proposition were
accepted, any law enacted thereafter, though otherwise valid and
applicable to the election when actually held, would have to be ignored
merely because the election ought to have been held at an earlier point
of time. According to him, there is no constitutional basis for such a
doctrine.
166. To illustrate the difficulty, the learned Advocate General posed a
situation where an election is legitimately postponed on account of an
exceptional circumstance recognised in law and, during that period,
the Legislature enacts a new law governing the composition or conduct
of the election. He submitted that it could hardly be contended that,
when the election is ultimately held, it must nevertheless be governed
by the law which existed on the date when the earlier term expired.
According to him, unless the subsequent law itself provides otherwise,
Page 93 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the election must be held in accordance with the law in force when the
statutory and electoral exercise is actually undertaken.
167. Mr. Pangam then addressed the Petitioners' reliance upon Kishansing
Tomar (supra). He accepted without reservation that the Constitution
Bench has emphasised the mandatory character of Article 243U and
the obligation of the State Election Commission to plan the election
sufficiently in advance. His submission, however, was that the
judgment itself recognises that exceptional circumstances may arise in
which elections cannot be completed within the ordinary
constitutional period. According to him, the references in that
judgment to natural calamities, breakdown of law and order and
similar situations cannot be read as an exhaustive statutory catalogue
incapable of accommodating any other constitutionally compelling
circumstance.
168. The learned Advocate General submitted that judgments cannot be
read as though the illustrations employed by the Court were
themselves statutory provisions. A constitutional court decides the
factual and legal situation before it and may identify circumstances
which then arise for consideration, but those illustrations cannot be
converted into a closed list excluding every situation which may
subsequently arise. His submission therefore was that Kishansing
Tomar (supra) does not lay down that only war, calamity or
breakdown of law and order can ever justify an election being
conducted after expiry of the tenure of the local body.
Page 94 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
169. In this context, he referred to subsequent judicial orders in which time
for completing local-body elections was extended in order to enable
statutory exercises concerning delimitation, restructuring or
reservation to be properly completed. According to him, these orders
demonstrate that the constitutional mandate of Article 243U has never
been understood in isolation from every other constitutional
requirement governing a lawful election. He submitted that the
question in each case is not whether Article 243U is important, which
is beyond dispute, but how that mandate is to operate when another
constitutional or statutory obligation essential to a valid election must
simultaneously be fulfilled.
170. Mr. Pangam submitted that this distinction also answers the reliance
placed upon Suresh Mahajan (supra). According to him, the
judgments relied upon by the Petitioners principally dealt with delays
caused by executive or administrative inaction, including belated
delimitation exercises which could and ought to have been undertaken
earlier. The present case, according to him, stands on a materially
different footing because a legislative change has intervened and that
legislation now occupies the field. The State Election Commission
cannot treat a law as though it were merely an executive impediment
which may be bypassed in order to adhere to an earlier administrative
schedule.
171. The learned Advocate General thereafter placed considerable reliance
upon the constitutional importance of a free and fair election. He
submitted that periodicity is undoubtedly one facet of electoral
democracy, but an election conducted with an incorrect composition
Page 95 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
of the Council, defective delimitation or constitutionally
impermissible reservation cannot be regarded as constitutionally
satisfactory merely because it has been completed within time.
According to him, the Constitution requires not simply an election, but
an election conducted under a lawful framework which gives proper
effect to the composition and reservation provisions contained in Part
IX-A.
172. It was in this context that Mr. Pangam justified the change from
“voters” to “population” in Section 9. He submitted that the
Constitution consistently uses population as the relevant demographic
concept for municipal representation and expressly defines
“population” in Article 243P(g) by reference to the last preceding
census of which the relevant figures have been published. Under the
earlier Section 9, the strength of a Municipal Council was determined
by reference to the number of voters, whereas under the Ordinance
that basis has been substituted by population and the numerical unit
has been altered from 2,500 to 3,000. According to him, the
amendment brings the statutory structure into closer conformity with
the constitutional scheme.
173. The learned Advocate General illustrated the practical consequence of
this change by reference to the comparative material placed before us.
He pointed out that the number of wards in certain Municipal Councils
changes when the Council strength is determined by reference to
population instead of voters. Such change necessarily affects not
merely delimitation but also reservation because the number of seats
available for reservation for women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Page 96 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Tribes and backward classes is calculated with reference to the total
number of seats in the Council. He therefore submitted that
delimitation, composition and reservation cannot be
compartmentalised as though alteration of one has no consequence
upon the others.
174. Mr. Pangam submitted that this constitutional relationship becomes
particularly clear from Article 243T. Reservation for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes is required to bear, as nearly as may be, the same
proportion to the total number of seats as their population in the
municipal area bears to the total population of that area. Reservation
in favour of backward classes, though enabled by clause (6), must
equally satisfy the constitutional requirements laid down by the
Supreme Court governing political reservation in local bodies.
According to him, an electoral structure created on one demographic
basis cannot conveniently be retained while reservation is worked out
on another if the resulting representation ceases to reflect the
statutory and constitutional scheme.
175. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the
contemporary empirical inquiry contemplated by the substituted
Section 10 cannot be dismissed as an unnecessary administrative
addition. Political reservation for backward classes, according to him,
cannot be mechanically provided merely because a particular
percentage has historically been employed. The dedicated
Commission must identify the nature and implications of political
backwardness local-body-wise and the reservation must thereafter be
worked out within the constitutional ceiling. The amended Section 10
Page 97 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
expressly incorporates that requirement into the municipal election
process.
176. He therefore contended that the Ordinance advances, rather than
defeats, the constitutional objective of a free and fair election. The
State's affidavit itself takes the position that the new procedure of draft
delimitation, objections, empirical inquiry and reservation was
introduced in furtherance of electoral fairness and the constitutional
requirements governing representative local government. According
to the learned Advocate General, the mere circumstance that this more
elaborate process requires additional time cannot render the law
unconstitutional if the procedure itself serves a legitimate
constitutional purpose.
177. Mr. Pangam then relied upon Article 243ZG and submitted that the
Constitution itself accords a special degree of protection to laws
relating to delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats. He
relied upon Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party v. Union
of India22, to emphasise the constitutional distinction between a law
governing delimitation and an executive order made under such law.
According to him, where the Constitution creates an express bar
against questioning the validity of a delimitation law, a challenge
which in substance seeks to prevent the operation of such legislation
must be approached with corresponding restraint.
22
(2011) 1 SCC 228
Page 98 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
178. The learned Advocate General also relied upon State of Goa v.
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra). He submitted that the Supreme Court
has drawn a clear distinction between statutory provisions relating to
delimitation or allotment of seats and orders passed in exercise of
powers conferred by those provisions. While an executive or statutory
order may remain open to judicial review where it violates the
governing enactment or the Constitution, the statutory provision itself
enjoys the protection contemplated by Article 243ZG within its field.
He therefore submitted that any grievance concerning the eventual
delimitation or reservation may be examined at the appropriate stage,
but that possibility cannot furnish a ground for directing that the
legislative framework itself be disregarded.
179. Mr. Pangam placed particular reliance upon another principle
recognised in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra), namely
the constitutional position of the State Election Commission. He
submitted that if any authority, including the State Government, acts
in breach of the Constitution or the governing legislation, the State
Election Commission possesses authority under Article 243ZA to
insist upon compliance and, if necessary, to approach the High Court.
Conversely, if the law governing an election requires a particular
statutory exercise to be undertaken before the election, the State
Election Commission cannot deliberately act in breach of that law
merely because adherence to it affects an earlier proposed timetable.
180. According to the learned Advocate General, the Petitioners'
alternative prayer would therefore place both the State Election
Commission and this Court in an untenable constitutional position.
Page 99 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
The Commission is asked to ignore a law which admittedly remains in
force, whereas the Court is asked to direct such non-compliance
without first declaring that law unconstitutional. He submitted that a
writ of mandamus can never command a statutory or constitutional
authority to act contrary to a subsisting law.
181. In support of this proposition, Mr. Pangam relied upon the principle
that a High Court cannot direct statutory provisions to be ignored
merely because it perceives an inconsistency or considers another
course more convenient, unless it first adjudicates upon their
constitutional validity. He particularly relied upon the Supreme
Court's disapproval of an approach where statutory provisions were
directed to be ignored for practical purposes without being struck
down. His submission was that precisely the same error would arise if
this Court upheld the present Ordinance and nevertheless directed the
State Election Commission to conduct these elections under the
superseded statutory regime.
182. Learned Advocate General therefore submitted that the Court should
avoid what, according to him, was the central error in the Karnataka
High Court approach. If the Ordinance is constitutionally invalid, the
Court may so declare upon a properly established ground. If it is not,
it must be given effect. There cannot, according to him, be an
intermediate constitutional category in which the law remains valid
but is treated as prospectively operative only because applying it to the
present elections creates inconvenience in adhering to Article 243U.
Page 100 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
183. Mr. Pangam lastly submitted that the State did not seek an indefinite
postponement of the municipal elections. He accepted throughout the
hearing that the elections must be held at the earliest possible date and
that every authority concerned must act expeditiously. His resistance
was to the proposition that expedition could be achieved by
abandoning the law presently in force. According to him, the
constitutionally permissible course was to implement the Ordinance,
complete the exercises of delimitation and reservation in accordance
with it and require all concerned authorities to perform their
respective functions within the shortest period reasonably and
lawfully possible.
184. The submission of the learned Advocate General, viewed in its
entirety, was therefore that the present controversy does not require a
choice between the Ordinance and Article 243U. The Ordinance must
operate because it is valid legislation occupying the field, while Article
243U must guide the speed and urgency with which that legislation is
implemented. According to him, the Petitioners have failed to
establish any ground for invalidating the Ordinance and the
appropriate course would consequently be to dismiss the challenge
while permitting the election process already commenced under the
amended provisions to proceed to its conclusion within a definite
timetable.
185. The learned Advocate General also addressed the submission that the
electoral process had already commenced before promulgation of the
Ordinance. He submitted that the preparatory steps relating to
determination of the number of Councillors, delimitation of wards and
Page 101 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
reservation of seats cannot, for every purpose, be equated with
commencement of the “election” itself. Referring to the settled
election-law jurisprudence, he submitted that the election, in its
comprehensive legal sense, ordinarily commences with issuance of the
election notification and continues until declaration of the result.
Delimitation and allied exercises which precede such notification are
antecedent statutory steps undertaken for creating the electoral
framework within which the election is ultimately conducted.
186. According to Mr. Pangam, this distinction had a direct bearing upon
the Petitioners’ contention that the Ordinance had retrospectively
interfered with an election already in progress. His submission was
that no election notification had been issued before 22 April 2026 and,
therefore, the Ordinance did not interrupt an election in the sense
understood by the constitutional provisions regulating interference
with an ongoing electoral process. What stood affected was the
antecedent exercise of delimitation under the earlier law, and once the
law governing that exercise itself changed, the State Election
Commission was obliged to proceed in accordance with the amended
provision.
187. The learned Advocate General further submitted that Article 243ZG
assumes significance in this context. Clause (a), with a non-obstante
clause, prohibits the validity of any law relating to delimitation of
constituencies or allotment of seats made or purporting to be made
under Article 243ZA from being called in question in any Court.
According to him, substituted Section 10 is precisely such a law
because it regulates delimitation and allotment or reservation of seats.
Page 102 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
The State has expressly taken this objection in its affidavit and has
contended that the challenge to Section 10 is consequently barred at
the threshold.
188. Mr. Pangam clarified that he was not contending that every action
taken by an authority under a delimitation law is immune from judicial
review. He accepted the distinction recognised in State of Goa v.
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra) between the statutory law itself and an
order or action taken under that law. According to him, an executive
or statutory order which transgresses the governing enactment or the
Constitution may remain amenable to judicial review, but the
constitutional protection accorded to the law relating to delimitation
itself cannot be rendered meaningless by indirectly preventing that
law from operating.
189. The learned Advocate General then relied upon the observations in
State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra) concerning the
constitutional status of the State Election Commission. He submitted
that the Commission is not a passive agency which must proceed with
an election despite a known constitutional or statutory defect. If
reservation is contrary to Article 243T or to the governing enactment,
the Commission can insist upon correction of that defect and, in an
appropriate case, postpone the electoral process until the illegality is
removed. His submission was that this principle necessarily operates
in both directions: the Commission must correct a constitutional
infraction, but it must equally insist upon compliance with an
operative statutory mandate.
Page 103 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
190. According to the learned Advocate General, the Petitioners’ argument
would produce the opposite result. It would require the State Election
Commission to knowingly disregard the amended law merely because
proceeding under the law would consume additional time. Such a
course, he submitted, would itself amount to a statutory infraction by
the constitutional authority entrusted with the conduct of municipal
elections.
191. Mr. Pangam thereafter returned to the question of reservation and
submitted that the Court should not treat delimitation and reservation
as mere administrative formalities capable of being dispensed with
whenever Article 243U is invoked. He relied upon the decision arising
from Tamil Nadu to contend that the constitutional object of
democratic local self-government cannot be effectively achieved
unless the territorial constituencies are properly constituted and the
constitutionally mandated reservations are correctly worked out on
the basis of the relevant population. In that case, the Supreme Court
itself declined to permit elections in newly constituted districts until
the requisite delimitation exercise had been completed.
192. On this basis, the learned Advocate General submitted that the
constitutional scheme does not recognise punctuality as the sole
attribute of a valid election. Timeliness, lawful composition, proper
delimitation and constitutionally compliant reservation are all
components of the same representative process. According to him,
Article 243U cannot be interpreted in a manner which compels an
election to be held on a framework which the Legislature has validly
Page 104 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
replaced and which no longer represents the law governing the
constitution of the Municipal Councils.
193. The learned Advocate General also rejected the suggestion that the
exceptional circumstances referred to in Kishansing Tomar (supra)
constitute an exhaustive list beyond which delay can never be
constitutionally tolerated. He submitted that judicial decisions are not
to be read as statutory enactments and that the factual illustrations
noticed in one case cannot foreclose the possibility of materially
different circumstances arising in another. His submission was that
the principle emerging from Kishansing Tomar (supra) is that delay
must be exceptional and supported by legally sustainable reasons, and
not that only the particular examples referred to in that judgment can
ever qualify as such reasons.
194. He therefore contended that the subsequent decisions and orders of
the Supreme Court concerning delimitation, reservation and
restructuring of local bodies have to be read as part of the development
of the same constitutional principle. According to him, those orders
demonstrate that the Court has, in appropriate cases, permitted the
constitutional timeline to yield to the minimum extent necessary to
complete another indispensable constitutional or statutory exercise,
while simultaneously requiring the authorities to complete the
elections within a judicially controlled period.
195. Mr. Pangam placed particular emphasis upon the successive orders
passed by the Supreme Court in the Karnataka proceedings. He
submitted that the High Court had directed that the pending elections
Page 105 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
be conducted without giving effect to the newly introduced legislative
regime, whereas the Supreme Court stayed that judgment and
thereafter permitted the processes contemplated by the subsequent
law to continue. The Supreme Court subsequently extended the time
for completing delimitation and the consequent elections on more
than one occasion. According to him, the significance of these orders
lies in the fact that the Court preserved the legislation and supervised
its implementation rather than directing that it be ignored merely
because Article 243U had already been breached.
196. The learned Advocate General submitted that the same constitutional
method should be adopted in the present case if this Court considers
the delay already occasioned to be unacceptable. The answer,
according to him, is not to revive the superseded law, but to require all
authorities functioning under the amended law to act with the greatest
possible expedition. He maintained that this course gives effect
simultaneously to the legislative mandate and to Article 243U and
avoids the constitutional difficulty inherent in commanding
disobedience of one in order to enforce the other.
197. Mr. Pangam also drew attention to the consequence which would
follow if the Ordinance were struck down or treated as inapplicable to
the present elections. Section 9 would revert to the earlier statutory
basis of determining the number of Councillors by reference to voters
instead of population, while the reservation provisions continued to
operate by reference to population. He submitted that such a result
would recreate the very incongruity which the Legislature had sought
Page 106 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
to remove and would potentially affect the number of wards and,
consequently, the number and location of reserved seats.
198. Learned Advocate General submitted that the Court ought not, while
adjudicating upon a challenge founded principally on the timing of the
Ordinance, grant relief which itself restores a statutory regime
carrying serious constitutional and representational consequences.
According to him, this consideration reinforces the need to preserve
the amended law and mould the time within which it is implemented
rather than revert to the earlier regime.
199. He further submitted that the revised number of Councillors has a
direct mathematical impact upon reservation. By way of illustration, if
the total number of wards in a Municipal Council rises from twenty-
four to twenty-seven, the number of seats reserved for women also
changes because the constitutional fraction is applied to the total
strength of the Council. Similar consequences follow in relation to
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and, subject to the applicable
constitutional requirements, backward classes. His submission
therefore was that the amendment to Section 9 cannot be treated as a
minor numerical alteration unconnected with the broader process of
delimitation and reservation.
200. The learned Advocate General also answered the Petitioners’
criticism that the State had introduced the amended regime without
ensuring that the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes was
immediately ready with its empirical material. He submitted that any
deficiency in administrative preparedness on the part of an
Page 107 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
implementing authority cannot, by itself, render the legislation
unconstitutional. The validity of the law must be tested on
constitutional grounds and not by reference to the efficiency or
inefficiency with which a statutory authority subsequently performs its
functions.
201. He nevertheless accepted that, once the law is upheld and the
authorities are required to proceed under it, none of them would be
entitled to consume time indefinitely. If the Court considered it
necessary to ensure expedition, it could require the State Government,
the State Election Commission and the Backward Classes Commission
to coordinate their functions and complete the statutory process
within the shortest legally permissible period. His objection was only
to any direction which required departure from, or non-
implementation of, the Ordinance itself.
202. Finally, the learned Advocate General submitted that the Petitions,
insofar as they seek invalidation of the Ordinance or a direction that it
be disregarded for the present elections, are liable to be dismissed. He
maintained that Article 243U remains fully operative and continues to
bind every authority, but that its enforcement must take place through
expeditious implementation of the law presently in force and not by
judicial suspension of that law. The State, according to him, does not
seek any open-ended extension and has no objection to the Court
ensuring that the remaining process is completed within a strict and
realistic timetable.
Page 108 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
203. Thus, the State’s answer to the Petitions is that there is no
irreconcilable conflict between Article 243U and the amended
Sections 9 and 10. The constitutional mandate of timely elections
requires urgency in implementation, whereas the amended law
prescribes the legal framework within which those elections must now
be held. The learned Advocate General accordingly urged that both
must be preserved and given effect to together.
204. In support of the State’s defence to the challenge founded upon Article
213, the learned Advocate General relied upon A.K. Roy v. Union of
India (supra), Dattatray Yedu Thombre v. State of Maharashtra
(supra) and Sahebrao Narayanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra23.
He submitted that an Ordinance promulgated under Article 213 is an
exercise of legislative power and stands on the same footing as an
enactment of the State Legislature during the period of its operation.
According to him, although the existence of the constitutional
conditions for exercise of the Ordinance-making power is not
altogether excluded from judicial review, the Court does not sit in
appeal over the satisfaction of the Governor or examine the adequacy
or sufficiency of the material as though it were reviewing an
administrative decision.
205. The learned Advocate General relied upon these authorities also to
answer the Petitioners’ allegation of colourable exercise of power and
fraud on the Constitution. He submitted that the Petitioners had not
laid the factual or legal foundation necessary for invalidating a
23
1993 SCC OnLine Bom 399
Page 109 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
legislative measure on such a ground and that the mere circumstance
that the Ordinance was promulgated when the earlier delimitation
exercise had progressed considerably would not establish
constitutional fraud. According to him, once legislative competence is
admitted, the Petitioners must establish a recognised constitutional
infirmity in the legislation itself and cannot invite the Court to infer an
improper legislative purpose merely from the point of time at which
the law was brought into force.
206. In dealing with the manner in which the constitutional power under
Article 213 is exercised, Mr. Pangam also relied upon the Constitution
Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab24. He submitted
that the Governor is the constitutional head of the State and ordinarily
acts upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The challenge
therefore could not proceed on an assumption that the Governor was
required personally to undertake an independent inquiry into the
necessity for the Ordinance divorced from the constitutional
machinery of the elected Government.
