BABU GANPAT ALIAS GANU THAKARE DECD THROU. LEGAL HEIRS SONUBAI NARAYAN VISHEversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA REVENUE AND FOREST DEPT AND ORS

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                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

                                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SAINATH
SANJAY                                WRIT PETITION NO. 1221 OF 2025
BODKHE
Digitally signed by
SAINATH SANJAY
BODKHE
Date: 2026.08.18
21:03:59 +0530        Babu Ganpat @ Ganu Thakare
                      Deceased through Legal Heir
                      Sonubai Narayan Vishe
                      Age : 66 years,
                      R/o. Village – Pashane,
                      Post – Monivali, Tq. Karjat,
                      Dist. Thane, through POA,
                      Surendra Narayan Vishe.
                      R/o. Village – Pashane,
                      Post – Monivali, Tq. Karjat, Dist. Thane         ..Petitioner

                             Versus

                      1. State of Maharashtra
                         Revenue & Forest Dept.,
                         Mantralaya, Mumbai.

                      2. Sakharam Janu Thakare
                         R/o. Village – Pali, Tq. Ambarnath,
                         Dist. Thane.

                      3. Maruti Hiru Bhalekar
                         Since deceased through LRs

                      3.1 Bhimabai Maruti Bhalekar

                      3.2 Nandu Maruti Bhalekar

                      3.3 Shaila Bhaskar Farde

                      3.4 Sunita Santosh Dhanke

                      3.5 Naresh Maruti Bhalekar

                      3.6 Usha Mangesh Bhalekar

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3.7 Harshal Mangesh Bhalekar

3.8 Raj Mangesh Bhalekar

     All R/o Village – Chikhloli,
     V Rubber Company, Forest Naka
     Badlapur – Kalyan Road,
     Tq. Ambarnath, Dist. Thane.

4. Balu @ Balya Pandu Patil
   Since deceased through LRs

4.1 Barku Balu @ Balya Patil

4.2 Dattatray Motiram Patil
    Both R/o Village – Narhen,
    Tq. Ambarnath, Dist. Thane.

                             …Respondents
_____________________________________

Mr. Aniket Ranade, for the Petitioner.

Mr. Vijay Killedar, for Respondent Nos.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 to 3.6.

Mr. Y D Patil, AGP for Respondent No.1 - State.
_____________________________________

                             CORAM         :      N. J. JAMADAR, J.

                       RESERVED ON :              28th JULY 2026
                    PRONOUNCED ON :               18th AUGUST 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.       Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the

consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.


2.     By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India,        the   petitioner   assails       the   legality,   propriety   and

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correctness of a judgment and order dated 08 th October, 2024

passed        by   the   learned   President,   Maharashtra    Revenue

Tribunal,      Mumbai      (“MRT”)   in   Revision   Application   being

Tenancy Revision No. TNC/REV/THN/223/2022, whereby the

revision application preferred by the petitioner against a

judgment and order dated 27th June 2022 passed by the Sub

Divisional Officer, Ulhasnagar in Tenancy Appeal No. 10/2021

thereby dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner against

an order dated 03rd February, 2021 passed by the Agricultural

Lands Tribunal, Ambernath (“ALT”), came to be dismissed.


3.     By the said order dated 03rd February, 2021, the ALT

declared that, late Babu Ganpat was not a tenant in respect of

the land bearing Survey No. 145/4 and 145/7 situated at Mouje

Narhen, Tq. Ambernath, Dist. Thane (“the subject lands”) and

dismissed an application preferred by the petitioner for fixing

the purchase price in respect of the subject lands under Section

32G of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,

1948 (“the Act, 1948”).


4.       The background facts leading to this petition can be

summarized as under :-




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4.1    Balu @ Balya Pandu Patil was the original holder of the

subject lands. Vide Mutation Entry No. 488 dated 10 th

September, 1954, the name of Babu Ganpat was entered into

the record of rights as a protected tenant in respect of the

subject lands. It appears, vide a subsequent Mutation Entry No.

620, the name of said Babu Ganpat was deleted on the premise

that since the year 1955 – 1956, Babu Ganpat was not

cultivating the subject lands and the holder Balu Pandu Patil

was himself cultivating the subject lands.


4.2    Balu Pandu Patil sold the land bearing Survey No. 145/7

to Sakharam Janu Thakare – Respondent No.2, and Survey No.

