HIROO ADVANIversusDAVID VEDNAYAGAM RAJA

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                   AGK
                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                 WRIT PETITION NO.12993 OF 2022

                   Hiroo Advani, Age 73 years,
                   Advocate, Supreme Court of India,
                   10, Thakur Niwas, Level-2,
                   173, J. Tata Road, Mumbai 400 020              … Petitioner
                                       Vs.
                   David Vednayagam Raja,
                   C/o. Shri Waman Shivram Keni,
                   Shivram Pandurang Bhandari Chawl,
                   M.G. Road, Charkop Village,
                   Kandivali (West), Mumbai 400 067               … Respondent
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI                                     WITH
Digitally signed                 WRIT PETITION NO.13031 OF 2022
by ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.04.30   Hiroo Advani, Age 73 years,
11:50:27 +0530
                   Advocate, Supreme Court of India,
                   10, Thakur Niwas, Level-2,
                   173, J. Tata Road, Mumbai 400 020              … Petitioner
                                       Vs.
                   Waman Shivram Keni,
                   Shivram Pandurang Bhandari Chawl,
                   M.G. Road, Charkop Village,
                   Kandivali (West), Mumbai 400 067               … Respondent


                   Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi with Mr. Vishwabhushan Kamble,
                   Mr. Shaikh Yusuf Ali, and Mr. Mulanshu Vora, for the
                   petitioners in both the writ petitions.
                   Mr. Narendra R. Kolte for the respondent in both the
                   writ petitions.




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                  CORAM                 : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                  RESERVED ON           : APRIL 17, 2026.

                  PRONOUNCED ON         : APRIL 30, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.   By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the
legality and correctness of the order dated 22 June 2022 passed by
the Industrial Court at Bandra, Mumbai in Revision Application
(ULP) Nos. 30 and 31 of 2021.

2.   The factual background, in brief, indicates that the
respondent had initially instituted Complaint (ULP) No.1539 of
1998 before the Industrial Court at Mumbai alleging commission
of unfair labour practices and seeking recovery of arrears which,
according to the respondent, were agreed to be paid by the
management of M/s Usha Offset Printers Pvt. Ltd. pursuant to a
settlement dated 10 March 1998. It was the case of the respondent
that under the said settlement, the company had undertaken to
pay the arrears within a stipulated period of 30 days. However,
despite such undertaking, the payment was not effected, and
instead the company allegedly sought repeated extensions from
the union on one pretext or another. It is further the case of the
respondent that the company itself had instituted Complaint (ULP)
No. 1439 of 1998, which ultimately came to be dismissed. The
respondent has further alleged that thereafter the company
declared a lockout with effect from 25 November 1998, compelling
the union to file Complaint (ULP) No. 539 of 1998. The said



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complaint culminated in an ex parte order dated 21 February 2004
passed by the Labour Court in favour of the respondent.

3.    It appears that thereafter, on 17 February 2005, the
respondent instituted Miscellaneous Criminal Complaint (ULP) No.
18 of 2005 before the 6th Labour Court at Mumbai alleging breach
of the aforesaid order dated 21 February 2004. A perusal of the
complaint, however, would indicate that there is no specific
averment as to the role of the present petitioner in the alleged
non-compliance. The complaint does not disclose as to how the
petitioner could be termed as a necessary or proper party, nor does
it set out any material particulars indicating that the petitioner was
under any legal obligation to ensure compliance with the order of
the Industrial Court. The mere fact that the petitioner was at some
point of time associated with the company as a director, by itself,
would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability in the absence of
specific pleadings showing his involvement in the day-to-day
affairs or responsibility for compliance with the order in question.
The foundational requirement of attributing responsibility has not
been satisfied in the complaint. The petitioner had ceased to be a
director of the said company with effect from 9 December 2001,
which is a date prior to the passing of the order dated 21 February
2004. This aspect assumes significance inasmuch as the alleged
breach pertains to a period subsequent to the petitioner’s
resignation,   thereby   raising   a   serious    doubt      as    to    the
maintainability of proceedings against him.

4.    The record further indicates that on 28 March 2005, the
Labour Court, Mumbai took cognizance of the complaint and



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issued process against the petitioner. Thereafter, the proceedings
appear to have progressed at a considerably later stage, with the
respondent filing a compilation of documents on 19 January 2019
and an affidavit of evidence on 26 April 2019. Even in the said
affidavit, there is a conspicuous absence of any averment
demonstrating that the petitioner falls within the definition of
“employer” under the Act or that he was in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the
relevant time. Despite such absence of foundational pleadings, the
Labour Court proceeded to direct the petitioner to appear and
record his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.