207. On the question of the constitutional requirement of reservation in
local bodies, the learned Advocate General relied upon Vikas
Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the subsequent
orders in the proceedings concerning Rahul Ramesh Wagh v. State of
Maharashtra(supra), and Vaibhav Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(supra). He submitted that reservation in favour of backward classes
in local-body elections cannot be provided mechanically and that the
24
(1974) 2 SCC 831
Page 110 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional and judicially prescribed exercise for determining such
reservation has to be undertaken before the electoral structure is
finalised. The material placed before us also shows that the Supreme
Court, while considering the subsequent Madhya Pradesh
proceedings, examined the report of the dedicated Commission with
reference to the Triple Test laid down in Vikas Gawali (supra) and the
requirement that the proportion of reservation be determined local-
body-wise while maintaining the overall ceiling of fifty per cent.
208. According to the learned Advocate General, these authorities
demonstrate that delimitation, determination of the number of seats
and reservation cannot be treated as inconsequential preliminaries
which may simply be dispensed with in order to achieve an earlier
polling date. He submitted that the constitutional command of timely
elections has to operate together with the constitutional requirements
governing the composition and representational character of the
elected body. The State cannot be compelled to constitute a Municipal
Council through an electoral arrangement which does not satisfy those
requirements merely because the previous term has expired or is about
to expire.
209.The learned Advocate General also relied upon Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam v. Secretary, Governor’s Secretariat25, in answer to the
proposition that Article 243U invariably requires elections to proceed
notwithstanding an incomplete delimitation or restructuring exercise.
He submitted that the Supreme Court has itself recognised, in an
25
(2020) 6 SCC 548
Page 111 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
appropriate factual situation, that delimitation may first have to be
completed before elections are conducted in newly constituted or
reorganised local bodies. His submission was therefore that Article
243U cannot be read in isolation from the other constitutional
requirements which determine the territorial and representative
structure of the body to which the election is to be held.
210. Mr. Pangam further relied upon Sri M. Shivaraju v. State of
Karnataka (supra), and the subsequent proceedings before the
Supreme Court concerning the Karnataka municipal elections. He
accepted that the Karnataka High Court had emphasised the mandate
of Article 243U, but submitted that the subsequent orders of the
Supreme Court assume considerable significance because the
Supreme Court did not require the intervening legislation to be
disregarded merely because elections had become due. According to
him, those orders demonstrate that where an operative legislative
regime requires a fresh statutory exercise, the proper constitutional
response may be to permit that exercise to be completed within a
controlled period rather than to direct an election under a superseded
legal regime. The Karnataka judgment itself records that the term of
the BBMP had expired on 10 September 2020 and that the election
ought ordinarily to have been completed before expiry of that term.
211. Reliance was also placed upon Menino Da Cruz v. State of Goa26, and
Romaldo Fernandes v. State of Goa27, while dealing with the
respective spheres occupied by the State Government and the State
26
Writ Petition No.664 of 2025 decided on 30 June 2025
27
2021 SCC OnLine Bom 275
Page 112 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Election Commission before the commencement of the election
process. The learned Advocate General submitted that delimitation of
constituencies and reservation of seats are exercises anterior to
commencement of the election and need not constitutionally be
performed by the State Election Commission merely because they
ultimately have a bearing upon the election. The material relied upon
before us records the distinction that the election process commences
upon issuance of the statutory election notification and that
delimitation and reservation precede that stage.
212. The learned Advocate General relied upon State of Goa v. Fouziya
Imtiaz Shaikh, (supra), in this context as well. He submitted that
Fouziya undoubtedly recognises the independent constitutional
position of the State Election Commission and its obligation to secure
elections in conformity with the Constitution, but does not confer
upon the Commission a power to disregard an operative law governing
delimitation or reservation. He pointed out that the authorities
considered in the Goa municipal-election jurisprudence include both
Fouziya and Romaldo Fernandes (supra) and submitted that the two
spheres must therefore be kept distinct.
213. Mr. Pangam also relied upon Jammu and Kashmir National
Panthers Party v. Union of India (supra), to contend that the Court,
while enforcing the democratic requirement of elections, is not
powerless to take account of a genuine legal or constitutional
impediment which makes immediate elections impracticable.
According to him, the Petitioners’ formulation that Article 243U
admits of no accommodation whatsoever would convert the
Page 113 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional provision into an inflexible rule operating without
regard to circumstances in which another constitutionally necessary
exercise has first to be completed.
214. The learned Advocate General then referred to V.S. Achuthanandan v.
P.J. Francis28, K.T.M.T.M. Abdul Kayoom v. Commissioner of
Income Tax29, and Escorts Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise30.
These authorities were not relied upon for their underlying factual
subject matter but for the settled principle governing the use of
precedents. Mr. Pangam submitted that a judicial decision must be
understood in the context of the question which arose for
determination and the material facts upon which the Court decided it,
and that expressions occurring in a judgment cannot be detached from
that setting and applied as though they were words contained in a
statute.
215. It was in that context that the learned Advocate General sought to
distinguish the Petitioners’ reliance upon Kishansing Tomar (supra)
and the subsequent decisions reiterating Article 243U. According to
him, the observations concerning exceptional circumstances in those
decisions cannot be converted into an exhaustive statutory catalogue
of the only circumstances in which some unavoidable delay may occur.
His submission was that a materially different factual or legal
circumstance must be examined on its own constitutional footing and
28
(1999) 3 SCC 737
29
1961 SCC OnLine SC 244
30
(2004) 8 SCC 335
Page 114 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
that the ratio of an earlier judgment cannot be enlarged beyond the
question which actually arose before the Court.
216. In continuation of the same submission, Mr. Pangam relied upon
Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra31, to submit that illustrations
employed by a Court while explaining a legal principle do not
necessarily exhaust every factual situation in which that principle may
operate. He therefore contended that the exceptional circumstances
referred to in Kishansing Tomar (supra) cannot be treated as a closed
category which constitutionally prohibits recognition of any
subsequent circumstance not specifically mentioned there.
217. The learned Advocate General also relied upon Vinod Chinchalkar v.
State of Maharashtra32, in support of the State’s submission
concerning the relationship between delimitation, reservation and the
commencement of the election process. He submitted that the
constitutional bar and the settled election jurisprudence require a
distinction to be maintained between challenges to the legal
framework governing delimitation and challenges arising after the
election process has formally commenced. According to him, the
Petitioners cannot treat every antecedent statutory step as though the
election itself had already commenced merely because substantial
administrative preparation had taken place. Finally, reliance was
placed upon Dhanraj v. Vikram Singh33. The learned Advocate
General invoked the decision while emphasising that the Court must
31
(2008) 16 SCC 14
32
2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5233
33
2023 SCC OnLine SC 724
Page 115 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
examine the true legal issue arising from the facts before it and apply
precedent in the setting in which the precedent was rendered, rather
than extracting isolated observations from decisions arising in
materially different circumstances. According to him, the present
controversy has to be decided by harmonising Articles 243T, 243U,
243ZA and 213 with the law presently governing the Municipal
Councils and not by treating any one decision concerning a different
statutory regime as conclusively answering the controversy before us.
218. On the cumulative strength of these authorities, the learned Advocate
General submitted that the State does not dispute the binding
character of Article 243U or the constitutional importance of
conducting municipal elections within time. His submission was that
the authorities relied upon by the Petitioners do not establish the
further proposition that an operative law governing the number of
Councillors, delimitation and reservation must be ignored merely
because implementation of that law requires some additional time.
According to him, the constitutionally permissible course is to
preserve the legislation, require strict and expeditious compliance
with it and ensure that the elections follow immediately thereafter.
219. Mr. Somnath Karpe, learned Counsel appearing for the Goa State
Election Commission, submitted that the Commission occupies a
position distinct from that of the State Government. The Commission
is the constitutional authority upon which Article 243ZA casts the
responsibility of superintendence, direction and control over
municipal elections and it fully recognises the mandate contained in
Article 243U that elections to constitute a Municipality are required to
Page 116 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
be completed before expiry of its tenure. At the same time, according
to him, the Commission is equally bound to conduct those elections in
accordance with the statutory regime which lawfully occupies the field
on the date when the electoral exercise is undertaken.
220.Mr. Karpe submitted that the State Election Commission had not
remained inactive in anticipation of the present elections. The
Commission had sought information concerning the dates of expiry of
the eleven Municipal Councils well in advance and, after obtaining the
requisite electoral material, had initiated the statutory exercise under
the law then prevailing. The Legislative Assembly electoral roll with 1
January 2026 as the qualifying date was adopted for division of the
municipal areas into wards, the number of Councillors for the eleven
Municipal Councils was fixed on 25 March 2026, and on 30 March
2026 a public notice was issued inviting objections and suggestions to
the draft delimitation. The order adopting the Legislative Assembly
electoral roll specifically records that it was adopted for division of the
municipal areas into wards for the ensuing general elections to all
eleven Municipal Councils.
221. Learned Counsel therefore fairly accepted that, before promulgation
of the Ordinance, the election machinery had moved considerably
under the then existing law. He stated, in answer to the specific queries
put by us, that by 22 April 2026 the draft delimitation had been
prepared and had been forwarded to the Government for the
consultation contemplated by the then existing statutory regime.
Subject to completion of that consultation, obtaining the necessary
material for reservation, preparation of the ward-wise voters list and
Page 117 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the remaining election formalities, the Commission stated that the
elections could have been concluded by the end of May 2026 or, at the
latest, during the first week of June 2026.
222. Mr. Karpe submitted, however, that this factual position did not
confer upon the Commission any authority to disregard the law which
intervened on 22 April 2026. His principal submission was that Article
243U and Article 243ZA must be read together. Article 243U fixes the
constitutional obligation concerning the duration and timely
constitution of Municipalities, whereas Article 243ZA requires the
State Election Commission to conduct elections within the legislative
framework enacted by the State under Article 243ZA(2). So long as the
Ordinance remains valid and operative, the Commission cannot elect
to proceed under the superseded law merely because the earlier
exercise had reached an advanced stage.
223. Learned Counsel submitted that the Commission cannot itself
adjudicate upon the constitutional validity of legislation and thereafter
refuse to implement it. If a statutory provision is contrary to the
Constitution, it is open to an aggrieved person, and in an appropriate
case even to the Commission, to approach the constitutional Court for
appropriate relief. Until the law is invalidated, read down or otherwise
held inapplicable by a competent Court, the Commission is required
to obey it. His submission during the hearing was that if the
Commission were to disregard the Ordinance, the State or an affected
citizen could legitimately seek a mandamus compelling the
Commission to act in accordance with the law.
Page 118 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
224. Mr. Karpe therefore resisted the Petitioners’ submission that the
earlier exercise should simply be continued while leaving the
Ordinance otherwise untouched. According to him, no vested right
had accrued to any person merely because the delimitation exercise
had commenced under the earlier statute. Once the governing law
changed before issuance of the election notification, the Commission
was required to adjust its subsequent action to the changed statutory
regime. The question, according to him, was not whether the earlier
law was workable but which law governed the election when the
Commission was required to proceed further.
225. The Commission also defended its decision to discontinue the pre-
Ordinance delimitation exercise. Mr. Karpe submitted that the change
made by amended Section 9 was not merely procedural. Under the
earlier regime, the number of Councillors was determined with
reference to the number of voters, whereas the Ordinance substituted
population as the relevant basis and simultaneously altered the
numerical benchmark from 2,500 to 3,000. According to the
Commission, this change affected the number of Councillors and
consequently the number and territorial configuration of the wards.
For that reason, the pre-Ordinance exercise could not simply be
carried forward into an election governed by the amended law.
226. In answer to the challenge specifically raised to the Commission’s
decision declaring the earlier delimitation exercise null and void,
learned Counsel submitted that the Commission acted because the
statutory foundation upon which that exercise had been undertaken
had materially changed. The record shows that, after publication of the
Page 119 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Ordinance, the State forwarded the amended law to the Commission
on 24 April 2026; the Commission called for municipality-wise
population figures on 28 April 2026; the Census 2011 figures were
supplied on 29 April 2026; and the matter was thereafter sent to the
Government on 7 May 2026 for consultation regarding the number of
Councillors under the new population-based framework. It was in this
setting that the Commission ceased to proceed with the earlier
delimitation exercise.
227. Mr. Karpe further submitted that the amended Section 10 has now
entrusted the State Election Commission itself with a structured
statutory responsibility extending from delimitation to final
reservation and declaration of the election. The Commission is
required first to delimit the wards, publish the draft delimitation,
receive and consider objections and issue the final delimitation
notification in consultation with the Government. It must thereafter
obtain empirical data concerning political backwardness from the Goa
State Commission for Backward Classes, prepare and publish the draft
reservation, consider objections thereto, issue the final reservation
notification in consultation with the Government and, after expiry of
the period stipulated by Section 10(7), declare the election.
228. Learned Counsel accepted that these statutory stages cannot be
allowed to become an open-ended process. During the hearing, we
therefore required the Commission to identify separately the periods
which it considered mandatory, the periods which represented only
outer limits, the administrative stages capable of compression and the
stages which could proceed contemporaneously. The Commission
Page 120 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
thereafter placed before us a detailed chart and written answers to the
questions posed by the Court.
229. Mr. Karpe informed us that, in the fresh exercise undertaken under
the Ordinance, the stage of draft delimitation had already been
reached and the statutory objection period was running. He explained
that objections to delimitation principally require examination of the
territorial configuration of the proposed wards and the corrections
sought in relation to particular localities or boundaries. He accepted
that the period permitted for the Commission to complete its
subsequent administrative functions is an outer period and that the
Commission would not insist upon consuming the whole of such
period if the objections could be considered earlier.
230. It was on this basis that the Commission stated that, after closure of
objections to the draft delimitation, consideration of objections,
finalisation of the ward boundaries, consultation with the Government
and publication of the final delimitation notification could together be
completed within approximately three weeks, provided the
Government completed its part of the consultation expeditiously. The
Commission expressly treated consultation with the Government as
mandatory, but did not suggest that a separate additional statutory
period must be added merely for consultation.
231. The next stage, according to Mr. Karpe, is materially dependent upon
the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes. Once final
delimitation is notified, Section 10(4) requires the State Election
Commission to obtain empirical data pertaining to political
Page 121 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
backwardness in respect of each municipal area and its wards. The
Commission therefore stated in its chart that the time required for
furnishing that data was principally a matter for the Backward Classes
Commission and could not accurately be estimated by the State
Election Commission itself.
232. Mr. Karpe nevertheless accepted during the hearing that such
dependence upon another statutory authority does not permit the
State Election Commission to remain passive. The Commission has
the constitutional responsibility for completing the election and must
therefore coordinate with the Backward Classes Commission and the
State Government so that the interdependent statutory exercises are
undertaken without avoidable intervals. His submission was that, once
the requisite empirical material is received, the Commission can
immediately proceed to the reservation stage contemplated by Section
10.
233. In relation to reservation, the Commission placed before us the
minimum administrative period which it considered necessary after
the statutory objection period had expired. It stated that scrutiny and
consideration of objections, consultation with the Government,
publication of the final reservation notification and preparation of the
ward-wise voters list could together be completed within
approximately twenty days, subject again to timely consultation by the
Government.
234. Mr. Karpe submitted that certain periods, however, flow expressly
from the statute and cannot be dispensed with by the Commission
Page 122 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
merely on account of the elections having become overdue. In
particular, the Commission treated the public objection periods
contemplated by the amended Section 10 and the period prescribed by
Section 10(7) after publication of the final reservation notification as
statutory requirements which it was bound to observe. After expiry of
the thirty-day period under Section 10(7), the Commission would be
in a position to declare the elections.
235. Once the elections are declared, the Commission stated that
approximately twenty-five days would be required to complete the
actual electoral programme, including filing of nominations, scrutiny,
withdrawal of candidature, polling, counting and declaration of
results. Mr. Karpe therefore submitted that the Court could
distinguish between the statutory minimum periods which the
Commission cannot lawfully eliminate and the administrative
intervals which can and, in the present circumstances, should be
compressed.
236. An important answer was given by the Commission when we
specifically asked whether, if the Ordinance were upheld, there existed
any constitutional or statutory reason why the entire election process
could not be completed within the minimum period identified by the
Commission itself. The Commission answered that, subject to the
minimum statutory periods identified in the chart, there was no
constitutional or statutory impediment to completing the
election process within that period. This statement assumes
significance because the Commission did not seek an indefinite period
Page 123 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
nor did it contend that the process under the Ordinance was incapable
of being judicially placed within a firm timetable.
237. Mr. Karpe also addressed the possibility of the municipal election
timetable approaching the forthcoming Assembly elections. He
submitted that elections to the Legislative Assembly fall within the
domain of the Election Commission of India, whereas municipal
elections fall within the constitutional domain of the State Election
Commission. He pointed out that both exercises may require
substantially the same administrative machinery, including polling
personnel, Returning Officers, police and law-and-order
arrangements, revenue officials, polling stations and vehicles, and that
practical difficulties could therefore arise if both electoral processes
substantially overlapped.
238. Learned Counsel, however, did not put this forward as a legal ground
for postponing the municipal elections. His response was that the
possibility of such logistical overlap would have to be dealt with if and
when it actually arose. He accepted that the Commission’s present
obligation was to complete the statutory process as expeditiously as
the law permitted and that an anticipated future election could not
presently furnish a basis for leaving the municipal election schedule
open-ended.
239. Mr. Karpe also relied upon the constitutional position of the State
Election Commission recognised in Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra), particularly the
principle that the expressions “superintendence, direction and
Page 124 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
control” and “conduct of elections” employed in Articles 243K and
243ZA confer broad constitutional authority upon the State Election
Commission. The decisions relied upon in that context include
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner34 and In re
Special Reference No.1 of 200235. According to him, this broad
constitutional authority enables the Commission to take all lawful
measures necessary for completion of the electoral process, but does
not confer power to act in derogation of an express statutory provision
which remains constitutionally valid.
240. Learned Counsel was also confronted with the decisions in Suresh
Mahajan which state that an ongoing delimitation exercise or
incomplete Triple Test cannot ordinarily justify withholding elections
which have become due. He did not dispute those propositions. His
answer was that the present case had to be considered in the additional
circumstance that an amended law had intervened and that the
Commission itself had been statutorily entrusted with completing the
fresh delimitation and reservation process under that law. The
materials before us record the Supreme Court’s reiteration that
delimitation is a continuous exercise which ought ordinarily to be
commenced well in advance so that the election programme is not
detained when the election becomes due.
241. The submission of the State Election Commission was therefore not that
Article 243U becomes inoperative until completion of amended
Section 10. Its case was that Article 243U supplies the constitutional
34
(1978) 1 SCC 405
35
(2002) 8 SCC 237
Page 125 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
urgency, while amended Sections 9 and 10 supply the presently
operative legal route through which the election must be conducted.
Mr. Karpe submitted that the Commission would abide by any lawful
time-bound direction which preserves both requirements and enables
it to complete the remaining exercise without unnecessary
administrative intervals.
242. Thus, the position adopted by the State Election Commission differs in
an important respect from a plea seeking postponement simpliciter.
The Commission accepts that the elections are overdue, accepts that
the remaining administrative stages can be substantially compressed,
identifies the periods which according to it cannot lawfully be
dispensed with, and states that there is no other constitutional or
statutory impediment to completing the election process within the
minimum timetable placed before this Court. Its resistance is confined
to the prayer that it be directed to revive and act upon the pre-
Ordinance exercise notwithstanding the law presently in force.
243. Mr. Shivan Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the intervenors in
Miscellaneous Civil Application No.1756 of 2026, supported the
Ordinance and submitted that the challenge must also be examined
from the perspective of those belonging to the Other Backward Classes
whose political representation is directly affected by the reservation
exercise. He submitted that the amended Section 10 introduces, for the
first time in a structured statutory form, the requirement of obtaining
authentic empirical material concerning political backwardness before
reservation is finalised and that this change advances transparency
and fairness in the electoral process. The intervention application
Page 126 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
specifically pleads that the amended regime enables collection,
preparation and assessment of reliable empirical data concerning
backward classes and that the applicants, being members of the OBC
category, are directly affected by any order which prevents that regime
from operating.
244. Mr. Desai submitted that the controversy cannot be reduced to a
contest between timely elections and the impugned Ordinance.
According to him, political reservation in local bodies has
constitutional consequences of its own and cannot be worked out on
outdated, incomplete or mechanically applied material merely to
accelerate the election schedule. The requirement of a
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry, according to him, is
intended to ensure that reservation actually reaches those backward
classes which remain politically under-represented in the concerned
local body.