145/4 to Sakharam Janu Thakare (R-2) and Maruti Hiru

Bhalekar (Deceased) – Respondent No.3, jointly under the

registered sale deeds dated 19th May, 1967 and 15th April, 1976,

respectively. The names of the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were

mutated to the record of rights of the subject lands as holders

thereof. The name of Babu Ganpat however continued to be

reflected in the other rights column.


4.3    Babu Ganpat passed away on 09th September, 1981. The

petitioner claimed to be the daughter of late Babu Ganpat. The

petitioner filed an application before the Tahsildar to mutate her

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name to the lands left behind by late Babu Ganpat. Vide

Mutation Entry No. 333, the name of the petitioner came to be

mutated to the agricultural lands purportedly left behind by late

Babu Ganpat, as his daughter. The petitioner claimed that,

though in the said Mutation Entry No. 333, the holder of the

lands was shown as Babu Ganpat @ Babu Ganu Thakare, yet,

Babu Ganpat and Babu Ganu Thakare were one and the same

person.


4.4    In the meanwhile, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed an

application before the ALT under Section 70(b) of the Act, 1948

seeking a declaration that, Babu Ganpat was not a tenant in

respect of the subject lands on the tiller’s day. It was further

contended that, the petitioner was not the daughter of said

Babu Ganpat.


4.5    The petitioner, in turn, filed an application under Section

32G of the Act, 1948 seeking fixation of the purchase price on

the premise that, her father had become a deemed purchaser of

the subject lands on the tiller’s day as her father was cultivating

the subject lands as a tenant thereof.


4.6    After a round of litigation, the matter came to be remanded

back to the ALT to determine whether Babu Ganpat whose name
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was entered in the record of rights as a tenant was ever alive,

and whether the said person was cultivating the subject lands ?


4.7    Upon remand, the ALT recorded the evidence adduced by

the parties and after appraisal of the evidence came to the

conclusion that, the petitioner failed to substantiate her claim

that Babu Ganpat and Babu Ganu Thakare were one and the

same person, and that the said person was cultivating the

subject lands as a tenant thereof and, therefore, the petitioner

was not entitled to fixation of the purchase price in respect of

the subject lands. Resultantly, the ALT directed that the name

of “Babu Ganpat” be deleted from the record of rights of the

subject lands and also went on to dismiss the application

preferred by the petitioner under Section 32G of the Act, 1948.


4.8    The petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the Sub-

Divisional Officer. The latter concurred with the view of the ALT

and dismissed the Appeal.


4.9    Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a revision before

the MRT. By the impugned judgment and order, the MRT

dismissed the revision opining, inter alia, that, there was no

error which would warrant interference by the MRT with the



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impugned orders passed by the authorities below in exercise of

its limited revisional jurisdiction.


4.10 Being further aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the

writ jurisdiction of this Court.


5.     I have heard Mr. Aniket Ranade, the learned Counsel for

the Petitioner, Mr. Y. D. Patil, the learned AGP for the

Respondent No.1 – State, and Mr. Vijay Killedar, the learned

Counsel for Respondent No. 2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 to 3.6, at some

length. With the assistance of learned Counsel for the parties, I

have also perused the material on record.


6.     Mr. Aniket Ranade, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner,

submitted that the authorities under the Act, 1948 have

completely misdirected themselves in making a declaration that

the Babu Ganpat, the father of the Petitioner, was not the

tenant, despite certification of Mutation Entry No. 488, dated

10th September 1954, under which the name of Babu Ganpat

was mutated as the protected tenant in respect of the subject

lands. Reliance on the Mutation Entry No. 620, which came to

be certified on 24th September 1960, was wholly misplaced as on

the tiller’s day, late Babu Ganpat was cultivating the subject

lands and consequently he became a deemed purchaser.
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Certification of a Mutation Entry in the year 1960 to the effect

that since 1955-1956, the original land holder started to

personally cultivate the subject lands and late    Babu Ganpat

ceased to cultivate the same was, at best, self-serving. Such a

Mutation Entry could not have been made the basis of the

determination and thereby defeat the statutory rights accrued

to Babu Ganpat on the tiller’s day.


7.     Secondly,   Mr.   Ranade   would   urge,   the     deceased-

Respondent No.3, Maruti Bhalekar had sworn an affidavit

categorically acknowledging that late Babu Ganpat @ Babu

Ganu Thakare, the predecessor-in-title of the Petitioner, was the

tenant in respect of the subject lands and the Petitioner was the

legal heir of late Babu Ganpat, and that Respondent No. 3 had

no objection to mutate the name of the Petitioner in the Record

of Rights in that capacity. None of the authorities has dealt with

the implications of the said admission.


