Bombay High Court
AWADESH RAMNARAYAN VISHWAKARMA AND ANRversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
A writ petition under Article 226 must be dismissed where an effective alternative remedy under the Securitisation Act, such as approaching the DRT, is available.
Summary
The petitioner, a borrower, filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging an order of a Competent Magistrate issued under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, and sought to restrain the Court Commissioner from taking possession of the secured asset. The High Court observed that the petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy by approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the same Act. Citing Supreme Court precedents (United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon and Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors), the Court reiterated the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedies before invoking Article 226. Consequently, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition and dismissed it, while allowing the petitioner to approach the DRT if not already done. The decision underscores the High Court's adherence to the principle that statutory mechanisms must be exhausted before seeking constitutional writ relief.
Issues considered
- Whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be entertained when an effective statutory remedy under the Securitisation Act is available.
- Whether the petitioner must exhaust the remedy of approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal before seeking relief from the High Court.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- Article 226
- writ petition
- exhaustion of alternative remedy
- Securitisation Act
- Debt Recovery Tribunal
- SARFAESI
- RDBFI
- High Court jurisdiction
Judgment
25_WP11678_26.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.11678 OF 2026
Awadesh Ramnarayan Vishwakarma … Petitioner
Vs.
State of Maharashtra and others … Respondents
None for Petitioners.
Ms. G. R. Raghuwanshi, AGP for Respondents-State.
CORAM : MANISH PITALE &
SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
DATE : SEPTEMBER 09, 2026
P.C. :
. None for the petitioner.
2. The petitioner is a borrower, who has filed this petition
challenging an order passed by the Competent Magistrate under Section
14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Securitisation Act). The
petitioner also seeks a direction from this Court restraining the Court
Commissioner from taking physical possession of the secured asset.
3. The present petition cannot be entertained in the face of
alternative efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner of
approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the provisions of
the Securitisation Act.
MINAL SANDIP
Digitally signed
by MINAL
SANDIP Date:
PARAB
PARAB 2026.09.10
16:31:13 +0530
4. In the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and
others, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
“43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled
law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is
available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with
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25_WP11678_26.doc
greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,
fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and
other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the
petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery
of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that
the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures
for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch
as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery
of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial
bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person.
Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that
before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a
person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant
statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious
that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions,
orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for
any other purpose are very wide and there is no express
limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we
cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint
evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to
keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative
remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but
it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court
should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the
petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing
application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular
legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his
grievance.”
5. It appears that despite the said position of law being
repeatedly indicated by the Supreme Court, the High Courts were
still entertaining the writ petitions, and therefore in the case of
Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and others,
(2024) 2 SCC 1, the Supreme Court was constrained to observe as
follows:-
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“101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard
to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory
remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon, it
appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its
writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory
remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.”
6. In view of the above, we decline to entertain the present writ
petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed. However, the petitioner is at
liberty to approach the DRT under the provisions of the Securitisation
Act in accordance with law, if the petitioner has not already availed of
the said alternative remedy.
(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)
Minal Parab
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