245. Learned Counsel emphasised that Article 243T(6) enables the State
Legislature to make provision for reservation in favour of backward
classes and that, once the State has chosen to provide such reservation,
the exercise must satisfy the constitutional requirements evolved by
the Supreme Court. His submission was that the empirical inquiry
contemplated by amended Section 10 is not an extraneous addition to
the election process but is the statutory mechanism through which
lawful political reservation is sought to be achieved.
246. Mr. Desai submitted that the Petitioners’ proposed solution of
proceeding with the elections under the previous regime would
Page 127 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
prejudice the very class whose interests the reservation provisions are
intended to protect. According to him, if the earlier exercise did not
incorporate the contemporaneous empirical inquiry now mandated by
law, directing the elections to proceed on that basis would perpetuate
the very deficiency which the amended provision seeks to cure.
247. Learned Counsel also adopted the submission that, so long as the
Ordinance remains operative, neither the State Election Commission
nor this Court can simply direct that it be ignored for the present
elections. According to him, there is a fundamental distinction
between holding a statutory provision unconstitutional and leaving it
intact while directing that it should not operate. The latter course, he
submitted, would amount in substance to judicially suspending
legislation without identifying any constitutional basis for doing so.
248. It was in this context that Mr. Desai relied upon K. Nagaraj v. State of
Andhra Pradesh36. He submitted that the wisdom, necessity and
expediency of legislation ordinarily lie within the legislative domain
and that a Court does not invalidate legislation merely because
another policy would appear preferable or because the timing of the
measure is questioned. According to him, unless the Petitioners
establish a constitutional prohibition or another recognised ground of
invalidity, the Court cannot substitute its own assessment of when the
amendment ought to have been enacted.
36
(1985) 1 SCC 523
Page 128 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
249. Mr. Desai further relied upon Gurudevta VKSS Maryadit v. State of
Maharashtra37, for the proposition that an operative statutory
provision must be given effect according to its terms and cannot be
rendered otiose merely because its application causes practical
difficulty in an individual case. He submitted that the constitutional
obligation of the State Election Commission is to conduct the elections
lawfully and not merely quickly, and that expedition cannot justify a
direction to act contrary to the statute which presently governs the
exercise.
250. Reliance was also placed upon Anugrah Narain Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh38. Mr. Desai referred to the decision in the context of the
special constitutional treatment accorded to delimitation and
allotment of seats in local-body elections. His submission was that
delimitation is not an inconsequential administrative step but forms
part of the legal architecture of representative democracy and that
Courts have repeatedly recognised the need for restraint where the
challenge concerns the constitution of electoral constituencies and the
distribution of seats.
251. Mr. Desai then relied upon State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal
Council39. He submitted that municipal institutions are creatures of
constitutional and statutory design and that changes in their
composition, status or electoral structure may legitimately require
consequential statutory exercises before elections can be held.
37
(2001) 4 SCC 534
38
(1996) 6 SCC 303
39
(2003) 9 SCC 731
Page 129 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
According to him, the constitutional requirement of periodic elections
does not mean that every intervening legislative reorganisation must
be ignored merely because the earlier term has expired or is close to
expiry.
252. Learned Counsel also placed reliance upon Dhanraj v. Vikram Singh
(supra), while emphasising that precedents must be applied with
reference to the actual issue and factual setting in which they were
rendered. He submitted that decisions dealing with executive delay or
routine delimitation cannot automatically govern a case where the
Legislature has introduced a new statutory mechanism for population-
based representation and empirical determination of backward-class
reservation.
253. Mr. Desai sought to distinguish the authorities relied upon by the
Petitioners, particularly those which treat delimitation as a continuous
exercise that should not ordinarily postpone elections. He submitted
that those decisions cannot be read as laying down an absolute
proposition that a constitutionally significant reservation exercise
must be abandoned whenever the election has become overdue.
According to him, the nature of the impediment matters, and the Court
must distinguish between avoidable administrative delay and
implementation of a substantive legislative framework intended to
secure lawful representation.
254. Learned Counsel further submitted that the amended Section 10 does
not authorise an indefinite postponement of elections. It prescribes
identifiable stages and definite statutory periods. The real question,
Page 130 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
according to him, is therefore not whether the law should be
disregarded but whether the authorities can be required to complete
those stages expeditiously. He submitted that a time-bound direction
under the amended regime would protect Article 243U without
sacrificing the constitutional and statutory safeguards concerning
representation and reservation.
255. Mr. Desai accordingly urged that the challenge to the Ordinance be
rejected and that the Court permit the State Election Commission and
the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes to complete the
exercise contemplated by amended Section 10 within a strict
timetable. His submission was that this course protects both
constitutional values involved in the controversy: the restoration of
elected municipal government at the earliest and the assurance that
such elected bodies are constituted on the basis of a lawful and
empirically supported reservation framework.
256. The substance of the intervenors’ case, therefore, is that the
constitutional mandate of timely elections cannot be implemented by
sacrificing the legality and fairness of political representation. They
support preservation of the Ordinance, not as a justification for
indefinite delay, but as the presently operative mechanism through
which delimitation and reservation must be completed before the
elections are held.
257. During the course of hearing, when we were examining the stage-wise
timetable placed before us by the State Election Commission, it
became apparent that the period required for completion of the
Page 131 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry contemplated by Section
10(4) remained uncertain. Since completion of that exercise was
necessary before the State Election Commission could proceed to the
stage of reservation under Section 10(5), we considered the presence
of the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes necessary for an
effective adjudication of these Petitions. The Commission was
accordingly impleaded as an additional respondent by our order dated
3 August 2026 and appeared before us on the following day. The
affidavit subsequently filed by its Member Secretary records this
sequence.
258. The learned Counsel appearing for the Backward Classes Commission
submitted that the Commission is the dedicated Commission required
to undertake the contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry into the
nature and implications of political backwardness qua local bodies
before reservation can be provided in favour of the Other Backward
Classes. The Commission accepted that this exercise is required to
satisfy the constitutional requirements governing political reservation
in local bodies and that its conclusions have ultimately to be made
available to the State Election Commission for the purpose of the
reservation exercise contemplated by amended Section 10.
259. Initially, it was submitted before us that the Commission would require
substantial time for completing this exercise. We therefore called upon
the Commission to explain what material was presently available with
it, what further information was required, which components of the
empirical inquiry depended upon final delimitation and why the entire
exercise could not commence immediately while the delimitation
Page 132 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
process was proceeding. During this discussion, the Commission
accepted that the Census of 2011 constituted the relevant published
census and that foundational demographic material concerning the
Other Backward Classes was already available with it.
260. The affidavit filed thereafter makes the available material more
specific. The Commission states that it presently possesses the Census
of 2011 as well as the survey report prepared by the Centre for
Development, Planning and Research in the year 2013 concerning the
OBC, SC and ST population in the State of Goa, including material
relating to the eleven Municipalities involved in these proceedings.
The Commission has stated that it will use this material for
undertaking the contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry into the
nature and implications of political backwardness qua these local
bodies.
261. The Commission explained that, in the ordinary course, when elections
to Municipalities, Panchayats or Zilla Panchayats are required to be
held, the State Election Commission issues the necessary instructions
to it for undertaking the empirical inquiry. It further stated that, after
the amendment transferred the delimitation exercise to the State
Election Commission, it had awaited instructions from the
Government and the State Election Commission before commencing
the exercise concerning reservation.
262. During the hearing, however, we specifically enquired why every
component of the empirical inquiry should remain suspended until
final delimitation was received. The question arose because
Page 133 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
identification of the OBC communities present within each
Municipality and examination of their political backwardness are
exercises relating to the municipal local body as a whole and do not
necessarily depend upon the precise boundary of every individual
ward. The Commission ultimately accepted that this part of the
exercise could commence immediately on the basis of the material
already available with it. The discussion before us records its
agreement to begin the exercise forthwith rather than await
completion of delimitation.
263. This position was thereafter expressly placed on affidavit. The
Commission states that, in view of what transpired during the hearing
on 4 August 2026, it would commence the contemporaneous rigorous
empirical inquiry without awaiting any further direction from the
Government or the State Election Commission and would proceed on
the basis of the Census of 2011 and the OBC data available from the
2013 survey report in respect of the eleven Municipalities.
264. At the same time, the Commission submitted that the entire exercise
cannot be completed independently of the final delimitation. The
ultimate reservation has to operate with reference to the finally
constituted wards and amended Section 10(4) itself requires the
empirical data to be furnished in respect of the municipal area and the
wards on the basis of the final delimitation notification. The statutory
scheme likewise contemplates receipt of that data by the State Election
Commission before publication of the draft reservation notification.
Page 134 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
265. The position which therefore emerged from the submissions of the
Commission was that the exercise could be divided, for purposes of
implementation, into two parts. The foundational municipality-wise
exercise concerning identification of the relevant backward classes,
examination of the material already available and assessment of the
nature and implications of their political backwardness could proceed
simultaneously with the pending delimitation exercise. The final
application of that inquiry to the wards as ultimately delimited, and
the furnishing of the requisite material for the reservation exercise,
would necessarily follow upon receipt of the final delimitation from
the State Election Commission.
266. The Commission also placed before us the practical constraints under
which it presently functions. Its affidavit states that its establishment
consists of a Member Secretary, two Clerks and two Office Boys and
that it does not presently receive sufficient funds for all the work
required of it. Whenever additional manpower is necessary, the
Commission has to seek assistance from the Directorate of Municipal
Administration or the Directorate of Panchayats.
267. On account of these constraints and the nature of the inquiry required
to be undertaken, the Commission has stated on affidavit that it would
require a minimum period of thirty days for conducting the
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry in respect of the eleven
Municipalities. It has further stated that, after the requisite direction
and delimitation particulars are received from the State Election
Commission for completing the reservation exercise based upon the
Page 135 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
final delimitation, it would complete the process within the period
stated in the affidavit.
268. The significance of the Commission’s stand is that the period required
by it does not have to commence only after every stage of delimitation
has concluded. The Commission has now undertaken to begin
immediately that portion of the empirical inquiry which can lawfully
be undertaken municipality-wise on the basis of the material already
in its possession. Consequently, while the final ward-wise application
of its findings will await communication of the final delimitation, the
intervening period need not remain unutilised.
269. The Commission has therefore not opposed the holding of elections nor
sought postponement of the electoral process as an independent relief.
Its concern is that the empirical inquiry required for lawful OBC
reservation must be properly completed. At the same time, it has
accepted before us that the exercise capable of being undertaken
independently of final ward boundaries can proceed simultaneously
and that only those components which necessarily depend upon the
finally delimited wards need await communication from the State
Election Commission.
270. The stand of the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes thus
removes, to a considerable extent, the uncertainty which initially
existed in the timetable placed before us. The Commission has
identified the foundational material already available with it, has
agreed to commence the empirical inquiry without awaiting further
instructions and has placed on affidavit the minimum period which,
Page 136 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
according to it, is required for completing the exercise in respect of the
eleven Municipalities. The legal effect of this assurance and the
manner in which the interdependent functions of the State Election
Commission, the State Government and the Backward Classes
Commission are required to be coordinated will be considered at the
appropriate stage of our analysis.
271. Having considered the pleadings in all the Petitions, the affidavits filed
by the State and the State Election Commission, the intervention
application, the affidavit of the Goa State Commission for Backward
Classes, the documents placed on record and the extensive
submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the
respective parties, we now proceed to consider the issues which arise
for determination. Though several facets of the controversy have been
urged before us, they ultimately converge upon the constitutional
relationship between the mandate of holding timely elections under
Article 243U, the legislative power of the State in matters relating to
municipal elections, the constitutional status and responsibility of the
State Election Commission and the legality and consequence of
introducing a substantially altered statutory regime after the electoral
exercise had already commenced and the terms of several Municipal
Councils had either expired or were nearing expiry.
272. The questions which, in our view, arise for determination are therefore
the following:
1. Whether the present challenge is barred, wholly or in part, by
Article 243ZG of the Constitution, and what is the permissible
scope of judicial review under Article 226 where the challenge
Page 137 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
is directed not merely to a particular delimitation or allotment
of seats but to the constitutional validity and operation of the
law governing the electoral process.
2. What is the nature and content of the mandate under Article
243U, particularly the requirement that an election to
constitute a Municipality shall be completed before expiry of its
duration; whether any departure from that mandate is
constitutionally permissible; and, if so, in what exceptional
circumstances and for what period.
3. Whether the legislative power of the State under Article
243ZA(2), read with the Ordinance-making power under Article
213, continues to be exercisable after the constitutional
obligation under Article 243U has matured; and whether the
timing and operation of such legislation are themselves subject
to constitutional scrutiny where implementation of the new law
necessarily postpones an election already due?
4. “Whether, in the facts of the present case, the Goa
Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 is liable to be
invalidated on the grounds urged by the Petitioners under
Articles 14, 213 and 243U, including the challenge to the timing
and purpose?
5. Whether, assuming that the Ordinance is constitutionally valid
and operative, the State Election Commission or this Court can
nevertheless disregard or postpone its application to the present
elections and direct completion of the electoral process under
the pre-existing statutory regime; and what is the legal effect of
the steps already undertaken before promulgation of the
Page 138 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Ordinance, including the decision of the State Election
Commission to abandon the earlier delimitation exercise?
6. How the constitutional requirements of periodic elections
under Article 243U are to be harmonised with the requirements
governing composition, delimitation and reservation under
Articles 243R, 243T and 243ZA, including the requirement of
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry for OBC
reservation; and whether these interdependent exercises must,
wherever legally possible, proceed simultaneously rather than
sequentially?
7. What constitutional obligations of advance preparedness,
independence, coordination and institutional responsibility
rest upon the State Government, the Legislature, the State
Election Commission and the Goa State Commission for
Backward Classes so that foreseeable statutory or
administrative exercises do not become the cause of recurring
breach of the electoral timetable fixed by the Constitution?
8. What relief should be moulded under Article 226 if the
Ordinance is preserved but the constitutional timetable under
Article 243U has already been breached; in particular, whether
this Court may prescribe a binding and compressed schedule for
completion of the remaining statutory stages so that the
elections are held within the shortest legally permissible
period?
273. For ready reference we have concised the important dates and events
below in a tabular form below:
Page 139 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
DATE EVENT
04.11.2020 Term of several Municipal Councils in Goa
expired
11.12.2020 Dyaneshwar Narso naik v/s State of Goa &
Ors. 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3903
(directions issued to SEC for Panchayat
elections
15.01.2021 Electoral Rolls of the Goa Legislative
Assembly (qualifying date 01.01.2021)
published and used for the 2021 Municipal
Elections.
28.01.2021 Municipality Amendment Bill inserting
proviso to Section 10 Clause 1
12.03.2021 State of
20.03.2021 Elections held to six Municipal Councils:
Pernem, Bicholim, Valpoi, Cuncolim,
Curchorem and Canacona.
31.03.2021 First Meeting convened of Bicholim,
Curchorem, Canacona and Pernem
Municipal Councils.
First Meeting convened of Cuncolim
05.04.2021 Municipal Council.
08.04.2021 First Meeting convened of Valpoi Municipal
Council
23.04.2021 General Elections held to five Municipal
Councils: Mapusa, Quepem, Sanguem,
Page 140 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Mormugao and Margao, following fresh
reservation notifications.
09.05.2021 First Meeting convened of Quepem
Municipal Council.
First Meeting convened of Margao,
26.05.2021
Mormugao and Mapusa Municipal
Councils.
30.05.2021 First Meeting convened of Sanguem
Municipal Council.
12.03.2021 State of Goa v/s Fouziya Shaikh & Anr
(2021) 8 SCC 401 – holds that under Article
243 ZA(1) the SEC is overall in charge of the
Superintendence, directions and control of
the preparation of the Rlectoral Roll and
conduct of municipal elections.
10.05. 2022 Suresh Mahajan v/s State of Madhya
Pradesh (2022 12 SCC 770) directs elections
to be held only after delimitation of wards
using triple test
07.01.2025 Goa State Election Commission letter to
Director of Municipal Administration
seeking duration of existing terms of
municipalities.
14.08.2025 Section 9 Amended, number of Councillors
raised from 25 to 27
29.10.2025 Director of Urban Development letter
supplying expiry-of-term information for 11
Page 141 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Municipal Councils to the Election
Commission.
07.01.2025 Election Commission letter (No. 552GEN-
ELNMC2025-26SEC954) regarding general
elections to 11 Municipal Councils in 2026,
listing last election dates.
16.12.2025 Draft Roll of Special Intensive Revision
2026 for Goa Legislative Assembly
published (forming part of integrated
electoral roll).
28.01.2026 Election Commission letter (No. 452GEN-
ELNMC2025-26SEC843) to Urban
Development on reservation of seats for
OBCs in 11 Municipal Councils:
backwardness data to be supplied by
15.03.2026.
13.02.2026 Petitioner in Writ Petition no.300/2026,
made letter to Election commission to
declare reservation
18.02.2026 Election Commission letter (No. 452GEN-
ELNMC2025-26SEC958) to Directorate of
Planning, Statistics and Evaluation seeking
ward-wise SC/ST population for 11
Municipal Councils (data requested by
25.02.2026).
Page 142 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
19.02.2026 Election Commission replied to Petitioner
in writ Petition 300/2026 that election to be
conducted according to the Municipal Act
21.02.2026 Special Intensive Revision 2026 electoral
roll (qualifying date 01.01.2026) published;
later adopted for municipal delimitation.
23 02.2026 Election Commission letter (No. 452GEN-
ELNMC2025-26SEC977) to Joint Chief
Electoral Officer requesting electoral rolls
for delimitation of municipal wards.
08.03.2026 Village Panchayat bye-elections to 14 vacant
wards across seven talukas held.
09.03.2026 Order (No. 452GEN-ELNMC2026-
2026SEC1039) by State Election
Commission adopting the Legislative
Assembly electoral roll as on 01.01.2026 for
division of municipal areas into wards for
the 2026 municipal elections.
11.03.2026 General elections to Corporation of the City
of Panaji (CCP) held
25.03.2026 Gazette publication (Series II No. 51) of
Order No. 493Delimitation11-
MC.2026SECPart1080 fixing the number of
councillors for each municipal council (e.g.,
25 for Mormugao, 24 for Margao, etc.).
Page 143 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
30.03.2026 Public notice No. 493 Delimitation11-
MC.2026SECPart1086) issued by the
Election Commission inviting
objections/suggestions on draft
delimitation, inspection and objections
allowed from 31.03.2026 to 07.04.2026
31.03.2026 Notification appointing Administrators to
six Municipal Councils (Bicholim,
Curchorem-Cacora, Canacona, Pernem,
Cuncolim and Valpoi).
31.03.2026 Expiry of existing term of Bicholim,
Curchorem, Canacona and Pernem
Municipal Councils; elections to be held
before this date.
31.03.2026 Eight-day period during which the public
could submit objections/suggestions on
-
draft delimitation for 11 Municipal
07.04.2026
Councils.
Expiry of existing term of
05.04.2026 Cuncolim Municipal Council,
08.04.2026 Valpoi Municipal Council
23.04.2026 Goa Municipalities Amendment Ordinance,
2026 (Ordinance No. 4 of 2026)
Page 144 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
promulgated by the Governor of Goa and
published in the Official Gazette
24.04.2026 Department of Urban Development letter
(No. 10989-2025-DMAElectionM.C.264) to
State Election Commission enclosing
Gazette with Ordinance and asking for
necessary action.
28.04.2026 State Election Commission letter (No.
493GEN-ELNMC2025-26SEC90) to
Directorate of Planning, Statistics and
Evaluation, seeking municipal-area-wise
population for 11 Municipal Councils in
light of the Ordinance.
29.04.2026 Directorate of Planning, Statistics and
Evaluation letter (No. 403/IV/MISC/2023-
24/DPSE/281) supplying municipal-area-
wise population as per Census 2011.
07.05.2026 File submitted by State Election
Commission to Government for
consultation to fix number of elected
councillors based on new population-based
framework under amended Section 9(2).
09.05.2026 Expiry of existing term of Quepem
Municipal Council.