8.     Thirdly, the ALT and SDO have proceeded on an erroneous

premise that, there were two different death certificates and the

Petitioner failed to establish that Babu Ganpat and Babu Ganu

Thakare were one and the same person and she was the

daughter of Babu Ganpat.

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9.     In opposition to this, Mr.     Vijay Killedar, the learned

Counsel for Respondent Nos.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 to 3.6, would

submit that the authorities under the Act, 1948 have recorded

concurrent findings of fact that the Petitioner failed to establish

that Babu Ganpat and Babu Ganu Thakare were one and the

same person and the Petitioner was the daughter of Babu

Ganpat. Secondly, the authorities on the basis of the objective

material have arrived at a finding that Babu Ganpat was not

cultivating the subject lands on the tiller’s day. Such findings of

fact are not open for interference even in exercise of the

revisional jurisdiction by the MRT, much less in exercise of its

supervisory jurisdiction by this Court in a Petition which assails

the order passed by the MRT. Those findings of fact can neither

be said to be perverse nor contrary to the provisions of the Act,

1948. In substance, there is neither an error of jurisdiction nor

patent illegality in the impugned orders which would warrant

interference in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction.


10.    On the merits of the matter, Mr. Killedar would urge that

the original purported affidavit of deceased Respondent No.2

was never produced before the authorities under the Act, 1948.

Secondly, there is a material discrepancy in the copy of the

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affidavit annexed to the Petition and a copy of the said affidavit

which was served on the contesting Respondents. An inference,

thus, becomes inescapable that the said affidavit is forged and

fabricated.


11.    Thirdly, on the aspect of the identity of Babu Ganpat @

Babu Ganu Thakare, the two death certificates recording

different dates of death of Babu Ganpat erode the credibility of

the claim of the Petitioner that she is the daughter of late Babu

Ganpat. Neither any heirship certificate nor any other document

was placed on record to substantiate the claim of the Petitioner

that she is the daughter of late Babu Ganpat. The failure on the

part of the petitioner to produce even an iota of evidence to

show that the Petitioner ever cultivated the subject lands after

the demise of Babu Ganpat further dents the Petitioner’s claim,

urged Mr. Killedar.


12.    In the backdrop of the aforesaid infirmities in the case of

the Petitioner which stare in the face, the authorities under the

Act, 1948 have justifiably exercised the jurisdiction to make a

declaration that Babu Ganpat was not the tenant in respect of

the subject lands and the Petitioner was not entitled to a

certificate under Section 32G of the Act, 1948.


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13.    I have given careful consideration to the rival submissions

canvassed across the bar. At the outset, it is necessary to note

that the discrepancy in the date of death of Babu Ganpat and

the absence of material to show that Babu Ganpat and the

Petitioner were cultivating the subject lands and paid the

rent/premium to the landlord, predominantly weighed with the

authorities under the Act, 1948, submitted Mr. Killedar.


14.    Since this Petition assails an order passed by the MRT in

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 76 of the Act,

1948, it may be apposite to first appreciate the jurisdictional

constraints of the MRT and this Court in exercise of its writ

jurisdiction against an order passed by the MRT in exercise of

its revisional jurisdiction.


15.    To retain emphasis, and appreciate the contours of the

jurisdictional limitations of the MRT, section 76 is extracted

below :-

        “S.   76   Revision   :   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
        contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939,
        1 an application for revision may be made to the
        [Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal] constituted under
        the said Act against any order of the Collector
        on the following grounds only:


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              (a)   that the order of the Collector was
              contrary to law;
              (b)   that the Collector failed to determine
              some material issue of law; or
              (c)   that there was a substantial defect in
              following the procedure provided by this
              Act, which has resulted in the miscarriage
              of justice.
              …….


16.    From the aforesaid text of Section 76(1) of the Act, 1948, it

becomes abundantly clear that the MRT is a Tribunal of limited

jurisdiction. The grounds on which the MRT may entertain a

challenge to, and if found necessary, interfere with, an order

passed by the Collector have been specifically enumerated in

Clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 76 of the Act,

1948. The revisional jurisdiction of MRT is thus circumscribed

by the express provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 76 of the

Act, 1948.



