KOTAWDEKAR ZAHEER LATIFversusCANARA BANK THRU OFFICER AND ORS

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                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                           WRIT PETITION NO.10927 OF 2026

                      Kotawdekar Zaheer Latif                    ..           Petitioner
                      V/S.
                      Canara Bank Thru Officer and Ors ..                    Respondents
                                                      -------------------
                      Mr. Neeraj Pandey (VC), with Heena Maniyar, for petitioner.
                      Mr. Hamid Mulla, AGP, for the State.
                                                      --------------------
                                                     CORAM : MANISH PITALE &
VARSHA
DEEPAK                                                       SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
GAIKWAD
Digitally signed by
VARSHA DEEPAK
GAIKWAD
Date: 2026.08.25
                                                        DATE : 25th AUGUST 2026.
18:14:11 +0530


                      PC:


                      1.        Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

                      2.        The petitioner claims to be third party in possession of the
                      secured asset on the basis of leave and licence agreement. The
                      respondent No. 1 bank (secured creditor) has proceeded in respect of
                      the secured asset as per the provisions of section 14 of the
                      Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets And Enforcement
                      of Security Interest Act, 2002, (Securitisation Act) culminating in order
                      dated 25.03.2026 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thane.

                      3.        This writ petition has been filed and urgently circulated on the
                      ground that in terms of notice dated 04.08.2026 issued by the Court
                      Commissioner appointed by order of the Magistrate, physical
                      possession of the secured asset is to be taken on 29.08.2026.
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4.           We are not inclined to entertain this writ petition, in the light of
the alternative efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner
under the provisions of the Securitisation Act.

5.           The Supreme Court in the case of 'United Bank of India Vs.
Satyawati Tondon and others1, held as follows:

                    42. There is another reason why the impugned order
                    should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible
                    grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4)
                    or action taken under Section 14, then she could have
                    availed remedy by filing an application under Section
                    17(1). The expression `any person' used in Section 17(1)
                    is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the
                    borrower but also guarantor or any other person who
                    may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4)
                    or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate
                    Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under
                    Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters
                    within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the
                    remedies available to an aggrieved person under the
                    SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

                    43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled
                    law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a
                    petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
                    effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and
                    that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters
                    involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of
                    public money and the dues of banks and other financial
                    institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions
                    involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the
                    public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that
                    the legislations enacted by Parliament and State
                    Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto

1     2010 (8) SCC 110

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                   themselves inasmuch as they not only contain
                   comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but
                   also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for
                   redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person.
                   Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that
                   before availing remedy under Article 226 of the
                   Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies
                   available under the relevant statute.

                   44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are
                   conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court
                   under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any
                   person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
                   Government, directions, orders or writs including the five
                   prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights
                   conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very
                   wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that
                   power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of
                   the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court,
                   which every High Court is bound to keep in view while
                   exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

                   45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
                   remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion,
                   but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High
                   Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226
                   of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the
                   fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative
                   remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and
                   the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism
                   for redressal of his grievance".

6.           It appears that thereafter also the High Courts were entertaining
such writ petitions under the Article of 226 of the Constitution of India
and therefore, the Supreme Court in the case of 'Celir LLP Vs. Bafna
Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors'.2, was constrained to make the
2    (2024) 2 SCC 1

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following observations:

                 "101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
                 serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in
                 regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of
                 statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the
                 SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article
                 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this
                 Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra), it appears that the
                 High Courts have continued to exercise its writ
                 jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory
                 remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act".



7.        In view of the above, we are clear that the present cannot be
entertained, and accordingly, the Writ Petition deserves to be
dismissed.

8.        In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the
petitioner is at liberty to take recourse to the statutory remedy by
approaching DRT under the provisions of Securitisation Act, strictly in
accordance with law.

9.        Needless to say, further action being taken by respondent No. 1
bank under the provisions of Securitisation Act would be tested in the
proceedings that may be initiated by the petitioner in accordance with
law.

10.       This Court is not commenting on the merits of the matter. All the
rights and contentions of the parties are kept open.




(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.)                            (MANISH PITALE, J.)

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