21.05.2026 Gazette (Series II No. 8, Extraordinary)
publishing Order No. 493 Delimitation11-
MC.2026SEC163 by SEC declaring the
earlier delimitation process (fixing the
number of councillors for each municipal
Page 145 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
area) null and void in view of the
Amendment Ordinance
Expiry of existing term of
26.05.2026 Margao, Mormugao and Mapusa Municipal
Councils
Sanguem Municipal Council
30.05.2026
27.04.2026 Writ Petition No. 1241 of 2026 (filing).
01.04.2026 Writ Petition No. 951 of 2026 (filing).
10.06.2026 Writ Petition No. 1572 of 2026 (filing).
04.05.2026 Writ Petition No. 1344 of 2026 (filing).
04.03.2026 Writ Petition No. 300 of 2026 (filing).
274. Before entering upon the remaining issues, we must first deal with the
preliminary objection founded upon Article 243ZG. The objection
assumes particular importance because substantial parts of the
amended Section 10 deal directly with delimitation of municipal wards
and allotment or reservation of seats, and the learned Advocate
General contends that the constitutional bar operates against a
challenge to the validity of the statutory provisions themselves.
275. Article 243ZG begins with a non obstante clause and declares, insofar as
relevant, that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution,
the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or
Page 146 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be
made under Article 243ZA, shall not be called in question in any Court.
The width of this protection cannot be understated. In State of Goa v.
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh, (supra) the Supreme Court has expressly held
that the bar contained in Article 243ZG(a) mandates judicial hands-
off in questioning the validity of statutory provisions dealing with
delimitation and allotment of seats. The Court drew a distinction,
however, between such statutory provisions and orders made in
exercise of statutory power which have not themselves been accorded
the force or status of law.
276. The distinction is consistent with Anugrah Narain Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh (supra). There, the Supreme Court held that statutory
provisions dealing with delimitation of municipal wards and allotment
of reserved seats could not be questioned in a Court of law because of
the express bar imposed by Article 243ZG. At the same time, an order
of delimitation which the concerned statute had not invested with the
force of law stood on a different footing. The constitutional protection
therefore attaches to the character of the measure which is challenged
and not merely to the fact that the controversy concerns an election.
277. We must consequently distinguish between the different forms of
challenge placed before us. Insofar as the Petitioners invite the Court
to examine the validity of statutory provisions which themselves
constitute law relating to delimitation of constituencies or allotment
of seats within Article 243ZG(a), the constitutional prohibition
operates according to its terms. The Court cannot undertake a merits
review of such legislation merely because its implementation affects
the timing of the present election. A different question arises where
Page 147 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
the challenge is directed to an administrative or statutory order which
has not itself been invested with the force of law. The decision dated
21 May 2026 of the State Election Commission discontinuing the
earlier delimitation exercise falls for consideration in that latter
category.
278. A further distinction is necessary. The Petitioners have also invoked
Article 213 and questioned the constitutional conditions attending
promulgation of the Ordinance itself. Such a contention is
conceptually distinct from inviting the Court to adjudicate upon the
merits, wisdom or validity of the delimitation scheme embodied in the
law. We do not consider it necessary in the present proceedings to
pronounce finally upon the precise boundary between the non
obstante prohibition in Article 243ZG(a) and the limited judicial
review of Ordinance-making power recognised under Article 213. Even
assuming that such limited review remains available at the threshold,
the challenge must remain confined to the recognised constitutional
parameters governing exercise of the Ordinance-making power and
cannot become an indirect means of reopening the merits of protected
delimitation legislation.
279. The independent prayer for enforcement of Article 243U stands on still
a different footing. To require the constitutional and statutory
authorities to complete an overdue election within the shortest period
permitted by the law presently in force does not call in question the
validity of the delimitation or seat-allotment law. Nor does judicial
supervision which facilitates rather than arrests completion of the
electoral process offend the purpose of Article 243ZG. State of Goa v.
Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra) itself recognises the distinction
Page 148 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
between the protected law and action taken in its implementation,
while emphasising the constitutional responsibility of the State
Election Commission to ensure legality in the electoral process.
280. Our jurisdiction will therefore be exercised within these limits. We shall
not reconsider individual ward boundaries, the wisdom of particular
delimitation choices or the merits of statutory provisions protected by
Article 243ZG(a). We shall examine, to the limited extent necessary,
the challenge founded upon Article 213; determine the independent
constitutional obligations flowing from Article 243U; consider the
legality and consequences of administrative action not possessing the
force of law; and mould relief so that the continuing constitutional
default is brought to an end at the earliest lawful point.
281. We must next determine the true character of Article 243U because
every other issue in these Petitions ultimately depends upon the
answer to that question. Article 243U(1) provides that every
Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under law, shall continue for
five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.
Clause (3)(a) then commands that an election to constitute a
Municipality shall be completed before expiry of its duration. The
language employed by the Constitution is neither tentative nor
directory.
282. The Constitution Bench in Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation
of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) has authoritatively explained that
the object of Part IX-A is to ensure regularity and continuity of elected
local self-government and that the election to constitute the
succeeding Municipality must be completed before expiry of the five-
year term. The Court further held that revision of electoral rolls or
Page 149 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
similar administrative exercises cannot ordinarily furnish a
justification for postponing the election and that the authorities must
organise their functions sufficiently in advance to comply with the
constitutional mandate. The material before us reproduces this
principle and the exceptional circumstances noticed by the Supreme
Court.
283. We therefore have no hesitation in holding that Article 243U creates a
constitutional deadline and not merely an administrative objective.
The five-year period is known from the very day on which the first
meeting of the elected body is appointed. The State Government, the
State Election Commission and every statutory authority whose
functions are necessary for holding the succeeding election are
consequently aware, years in advance, of the date by which their
respective exercises must ordinarily stand completed.
284. The constitutional significance of this requirement lies in the fact that
Part IX-A does not merely create Municipalities as administrative
institutions. It constitutionalises democratic local self-government.
The periodic return of electoral authority to the people is therefore not
a matter left to governmental convenience. The expression “and no
longer” in Article 243U(1), read with the command in clause (3)(a),
excludes the notion that an unelected interregnum may routinely arise
merely because one or more preparatory exercises remain incomplete.
285. It is equally necessary to clarify that Article 243U does not prescribe a
sliding scale under which a shorter delay becomes constitutionally
permissible merely because a longer delay would be more serious. The
duration of a breach may be relevant while moulding relief, but it
Page 150 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
cannot convert non-compliance into compliance. The constitutional
command operates in the same manner whether the delay is measured
in weeks or months.
286. Kishansing Tomar (supra) recognises that situations of an
extraordinary character may make strict adherence to the electoral
timetable impossible. The instances noticed by the Supreme Court,
including natural calamities, serious breakdown of law and order or
comparable situations, indicate the exceptional nature of the
departure contemplated. We would therefore be slow to enlarge those
exceptions by judicial formulation. It is sufficient for the present case
to hold that a departure from Article 243U cannot arise from ordinary
administrative delay, lack of preparedness or a situation which the
authorities themselves could reasonably have anticipated and avoided.
287. This distinction becomes important in the present case because the
Respondents contend that the intervening legislation itself creates a
legally compelling situation which must be accommodated. The
existence of a valid legislative measure may indeed distinguish the
present case from one of mere executive inaction. But it does not
follow that every delay consequent upon valid legislation
automatically acquires constitutional legitimacy. Legislative
competence and the constitutional consequence of the timing of its
exercise are distinct questions.
288. The controversy cannot, in our view, be resolved by treating Article
243U on the one hand and Articles 243R, 243T and 243ZA on the
other, as competing provisions of which one must prevail over the
Page 151 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
other. Part IX-A constitutes an integrated constitutional scheme.
Article 243R concerns the representative composition of
Municipalities; Article 243T deals with reservation; Article 243U
secures the duration and periodic democratic reconstitution of
Municipalities; and Article 243ZA entrusts the conduct of municipal
elections to the State Election Commission while enabling the State
Legislature to make law in relation thereto.
289. Article 243ZA(2), however, expressly makes the State Legislature's
power subject to the provisions of the Constitution. That qualification
is of controlling importance. A law relating to municipal elections may
undoubtedly regulate composition, wards, delimitation, reservation
and electoral procedure, but the power to enact such law does not
stand outside Article 243U. The legislation must therefore operate
within, and not independently of, the constitutional scheme of
periodic elections.
290. Conversely, Article 243U cannot be understood as disabling the
Legislature from correcting or improving the law merely because an
election is approaching. There may be circumstances in which
statutory correction becomes necessary to remove a constitutional
defect or respond to a judicial declaration or accommodate a lawful
restructuring or secure another requirement of representative
democracy. Nothing in Article 243U creates an implied legislative
embargo during the period preceding a municipal election.
291. The two provisions must therefore be allowed to operate together. A valid
law made under Article 243ZA(2) must ordinarily be obeyed. At the
same time, its enactment does not create a fresh constitutional period
for holding elections, nor does it suspend the obligation already
Page 152 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
imposed by Article 243U. The duty of the State and the State Election
Commission is to implement the law in a manner which preserves, to
the maximum extent legally possible, the constitutional requirement
of timely democratic reconstitution.
292. This is why we are unable to accept the argument that the Ordinance is
constitutionally irrelevant to Article 243U merely because it does not
expressly extend the tenure of any existing Municipality.
Constitutional review cannot be confined to the form of the enactment.
If implementation of a new delimitation or reservation regime
necessarily postpones the succeeding election beyond the
constitutional term, its operation directly engages Article 243U even
though the statute contains no express provision extending the
outgoing Municipality.
293. Nor can the converse proposition be accepted that every delay flowing
from otherwise valid legislation thereby becomes constitutionally
legitimate. Legislative competence, validity of the statutory object and
the constitutional consequences of the timing of its implementation
are distinct considerations. A legitimate statutory objective does not,
merely because it is legitimate, erase the obligation imposed by
another provision of the Constitution.
294. The constitutional exercise is therefore one of harmonisation. The Court
must avoid both extremes: it cannot treat Article 243U as disabling
legislative correction altogether, and it cannot treat legislation under
Article 243ZA(2) as authorising the constitutional electoral clock to
begin afresh. The statutory process must continue, if the law survives
constitutional scrutiny, but it must be administered under the
discipline of Article 243U.
Page 153 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
295. The argument of the Petitioners in respect of timing of the Ordinance
therefore assumes constitutional significance. The Petitioners have
repeatedly pointed out that the State did not discover in April 2026
either the existence of Article 243P, the constitutional provisions
governing reservation or the fixed dates upon which the terms of the
eleven Municipal Councils would expire. The case advanced before us
is that the legislative concerns now relied upon by the State were
capable of consideration substantially earlier.
296. The Petitioners further relied upon the intervening history to submit
that several legislative sessions and local-body electoral exercises had
taken place during the preceding years without the amendment now
said to be necessary being brought into force. Their oral submission
specifically referred to approximately seventeen intervening
legislative sessions and to elections conducted during the intervening
period. The significance of this chronology lies not in questioning
legislative wisdom but in examining whether the eventual timing of
the intervention was constitutionally avoidable.
297. The State's explanation that municipal representation ought to be based
upon population rather than the number of voters may explain why
the Legislature regarded an amendment as desirable. Likewise, the
need to ensure that OBC political reservation complies with
constitutional requirements may explain why a more structured
reservation exercise was considered appropriate. Neither explanation,
however, by itself answers the different question why the legislative
change was introduced only after the municipal electoral cycle had
reached its terminal stage.
Page 154 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
298. By then, the State Election Commission had already undertaken
significant preparatory steps for the ensuing general elections. The
record shows that the Commission had adopted the relevant Assembly
electoral roll for the eleven Municipal Councils and had commenced
the process connected with division of the municipal areas into wards.
The impugned intervention therefore did not occur against an
untouched electoral field; it operated upon a process which had
already substantially commenced.
299. An expiry of a municipal term is not an unforeseeable event. Except in
cases of premature dissolution, the date is known from the
commencement of the five-year tenure itself. The State, the
Legislature and the State Election Commission must therefore
organise foreseeable legislative, delimitation, reservation and
administrative exercises with that terminal date in view.
300. Where the necessity for statutory correction is known or reasonably
foreseeable well in advance, constitutional prudence requires the State
to undertake that correction sufficiently early to permit its
implementation without displacing the succeeding election. A State
cannot ordinarily remain inactive during the period when such
correction could have been undertaken and thereafter rely upon the
time required to implement the late correction as a complete
justification for non-compliance with Article 243U.
301. We nevertheless refrain from attributing to the Legislature or the
Government a partisan or oblique motive merely from the chronology.
A finding that legislation was enacted to secure political advantage, to
postpone elections deliberately or to play a fraud upon the
Page 155 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Constitution is a grave finding and requires clear pleadings and cogent
material. Suspicion arising from timing cannot substitute for proof.
302. But the absence of proof of subjective mala fides does not conclude the
matter. The objective constitutional effect remains open to
examination. The relevant facts include the known expiry dates of the
Municipal Councils, the pre-existing constitutional and judicial
position, the legislative opportunities which had intervened, the stage
already reached by the State Election Commission and the inevitable
consequence that the new statutory process would require substantial
work to be undertaken afresh. The chronology therefore warrants
serious constitutional criticism even though it does not, by itself,
establish an oblique legislative purpose.
303. The Petitioners have separately assailed the Ordinance under Article
213. Their submission is that the circumstances which could render
immediate legislative action necessary did not arise suddenly in April
2026 and that the matters now relied upon by the State were capable
of consideration through the ordinary legislative process considerably
earlier.
304. The scope of this challenge must be kept distinct from the attack upon
the substance of the delimitation law. The Constitution Bench in
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra) recognises that the
satisfaction underlying exercise of the Ordinance-making power is not
altogether beyond judicial review. The Court may examine whether the
constitutional power has been exercised upon relevant material and
whether the exercise is vitiated by fraud on power, an extraneous
purpose or abuse of constitutional authority. It does not sit in appeal
Page 156 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
over the sufficiency or adequacy of the material or substitute its own
assessment of legislative necessity.
305. We need not determine in these proceedings the larger question
whether, and to what extent, Article 243ZG(a) would itself preclude an
Article 213 challenge to an Ordinance insofar as the resulting
legislation falls within the protected field of delimitation or allotment
of seats. We proceed on the assumption, favourable to the Petitioners,
that the limited review recognised in Krishna Kumar Singh is
available in relation to the constitutional conditions attending
promulgation of the Ordinance. Even on that assumption, the Court
must maintain the distinction between examining the existence and
relevance of circumstances bearing upon the Ordinance-making
power and reassessing the merits of the legislative scheme which
Article 243ZG protects.
306. The chronology undoubtedly invites scrutiny. The dates of expiry of the
Municipal Councils were known well in advance. The relevant census
material was already available. The constitutional requirements
governing reservation were not newly introduced in April 2026. The
State Election Commission had, by then, undertaken substantial
preparatory work. The Petitioners are therefore justified in asking why
recourse to the extraordinary legislative route became necessary only
when the electoral cycle had reached its terminal stage.
307. That circumstance, however, does not by itself establish absence of the
constitutional satisfaction required by Article 213. The considerations
relied upon before us by the State concern the representative basis of
municipal composition, population-based determination of Council
strength, delimitation and the statutory structure governing
Page 157 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
reservation. Those considerations bear a rational relationship to the
subject matter upon which the Ordinance operates. On the material
placed before us, we are unable to hold that the Ordinance-making
power rested upon no relevant circumstance at all, or that it was
exercised for an extraneous purpose, as a fraud on power, or in abuse
of the constitutional authority conferred by Article 213.
308. To proceed further and determine whether those circumstances were
sufficiently compelling to justify immediate legislative action, or
whether the amendment could or ought to have been enacted earlier
through the ordinary legislative process, would carry judicial review
into an assessment of adequacy and legislative necessity which the
constitutional standard does not permit. The challenge founded upon
Article 213 therefore fails within the limited field in which we have
examined it.
309. That conclusion does not render the chronology constitutionally
irrelevant. The validity of the exercise of legislative power and the
consequences of its timing for an independently binding constitutional
obligation are different questions. The circumstances surrounding the
late intervention remain directly relevant in determining whether the
resulting delay under Article 243U was foreseeable and avoidable, in
fixing institutional responsibility, and in deciding how strictly the
remaining statutory process must now be compressed. The chronology
is considered for those purposes and not as a means of indirectly
invalidating a delimitation law protected by Article 243ZG(a).
310. The constitutional principle which follows is that a later legislative
intervention does not reset the electoral clock prescribed by Article
Page 158 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
243U. The constitutional terminal date remains the date fixed by that
Article. Where an operative law introduces additional statutory
requirements after the electoral obligation has matured, those
requirements must be fulfilled, but they do not create a fresh
constitutional tenure or a fresh period within which the authorities
may thereafter begin preparing for the election.
311. The resulting delay must therefore be confined to what is genuinely
indispensable for compliance with the operative law. Every
administrative stage capable of lawful acceleration must be
accelerated; every independent preparatory function capable of
simultaneous performance must proceed concurrently; and every
authority concerned must organise its function around the continuing
constitutional default rather than treating the intervening legislation
as a fresh starting point.
312. Any contrary approach would make constitutional periodicity
vulnerable to successive alterations in antecedent electoral processes.
Delimitation, reservation, empirical inquiry, electoral-roll revision or
other statutory exercises could then, merely by being undertaken late,
repeatedly displace the date which the Constitution has fixed. Article
243U cannot be construed in a manner which produces that
consequence.
313. At the same time, Article 243U does not authorise the State Election
Commission to conduct an election in disregard of the law presently
governing composition, delimitation and reservation. Electoral
legitimacy requires both a lawful electoral structure and timely
democratic renewal. Neither principle can be preserved by destroying
the other.
Page 159 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
314. The constitutional remedy must therefore preserve the operative
statutory framework while reducing the continuing departure from
Article 243U to the minimum which lawful implementation genuinely
requires. Such a direction does not enlarge the constitutional period.
It responds to a breach which has already occurred by requiring
restoration of elected municipal government at the earliest point
consistent with law.
315. Having regard to the limits of jurisdiction identified under Article
243ZG(a), it is unnecessary and, insofar as the protected field is
concerned, impermissible for this Court to undertake a merits review
of the delimitation and seat-allotment architecture enacted by the
Ordinance. Certain aspects of the amended framework must
nevertheless be noticed, not for determining the wisdom or validity of
the protected legislative choices, but for understanding whether the
law presently in force is capable of being implemented consistently
with the other provisions of Part IX-A and for identifying the relief
which can lawfully be granted.
316. Amended Section 9 substitutes population for voters and alters the
numerical benchmark used for determining the number of elected
Councillors. The substituted Section 10 then provides the
consequential machinery concerning the number of wards,
delimitation, objections, final delimitation and reservation. Whatever
may be said about the legislative wisdom of that choice, these
provisions presently constitute the statutory framework under which
the ensuing election is required to proceed.
Page 160 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
317. Article 243P(g) itself recognises population as a constitutionally relevant
concept for Part IX-A, while Article 243T employs population
expressly for reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. We refer to those provisions only to note that population is not
a constitutionally alien consideration in the structure of municipal
representation. It is unnecessary for the disposal of these Petitions to
decide whether the Constitution required the State to adopt
population as the particular statutory criterion now chosen.
318. The position regarding reservation for Other Backward Classes is
distinct. Article 243T(6) enables the Legislature to provide for such
reservation, but where political reservation is provided, the exercise
must conform to the constitutional requirements declared by the
Supreme Court, including a dedicated Commission, contemporaneous
rigorous empirical inquiry, local-body-specific determination and
compliance with the applicable aggregate ceiling. The State Election
Commission and the dedicated Commission remain bound by those
requirements notwithstanding the urgency created by Article 243U.
319. It is therefore necessary not to conflate two different matters. The first
is the statutory choice concerning municipal composition and
delimitation. The second is constitutional compliance in the
subsequent OBC reservation exercise. Our directions concerning
empirical inquiry are directed to the latter. They neither approve nor
reopen the merits of the protected legislative choices embodied in the
former.
320. The practical legal position is consequently that the Ordinance remains
operative. Insofar as its provisions constitute law relating to
delimitation or allotment of seats within Article 243ZG(a), their
Page 161 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
validity cannot be reopened through a merits challenge in these
proceedings. Insofar as the Ordinance has been separately challenged
under Article 213, we have, even assuming limited judicial review to be
available, found no ground within the recognised constitutional
parameters for holding the exercise of that power invalid. No other
independently sustainable ground has been established which
requires the present statutory framework to be treated as
constitutionally inoperative.
321. The consequence must be kept distinct from the question of remedy.
Preservation of the operative law does not legitimise the failure to
comply with Article 243U, nor does it confer upon the Respondents a
new constitutional period for implementation. Equally, the Court
cannot respond to that breach by directing the authorities to act as if
the law presently governing the election did not exist.
322. The election must therefore proceed under the operative statutory
regime. The constitutional infirmity requiring remedial intervention
lies not in any judicially established invalidity of that regime, but in
the continuing failure to complete the election within Article 243U.