17.    The distinction between an appellate jurisdiction and a

revisional    jurisdiction   is   well   marked.    In   an     appellate

jurisdiction, ordinarily the Appellate Court /Tribunal has power

to review the evidence and re-appreciate the matter subject to

statutory limitations. In contrast, in exercise of revisional


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jurisdiction, the revisional authority has no power to review,

reweigh and re-appreciate the evidence, unless there is a

specific conferment of such power.


18.    A profitable reference in this context can be made to the

Constitution     Bench     judgment       in     the   case    of    Hindustan

Petroleum Corporation Ltd Vs Dilbahar Singh,1 wherein while

construing the revisional power of the High Court, under the

State Rent Control legislations, the Supreme Court adverted to,

and explained, the distinction between appellate and revisional

jurisdiction. The relevant part of paragraph 28 reads as under:-

       “28. …...Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of
       appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa. Both,
       appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are
       creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an
       inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is
       continuation of suit or original proceedings, as the case
       may be. The power of the appellate court is coextensive
       with   that   of   the   trial   court.   Ordinarily,    appellate
       jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such
       jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that
       provides for the appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand,
       revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate
       jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that
       of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not
       continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the
       aid of Revisional Court is invoked on the revisional side, it

1      (2014) 9 SCC 78.
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       can interfere within the permissible parameters provided
       in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is
       provided        against    an      order         passed      by    the
       Tribunal/appellate        authority,       the    decision    of   the
       Revisional Court is the operative decision in law. In our
       view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional
       jurisdiction,    much     would,    however,       depend     on   the
       language employed by the statute conferring appellate
       jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction.”
                                                        (emphasis supplied)


19.      In the backdrop of the aforesaid exposition of the legal

position, reverting to the aspect of the extent of revisional

jurisdiction of the MRT under Section 76 of the Act of 1948, it is

imperative to note that the legislature has not even vested a

general power of revision in the MRT. On the other hand, the

revisional jurisdiction is restricted to correcting what can

properly be termed as errors of law or substantial defect in

procedure entailing a miscarriage of justice.


20.      While construing the scope and extent of the revisional

powers of the Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act, in the case

of Rahimatulla Rahiman Sarguru vs. Bapu Hari Mane and

another,2 the Supreme Court has held that the powers of

revision entrusted to Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under


2      1979(4) SCC 391.
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Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,

are practically identical with the second appellate power of the

High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

before it was amended by Act 104 of 1976.


21.    The    High   Court   while   exercising   its    supervisory

jurisdiction needs to keep in view the aforesaid jurisdictional

limitations of the MRT and refrain from delving into the factual

disputes. The High Court cannot reweigh and re-appreciate the

evidence adduced before the authorities under the Act, 1948.


22.    In the case of Maruti Bala Raut Vs Dashrath Babu

Wathare and Ors,3 the Supreme Court enunciated that the High

Court while exercising its powers under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India was not entitled to discuss the evidence

and come to its own conclusion on evidence as to who was in

possession of the land. That was a matter for the revenue

authorities and only within the scope of Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, could the High Court interfere.


23.    The contours of writ jurisdiction were illuminatingly

postulated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the




3      AIR 1974 SC 2051.
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case of Rajendra Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and

another,4 as under:

       “85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article
       227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is
       settled law that this power of judicial Superintendence
       must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts
       and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When
       a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High
       Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary
       writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of
       justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under
       Article 227 cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an
       appeal in disguise”.


       86.    In   exercise   of   its   extraordinary   power   of
       superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles
       226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High
       Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of
       law which go to the root of the decision; perversity;
       arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of
       principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and
       usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-
       assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on
       record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ
       jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control
       Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances
       of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court
       cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum,
       just because there is no other provision of appeal in the
       eye of law.”


4      (2019) 20 SCC 143.
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                                         (emphasis supplied)


24.    Keeping in view the aforesaid jurisdictional limitations of

the MRT and this Court, the submissions canvassed on behalf

of the parties deserve to be appreciated.


25.    There is not much controversy between the parties over

the certification of Mutation Entry No. 488 and Mutation Entry

No.620.       The material on record indicates that late Babu

Ganpat’s name was mutated to the Record of Rights of the

subject lands as a protected tenant. The legal implications of

the said mutation entries on the rights of the tenant, under the

protective regime of the Tenancy Acts are at the heart of the

controversy. Whether the developments that have taken place

subsequent to the tiller’s day including the certification of M.E.

No.620 impinge upon the rights of the tenant is the moot

question.




