AJAY JAGAN VYAWHAREversusTHE SECRETARY URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS

2026:BHC-AUG:13852-DB




                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                               BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                               WRIT PETITION NO. 1891 OF 2026

                 Ajay s/o Jagan Vyawhare,
                 Age : 39 years, Occu: Engineer,
                 R/o : Jijamata Shikshan Colony,
                 Fateepur Road, Behind Panchayat Samiti,
                 Tal : Bhokardan, Dist. : Jalna.                -----PETITIONER

                                          VERSUS

           1.    The Secretary,
                 Urban Development Department,
                 4th Floor,Madam Cama Road,
                 Hutatma Rajguru Marg,
                 Mumbai-400032

           2.    The Commissioner and Director,
                 Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats,
                 Administration Directorate,
                 Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation Building,
                 7th Floor, Belapur Bhavan,
                 CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400 614.

           3.    The Additional Commissioner,
                 Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats,
                 Administration Directorate,
                 Navi Mumbai Municipal Corporation Building,
                 7th Floor, Belapur Bhavan,
                 CBD Belapur, Navi Mumbai – 400 614.

           4.    The Collector,
                 Aurangabad

           5.    The Chief Officer,
                 Gangapur Municipal Council,
                 Dist. Chh. Sambhajinagar                       ----RESPONDENTS

           Ms. Preeti R. Wankhede, Advocate for petitioner
           Ms. Neha B. Kamble, AGP for respondent Nos. 1 to 4




           WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                 1 of 13
                                 CORAM : Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi &
                                         Hiten S. Venegavkar, JJ.
                                 DATE      : 24th March, 2026

JUDGMENT (PER : Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.) :-

1.           Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.



2.          Heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned

AGP for the respondents. With the consent of the learned counsel

appearing for the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal at the

stage of admission.



3.          The present petition is instituted for quashing and setting

aside the order dated 24.12.2025 issued by respondent No.2, the

Commissioner and Director of Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats,

whereby a de novo departmental inquiry has been directed against the

petitioner and a new Inquiry Officer has been appointed. The petitioner

asserts that he possesses the degree of Bachelor of Engineering in

Mechanical Engineering and has been in the service of the Urban

Development Department since 18.05.2013, as Water Supply and

Sanitation Engineer. At present he is posted at Municipal Council,

Bhokardan, District Jalna. According to the petitioner, while he was

serving in the office of the Chief Officer, Gangapur Municipal Council,

certain allegations of misconduct and financial irregularities came to be

raised against him in the year 2020. The matter was thereafter pursued



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                      2 of 13
at the departmental level. A preliminary inquiry was directed. Separate

preliminary      inquiry    reports,    along    with    a    draft    charge-sheet    for

departmental       proceedings         under    the     Maharashtra       Civil   Services

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (for short “1979 Rules”), were

submitted on 16.06.2023. On that basis, a memorandum of charge dated

17.08.2023 came to be served upon the petitioner containing three

charges. It is the case of the petitioner that the inquiry thereafter

proceeded to its conclusion and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report

to the competent authority. However, without furnishing a copy of that

report to the petitioner, and without first taking a decision thereon in the

manner known to law, respondent No.2 passed the impugned order

dated 24.12.2025 directing a de novo inquiry by appointing another

Inquiry   Officer.    The     petitioner   submitted         a     representation   dated

06.01.2026 seeking a copy of the earlier inquiry report, but the same

was not supplied. Thereafter, the newly appointed Inquiry Officer issued

notice dated 04.02.2026 calling upon the petitioner to appear in the

fresh inquiry.



4.            The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that once a

regular departmental inquiry was lawfully conducted pursuant to the

charge    memorandum          dated      17.08.2023,         and    had   culminated    in

submission of an inquiry report, the disciplinary authority could not have

simply brushed aside that report and ordered a de novo inquiry on the



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                                   3 of 13
very same charges by appointing a new Inquiry Officer. It was urged that

such a course is alien to Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules. According to the

submission, Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules permits the disciplinary authority to

consider the inquiry record, accept the findings, or disagree with the

findings by recording reasons; and, in an appropriate case, remit the

matter for further inquiry. However, it does not authorize commencement

of a second inquiry from the beginning on the same charge-sheet merely

because the authority is dissatisfied with the report already received. The

learned Advocate further submitted that the petitioner was entitled, at

the least, to be furnished the inquiry report and the tentative reasons of

disagreement before any adverse step could be taken, since otherwise

he would be deprived of the opportunity to meet the reasoning which

weighed with the disciplinary authority. Reliance was placed on K.R. Deb

v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447, the

judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Rajesh Chaudhary v. State of

U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 4781, and the judgment of this Court in

Nityanand Gajanand Patil v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition

No.1135 of 2016, decided on 4 July 2018, reported at 2018(4) All MR

865.