The appropriate response is accordingly to preserve the law while
subjecting its implementation to the strictest timetable which its own
provisions, the material placed by the constitutional authorities and
the requirements of fair electoral administration permit.
323. We now turn to the alternative submission advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners. It is contended that even if the Ordinance is not struck
down, it ought not to govern the present round of municipal elections.
The Petitioners submit that the electoral process had already
substantially commenced under the pre-existing law; that the
Page 162 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional obligation under Article 243U had already matured;
and that the present elections should therefore be completed on the
basis of the earlier delimitation and electoral framework. This
alternative relief is specifically sought in the Petitions.
324. The submission has considerable attraction at first sight. It seeks to
preserve the Ordinance for the future while preventing its immediate
application from prolonging an existing constitutional default. It also
proceeds upon the factual circumstance that, prior to promulgation of
the Ordinance, the State Election Commission had already adopted
the relevant electoral roll, fixed the number of Councillors and
undertaken the process of delimitation. The chronology placed before
us shows that the State itself had furnished the dates of expiry of the
eleven Municipal Councils as early as October 2025; the State Election
Commission adopted the Assembly electoral roll on 9 March 2026;
fixed the number of Councillors on 25 March 2026; and thereafter
proceeded with the delimitation exercise.
325. The difficulty, however, lies in the juridical basis upon which such a
direction can be issued. We have declined to invalidate the impugned
Ordinance. We have also declined to hold that the amendments
introduced by it are, in their substance, constitutionally
impermissible. Once that conclusion is reached, the Court must be
slow to fashion a remedy which, in effect, directs the constitutional and
statutory authorities to proceed as though the operative law did not
exist.
326. There is a fundamental distinction between interpreting a statute so as
to preserve its constitutionality and suspending its application to a
particular set of elections while leaving its validity otherwise
Page 163 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
untouched. Reading down is permissible where the statutory language
is reasonably capable of a constitutionally compliant construction.
Severance may be employed where an offending provision is separable
from the remainder. But neither doctrine authorises the Court to
create an election-specific exemption which the Legislature itself has
not enacted merely because application of the law produces a difficult
constitutional consequence.
327. The principle assumes particular significance in the light of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Dhanraj v. Vikram Singh (supra). The
Supreme Court disapproved a course whereby statutory provisions
were directed to be ignored without those provisions first being held
constitutionally invalid. The underlying principle is straightforward:
so long as a statutory provision remains valid and operative, a Court
cannot ordinarily direct the authority bound by it to act contrary to it
merely because another course appears more convenient or desirable.
328. That principle applies with added force to the State Election
Commission. The Commission is an independent constitutional
authority, but its independence does not confer upon it a power to
disregard an operative statute. Article 243ZA(2) itself contemplates
State legislation governing municipal elections. The Commission must
therefore act independently of the executive while remaining subject
to the Constitution and the valid law governing the election.
Independence from Government is not independence from law.
329. The Petitioners sought to overcome this difficulty by relying
substantially upon the Karnataka litigation, particularly Sri M.
Shivaraju v. State of Karnataka (supra), where the High Court had
taken the view that the amended delimitation regime should not
Page 164 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
govern elections which had already become due. We have considered
that line of authority with care because the factual resemblance is
undeniable. Yet its subsequent history prevents us from treating the
Karnataka High Court's approach as furnishing a secure foundation
for the relief now sought.
330. The Karnataka High Court had, in substance, restricted the application
of the intervening amendment in order to preserve the election
timetable under Article 243U. The State of Karnataka carried the
judgment to the Supreme Court. The official record of the Supreme
Court confirms that the challenge to the common judgment dated 4
December 2020 was entertained in the proceedings arising from State
of Karnataka v. M. Shivaraju(supra). The subsequent proceedings
and orders relied upon before us demonstrate that the Supreme Court
did not treat the amended statutory framework as simply non-existent
merely because the election had earlier become due. The Karnataka
litigation therefore cautions against converting the High Court's
solution in that case into a general proposition that an intervening
electoral statute may, while remaining valid, be kept aside for an
ongoing election.
331. Nor do we consider the subsequent Karnataka orders as laying down the
converse proposition that every intervening law necessarily justifies
whatever delay its implementation produces. Those orders arose in
their own factual setting, including subsequent statutory and
structural developments. The correct lesson to draw from Karnataka
legislation as to where the statutory law has changed and remains
operative, the constitutional Court must be circumspect in directing
the election authority to proceed under a superseded regime; but the
Page 165 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
continued operation of the new law does not relieve the Court of its
duty to enforce Article 243U through appropriate directions.
332. We are therefore unable to accept the alternative prayer in the form in
which it is made. To declare that the Ordinance shall remain valid
generally but shall be treated as inapplicable to the present elections
would, in substance, achieve indirectly what we have declined to do
directly. It would suspend the statutory scheme for one electoral cycle
without striking it down, severing it or identifying a permissible
interpretative basis for excluding its operation.
333. This conclusion, however, does not render the substantial work
undertaken before the Ordinance constitutionally irrelevant. The
Petitioners are correct in submitting that the State Election
Commission had not remained at the starting point. Considerable
preparatory work had been undertaken before 22 April 2026. The
relevant question is therefore not whether the earlier law can continue
to govern despite the Ordinance, but whether anything lawfully
undertaken under the earlier regime remained capable of being
utilised consistently with the amended law.
334. This brings us to the separate challenge in Writ Petition No.1572 of 2026
to the decision of the State Election Commission dated 21 May 2026
declaring the earlier delimitation exercise null and void. The petitioner
specifically challenges that decision and contends that the
Commission unnecessarily destroyed an advanced electoral exercise
instead of adapting it to the amended statutory regime. The relief
sought in that petition separately questions the declaration by which
the earlier delimitation process was rendered infructuous.
Page 166 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
335. The Commission's position is that the Ordinance altered the very basis
upon which municipal composition and delimitation had earlier been
undertaken. The earlier exercise proceeded upon the statutory
criterion of voters, whereas amended Section 9 substitutes population
and alters the numerical norm for determining the strength of the
Council. Once the number of Councillors and, consequentially, the
number and structure of wards were required to be reconsidered on
the amended statutory basis, the Commission contends that the earlier
delimitation could not simply be carried forward.
336. In principle, we find substance in that explanation. A delimitation
exercise is not an isolated cartographic exercise. It follows the
determination of the number of Councillors and the number of wards
under the governing statute. Where the statutory foundation which
determines those matters changes materially, the Commission cannot
be compelled to preserve an earlier delimitation if doing so would
produce wards inconsistent with the law now in force.
337. At the same time, the expression "null and void" employed in relation to
the entire previous exercise should not obscure the constitutional
responsibility of the Commission to preserve and utilise, wherever
lawfully possible, preparatory work which does not conflict with the
amended statute. Electoral rolls, demographic material,
administrative mapping, municipal boundaries, objections or other
factual material do not necessarily lose all utility merely because the
legal criterion governing the final delimitation has changed. Whether
a particular component could be reused is essentially an
administrative matter for the Commission, provided that the resulting
exercise conforms strictly to the amended Sections 9 and 10.
Page 167 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
338. We would therefore not invalidate the decision dated 21 May 2026
merely because the Commission discontinued the earlier delimitation.
The change from voters to population and the consequential
reconsideration of the number of Councillors supplied a legal basis for
commencing the statutory exercise afresh. The chronology itself shows
that after the Ordinance the Commission again fixed the number of
Councillors on 25 May 2026 in accordance with the amended
framework.
339. Our concern lies elsewhere. The Commission was constitutionally
obliged, once the Ordinance intervened, to ensure that the transition
from the old regime to the new one caused the least possible additional
loss of time. A valid change in the statutory foundation justified such
repetition as the new law genuinely required; it did not justify treating
every prior act as wasted work or commencing each consequential
administrative exercise sequentially from the beginning where parallel
or adapted performance remained legally possible.
340. This follows also from the nature of the Commission's constitutional
office. The State Election Commission possesses the same broad
constitutional responsibility, in the field entrusted to it, to secure the
timely conduct of local-body elections. The Supreme Court has
recognised that where a constitutional or statutory infraction
threatens the election, the Commission may call upon the State or
other authority to correct it and may even approach the writ Court for
necessary directions. The Commission cannot therefore regard itself
as a passive recipient of successive governmental or statutory
developments. Its duty is to anticipate the constitutional deadline and
actively organise every lawful component of the election around it.
Page 168 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
341. We must nevertheless acknowledge an important feature of the present
record. The Commission had, in fact, commenced the election-related
exercise before the Ordinance. Our criticism is therefore not that it
remained wholly inactive. The more precise constitutional concern is
whether, once a substantial change in law occurred, the Commission
sufficiently asserted its independent constitutional role by
immediately identifying the shortest lawful pathway to complete the
revised process, securing timely assistance from the State and other
statutory authorities and insisting upon simultaneous performance
wherever the law permitted it.
342. The State Election Commission is neither a department of the
Government nor an adversary of the Government. It occupies an
independent constitutional position. That independence requires
constitutional distance from executive convenience, but it equally
requires cooperation where the statute legitimately assigns
interdependent functions to different authorities. The Commission
must therefore cooperate with the State without becoming dependent
upon its pace and must implement State legislation without
surrendering its independent obligation under Article 243U.
343. It follows that neither the State nor the Commission can invoke the
statutory change as a complete answer to the constitutional default.
The State cannot say that because a valid law was enacted, the time
consumed by its implementation is constitutionally irrelevant. The
Commission cannot say that because the statute requires consultation,
empirical data or other action by different authorities, its
constitutional obligation remains suspended until those authorities
act. Each institution must perform its own function and, where
Page 169 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
functions overlap, must cause them to proceed with the degree of
simultaneity which the law permits.
344. We accordingly reject the prayer that the impugned Ordinance be kept
out of operation for the present elections. We also decline to set aside
the State Election Commission's decision to discontinue the earlier
delimitation merely because an earlier exercise had substantially
progressed. The elections must now proceed under the law presently
in force.
345. That conclusion does not end the matter. Indeed, it brings us to the most
important remedial question in these Petitions. If the amended
statutory regime must govern the present elections, the Court must
determine whether every period mentioned in the statute must
necessarily operate consecutively and to its outer limit; which stages
admit of simultaneous performance; how the empirical exercise
relating to OBC reservation is to be accommodated; and what binding
timetable is required to bring the existing breach of Article 243U to an
end at the earliest lawful point.
346. The answer to that question requires us next to consider together the
amended Section 10, the stage-wise statement furnished by the State
Election Commission, the affidavit of the Goa State Commission for
Backward Classes and the constitutional requirement that statutory
compliance must now proceed with the urgency demanded by an
electoral term which has already expired.
347. The controversy at this stage is therefore no longer whether the amended
statutory regime is to be followed. We have held that it must. The
question is how that regime is to be implemented after the
Page 170 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional date contemplated by Article 243U has already passed.
This requires us to identify, with some care, what the amended Section
10 actually mandates, which periods are irreducible, which are outer
limits within which an authority must act, and which administrative
exercises can proceed simultaneously.
348. The distinction is important. A statutory period granted for exercise of a
power cannot invariably be treated as a statutory entitlement to
consume the whole of that period. Much depends upon the language
employed and the purpose for which the period is prescribed. Where
the Legislature requires objections to remain open for a specified
number of days or expressly requires expiry of a specified period
before the next stage can commence, the Court cannot curtail that
period merely because expedition is desirable. To do so would amount
to rewriting the statute. Where, however, the statute requires an
authority to complete an exercise "within" a stipulated period, the
stipulated period ordinarily fixes the outer limit and does not prohibit
the authority from completing the exercise earlier if it is reasonably
capable of doing so.
349. Amended Section 10 itself illustrates the distinction. Sub-section (3)
requires the draft delimitation to be published inviting objections and
suggestions from the public within a period of thirty days. The
opportunity made available to the electorate for raising objections is
an integral part of the statutory process and cannot be judicially
abbreviated. The same is true of the thirty-day period made available
under sub-section (5) for objections and suggestions to the draft
reservation. These are not merely administrative conveniences. They
Page 171 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
confer an opportunity upon persons affected by delimitation and
reservation and must be respected.
350. Different considerations apply to the period prescribed for
consideration of objections and issuance of the final delimitation
notification under Section 10(3), and to the corresponding exercise
under Section 10(6). In both cases, the statute requires the final
notification to be issued "within a period of 30 days" from the last date
for submission of objections. The language fixes the outer boundary of
permissible action. It does not compel the State Election Commission
or the Government, during consultation, to remain inactive until the
thirtieth day.
351. The State Election Commission itself has accepted this construction in
substance. In the stage-wise statement furnished to this Court, it states
that after closure of objections to draft delimitation the objections can
be considered, necessary alterations made, the proposal transmitted
for Government consultation and the final notification issued within
approximately three weeks, provided the Government completes
consultation expeditiously. Similarly, in relation to finalisation of
reservation under Section 10(6), the Commission estimates that
scrutiny of objections, consultation and issuance of the final
notification can be completed in approximately twenty days if the
Government responds within a defined timeframe.
352. These statements are significant. They demonstrate that the periods of
thirty days prescribed for finalisation are not, even according to the
constitutional authority entrusted with the process, irreducible
periods which must necessarily be exhausted. They are outer statutory
limits. Once Article 243U has already been breached, there can be no
Page 172 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
justification for treating an outer limit as a period available for routine
administrative consumption.
353. Section 10(7) stands on a different footing. It provides that the State
Election Commission shall declare elections "after expiry of 30 days"
from publication of the final notification of reservation. The
Legislature has therefore expressly interposed a period which must
expire before declaration of elections. The State Election Commission
has treated that period as mandatory, and we see no interpretative
basis upon which this Court could reduce it while simultaneously
preserving the provision.
354. The same discipline must apply to this Court. The anxiety to restore
constitutional government cannot authorise us to remove a period
which the Legislature has expressly required to expire. Judicial
enforcement of Article 243U cannot be converted into judicial
amendment of Section 10. Our function is to compress what is legally
compressible and to insist upon simultaneous performance where the
statute permits it, not to dispense with safeguards which the
Legislature has expressly made part of the election process.
355. The amended Section 10 is drafted sequentially in the sense that certain
legal consequences depend upon completion of the preceding
statutory stage. Final delimitation must precede the ward-specific
empirical data contemplated by Section 10(4); receipt of the required
data precedes publication of draft reservation; final reservation
follows the period of objections; and declaration of elections follows
expiry of thirty days from the final reservation notification. That
statutory sequence must be respected.
Page 173 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
356. It does not follow, however, that every administrative or preparatory act
associated with those stages must also await formal completion of the
preceding stage. A distinction must be maintained between a statutory
act which can legally occur only after a specified event and the
preparatory work necessary to enable that act to be performed
promptly when the event occurs.
357. This distinction assumes particular importance because the
constitutional default which presently exists is substantially the
product of treating interconnected electoral exercises as though each
must commence only after the preceding exercise has been completely
exhausted. Article 243U requires precisely the opposite approach to
constitutional administration. Where the date of election is known in
advance, independent and interdependent authorities must undertake
all preparatory functions capable of lawful parallel performance
sufficiently early so that only those acts which legally depend upon the
preceding stage remain to be performed later.
358. The Supreme Court in Suresh Mahajan (supra) has emphasised, in the
context of delimitation, that such an exercise is a continuing one and
ought to be commenced well in advance so that it does not become a
reason for withholding elections. The principle is directly relevant
here. The constitutional obligation is not satisfied by commencing
each antecedent process when the preceding process formally ends; it
requires institutional preparedness well before the electoral deadline.
The material placed before us reproduces the Supreme Court's
insistence that ongoing delimitation cannot ordinarily furnish a
legitimate ground for the State Election Commission to withhold
discharge of its constitutional obligation.
Page 174 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
359. We would therefore read the amended statutory scheme in a manner
which preserves its sequence without importing into it an unnecessary
requirement of administrative sequentiality. Thus, while the final
ward-wise operation of reservation may necessarily depend upon the
final delimitation, collection and analysis of the underlying empirical
material need not remain dormant merely because final ward
boundaries have not yet been notified.
360. This brings us to the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes. The
affidavit filed by its Member Secretary assumes considerable
significance. The Commission states that it is the dedicated body
which must undertake the contemporaneous rigorous empirical
inquiry into the nature and implications of backwardness qua local
bodies. More importantly, it accepts that it already has available with
it the Census of 2011 and the report prepared by the Centre for
Development, Planning and Research in 2013 relating to OBC, SC and
ST population in the State of Goa, including the eleven Municipalities
presently concerned.
361. The Commission has further stated that it had been awaiting directions
from the Government and the State Election Commission because the
amendment transferred the delimitation exercise to the State Election
Commission. It has, however, accepted, after the issue was examined
during the hearing, that it can commence the contemporaneous
rigorous empirical inquiry without awaiting such further directions
and that the inquiry can begin on the basis of the material already
available with it.
Page 175 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
362. This clarification materially narrows the difficulty which was initially
projected before us. Section 10(4) undoubtedly contemplates that the
empirical data ultimately obtained by the State Election Commission
must relate to each Municipal area and the wards and must be based
on the final notification of delimitation. We do not therefore suggest
that the final ward-specific determination can precede final
delimitation. What need not await final delimitation is the substantial
foundational inquiry which does not depend upon the precise drawing
of ward boundaries.
363. The identification of relevant backward classes, examination of the
nature and extent of political backwardness, analysis of existing
demographic and empirical material, verification of available data and
such other municipality-level inquiry as the law requires are matters
capable of being undertaken before the final ward map is placed before
the Commission. Once the final delimitation becomes available, the
remaining exercise is to apply the completed or substantially
completed empirical inquiry to the finally constituted wards in the
manner required by law.
364. We are conscious that the rigorous empirical inquiry required for
political reservation cannot be reduced to a mechanical mathematical
allocation. Nor can this Court prescribe to the dedicated Commission
the substantive conclusion which its inquiry must reach. The
constitutional requirement of an independent empirical
determination must remain intact. What Article 243U does permit,
and in the present circumstances requires, is that the Commission be
compelled to undertake the inquiry with urgency and preparedness
Page 176 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
rather than postpone commencement of all work until the final ward
boundaries are formally notified.
365. The affidavit seeks a minimum period of thirty days for the Commission
to conduct the contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry
concerning the eleven Municipalities and also refers to completion of
the exercise within the period stated by it after the necessary direction
from the State Election Commission. We do not read the affidavit as
requiring two successive blocks of thirty days. Such a construction
would be inconsistent with the Commission's own assurance that
substantial municipality-wise work can commence immediately on the
basis of the material already available to it. The foundational inquiry
must therefore proceed contemporaneously with completion of
delimitation, leaving only such ward-linked application as genuinely
requires the final delimitation to be undertaken thereafter.
366. This approach does not dilute the Triple Test. It gives effect to it. The
constitutional object of the requirement of a contemporaneous
rigorous empirical inquiry is to ensure that political reservation for
backward classes reflects present and localised political backwardness
and is not granted mechanically. That object is not furthered by
allowing the dedicated Commission to remain institutionally
unprepared until an election becomes imminent. The rigour of an
inquiry and the timeliness with which the institution prepares to
conduct it are not competing values.
367. The present case, in fact, demonstrates why this distinction matters. The
Commission is not an authority constituted afresh for each election. It
Page 177 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
is a continuing statutory institution. The need for political reservation
in local bodies and the jurisprudential requirement of a dedicated
empirical inquiry have been in the field for years. The Commission
cannot therefore organise its institutional functioning on the
assumption that meaningful preparatory work will begin only when
the State Election Commission, after final delimitation, formally calls
for a report.
368. We must, however, be careful not to attribute to the Commission a legal
obligation which the statute does not impose. Section 10(4), in its
present form, expressly makes final delimitation relevant to the ward-
specific data ultimately required by the State Election Commission.
Our criticism is not that the Commission ought to have completed the
entire statutory exercise before delimitation. It is that institutional
preparedness, maintenance and analysis of available empirical
material, and all municipality-level work which does not legally
depend upon final ward boundaries ought not to have remained in
abeyance.
369. The issue is not new even to municipal governance in Goa. In Naresh
Gaunekar v. State of Goa (supra), this Court was confronted with
delayed municipal elections in the context of reservation and empirical
data. The Court observed that a man-made situation, whether
intentionally or otherwise created, could not normally justify
deferment of elections and emphasised the responsibility of the State
and the Election Commission to act promptly. We refer to that
decision not to equate the statutory framework then existing with the
amended law now before us, but because the recurring institutional
Page 178 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
problem it identifies has regrettably reappeared: an antecedent
reservation exercise was permitted to approach the constitutional
electoral deadline without being institutionally completed in time.