26.    The Mutation Entry No. 488 clearly indicates that on 10 th

September, 1954, the said mutation entry was made, to the

effect that late Babu Ganpat was cultivating the lands bearing

Survey No. 145/4 and 145/7 held by late Balu Pandu Patil as a

Manager of the Joint Hindu Family. Thus, the name of Babu


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Ganpat was mutated in the Record of Rights as a protected

tenant under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939. The said mutation

entry was certified on 28th December, 1954. It implies that late

Babu Ganpat did cultivate the subject lands as a protected

tenant thereof and was, thus, entitled to the protection under

the then prevailing legal regime.


27.    The fulcrum of the Respondents case revolved around the

certification of M.E. No. 620. Evidently, the said mutation entry

was made on 30th January, 1960. It records that Babu Ganpat,

the protected tenant, was cultivating the subject land. However,

since 1955–1956, the landholder Balu Pandu Patil started to

cultivate the subject lands personally. Thus, the name of late

Babu Ganpat came to be deleted from the Record of Rights, and

the name of the landholder Balu Pandu Patil came to be

mutated as the cultivator thereof. The said mutation entry was

certified on 24th September, 1960.


28.    Incontrovertibly, M.E. No. 620 records in clear and

unequivocal terms that Babu Ganpat was cultivating the

subject land as a protected tenant thereof and since 1955–1956,

the late Babu Ganpat ceased to cultivate the subject land.

Interestingly, the said mutation entry was made on 30 th

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January, 1960; almost three years after the tiller’s day. Could

the rights of the protected tenant be defeated by effecting the

mutation entry post tiller’s day was thus the core question to be

determined by the authorities under the Act, 1948.


29.    At this stage, the provisions of the Act, 1948 as regards

the "protected tenant" assume significance. Section 2(18) of the

Act, 1948 defines a "tenant" as under:

        “2(18)       "tenant" means a person who holds land on lease
        and include,
        (a)      a person who is deemed to be a tenant under section 4;
        (b)      a person who is a protected tenant; and
        (c)      a person who is a permanent tenant;
        and the word             "landlord"      shall     be   construed
        accordingly.”


30.      Sub-section (14) of Section 2, in turn, defines "protected

tenant" as under:

        “2(14)     “Protected tenant” means a person who is recognized
        to be a protected tenant under Section 4A;”



31.     Section 4A reads as under:

        “4A. Protected tenants.- For the purposes of this Act, a
        person shall be recognized to be a protected tenant, if
        such person has been deemed to be a protected tenant
        under sections 3, 3A and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act,
        1939, referred to in Schedule I to this Act.”



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32.    Section 89(1) provides that the enactment specified in

Schedule-I was thereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the

fourth column thereof. Schedule-I repealed the Bombay Tenancy

Act, 1939, except Sections 3, 3A and 4 as modified in the

manner enumerated in the fourth column. Sections 3, 3A, and 4

define who shall be deemed to be a ‘protected tenant’. Section

3A, inter alia, provides that the tenants on expiry of one year

from the coming into force of the Bom. XXVI of 1946 to be

deemed protected tenants. It further provides that, every tenant

shall, from the eighth day of November, 1947, be deemed to be a

protected tenant for the purposes of that Act and his rights as

such protected tenant shall be recorded in the Record of Rights,

unless his landlord has prior to the aforesaid date made an

application to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the tenant is

not a protected tenant.



33.    The certification of Mutation Entry No. 488 is thus

required to be construed in the light of the aforesaid provisions,

which define a protected tenant. The entry in the Record of

Rights as a protected tenant, therefore, cannot be construed as

inconsequential or immaterial. Section 32, which envisages the

deemed purchase of land by a tenant provides that, on the


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tiller’s day i.e. 1st April, 1957, every tenant shall, subject to the

other provisions of that section and the provisions of the next

succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his

landlord, free from all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the

said day, the land held by him as tenant, if the conditions

prescribed therein are satisfied.


34.    Thus under Section 32, by operation of law, every tenant

of the agricultural land governed by the Act, 1948 becomes the

owner thereof. The law declares him to be a deemed purchaser

on the tiller’s day, without any act on his part. Conversely, the

landlord is divested of the title to the agricultural land. The

landlord's title passes to the tenant on the tiller’s day,

statutorily and instantaneously. Although, the title which

passes to the tenant may be displaced if the purchase is

declared ineffective on account of the subsequent default on the

part of the tenant, yet, it is incontestable that if the tenant is

cultivating the land on the tiller’s day, the landlord's interest in

such land gets extinguished as a result of the statutory sale.