5.    The petitioner thereafter invoked the revisional jurisdiction
of the Industrial Court under Section 44 of the Act by filing
Revision Application No. 30 of 2021. The Industrial Court,
however, by the impugned order dated 22 June 2022, dismissed
the revision application without properly appreciating the legal
position governing the maintainability of such revision and
without due consideration of the issue of limitation. The order
does not reflect a proper application of mind to the settled
principles governing exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

6.    Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi, learned counsel for the petitioner has
contended that the petitioner was not a party to the original
proceedings, namely Complaint (ULP) No.1539 of 1998, and
therefore the subsequent criminal complaint is not maintainable
against him. It is submitted that in criminal law, vicarious liability
cannot be presumed in the absence of a specific statutory



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provision. In the absence of any averment or material to show that
the petitioner was personally responsible for the alleged breach,
the continuation of criminal proceedings would be unsustainable.
It is further submitted that no period of limitation is prescribed for
invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 44 of the MRTU and
PULP Act. It is further urged that neither in the complaint nor in
the affidavit of evidence has the respondent made any statement
to establish that the petitioner answers the description of an
“employer” within the meaning of the Act or that he was in charge
of the day-to-day affairs of the company. Reliance is placed on the
decision in Dipak Ray v. Mafatlal Engineering Employees' Union,
(1995) 2 Mah LJ 149 to contend that in the absence of such
foundational pleadings, criminal proceedings under Section 48 of
the Act cannot be sustained against a person who was not a party
to the original proceedings and against whom no specific role is
attributed.

7.      Per contra, Mr. Narendra Kolte, learned counsel for the
respondent has submitted that the respondent had duly served a
compliance letter dated 11 March 2004 upon all the accused,
including the petitioner, both by hand delivery and through an
advocate. It is contended that despite receipt of the said
communication, the accused failed to comply with the order dated
21 February 2004, thereby necessitating initiation of criminal
proceedings. It is further submitted that the Labour Court, upon
being satisfied that a prima facie case was made out, rightly issued
process against the accused persons by order dated 28 March
2005.



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8.    It is also contended on behalf of the respondent that the
revision application preferred by the petitioner was grossly
belated,   having     been   filed   after   an    inordinate       delay     of
approximately 16 years from the date of issuance of process. It is
submitted that the petitioner did not file any application seeking
condonation of delay nor did he furnish any satisfactory
explanation for such delay. According to the respondent, the
revision application was thus liable to be rejected on the ground of
delay alone. It is further alleged that the petitioner has abused the
process of law, and on these grounds, dismissal of the present writ
petition is sought.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

9.    Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having
perused the record placed before this Court, this Court is of the
view that the present petition does not deserve interference. The
reason is not found in the merits, but in the gross delay with which
the petitioner has approached the revisional forum and thereafter
this Court. The challenge is directed against the order dated 28
March 2005 by which process was issued against the petitioner in
Miscellaneous Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 18 of 2005, yet the
petitioner chose to file Revision Application No. 30 of 2021 after a
lapse of about sixteen years.

10.   The factual background is not in serious dispute. The
respondent had earlier obtained an order dated 21 February 2004
in Complaint (ULP) No. 539 of 1998. The respondent thereafter
initiated Miscellaneous Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 18 of 2005




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alleging breach of that order. The Labour Court issued process on
28 March 2005. The petitioner did not challenge the said order
within a reasonable time. He did not place before the Court any
satisfactory explanation. The record does not disclose any
circumstance    which       prevented   him     from      approaching        the
revisional court earlier.

11.   The petitioner has tried to contend that Section 44 of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act does not prescribe any period of limitation
and therefore the revision could not have been rejected on the
ground of delay. This submission cannot be disputed. There may be
no statutory limitation under Section 44. But the absence of a
limitation does not mean that a party may sleep over its rights for
years together and then seek exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The
doctrine of delay and laches still operates. A litigant who
approaches the Court after an unreasonable delay cannot claim
relief because the statute does not fix a limit. The Court must
examine whether the delay is such that it renders the claim stale.
In the present matter, the answer is clearly in the affirmative.

12.   The respondent has rightly pointed out that the revision was
preferred after about sixteen years from the date of issuance of
process. That fact is sufficient to create doubt about the
maintainability of the challenge. It is not even a case where a brief
delay required a liberal approach. The delay is extraordinary. No
specific and cogent grounds were shown. There is no sufficient
cause on record.




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13.      The petitioner has sought to argue that he was not a party to
the original complaint and that the criminal complaint itself was
not maintainable against him. That argument may have had some
substance if it had been raised at the proper time. But when the
petitioner allows the process to remain unchallenged for such a
long duration, he cannot later insist that the Court should ignore
the delay altogether.

14.      The respondent has also submitted that the petitioner had
participated in the affairs of the company and that the complaint
and affidavit asserted his role. Whether those submissions would
succeed on merits is not the issue at this stage. What is material is
that the petitioner permitted the proceedings to remain pending
for more than a decade and a half. On this ground alone, the Court
is not inclined to reopen the matter.

15.      It is necessary to notice that the Industrial Court also took
the view that the revision application was belated. This Court finds
no perversity in that approach. The revisional court was justified in
holding that the petitioner had approached it after a inordinate
delay.

16.      The submission of the petitioner that there is no limitation
under Section 44 therefore does not carry the matter further. This
Court is not holding that every delayed revision must fail only
because it is late. The Court is holding that where the delay is so
enormous and the explanation is absent, the Court would be
justified in refusing to entertain the challenge. In the present case,
the petitioner has not been able to offer any reason for the long




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interval between the issuance of process and the filing of the
revision. The petition therefore suffers from the vice of laches in its
strongest form.

17.   For all these reasons, this Court is satisfied that the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches
alone.

18.   In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, the following order is passed:

19.   The judgment and order dated 22 June 2022 passed by the
Industrial Court at Bandra, Mumbai in Revision Application (ULP)
No. 30 of 2021 is upheld.

20.   Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

                                               (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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