370. The State Government's role is equally important. Amended Section 10
requires consultation with the Government before final notification of
delimitation and again before final notification of reservation.
Consultation is therefore part of the statutory scheme and cannot be
dispensed with. The State Election Commission itself accepts that
Government consultation is mandatory.
371. What is mandatory is consultation, not administrative delay. The
Government cannot convert a constitutional consultation into an
indefinite file movement. Once the State Election Commission places
the relevant proposal before it, the Government must arrange its
internal decision-making so that consultation is meaningful but
expeditious. The very authority which enacted the altered statutory
framework cannot thereafter become the reason why implementation
of that framework consumes time beyond what is genuinely necessary.
372. The stage-wise statement submitted by the State Election Commission
makes the dependence explicit. It states that completion of both final
delimitation and final reservation within the shorter periods identified
by it depends upon the Government undertaking consultation within
a particular timeframe. The responsibility for timely completion
therefore rests not upon the State Election Commission alone. The
Government bears a corresponding constitutional duty to place at the
Page 179 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Commission's disposal timely decisions, personnel, infrastructure,
funds and other assistance necessary for the election.
373. This is not a new constitutional proposition. In the earlier Goa
municipal-election litigation, directions were issued requiring the
State to respond to communications of the State Election Commission
within a reasonable period and to provide the assistance necessary for
the Commission to discharge its constitutional obligations while
preserving its independence. The recurrence of the same concern
reinforces the need for institutional discipline rather than weakens it.
374. Of particular importance is the answer given by the State Election
Commission to a direct question put by the Court. The Commission
states that, subject to the minimum periods identified in its stage-wise
schedule, there is "no legal or practical impediment" to holding the
elections within that schedule. It further states that, subject to those
minimum periods, there is no constitutional or statutory reason why
the entire electoral process cannot be completed within the period
identified by it.
375. That statement is important for two reasons. First, it removes any
suggestion that some unidentified statutory obstacle presently
prevents completion of the elections. Secondly, it confirms that the
remaining delay is capable of judicial control by fixing responsibility
for each stage and ensuring that outer statutory limits are not routinely
exhausted where the work is capable of earlier completion.
Page 180 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
376. The Commission has also candidly stated that, had the Ordinance not
intervened, the election under the earlier framework would, subject to
completion of the then remaining process, have concluded by the end
of May 2026 or, at the latest, during the first week of June 2026. That
circumstance does not render the Ordinance invalid or justify
reverting to the earlier law, for reasons already recorded. It does,
however, demonstrate concretely the extent to which the intervening
statutory regime displaced an electoral process which had reached an
advanced stage. It therefore reinforces the obligation to permit no
avoidable delay from this point forward.
377. The Commission estimates that, after declaration of elections,
approximately twenty-five days are required for the actual election
programme, including nominations, scrutiny, withdrawal, polling and
declaration of results. That is the electoral component which follows
completion of the antecedent statutory process. The constitutional
objective must consequently be to bring the antecedent process to its
lawful conclusion at the earliest possible date so that the election
programme can immediately follow the statutory waiting period.
Constitutional preparedness as an institutional obligation
378. The constitutional obligation under Article 243U carries with it a
corresponding obligation of institutional preparedness. The
authorities concerned cannot organise the electoral process on the
assumption that each antecedent step will begin only when the
preceding authority has formally completed its function. Delimitation,
reservation, empirical inquiry, preparation of electoral rolls and
election logistics are interrelated components of a recurring
Page 181 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
constitutional exercise and must, to the extent permitted by law, be
planned and undertaken in advance.
379. This obligation does not authorise an authority to act before the statute
permits it to act, nor does it require anticipation of every conceivable
future legislative change. Its content is narrower and more practical.
Where preparatory work can lawfully be undertaken before
completion of another statutory stage, the authority responsible for
that work must not remain inactive merely because the final legal act
depends upon a later event.
380. The distinction is therefore between statutory sequencing and
administrative sequencing. A statutory act which, by the terms of the
law, can occur only after completion of a preceding stage must await
that stage. But preparatory, empirical, administrative and consultative
work which does not legally depend upon such completion must
proceed simultaneously wherever necessary to preserve the
constitutional electoral timetable. Administrative sequencing cannot
be superimposed upon statutory sequencing so as to multiply delay.
381. Applied to the present case, the statutory periods prescribed for public
objections and the express waiting period under Section 10(7) must
necessarily be honoured. Those periods cannot be shortened merely
because the elections have become overdue. The constitutional
urgency arises in relation to everything which the law does not require
to remain in abeyance.
Page 182 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
382. Accordingly, classification and preliminary scrutiny of objections,
municipality-wise empirical inquiry, preparation of voter lists,
Governmental consultation to the extent capable of advance
preparation, staffing, logistical arrangements and every other
independent activity which can lawfully proceed alongside another
statutory stage must be undertaken contemporaneously. No authority
can claim an additional period for work which could reasonably and
lawfully have been performed during a period already running.
383. The constitutional choice is therefore not between a legally compliant
process of delimitation and reservation on the one hand and timely
elections on the other. Both requirements must be fulfilled. The
obligation of the institutions concerned is to organise the process so
that compliance with one does not, through avoidable administrative
sequencing, become the cause of failure of the other.
384. Having identified the constitutional and statutory principles which
must govern the remaining process, we must now translate them into
a workable timetable. The exercise is not one of choosing an arbitrary
date by which the elections should be held. Nor can we simply adopt
every outer period appearing in Section 10 and add them
consecutively. The appropriate course is to begin with the stage which
the process has presently reached, preserve every period which the
statute makes irreducible, require completion substantially earlier
wherever the statute merely prescribes an outer limit, and compel
simultaneous performance of all preparatory functions which do not
legally depend upon completion of an earlier stage. The resulting
timetable must represent, as nearly as the law permits, the shortest
Page 183 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
route from the present constitutional default to an elected Municipal
Council.
The timetable which must now govern the process.
385. Certain stages contemplated by amended Sections 9 and 10 already
stand completed. The number of wards has been fixed; the fresh
delimitation exercise contemplated by Section 10(2) has been
undertaken; and the draft delimitation has been published. The thirty-
day period made available under Section 10(3) for objections and
suggestions to the draft delimitation is presently running. We have
already held that this statutory opportunity cannot be curtailed. The
first operative date for the purposes of the remaining schedule must
therefore be the last date already notified for receipt of objections to
the draft delimitation.
386. What follows after that date requires closer consideration. Section 10(3)
permits the State Election Commission a period of up to thirty days to
consider the objections, make such modifications as are warranted,
consult the Government and issue the final delimitation notification.
The Commission itself has not claimed that all thirty days are
indispensable. Its written response initially stated that these stages
could be completed in approximately three weeks, provided the
Government undertakes consultation expeditiously. During the
hearing, after the matter was further examined, the possibility of
bringing this stage within approximately fifteen days was also
considered.
Page 184 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
387. We see no legal reason why the entire thirty-day outer period should be
consumed. The objections will already have been received during the
preceding thirty days. Nothing prevents the State Election
Commission from classifying and scrutinising them as and when they
are received, without finally deciding the exercise until the statutory
period closes. Officers can identify repetitive objections, collate
municipality-wise issues, verify maps and supporting material and
prepare the administrative groundwork contemporaneously. What
must await the closing date is the final consideration of the complete
body of objections, not the commencement of every preparatory act
connected with their consideration.
388. We accordingly consider Fifteen days from the last date for submission
of objections to be a fair and legally sustainable outer period for
completion of the entire exercise under the latter part of Section 10(3),
including consideration of objections, necessary corrections,
consultation with the Government and publication of the final
delimitation notification. This is not a reduction of the statutory period
prescribed for public participation. It is a direction that the
constitutional authorities perform within fifteen days an exercise
which the statute permits them to complete at any time within thirty
days and which the State Election Commission itself accepts is
administratively capable of substantial compression.
389. Government consultation must be accommodated within, and not
added after, those Fifteen days. The file cannot be permitted to travel
to the Government on the Fifteenth day and thereafter commence
another unregulated period of consultation. The Commission must
Page 185 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
structure its consideration so that the proposal is transmitted
sufficiently early, and the Government shall return its considered
response within the period fixed by the Commission consistent with
the fifteen-day outer limit. The State cannot enact a statutory
consultation requirement and thereafter allow that very consultation
to defeat the constitutional timetable.
The empirical inquiry and the final delimitation
390. The next stage requires particular care. Section 10(4) provides that the
empirical data pertaining to political backwardness shall be obtained
from the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes in respect of the
Municipal area and the wards, based upon the final delimitation.
Literally applied to the final ward-specific product, the provision
requires final delimitation first. It does not, however, require the
dedicated Commission to remain inactive until that date. The affidavit
filed before us removes any possible doubt on this aspect.
391. The Commission has stated on oath that it possesses the Census 2011
material and the 2013 survey report concerning OBC, SC and ST
population and that it will commence the contemporaneous rigorous
empirical inquiry in respect of the eleven Municipalities on the basis
of that material without awaiting further directions from the
Government or the State Election Commission. Its plea regarding time
must therefore be understood in the setting in which the undertaking
has been given. The substantial municipality-wise inquiry is to
proceed now; only that part of the exercise which genuinely requires
the finally constituted wards can remain for completion after the final
delimitation notification.
Page 186 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
392. We are not prepared to permit a fresh thirty-day period to commence for
the first time on publication of final delimitation. That would
disregard both the undertaking of the Commission and the
constitutional principle of simultaneous preparedness which we have
already explained. Equally, we cannot direct the Commission to
complete the ward-specific exercise before the wards legally come into
existence in their final form.
393. The proper balance is therefore this. The Goa State Commission for
Backward Classes shall continue and substantially complete, during
the period in which the delimitation objections are being considered,
every component of the rigorous empirical inquiry which can be
undertaken municipality-wise. By the time the final delimitation is
notified, the Commission should be left only with the work which
genuinely depends upon application of that inquiry to the finally
delimited wards.
394. The thirty days which the Commission has sought for undertaking its
rigorous empirical inquiry cannot, in the circumstances, be treated as
thirty additional days following final delimitation. The Commission's
affidavit was filed in the first week of August 2026 and records its
undertaking to commence the exercise immediately. If the
Commission acts in accordance with that undertaking, the
municipality-wise empirical exercise will have had substantially the
period which it itself regarded as necessary before the final
delimitation becomes available.
Page 187 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
395. Upon publication of the final delimitation, the Commission shall
complete the residual ward-specific exercise and communicate the
requisite empirical data and recommendations to the State Election
Commission within seven days. We emphasise that this period is not
prescribed for undertaking the Triple Test or the rigorous empirical
inquiry afresh. It is confined to the residual application, to the finally
delimited wards, of the municipality-wise inquiry which, under the
Commission's own undertaking and the directions recorded above,
must already have proceeded for substantially the period which the
Commission itself regarded as necessary. The seven-day direction
does not prescribe, abbreviate or otherwise interfere with the
substantive methodology to be adopted by the dedicated Commission.
395A. If, notwithstanding diligent completion of all municipality-wise work
capable of being undertaken before final delimitation, the Commission
finds that some identified component which genuinely depends upon
the finally notified ward structure cannot, for reasons inherent in the
empirical exercise itself, be lawfully completed within the residual
period fixed above, it shall approach this Court before expiry of that
period. Any such application shall identify with precision the work
remaining, explain why it could not lawfully have been undertaken
earlier, disclose the work already completed and indicate the
minimum additional period asserted to be indispensable.
Administrative inaction, want of prior preparation or work which
could reasonably have proceeded before final delimitation shall not
furnish such a ground.
Page 188 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
396. This direction also answers the concern that expedition might
compromise the quality of the empirical inquiry. It need not. The
Commission is not being required to compress a thirty-day substantive
inquiry into seven days. It is being required not to waste the period
available before final delimitation and thereafter to complete only the
legally dependent part of the exercise with urgency.
Publication of draft reservation.
397. Section 10(5) becomes operative upon receipt of the requisite data from
the Backward Classes Commission. The State Election Commission's
chart indicates a composite period of approximately thirty-four days
at this stage, which includes preparation and publication of the draft
reservation and the mandatory thirty-day period for objections. Since
thirty of those days represent the statutory period for public objections
and cannot be curtailed, the administratively compressible element is
the short interval between receipt of the empirical data and
publication of the draft reservation.
398. No substantial additional inquiry by the State Election Commission
has been demonstrated as requiring a prolonged period before
publication of the draft. The Commission will already know the
number of wards and their final boundaries; it will have the SC and ST
population material; and it will receive the OBC empirical
determination from the dedicated Commission. We therefore consider
four days from receipt of the report under Section 10(4) sufficient for
the State Election Commission to prepare and publish the draft
reservation notification under Section 10(5).
Page 189 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
399. Thereafter, the full thirty-day period prescribed by Section 10(5) for
objections and suggestions must run. It cannot be shortened. As in the
case of delimitation objections, however, the State Election
Commission need not remain administratively inactive during that
period. Objections can be received, indexed, municipality-wise
classified and subjected to preliminary scrutiny as they arrive, without
foreclosing consideration of any objection filed until the final day.
400. Section 10(6) requires consideration of the objections and publication
of the final reservation notification, in consultation with the
Government, within thirty days from the last date for submission of
objections. Here again, thirty days is an outer limit and not a
compulsory period of inaction. The State Election Commission has
stated in its own stage-wise assessment that this exercise, including
scrutiny, correction where necessary, Government consultation and
publication of the final notification, requires approximately twenty
days, subject to timely consultation by the Government.
401. We see no basis to substitute our own administrative estimate for that of
the constitutional authority conducting the election. We therefore
accept twenty days as the maximum period for completing the exercise
under Section 10(6). Again, consultation with the Government must
be completed within those twenty days and cannot be treated as a
further period to be added thereafter.
402. The Government shall accordingly constitute, if it has not already done
so, an appropriate nodal arrangement so that proposals received from
the State Election Commission under Sections 10(3) and 10(6) are
Page 190 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
considered without ordinary departmental delay. The requirement of
consultation must be meaningful, but meaningful consultation does
not require leisurely consultation. The constitutional urgency now
attached to these elections requires the Government to make officers
and decision-makers available whenever the State Election
Commission forwards the proposals.
403. After publication of the final reservation notification, the statute itself
introduces a period which this Court cannot compress. Section 10(7)
provides that the State Election Commission shall declare the election
after expiry of thirty days from publication of the final reservation
notification. The Commission has treated this as mandatory. We
agree. The full thirty days must therefore expire.
404. This thirty-day period, however, cannot become another period of
institutional inactivity. Amended Section 11(3) requires copies of the
ward-wise voters lists to remain open for public inspection at least
thirty days prior to the election notification. The two requirements are
capable of substantial, and indeed complete, concurrency. Once final
reservation and ward structure are available, the ward-wise voters lists
shall be prepared and placed for inspection immediately so that the
thirty-day requirement under Section 11(3) runs concurrently with the
thirty-day waiting period under Section 10(7).
405. During the same period, the State Election Commission and the State
Government shall complete every logistical preparation for the actual
election: appointment and training of Returning Officers and polling
personnel, identification of polling stations, arrangement of security,
Page 191 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
transport, ballot or voting equipment as applicable, material, funds
and all other election infrastructure. The State Election Commission's
own response identifies these as matters in respect of which the
Government must provide assistance. None of these matters requires
an additional period after the expiry of Section 10(7).
406. The State Election Commission has stated that the actual election
programme contemplated by Rule 4 of the Goa Municipalities Election
Rules, 1969 requires approximately twenty-five days from notification
through nominations, scrutiny, withdrawal, polling, counting and
declaration of results. We find no reason to interfere with that
estimate. The election notification shall therefore be issued
immediately upon expiry of the statutory period under Section 10(7),
and the entire electoral process shall be completed within the ensuing
twenty-five days.
407. The schedule which emerges is thus not one created by judicial
convenience. Its constituent periods are drawn from the statute, the
affidavit of the dedicated Commission and the State Election
Commission's own assessment of the minimum practical time
required. The Court has preserved in full the two thirty-day periods
made available to citizens for objections and the express thirty-day
waiting period under Section 10(7). We have not reduced a single
period which the statutory language requires to run for a specified
duration.
408. What has been removed is avoidable interstitial delay. The thirty-day
outer period for finalisation of delimitation under Section 10(3) has
Page 192 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
been confined to fifteen days, while the corresponding thirty-day outer
period for finalisation of reservation under Section 10(6) has been
confined to twenty days. In each case, the statute permits earlier
completion and the periods fixed by us proceed upon the practical
position placed before the Court by the State Election Commission.
The empirical inquiry is required to proceed contemporaneously
rather than commence only after final delimitation. The ward-wise
voter-list requirement is made to run concurrently with Section 10(7),
while Government consultation and election logistics are absorbed
within the respective existing stages rather than being added as
independent periods.398. Thus, calculated from the last date already
fixed for objections to the draft delimitation, the remaining process
would ordinarily comprise: Fifteen days for final delimitation; seven
days for the residual ward-specific work of the Backward Classes
Commission; four days for publication of draft reservation; thirty days
for objections to reservation; twenty days for final reservation; thirty
days required by Section 10(7), during which Section 11 and all election
preparations must proceed simultaneously; and approximately
twenty-five days for the actual election programme.
409. Even that arithmetic must not be understood as authorising every
authority to wait until the final day assigned to it. These are outer
judicial limits. If any stage is completed earlier, the next stage shall
commence immediately. No authority may retain the benefit of unused
days merely because this judgment has specified a maximum period.
410. There is a further reason for taking this approach. The Supreme Court in
Suresh Mahajan (supra) described the constitutional timeline under
Page 193 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Articles 243E and 243U in uncompromising terms and rejected
delimitation or formation of wards as a ground for postponing local-
body elections. The judgment records that neither the State Election
Commission, the State Government nor the State Legislature can
countenance a dispensation contrary to the constitutional mandate.
We are presently dealing with an intervening law which, for reasons
already recorded, must be implemented. That circumstance explains
why some further statutory time has become unavoidable. It cannot
justify one day more than lawful implementation genuinely requires.
411. The directions which we propose are therefore not an extension of Article
243U. No Court can grant such an extension. They constitute a
remedial timetable imposed after the constitutional deadline has
already been breached, for the sole purpose of bringing that breach to
an end at the earliest point compatible with the law which we have
upheld.
412. Since the statutory scheme contains several successive stages and
different kinds of time periods, we consider it appropriate to set out
the position in a comparative form. This will also make clear the
limited nature of the intervention which we have undertaken.
Wherever the statute prescribes a period which must necessarily run,
we have left it untouched. Wherever it merely fixes an outer limit for
performance of an administrative or consultative function, we have
required completion within the shorter period which the State Election
Commission itself regards as practicable. We have also directed
concurrent performance only where one statutory act does not legally
depend upon completion of another.