35.    A profitable reference in this context can be made to the

Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case




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of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay 5, wherein the

the law was exposited as under:

         “41. ……. The title of the landlord to the land passes
         immediately to the tenant on the tiller's day and there is a
         completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord
         and the tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus
         penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not
         willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails
         to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to
         purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing
         declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land
         and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a
         declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes
         ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the
         purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tiller's day
         and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the
         tenant then being the payment of price in the mode
         determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in
         the payment of such price either in lump or by installments as
         determined by the Tribunal, S. 32M declares the purchase to
         be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the
         disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the
         manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to
         be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is
         committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase
         or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title
         to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes
         to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period
         prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the
         event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement
         that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing
         default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the


5      AIR 1959 Supreme Court 459.
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         Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land
         defeasible only in either of those cases and it cannot therefore
         be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for
         any period definite or indefinite. If that is so, there is an
         extinguishment or in any event a modification of the landlord's
         right in the estate well within the meaning of those words as
         used in Art. 31A(1)(a).”

                                                     (emphasis supplied)



36.    Following the aforesaid pronouncement in the case of

Amrit Bhikaji Kale and others vs. Kashinath Janardhan Trade

and another6, the Supreme Court enunciated the law as under:

        “6.   The Tenancy Act was comprehensively amended by
        Amending Act 15 of 1957. The amendment brought in a
        revolutionary measure of agrarian reforms making tiller of the
        soil the owner of the land. This was done to achieve the object
        of removing all intermediaries between tillers of the soil and the
        State. Sec. 32 provides that by mere operation of law, every
        tenant of agricultural land situated in the area to which the Act
        applies shall become by the operation of law, the owner thereof.
        He is declared to be a deemed purchaser without anything
        more on his part. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sri
        Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay (1959 Supp 1 SCR
        489) held that:

        [extracted above]

        Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers'
        day, the landlord's interest in the land gets extinguished and
        simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by
        the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or
        created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant


6      (1983) 3 Supreme Court Cases 437.
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        relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of
        Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken.
        The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that
        ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the
        tiller    of   the      soil   becomes     the   owner    thereof   This   is
        unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statutory sale is
        only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the
        Tribunal u/s 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be
        landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and
        comes in direct contact with the State. Without any act of
        transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and
        is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the
        deemed purchaser. ….”

                                                             (emphasis supplied)




37.    The MRT was thus required to pose unto itself the

question         as    to       whether     late     Babu        Ganpat,     who        was

unquestionably              a    protected       tenant,    became      the     deemed

purchaser of the subject land on the tiller’s day? Whether the

mutation entry certified in the year 1960 to the effect that the

protected tenant ceased to be the tenant since the year 1955–

1956 was sufficient to defeat the right of the protected tenant?

38.    Instead of determining aforesaid pertinent questions, the

MRT proceeded to delve into the thicket of facts in regard to the

discrepancy in the death certificate of Babu Ganpat, the

absence of material to show that the petitioner was the

daughter of late Babu Ganpat, and also to show that the

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petitioner     personally   cultivated   the   subject   lands.   These

questions, in the facts of the case, would assume subsidiary

character if it is found that the rights of the protected tenants

could not be defeated by certification of a mutation entry after

almost three years of the tiller’s day. If Babu Ganpat was found

to be in the cultivation of the subject lands on the tiller’s day,

the entire complexion of the dispute materially changes.

39.    Since the MRT has not examined this crucial aspect of the

matter, this Court considers it appropriate to remit the matter

back to the MRT for a fresh decision on the question, whether

the protected tenancy of late Babu Ganpat could be defeated by

certification of the Mutation Entry deleting the name of the

protected tenant from the Record of Rights of the subject lands

after three years of the tiller’s day.

40.    Hence, the following order :-

                               ::ORDER::

        (i)    The Petition stands partly allowed.

        (ii)   .The impugned order passed by the MRT in

        Revision Application No. TNC/REV/THN/223/2022

        stands quashed and set aside.

        (iii) The Revision Application stands remitted back

        and restored to the file of MRT for afresh hearing and

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        disposal in accordance with law after providing an

        opportunity      of   hearing   to    the   parties,   as

        expeditiously as possible and, preferably, within a

        period of six months from the date fixed for the

        appearance of the parties before the MRT.

        (iv) The parties shall appear before the MRT on 7 th

        September 2026. No fresh notice need be issued to

        the parties for appearance before the MRT.

        (v) Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms.

        (vi) No costs.


                                             [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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