5.          The learned AGP, on the other hand, submitted that the

petitioner has placed an unduly restrictive construction upon Rule 9 of

the 1979 Rules. According to her, once the inquiry report reached the



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                    4 of 13
disciplinary authority, it was open to the authority to take appropriate

action upon finding that the report was unsatisfactory or that the inquiry

had not properly dealt with the charges. She urged that the expression

used in the impugned order should not be construed with undue

technicality and that the substance of the decision is that the disciplinary

authority was not satisfied with the first inquiry, and therefore, decided

that the matter should proceed further. She further submitted that there

is no violation of natural justice because after the new Inquiry Officer

entered upon the inquiry, notice was issued to the petitioner and the

petitioner has, in fact, participated by filing a reply. It was therefore,

contended that the challenge is belated and deserves rejection.



6.          Having considered the rival submissions, the controversy lies

in a narrow compass. The principal question is whether, after an inquiry

under Rule 8 has been concluded and an inquiry report has been

submitted, the disciplinary authority can, without first acting upon that

report in accordance with Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules, direct a de novo

inquiry on the same charges by appointing a new Inquiry Officer.



7.          For answering that issue, Rule 9 of the Maharashtra Civil

Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 which reads as follows -

         9. Action on the inquiry report – (1) The disciplinary
         authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may,
         for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                      5 of 13
         case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and
         report, and the inquiring authority shall thereupon
         proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the
         provisions of Rule 8 of these rules as far as may be.

         (2) The disciplinary authority shall forward or cause
         to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if
         any, held by the disciplinary authority or where the
         disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority, a
         copy of the report of the inquiring authority together
         with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any,
         with the findings of inquiring authority on any article of
         charge to the Government servant who shall be
         required to submit, if he so desires, his written
         representation on submission to the disciplinary
         authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether
         the report is favourable or not to the said Government
         servant.

         (2-A) The disciplinary authority shall consider the
         representation, if any, submitted by the Government
         servant and record its findings before proceeding
         further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (3) and
         (4).

         (3) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its
         findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the
         opinion that any of the minor penalties should be
         imposed on the Government servant, it shall,
         notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 10 of these
         rules on the basis of the evidence adduced during the
         inquiry held under Rule 8 determine what penalty, if
         any, should be imposed on the Government servant and
         make an order imposing such penalty :
               Provided that, in every case where it is necessary
         to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry
         shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the
         Commission for its advice, and such advice shall be
         taken into consideration before making any order
         imposing any penalty on the Government servant.

         (4) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its
         findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on


WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                     6 of 13
          the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is
          of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in
          clauses (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5, should be
          imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an
          order imposing such penalty and it shall not be
          necessary to give the Government servant any
          opportunity of making representation on the penalty
          proposed to be imposed;

                Provided that, in every case where it is necessary
          to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry
          shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the
          Commission for its advice, and such advice shall be
          taken into consideration before making an order
          imposing any such penalty on the Government servant.


8.             The statutory scheme is, therefore, clear. Once an inquiry

report is submitted, the disciplinary authority has to deal with that

report. The Rules contemplate three distinct stages. First, under Rule 9

(1) of the 1979 Rules, where further inquiry is considered necessary, the

matter may be remitted to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and

report, for reasons recorded in writing. Secondly, under Rule 9(2) of the

1979 Rules, the disciplinary authority must consider the inquiry report

and record its findings on each charge, and if it disagrees with the

Inquiry Officer, it must record reasons for such disagreement and the

disciplinary    authority   shall   forward   the   copy   of   the   report   of

disagreement, if any, to the Delinquent Officer. Then the Delinquent

Officer shall submit his written representation to the authority within 15

days. The copy of the report shall be forwarded irrespective of whether

the report is favorable or not and the Delinquent Officer shall be given an



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                         7 of 13
opportunity of being heard. Thirdly, after such consideration of the

representation as per rule 9 (2-A) of the 1979 Rules, the authority

proceeds to the stage of penalty in accordance with Rule 9(3) or Rule

9(4) of the 1979 Rules, as the case may be. The Rules do not envisage

that a concluded inquiry report may be ignored as though it never

existed and that an entirely new inquiry may be commenced afresh on

the same charges by merely appointing another Inquiry Officer.


9.          This position stands fortified by authority. In K. R. Deb

(supra), the Supreme Court, while construing Rule 15 of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, held that the rule did

not contemplate successive inquiries and that, if there had been some

serious defect in the inquiry or some important witnesses had not been

examined for valid reasons, the disciplinary authority could ask the

Inquiry Officer to record further evidence, but not direct a fresh inquiry

by another officer merely because it was dissatisfied with the result. That

judgment has consistently been treated as laying down the principle that

service jurisprudence does not countenance repeated inquiries on the

same charge-sheet in the absence of statutory authority.