Page 194 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
413. The remaining electoral process shall accordingly be understood in the
following manner:
Statutory SEC's stated Nature of
Direction of
Stage / existing practical interventi
this Court
position position on
Draft
30 days for
delimitatio
public
n and
objections Treated by SEC Full 30 days No
objections
to draft as mandatory retained interference
under
delimitatio
Section
n
10(3)
Considerati
SEC initially
on of
sought for 3
delimitatio
weeks, subject
n
to expeditious
objections, Final
Government Outer limit
modificatio notification
consultation; Maximum 15 compressed;
n, to be issued
but during days from public-
Governmen within 30
hearing on closure of objection
t days from
bifurcation of objections period
consultatio last date for
constituent untouched
n and final objections
period an
delimitatio
overall period
n under
of about 15 days
Section
was worked out
10(3)
Page 195 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Statutory SEC's stated Nature of
Direction of
Stage / existing practical interventi
this Court
position position on
Section
10(4)
requires
OBC
empirical
Commission
data in
seeks about 30
respect of
days for No statutory
Municipal Foundational
rigorous period
Municipalit area and municipality-
empirical curtailed;
y-wise OBC wards wise inquiry to
inquiry and sequential
empirical based upon proceed
states that administrati
inquiry final concurrentl
Census 2011 ve delay
delimitatio y forthwith
and 2013 survey removed
n; no
material are
separate
already
statutory
available
number of
days
prescribed
Residual Final ward- Commission's Only
ward- specific affidavit Maximum 7 residual
specific application contemplates days after work
OBC necessarily completion final confined;
exercise follows after receipt of delimitation substantive
after final final necessary inquiry must
Page 196 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Statutory SEC's stated Nature of
Direction of
Stage / existing practical interventi
this Court
position position on
delimitatio delimitatio delimitation- already have
n n related proceeded
direction/mater
ial
Preparation SEC chart
To follow Administrati
and contemplates
receipt of ve interval
publication approximately 4 days to
empirical fixed;
of draft 34 days prepare/publis
data; statutory
reservation including the h draft
thereafter objection
under 30-day reservation
30 days for period
Section objection
objections untouched
10(5) period
Objections
to draft
SEC treats the
reservation Full 30 days No
30 days period as
under retained interference
mandatory
Section
10(5)
Considerati SEC states
Final Outer limit
on of approximately
notification compressed
reservation 20 days, subject Maximum
to be issued in
objections, to timely 20 days
within 30 accordance
Governmen Government
days from with SEC's
t consultation
Page 197 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Statutory SEC's stated Nature of
Direction of
Stage / existing practical interventi
this Court
position position on
consultatio last date for own
n and final objections estimate
reservation
under
Section
10(6)
Election to
be declared
Waiting
after
period SEC treats this
expiry of Full 30 days No
under period as
30 days retained interference
Section mandatory
from final
10(7)
reservation
notification
Lists to
remain
open for To run
Ward-wise No statutory
inspection concurrentl
voters lists Separate period
at least 30 y with the
under statutory curtailed;
days prior Section
Section obligation concurrency
to 10(7) thirty-
11(3) directed
election day period
notificati
on
Page 198 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Statutory SEC's stated Nature of
Direction of
Stage / existing practical interventi
this Court
position position on
Entire
preparation to
Government to proceed
provide polling during
Administrati
No separate personnel, preceding
Election ve
period in stations, statutory
logistics sequencing
Section 10 security, stages and
eliminated
vehicles, funds particularly
and machinery during
Section
10(7) period
Approximat
Actual SEC estimates ely 25 days;
Election SEC's own
election approximately elections to
programme operational
programme 25 days from be
governed estimate
under Rule notification to completed
by Rules accepted
4 completion within that
period
414. The above comparison demonstrates that the Court has not reduced
the three periods which the amended law requires to be afforded in
full: the thirty days for objections to draft delimitation, the thirty days
for objections to draft reservation, and the thirty days which must
Page 199 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
expire after publication of final reservation before declaration of
elections. Nor have we curtailed the thirty-day voter-list inspection
requirement under Section 11(3). That requirement is instead capable
of operating concurrently with the statutory waiting period under
Section 10(7).
415. The only periods which have been judicially confined are those in
which the statute permits the competent authority to act earlier. Thus,
the expression “within a period of 30 days” in the latter parts of
Sections 10(3) and 10(6) prescribes the latest permissible date and
does not compel the authorities to consume the entire period. The
fifteen-day period fixed for completion of the exercise under Section
10(3) and the twenty-day period fixed under Section 10(6) proceed
upon the material placed before us concerning the work involved at
the respective stages and remain subject principally to timely
Government consultation.
416. The empirical exercise under Section 10(4) stands on a different
footing because the statute prescribes no independent numerical
period for its completion. The seven-day period following final
delimitation is therefore not a curtailment of a statutory minimum. It
rests upon the Commission's undertaking to undertake the substantial
municipality-wise rigorous empirical inquiry contemporaneously, the
material already available to it, and the distinction drawn above
between foundational inquiry and the residual exercise which legally
depends upon final ward boundaries. The period does not control the
Commission's substantive methodology; and the limited liberty
recognised in paragraph 395A protects against any demonstrated legal
Page 200 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
or empirical impossibility which could not, despite due diligence, have
been addressed during the period already available. On this basis, the
timetable represents the minimum further period which the present
record permits without requiring any authority to act contrary to law.
It is equally important to reiterate that the periods fixed by this Court
are maxima and not allowances. Completion of a stage before expiry
of the period assigned to it must immediately trigger the next legally
dependent stage.
417. Before dealing with the remaining apprehension concerning proximity
of the elections to the Legislative Assembly, we consider it necessary
to address a wider constitutional concern which arises directly from
the facts before us. A constitutional timetable cannot be preserved
merely by judicial directions issued after breach. The primary
responsibility lies upon the institutions entrusted with the electoral
process to conduct their respective functions in a manner which
prevents such breach from arising.
418. Article 243U operates through several institutions. The State
Legislature frames the governing law; the State Government performs
statutory and administrative functions and provides the machinery
necessary for elections; the State Election Commission exercises
constitutional superintendence, direction and control over the
electoral process; and specialised bodies may perform antecedent
functions concerning reservation or empirical inquiry. Their functions
are distinct, but the constitutional result is indivisible: an elected
Municipality must be democratically reconstituted within the period
Page 201 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
prescribed by the Constitution. No authority can therefore treat
compliance with Article 243U as the responsibility of another.
419. Constitutional powers do not operate in isolation. Each is conferred
within the larger constitutional structure and must be exercised
consistently with its other commands. A power legitimately conferred
for one constitutional purpose cannot ordinarily be exercised, or its
exercise timed, in a manner which renders another express
constitutional obligation incapable of performance. This is especially
so where the competing obligation fixes the duration of a
democratically elected institution in the emphatic terms “and no
longer”.
420. The Supreme Court in Suresh Mahajan, while reiterating Kishansing
Tomar (supra), has made clear that all authorities concerned are
obliged to ensure installation of the newly elected local body before
expiry of the five-year term and has described that constitutional
mandate as inviolable. The Court specifically included within that
discipline the State Election Commission, the State Government and
the State Legislature, and rejected ongoing delimitation as a legitimate
ground for withholding elections where such exercise could and ought
to have been commenced sufficiently in advance.
421. The consequence is that constitutional periodicity imposes not merely
a prohibition against formal extension of an elected body's tenure, but
a continuing obligation of institutional foresight. Where the need for
legislative correction, delimitation, reservation, empirical inquiry,
electoral-roll preparation or other antecedent work is known or
Page 202 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
reasonably foreseeable, the corresponding exercise must be
undertaken sufficiently early to enable both the governing law and the
constitutional election calendar to be honoured.
422. This does not mean that legislative power becomes dormant as an
election approaches, nor that a genuine legal or constitutional defect
must remain uncorrected because an election is imminent. The
Legislature retains its constitutional competence. The controlling
limitation is that the exercise of such competence does not, merely by
reason of its timing, create a fresh constitutional period for holding
elections or suspend the operation of Article 243U.
423. The distinction is therefore between the existence of constitutional
power and the responsibility attending its exercise. The power to
legislate may exist; the power to delimit may exist; the power to
prescribe reservation may exist; and the authority to undertake the
corresponding statutory processes may exist. Yet none of those powers
can proceed on the premise that Article 243U will accommodate
whatever period their exercise ultimately consumes. The Constitution
fixes the electoral calendar; the institutions must organise their
functions around it. The calendar cannot be reorganised around
institutional delay.
424. We would describe this as the principle of constitutional non-
manipulability of the electoral calendar. The expression does not
attribute manipulation or improper motive to any particular authority.
It describes an objective constitutional limitation. Once the
Constitution fixes the duration of an elected institution and the date
Page 203 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
by which democratic renewal must occur, that date cannot be treated
as an adjustable governmental variable. Administrative convenience,
belated institutional action or the introduction of a new statutory
process cannot, by themselves, convert the constitutional terminal
date into a moving date dependent upon completion of successive
governmental exercises.
428. Any other view would reduce Article 243U to a guarantee in form but
not in substance. If every fresh delimitation, restructuring, reservation
exercise or legislative alteration introduced near the end of the term
were sufficient to postpone the election, the Constitution would
prescribe a five-year democratic tenure while leaving the actual return
to the electorate dependent upon the timing of antecedent
institutional action. Such a construction cannot be accepted.
429. The Legislature therefore bears a particular responsibility when
altering the legal architecture of elections. Electoral legislation is
undoubtedly an exercise of plenary legislative power within the field
constitutionally assigned to the State, but Article 243ZA(2) itself
makes that power subject to the Constitution. Where an amendment
materially affects composition, delimitation, reservation or the
sequence preceding an election, constitutional prudence requires
consideration not only of the substantive object of the amendment but
also of whether sufficient time remains for its lawful implementation
without defeating Article 243U.
430. The present chronology illustrates the importance of that obligation.
The Petitioners have pointed to several legislative opportunities
Page 204 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
preceding promulgation of the Ordinance and to the fact that the
relevant constitutional and electoral circumstances were not newly
discovered in April 2026. We have declined to infer partisan purpose
from that chronology. Its constitutional significance lies elsewhere:
where the circumstances underlying a legislative intervention have
existed for a substantial period, introduction of a materially altered
electoral regime at the terminal stage places a heightened obligation
upon the institutions concerned to ensure that its implementation
does not unnecessarily prolong the constitutional default.
431. The State Government bears a corresponding responsibility. It
ordinarily knows the dates on which Municipal Councils will complete
their terms and the statutory exercises which must precede the
succeeding elections. Its obligation therefore cannot begin only when
the State Election Commission seeks assistance. Government
departments must maintain the data, administrative machinery and
institutional coordination necessary for timely elections. Where
consultation is prescribed, it must be undertaken promptly; where
personnel, funds, security, transport or infrastructure are required,
they must be made available without avoidable delay.
432. This assumes particular importance during an unelected interregnum,
when administration of the local body passes into an appointed
arrangement. We do not suggest that appointment of an
Administrator, where authorised by law, is itself unconstitutional. The
constitutional concern arises when an arrangement intended to be
temporary is prolonged through institutional delay and thereby
Page 205 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
displaces elected local government beyond what the Constitution
permits.
433. The State Election Commission occupies a distinct constitutional
position. Article 243ZA entrusts to it the superintendence, direction
and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of
municipal elections. Its independence is therefore not merely
structural; it is a functional safeguard intended to ensure that the
electoral process, including its timing, does not become subordinate to
the convenience or interests of the executive Government.
434. In State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra), the Supreme Court
emphasised the independence of the State Election Commissioner
from the State Government and recognised the office as an important
constitutional institution overseeing elections to Panchayats and
Municipalities. The judgment also recognises that, where another
authority acts contrary to constitutional or statutory requirements
affecting the election, the State Election Commission is not powerless
to seek correction in discharge of its constitutional responsibility.
435. The practical content of that independence becomes most significant
when timely conduct of an election requires the Commission to insist
upon performance by the Government or another statutory authority.
The Commission cannot merely accommodate avoidable executive
delay or treat governmental inaction as determinative of its own
electoral calendar. Its constitutional role requires it to identify the
steps necessary for the election and call upon the competent
authorities to perform them within the required time and furthermore,
Page 206 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
where an unlawful impediment threatens its constitutional duty,
invoke the remedies available in law.
436. This does not place the State Election Commission above the statute.
Its independence does not confer a power to disregard valid
legislation. The Commission must obey the law, but it must do so
independently. It must implement the statutory framework without
surrendering its constitutional obligation to ensure that every legally
compressible or concurrent step is undertaken with the urgency
required by Article 243U.
437. Nor should cooperation between the State Election Commission and
the Government be mistaken for dependence. Elections necessarily
require administrative cooperation in relation to personnel, security,
infrastructure, funds and statutory consultation. Such cooperation is
both lawful and necessary. But it must occur between institutions
performing distinct constitutional functions, and the electoral
timetable of the Commission cannot merely become a reflection of the
pace preferred by the executive Government.
438. Courts must, and we have, exercised restraint before attributing
partisan motives to constitutional authorities. The constitutional
standard does not depend upon proof of subjective motive.
Institutions entrusted with elections must nevertheless conduct
themselves in a manner which preserves public confidence that the
timing of elections is governed by the Constitution and law, and not by
governmental convenience.
Page 207 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
439. The resulting principle is institutional rather than partisan. No
Government has a constitutional entitlement to choose a politically
convenient date for an election whose periodicity is fixed by the
Constitution. No Legislature can proceed on the assumption that
enactment of a new electoral requirement automatically supplies
additional constitutional time for its implementation. No State
Election Commission can surrender the electoral calendar to the pace
at which another authority chooses to act. Each must exercise its
powers so that the Constitution, rather than institutional convenience,
determines when democratic authority returns to the electorate.
440. The need to state the principle is reinforced by the recurrence of
disputes concerning delayed local-body elections. In Suresh Mahajan,
the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation involving
thousands of local bodies functioning without elected representatives
and characterised it as approaching a breakdown of the rule of law and
a palpable infraction of the constitutional mandate. Judicial
intervention after expiry of elected terms cannot therefore become a
substitute for advance constitutional planning by the institutions
themselves.
441. Article 243U must consequently be understood as imposing two
connected obligations, firstly, the immediate obligation to complete
the particular election within the constitutional period, and secondly,
the continuing institutional obligation to plan legislative,
administrative, delimitation, reservation and electoral functions
sufficiently in advance so that the first obligation remains capable of
performance. The second obligation is not an independent extension
Page 208 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
of Article 243U but it is the discipline necessary to make the first
obligation effective.
442. These observations are confined to the constitutional authorities and
statutory institutions whose functions arise in the present
proceedings. We do not pronounce upon the conduct of Governments
or election authorities in electoral processes which are not before us.
The broader constitutional principle, however, follows from Part IX-A
itself, where the Constitution fixes democratic periodicity, every
institution exercising power in relation to that election must exercise
its authority in a manner which preserves, rather than displaces, that
periodicity.
443. We may now address the apprehension expressed by the State
Election Commission concerning the proximity of the forthcoming
election to the Goa Legislative Assembly. In its response to the Court's
questionnaire, the Commission states that Assembly elections fall
within the domain of the Election Commission of India, but points out
that polling personnel, polling stations, revenue officers, law-and-
order machinery, vehicles and other administrative resources may
substantially overlap between the two electoral exercises. It therefore
apprehends practical difficulty if the municipal elections are permitted
to drift too close to the Assembly election process.
444. The apprehension is understandable as a matter of administration. It
cannot, however, furnish a legal basis for extending the municipal
election timetable. Article 243U does not make the periodicity of
municipal elections contingent upon convenience created by the
Page 209 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
electoral calendar of another representative institution. On the
contrary, the possibility of overlap furnishes an additional reason why
the authorities ought to complete the municipal elections at the
earliest lawful date.
445. We would be entering an impermissible field if we were to prescribe
how or when the Election Commission of India should conduct the
election to the Legislative Assembly. That authority is not the subject
of the present proceedings and its constitutional functions arise under
a different part of the Constitution. Our concern is narrower. The
possibility of a future Assembly election cannot be invoked by the State
Government or the State Election Commission to postpone municipal
elections which are already constitutionally overdue.
446. Administrative resources are capable of planning but a constitutional
deadline are mandatory and not subjected to administrative
convenience or availability. If additional personnel, vehicles, security
arrangements or other resources are required to ensure that the
municipal process is completed before the Assembly election
machinery becomes fully engaged, it is for the State Government to
make those arrangements. An anticipated future demand upon the
same administrative machinery cannot legitimise continuation of an
existing breach of Article 243U.
447. We accordingly hold that proximity to the Legislative Assembly
elections shall not constitute a ground for enlargement of any period
fixed by this judgment. On the contrary, the State Government and the
State Election Commission shall organise the remaining process so
Page 210 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
that the municipal elections are brought to their lawful conclusion
without their being allowed to drift into avoidable conflict with the
Assembly election process.
448. In view of the foregoing discussion, the questions formulated for
determination may now be answered. Since several of them overlap in
their constitutional content, our answers must be read together and
not as isolated propositions.
449. As to the first question, Article 243ZG does not render the present
Petitions wholly non-maintainable. Insofar as the challenge is directed
to statutory provisions which constitute law relating to delimitation of
constituencies or allotment of seats within Article 243ZG(a), the
constitutional bar operates according to its terms and their merits
cannot be reopened before this Court. That prohibition does not
extend in the same manner to administrative action not invested with
the force of law, nor does it prevent enforcement of the independent
constitutional mandate contained in Article 243U. Our jurisdiction
has accordingly been exercised within those limits.
450. As to the second question, Article 243U embodies a mandatory
constitutional command. The duration of a Municipality is five years
and no longer, and the election constituting its successor must be
completed before expiry of that duration. Ordinary administrative
delay, want of preparedness or circumstances which the authorities
could reasonably have anticipated cannot constitute an exception to
that mandate.
Page 211 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
451. Article 243U consequently requires not only performance when the
terminal date arrives but institutional preparation sufficiently in
advance to make timely performance possible. Authorities entrusted
with legislative, delimitation, reservation, empirical, electoral-roll and
logistical functions must organise their respective duties with the
known constitutional date in view.
452. As to the third question, the power of the State Legislature under
Article 243ZA(2), and the Ordinance-making power under Article 213
where its constitutional conditions are satisfied, do not become
dormant merely because an election is approaching or has become
due. Article 243U creates no legislative paralysis. Equally, exercise of
legislative power does not suspend Article 243U or create a fresh
constitutional period for the succeeding election.
453. Where an operative statutory alteration intervenes, the statute and
Article 243U must therefore be performed together. The statutory
requirements remain binding, but implementation must proceed with
the degree of expedition required by an electoral deadline which has
already been breached.
454. As to the challenge under Article 213, we have proceeded on the
assumption that the limited judicial review recognised for exercise of
the Ordinance-making power remains available notwithstanding the
protection which Article 243ZG(a) accords to the resulting
delimitation law. Within that limited review, the material does not
establish absence of every relevant circumstance, extraneous purpose,
fraud on power or abuse sufficient to invalidate the Ordinance. We
Page 212 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
have not entered upon the adequacy or sufficiency of the
circumstances relied upon by the State.
455. The legal consequence is that the Ordinance remains operative.
Insofar as its provisions fall within Article 243ZG(a), their merits are
protected from judicial challenge in these proceedings. The separate
Article 213 challenge also fails for the reasons recorded above, and no
independently sustainable constitutional ground has been established
which requires the remaining framework to be treated as inoperative.
456. This conclusion must not be understood as constitutional approval of
the timing of the legislative intervention. The expiry dates were known
in advance, substantial preparatory work had already been
undertaken, and the considerations relied upon by the State were not
shown to have arisen for the first time immediately before April 2026.
Those circumstances do not establish partisan motive or fraud on the
Constitution, but they are relevant to foreseeability, institutional
preparedness and the strictness of the remedial timetable now
required under Article 243U.
457. The distinction is fundamental. A law may remain operative while the
institutional timing which accompanied its introduction warrants
constitutional criticism. The former question concerns validity and the
limits imposed by Articles 243ZG and 213; the latter concerns the
continuing force of Article 243U and the responsibility of the
constitutional authorities to prevent foreseeable legislative or
administrative processes from prolonging an electoral default.
Page 213 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
458. As to the fifth question, once the Ordinance is held valid and operative,
neither the State Election Commission nor this Court can direct that it
be ignored for the present election merely because the pre-existing
process had advanced substantially. To keep the Ordinance valid
generally but exclude it from the present electoral cycle, without
striking it down, severing any provision or identifying a permissible
interpretative basis for such exclusion, would in substance amount to
suspending the law for one election. That course is not available
merely as a matter of convenience.
459. We therefore reject the alternative prayer that the present elections be
conducted wholly under the superseded statutory regime. We also
decline to set aside the State Election Commission's decision to
discontinue the earlier delimitation exercise merely because that
exercise had substantially progressed. The amended criterion of
population materially altered the statutory foundation on which the
number of Councillors and wards was to be determined.
460. The earlier work is, however, not constitutionally meaningless. To the
extent that factual, administrative or electoral material generated
earlier remains capable of lawful use under the amended framework,
the State Election Commission is expected to utilise it. A change in the
statutory basis justifies repetition only of such work as the new law
genuinely requires. It does not justify discarding every earlier
preparatory act and beginning all administrative work afresh.
461. As to the sixth question, Articles 243R, 243T, 243U and 243ZA are not
competing provisions which require one constitutional value to be
Page 214 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
sacrificed to another. Lawful composition, fair delimitation,
constitutionally compliant reservation and timely democratic renewal
are all parts of the same constitutional scheme. The correct approach
is therefore one of harmonious performance.
462. The OBC reservation exercise must satisfy the constitutional
requirements governing political reservation, including the
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry and local-body-specific
determination required by the Supreme Court. That constitutional
requirement cannot be diluted merely to save time. Equally, it cannot
be administered through avoidable sequentiality so as to defeat Article
243U. The substantive rigour of the Triple Test must remain intact
while every component capable of lawful advance or simultaneous
performance must proceed without interruption.
