Bombay High Court
RAMU LAXMAN PAWDE DECD THRU LRSversusTHE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, PUNE DIST. PUNE AND ORS
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The petition is barred by delay and laches and is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Summary
The petitioner, a project‑affected person of the Chaskaman Irrigation Project, sought an order directing the Deputy Collector to allot him an alternate house under the rehabilitation scheme. He filed the application more than three decades after the land acquisition, claiming that his predecessor had been displaced. The High Court observed that the cause of action arose in 1987 and that the petitioner had offered no explanation for the 35‑year delay, rendering the claim stale. Citing the Tatoba Rama Chavan case and the Supreme Court’s observations in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining, the Court held that the petition was barred by principles of delay and laches. Consequently, the petition was summarily dismissed without costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a writ petition filed under Article 226 is maintainable when the cause of action arose more than three decades earlier.
- Whether the doctrine of delay and laches bars the petitioner’s claim for alternate land allotment.
- Whether the court can issue a direction to consider a stale representation in a land‑rehabilitation matter.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- delay
- laches
- Article 226
- writ petition
- project affected persons
- land acquisition
- alternate land allotment
- rehabilitation act
- stale claim
Judgment
Digitally
signed by
PRAJAKTA
PRAJAKTA SAGAR
SAGAR VARTAK 5WP-16555-23.DOC
VARTAK Date:
2026.01.13
15:11:16
+0530
Prajakta Vartak
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.16555 OF 2023
Ramu Laxman Pawde Decd. Thr. LR. ...Petitioner
vs.
The District Collector, Pune & Ors. ...Respondents
_______
Mr. Nitin P. Deshpande with Mr. Santosh P. Kurade, for Petitioner.
Ms. Neha Bhide, Govt. Pleader with Ms. Shruti D. Vyas, Addl. Govt. Pleader with
Ms. M. S. Bane, AGP for the State.
_______
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
AARTI SATHE, JJ.
DATE: 8 JANUARY, 2026
P.C.
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed praying
for the following reliefs:-
“A. this Hon’ble Court may, by an appropriate writ, order or
direction, direct the Deputy Collector, Rehabilitation, Pune & Sub-
Divisional Officer, Shirur, to process the Petitioner’s application and allot
house alternate house a Plot No.73 out of Gat No.1181/2/1 at Wadav
Bk, Gavthan, Tal. Shirur, Dist. Pune as prayed for, if the Petitioner is
entitled to get alternate land as prayed for within a period of three weeks
from the date of order of this Hon’ble Court.”
2. The petitioner claims to be a project affected person of the Chaskaman
Irrigation Project, hence he was entitled to allotment of an alternate house. The
petitioner states that he filed an application for allotment of an alternate house to
the competent authority, which according to him, has not yet been processed.
Hence, this petition is filed. It is, however, quite surprising to note that the alleged
cause of action has arisen in the year 1987. The petitioner himself contends that
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his predecessor was displaced and not the petitioner, as the acquisition pertained to
the predecessor’s house. After a gap of about 35 years, the petitioner made an
application for allotment of an alternate house stating that he has not received any
house anywhere in the State.
3. We have perused the memo of the petition. The petitioner is pursuing such
cause after a delay of about 35 years, and that too a cause of action, which
according to the petitioner, had occurred to his predecessors, as clearly seen from
the memo of the petition. The petitioner has also failed to provide any explanation
for such gross delay and laches so as to persuade us to entertain this petition in
respect of a cause of action which had arisen to the petitioner about 35 years ago.
We are also not sure as to whether the petitioner was even a major at the time when
the land acquisition took place.
4. In this view of the matter, as the petition being hopelessly barred by the
principles of delay and laches, it cannot be entertained. The law in such context
was considered by this Court in dismissing similar proceedings in Tatoba Rama
Chavan (since deceased) through his legal heir Taramati Tatoba Chavan,v/s.
Collector, Kolhapur District, Kolhapur & Ors. (Civil Writ Petition No. 3883 of
2022), which in our opinion, clearly becomes applicable. In Tatoba Rama Chavan
(supra) the Court made following observations where the same cause of action of
such dead claim was being pursued:-
“8. The Petitioner in the present petition is blissfully silent on
several basic requirements for her to maintain this petition. She has not
made any averments as to whether any occupancy price was paid by the
Petitioner's father and any other preconditions required for grant of land
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were complied with. The process of acquisition is over in the year 1983
itself. In the absence of the same, coupled with the fact of no explanation
for the delay, it cannot be said that the Petitioner as made out even a
prima facie case. On the contrary, it appears on the face of it a dead/stale
claim is sought to be revived by filing the present petition.
9. We have come across some proceedings where, as a matter of
course, the petitioners whose land was acquired ages back like in the
present case. It appears to be a tendency to approach this Court seeking
orders that their belated representations be considered. We may observe
that when such petitioners have no legal rights, they cannot invoke equity
or sympathy that they are project affected persons. This more particularly
as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs although may be equitable
jurisdiction, however, the same is on a foundation of an existing and a live
claim on which a litigant may seek a relief on a grievance of infringement
of any of his legal rights. If what is being canvassed by the petitioners is
accepted, it would result in the Court acting contrary to the mandate of
law in issuing directions to the Government to re-open dead cases and
make allotment of lands irrespective of the statutory scheme under the
enactment, which was prevalent at the relevant point of time and as noted
by us above. In our considered opinion, a loud and clear message has to
go to such litigants who in fact attempt to abuse the process of law to
approach the Court in belated claims. The present case is one such classic
example of such dead claim being pursued. The only consequence is that
such petitions are required to be, at the threshold, kept away from
crowding the Courts, as they are clearly an abuse of the process of law.
10. Thus, in our view, the present petition is not maintainable under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioner has approached
this Court after an inordinate delay of almost 38 years from the date of
the land having being acquired. The petitioner has not bothered to
explain the delay of almost 37 years in making an application in the year
2020 to enforce the award passed in the year 1983. Even if the year 1999,
when the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999,
came into existence is considered, even then the petitioner's application
dated 17th January 2020 seeking allotment of the land is filed after a
period of more than 20 years and there is no explanation for the delay of
20 years. In our view, as the petition is filed after gross delay and laches
and such a Petitioner, who slept over his/her rights for almost three
decades, cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so, when there is no
averment in the petition explaining the delay.
11. In the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining, the
Supreme Court have observed in para 6 as under:
“6. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is
terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the
termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000,
he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such
challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of
delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the
ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High
Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he
gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to
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5WP-16555-23.DOC
service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying
such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of
this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition
before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the
employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The
Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such
applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the
other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a
direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The
courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen
deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a
mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does
not involve any ‘decision’ on rights and obligations of parties.
Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to
‘consider’. If the representation is considered and accepted, the
ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on
account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to
‘consider’. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-
employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to
the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection
of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A
prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and
for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The
Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such
applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the
representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and
grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets
obliterated or ignored.
7. Every representation to the government for relief, may
not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters
which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected
on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim.
……..
8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to
consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee
(person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the
impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When
an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or
representation, in compliance with direction of the court or
tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor
amount to some kind of ‘acknowledgment of a jural relationship’
to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
*****
10. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the
issue only to emphasize the need for circumspection and care in
issuing directions for ‘consideration’. If the representation is on
the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that
it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing
‘consideration’ of such claims.””
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5. The petition is accordingly summarily dismissed. However, we refrain from
imposing any costs.
(AARTI SATHE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.)
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