463. The same principle governs the amended Section 10. The periods
which the statute requires to run in full must be preserved. Thus, the
thirty-day periods for public objections to draft delimitation and draft
reservation and the thirty-day period which must expire under Section
10(7) cannot be judicially abridged. By contrast, where the statute
requires an authority to act "within" thirty days, that period ordinarily
operates as an outer limit and does not confer a right to consume all
thirty days notwithstanding the urgency created by an existing
constitutional default.
464. As to the seventh question, we hold that the State Government, the
Legislature, the State Election Commission and every statutory body
entrusted with an antecedent electoral function bear a continuing duty
Page 215 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
of constitutional preparedness. The responsibility for Article 243U is
collective in performance though distinct in institutional function.
Each authority must anticipate the known electoral calendar and
perform its own role sufficiently in advance.
465. The Legislature must be conscious that substantial alterations to
electoral architecture made at the terminal stage of an elected body's
tenure may carry consequences for a constitutional deadline which is
not movable. The State Government must provide consultation,
personnel, funds, security and administrative assistance with a degree
of urgency commensurate with the constitutional obligation. The
dedicated Backward Classes Commission must maintain institutional
readiness to perform the recurring empirical function entrusted to it.
466. The State Election Commission bears a distinct constitutional
responsibility. Its independence does not mean freedom from statute;
it means independence in enforcing the Constitution and the valid law
governing elections. It must not remain a passive recipient of
governmental delay. It must identify the statutory steps required,
insist upon timely performance by the authorities concerned and
organise the electoral process around the constitutional deadline
rather than around executive convenience.
467. The principle which emerges may be stated in this manner. The
constitutional electoral calendar is not an instrument of governmental
adjustment. A constitutional authority may exercise every power
lawfully conferred upon it, but the timing and manner of that exercise
cannot proceed on the assumption that a fixed constitutional election
Page 216 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
date will automatically yield to whatever period the exercise ultimately
consumes. This is the principle of constitutional non-manipulability of
the electoral calendar.
468. The above referred principle is objective and institutional. It does not
depend upon proof of partisan intent. Its purpose is to prevent
constitutional periodicity from becoming vulnerable to successive
legislation, delimitation, reservation or administrative interventions
introduced belatedly so that the election date is repeatedly displaced.
The Constitution cannot prescribe a five-year democratic tenure in a
form and leave its actual return to the administrative convenience of
the electorate to complete foreseeable antecedent exercises.
469. We therefore hold that a valid intervening law may have to be
implemented even after an Article 243U default has occurred, but the
resulting departure from the constitutional timetable must be
confined to the irreducible period genuinely required for lawful
implementation. All avoidable delay must be eliminated. All
administrative periods capable of compression must be compressed.
All legally independent preparatory functions capable of simultaneous
performance must proceed concurrently.
470. As to the eighth and final question, the appropriate relief is therefore
neither to strike down the Ordinance nor to direct its non-application
to the present elections. The proper constitutional remedy is to
preserve the operative law while imposing a binding timetable which
ensures that the existing breach of Article 243U is brought to an end
at the earliest lawful date.
Page 217 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
471. In doing so, this Court is not extending the constitutional period under
Article 243U. That period has already expired in respect of several of
the Municipal Councils. Nor are we creating a judicial substitute for
the statutory scheme. We are enforcing the statute in the manner
which most closely restores compliance with the Constitution after an
existing default.
472. The timetable set out earlier therefore represents the maximum
permissible periods for completion of the remaining stages.
Mandatory statutory periods have been retained intact. Outer
administrative periods have been confined consistently with the State
Election Commission's own assessment. The municipality-wise
empirical inquiry has been directed to proceed contemporaneously;
the residual ward-specific exercise has been confined to the short
period following final delimitation; Government consultation is to
take place within, and not in addition to, the periods fixed; and the
voter-list requirement under Section 11(3) is to operate concurrently
with the waiting period under Section 10(7).
473. The possible proximity of the Legislative Assembly election does not
alter these conclusions. It may present an administrative
consideration which the authorities should sensibly anticipate, but it
cannot constitute a constitutional ground for further postponement of
elections already overdue under Article 243U. The State Government
and the State Election Commission must therefore arrange the
necessary machinery so that the municipal election process is
completed within the timetable fixed by this Court.
Page 218 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
474.The controversy before us may ultimately be reduced to a single
constitutional proposition. The Constitution does not require a choice
between lawful elections and timely elections; it requires both. Where
a valid statutory change intervenes after an election has become
constitutionally due, the law cannot ordinarily be ignored, but neither
can the constitutional clock under Article 243U be treated as having
restarted. The intervening law must therefore be implemented with
the greatest expedition legally possible, and any departure from the
constitutional electoral deadline must remain confined to the
irreducible period genuinely necessary for its lawful implementation.
475. This approach preserves the respective constitutional fields without
permitting one provision to consume another. It respects the
legislative authority recognised by Article 243ZA(2), the constitutional
requirements governing composition and reservation under Articles
243R and 243T, and the independent authority of the State Election
Commission under Article 243ZA, while preserving the controlling
discipline of Article 243U. Harmonious construction in this context
therefore means that lawful delimitation and reservation must be
completed, but they must be administered in a manner which does not
permit avoidable legislative, administrative or institutional delay to
displace the constitutional periodicity of elected local government.
476. The significance of this principle extends beyond remedying a default
after it has occurred. Constitutional periodicity necessarily requires
constitutional foresight. A Government which knows the terminal date
of an elected body, a Legislature which proposes to alter the electoral
framework, a State Election Commission charged with conducting the
Page 219 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
election, and every statutory authority whose function forms part of
that process must organise their respective duties sufficiently in
advance so that the exercise of one constitutional or statutory power
does not become the cause of failure of another constitutional
command. An unelected arrangement after expiry of a municipal term
can only be temporary and exceptional; it cannot, through foreseeable
institutional delay, become a substitute for the periodically renewed
democratic mandate contemplated by Part IX-A.
477. We accordingly answer the questions for determination in the terms
set out above. The impugned Ordinance survives the challenge. It will
govern the present electoral process. The earlier statutory regime
cannot be revived merely for these elections. The validity of the
Ordinance, however, does not legitimise the delay which has already
occurred, nor does it confer any further discretionary period upon the
Respondents. The remaining process must now be completed strictly
within the compressed constitutional timetable which follows from
our conclusions.
478. We shall therefore proceed to formulate the final directions. In doing
so, the relative periods already identified must be translated, so far as
the record permits, into definite calendar dates. The object is to leave
no uncertainty as to who must perform each remaining act, the last
date by which it must be performed, which functions must run
concurrently, and the date by which the elected Municipal Councils
must ultimately be constituted.
Page 220 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
479. Having regard to the conclusions recorded above, it is necessary that
our directions should now operate by reference to definite dates rather
than merely relative periods. This is particularly necessary because the
terms of several Municipal Councils have already expired and the
constitutional default under Article 243U is continuing. A direction
merely requiring the authorities to act “expeditiously” would, in the
circumstances which have led to these Petitions, leave too much
uncertainty in a field where the Constitution itself insists upon
certainty.
480. The draft delimitation under the amended Section 10(3) was
published on 24 July 2026. This fact was confirmed on behalf of the
State Election Commission during the hearing. Section 10(3) requires
the period of thirty days for objections and suggestions to be
preserved. Computed from the date of publication, that period expires
on 23 August 2026. We shall therefore take 23 August 2026 as the
starting point for the remaining timetable.
481. The dates which follow are outer limits. They do not confer upon any
authority an entitlement to wait until the last date. If any stage is
completed earlier, the immediately succeeding stage shall commence
without waiting for the date indicated in this judgment. Conversely, no
stage may be carried beyond the date fixed merely because an earlier
stage was completed before its own outer limit.
482. We have also taken care not to prescribe a date which makes
performance legally impossible. The State Election Commission has
itself stated that, subject to the minimum statutory periods identified
Page 221 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
by it, there is no constitutional or statutory impediment to completion
of the elections according to the compressed schedule. It has further
identified Government consultation and provision of election
machinery as the principal matters requiring cooperation from the
State. The timetable which follows therefore proceeds substantially
upon the material placed before us by the authorities themselves.
483. The State Election Commission shall receive objections and
suggestions to the draft delimitation until expiry of the statutory
period on 23 August 2026. Nothing in this judgment curtails that right
of objection.
484. Immediately thereafter, the State Election Commission shall consider
all objections and suggestions, make such alterations to the draft
delimitation as may lawfully be required, complete the consultation
contemplated by Section 10(3) with the State Government and publish
the final notification of delimitation on or before 9 September 2026.
The entire process, including Government consultation, shall thus
stand completed within fifteen days after closure of objections.
485. The State Government shall treat consultation under Section 10(3) as
an urgent constitutional matter. Whenever the proposal is received
from the State Election Commission, it shall be considered and
returned within such short period as enables the final delimitation
notification to be issued by 9 September 2026. Ordinary departmental
movement, circulation between departments, absence of officers or
other routine administrative considerations shall not constitute
grounds for exceeding the date fixed by this Court.
Page 222 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
486. The Goa State Commission for Backward Classes shall, meanwhile,
continue without interruption the contemporaneous rigorous
empirical inquiry which it has undertaken before this Court to
commence on the basis of the material already available with it,
including Census 2011 and the 2013 survey report concerning the
eleven Municipalities. The Commission shall not await the final
delimitation for completion of any municipality-wise component of
the inquiry which can lawfully be undertaken before that event.
487. Upon publication of final delimitation, the Goa State Commission for
Backward Classes shall undertake only the residual exercise which
genuinely depends upon the finally constituted wards and shall
furnish to the State Election Commission the empirical data and
recommendations contemplated by Section 10(4) on or before 16
September 2026.
488. We reiterate that the period until 16 September 2026 is not granted
for commencement of the empirical inquiry. The inquiry has already
been undertaken to commence pursuant to the statement made before
this Court. The seven days following final delimitation are confined to
completion of its ward-related application. The substantive
requirements laid down by the Supreme Court concerning
contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry, local-body specificity
and the aggregate constitutional ceiling upon reservation shall be
complied with in their entirety.
489. Upon receipt of the report and data from the Backward Classes
Commission, the State Election Commission shall complete the
Page 223 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
exercise necessary for preparing the draft reservation and shall
publish the draft notification contemplated by Section 10(5) on or
before 20 September 2026. The Commission's own stage-wise
assessment contemplated approximately four administrative days in
addition to the statutory objection period at this stage.
490. The statutory period of thirty days for objections and suggestions to
the draft reservation shall thereafter remain available in full. On the
outer dates now fixed, that period shall expire on 20 October 2026. No
part of this statutory opportunity is abridged by our directions.
491. During that thirty-day period the State Election Commission may,
without prejudging any objection, receive, register, classify and
undertake preliminary scrutiny of the objections as they are filed. It
need not wait until 20 October 2026 before commencing the
administrative work necessary for their eventual consideration.
492. After closure of the objections, the State Election Commission shall
finally consider them, effect such lawful corrections as may be
required, undertake the consultation with the State Government
contemplated by Section 10(6), and publish the final reservation
notification on or before 9 November 2026. The period of twenty days
accords with the State Election Commission's own estimate of the
minimum administrative time reasonably required for this stage,
subject to prompt Government consultation.
493. The State Government shall ensure that consultation under Section
10(6) is completed within the aforesaid twenty-day period.
Page 224 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
Consultation cannot be added to it as an independent block of time.
The Chief Secretary shall ensure that an appropriate officer or group
of officers is designated in advance to deal with the proposal
immediately upon its receipt from the State Election Commission.
494. Section 10(7) expressly requires expiry of thirty days from publication
of final reservation before the State Election Commission declares the
elections. That requirement shall remain wholly untouched. If the final
reservation is published on the outer date of 9 November 2026, the
statutory thirty-day period will expire on 9 December 2026, and the
election programme shall be declared forthwith thereafter, on 10
December 2026.
495. The requirement under Section 11(3), that the ward-wise voter lists
remain open for public inspection at least thirty days prior to the
election notification, shall operate concurrently with the period under
Section 10(7). Section 11(3) itself prescribes the thirty-day
requirement. The State Election Commission shall therefore ensure
that the ward-wise lists are prepared and placed for inspection
sufficiently in advance and, on the outer schedule now fixed, not later
than 9 November 2026. There shall be no additional thirty-day period
thereafter.
496. The State Election Commission and the State Government shall
simultaneously complete, during this period, all logistical
arrangements necessary for the poll, including appointment and
training of Returning Officers, Assistant Returning Officers and
polling personnel; identification and preparation of polling stations;
Page 225 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
security and law-and-order arrangements; deployment of revenue and
other officers; transportation; procurement and positioning of
election material; allocation of funds; and every other administrative
requirement. The Commission itself identifies these matters as the
assistance required from the State.
497. The actual election programme, after notification, has been assessed
by the State Election Commission at approximately twenty-five days,
including nomination, scrutiny, withdrawal, polling and declaration of
results. The State Election Commission shall accordingly complete the
entire election process, including declaration of results, within twenty-
five days of the election notification and, on the outer schedule
presently fixed, not later than 4 January 2027.
498. The resulting calendar may, for clarity, be stated in one place. The
statutory delimitation objection period has expired on 23 August
2026. Further period is calculated accordingly, i.e. final delimitation
shall be notified by 9 September 2026; the residual OBC empirical
exercise shall be completed by 16 September 2026; draft reservation
shall be published by 20 September 2026; objections thereto shall
close by 20 October 2026; final reservation shall be published by 9
November 2026; the statutory waiting period shall expire on 9
December 2026; the election notification shall be issued on 10
December 2026; and the electoral process shall stand completed by 4
January 2027.
499. These dates represent the outermost schedule on the assumptions
recorded above. If final delimitation, the empirical report, draft
Page 226 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
reservation or final reservation is completed earlier, every subsequent
date shall correspondingly advance. In no circumstance shall earlier
completion of one stage be converted into idle time before
commencement of the next.
500. We also make it clear that the election programme need not await any
further approval of the State Government after completion of the
statutory stages. Article 243ZA vests the superintendence, direction
and control of municipal elections in the State Election Commission.
Once the legal prerequisites stand completed, the determination and
notification of the election programme are matters for the State
Election Commission in exercise of its constitutional authority.
501. The State Government shall therefore not issue, and the State Election
Commission shall not entertain, any request which has the effect of
postponing the timetable fixed by this Court on considerations of
administrative convenience, political events, availability of particular
officers or anticipated proximity of the Legislative Assembly elections.
Nothing prevents the institutions concerned from coordinating their
administrative resources, but such coordination must take place
around the constitutional timetable and not by displacing it.
502. Equally, the pendency of any proposal to amend, replace or otherwise
alter the statutory provisions presently governing these elections shall
not by itself suspend the directions contained in this judgment. We do
not and cannot restrain the competent Legislature from exercising its
constitutional legislative power. What follows from Article 243U,
however, is that the authorities presently bound by the law must
Page 227 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
continue to discharge their existing duties unless and until the
governing legal position is lawfully altered. A contemplated legislative
measure cannot become a reason for administrative inaction.
503. If any subsequent legislative measure is enacted before completion of
these elections, its legal consequences will necessarily depend upon its
terms and constitutional validity and cannot be adjudicated
prospectively in these proceedings. What cannot be accepted is the
assumption that the mere possibility of future legislation entitles the
Respondents to stop or slow the process which they are presently
required to complete.
504. Compliance with the above timetable shall be personally supervised,
in their respective institutional spheres, by the State Election
Commissioner, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Goa and the
Member Secretary of the Goa State Commission for Backward Classes.
This direction is not intended to centralise functions which the statute
assigns to different officers. It is intended to ensure that responsibility
for constitutional compliance does not become diffused between
institutions.
505. We consider such accountability necessary in the present case because
the constitutional breach has already occurred. Once a Court has
preserved the intervening legislation notwithstanding its late
introduction, the corresponding obligation upon the authorities to
complete its implementation within the shortest lawful period
becomes particularly stringent. The preservation of the law cannot
become the source of a further open-ended postponement.
Page 228 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
506. The State Election Commission shall maintain a stage-wise record of
compliance with the dates fixed above. If any authority anticipates a
genuine legal impossibility in meeting a particular date, it must place
the difficulty before this Court before expiry of that date and not after
default has occurred. Mere administrative inconvenience, shortage of
personnel which could reasonably have been addressed, pendency of
inter-departmental consultation or anticipated Assembly-election
work shall not constitute sufficient grounds for modification.
507. Liberty to apply is accordingly confined to a supervening circumstance
of a genuinely exceptional and unavoidable nature which renders
compliance legally or factually impossible despite due diligence. This
liberty shall not be understood as an invitation to seek enlargement of
time on considerations which have already been considered and
rejected in this judgment.
Operative Order:
508. For the reasons recorded above, the Petitions are disposed of by the
following order:
(i) The challenge seeking invalidation of the Goa Municipalities
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2026 is rejected for the reasons recorded
in this judgment. The Ordinance accordingly remains operative and
shall govern the present general elections to the eleven Municipal
Councils.
(ii) The alternative prayer seeking a declaration that the Ordinance shall
remain inapplicable to the present electoral cycle and that the
Page 229 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
elections be conducted under the pre-amendment statutory regime
is rejected.
(iii) The challenge to the decision of the State Election Commission
dated 21 May 2026 discontinuing the earlier delimitation exercise is
rejected, subject to the clarification that all factual and
administrative material generated in the earlier process which is
capable of lawful utilisation under the amended regime may and
shall, wherever practicable, be utilised.
(iv) The State Election Commission shall complete consideration of
objections to draft delimitation, Government consultation and
publication of final delimitation under Section 10(3) on or before 9
September 2026.
(v) The Goa State Commission for Backward Classes shall continue
forthwith the municipality-wise contemporaneous rigorous
empirical inquiry and, upon final delimitation, complete the
residual ward-specific exercise and furnish its report/data under
Section 10(4) to the State Election Commission on or before 16
September 2026, subject only to the limited liberty contained in
paragraph 395A of this judgment.
(vi) The State Election Commission shall publish the draft reservation
notification under Section 10(5) on or before 20 September 2026
and shall afford the full statutory period of thirty days for objections
and suggestions.
(vii) Upon closure of objections on the outer schedule on 20 October
2026, the State Election Commission shall complete their
Page 230 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
consideration, Government consultation and publication of final
reservation under Section 10(6) on or before 9 November 2026.
(viii) The thirty-day period under Section 10(7) shall remain untouched.
On the outer schedule, the State Election Commission shall declare
the elections on 10 December 2026.
(ix) The requirements under Section 11(3) shall be complied with
concurrently with the period under Section 10(7), and no additional
period shall be claimed on that account.
(x) The actual election programme shall thereafter be completed within
twenty-five days and, on the outer schedule fixed by this judgment,
the results of the elections to all eleven Municipal Councils shall be
declared not later than 4 January 2027.
(xi) Every date specified above is an outer limit. Earlier completion of
any stage shall result in immediate advancement of every
succeeding stage to the extent legally permissible.
(xii) The State Government shall furnish to the State Election
Commission all personnel, infrastructure, security, funds, transport
and other assistance required for compliance with this timetable
and shall complete consultations under Sections 10(3) and 10(6)
within the respective periods fixed above.
(xiii) Proximity of the Legislative Assembly election, ordinary
administrative inconvenience or shortage of governmental
machinery shall not constitute grounds for postponement of the
municipal elections beyond the schedule fixed herein.
Page 231 of 232
25th August 2026
WP-300/2026, 1069/2026, 1073/2026, 1071/2026 and 1072/2026
(xiv) The State Election Commissioner, the Chief Secretary of the State
of Goa and the Member Secretary of the Goa State Commission for
Backward Classes shall ensure compliance with these directions
within their respective spheres.
(xv) Liberty to apply is restricted to a genuinely exceptional
supervening circumstance rendering compliance impossible despite
due diligence. Any such application shall be made before expiry of
the relevant period and shall disclose, on affidavit, the precise
impediment, steps already undertaken and the minimum further
period, if any, claimed to be indispensable.
509. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. In the circumstances,
there shall be no order as to costs.
HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, J. VALMIKI MENEZES, J.
Page 232 of 232
Signed by: MARIA SUZANA REBELLO
25th August 2026
Designation: Personal Assistant
Date: 25/08/2026 20:05:11
Checking your session…