10.         Equally important is the law governing disagreement with an

exonerating or otherwise favorable inquiry report. In Punjab National

Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84, the Supreme Court held




WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                    8 of 13
that when the disciplinary authority differs from the conclusions of the

Inquiry Officer, the delinquent employee must be given an opportunity to

represent against the tentative reasons for disagreement before the

disciplinary authority records its own final findings. Yoginath D. Bagde

vs. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739, which arose directly in

the context of Rule 9(2) of the 1979 Rules of the Maharashtra Rules,

reiterates that the requirement of hearing in consonance with natural

justice must be read into Rule 9(2) of the 1979 Rules before the

disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry

Officer. That principle has been reiterated in later decisions as well,

including Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd., (2006) 9 SCC 440.



11.         This Court has also followed the same principle. In Dr.

Vandan s/o Krushnarao Mohod v. Dr. Panjabrao Deshmukh Krishi

Vidyapeeth, 2016(5) All MR 244, the Nagpur Bench held that the

delinquent must be afforded an opportunity to meet the adverse findings

in the inquiry report and that giving an opportunity only on the question

of punishment is not enough. In Nityanand Gajanand Patil (supra), a

Division Bench of this Court was considering an order rejecting an

exonerating report and directing a de novo inquiry under the 1979 Rules.

The Court held that even if the Rules do not expressly spell out a pre-

decisional hearing in those exact terms, compliance with natural justice

has to be read into the process when the disciplinary authority proposes



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                  9 of 13
to disagree with the Inquiry Officer and proceed adversely against the

employee.



12.         The persuasive value of the Allahabad High Court judgment

in Rajesh Chaudhary (supra) lies in the same direction. It recognizes

the general principle that ordinarily, there can be only one inquiry in

respect of a particular misconduct, and that fresh proceedings on the

same charge become permissible where the earlier proceedings are first

found defective in law and are set aside on technical or procedural

grounds. That principle does not aid the respondents here, because in

the present case the earlier inquiry report was not set aside by any

competent forum, nor was any defect in the earlier inquiry identified and

dealt with in the manner contemplated by the Rules.



13.         Tested on the anvil of the above statutory scheme and

precedents, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the form in which

it is issued. The order dated 24.12.2025 uses the expression “de novo

inquiry” and appoints a fresh Inquiry Officer. That course suffers from

two fundamental infirmities. First, it bypasses the existing inquiry report

altogether. The disciplinary authority could not ignore the already

submitted report and straightaway commence a second inquiry on the

same articles of charge. Secondly, no material is shown that the

petitioner was supplied the earlier inquiry report together with the




WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                   10 of 13
reasons why the disciplinary authority proposed not to accept it. If the

disciplinary authority was dissatisfied with the report, the law required it

to adopt the route recognized by Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules; either remit

the matter for further inquiry under Rule 9(1) of the 1979 Rules, or

record tentative reasons for disagreement under Rule 9(2) of the 1979

Rules, furnish the report and reasons to the petitioner, consider his

representation as contemplated by the current structure of Rule 9 of the

1979 Rules, and only thereafter proceed further. What it could not do

was to start from the beginning by appointing another officer to hold a

fresh inquiry on the same charge memorandum.



14.         The argument of the respondents that the petitioner has

participated before the newly appointed Inquiry Officer also does not

cure the defect. Participation in proceedings initiated pursuant to an

order ex facie beyond the scope of the governing rule does not validate

the original illegality. The challenge in the present case goes not to some

procedural irregularity in the subsequent hearing, but to the competence

of the authority to direct a de novo inquiry in the first place without first

acting on the earlier report according to Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules .



15.         At the same time, we are          unable to accept the wider

submission on behalf of the petitioner that once an inquiry report is

submitted, the disciplinary authority is bound either to accept it or to get




WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                      11 of 13
it set aside by some higher forum before proceeding any further. That

proposition travels too far. Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules itself permits the

disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer,

provided reasons are recorded and the further course adopted is one

authorized by the Rules. Likewise, Rule 9(1) of the 1979 Rules permits

remission for further inquiry. Thus, the disciplinary authority is not

rendered powerless upon receipt of the report. Its power, however, is

structured and not unbridled. It must remain within the framework of

Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules and the principles of natural justice read into

that rule by binding precedent.



16.         In that view of the matter, the proper course is not to

foreclose the disciplinary proceedings altogether, but to set aside the

impugned order and require the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh

from the stage at which the first inquiry report was received. The

petitioner must be furnished a copy of that inquiry report if not already

supplied. If respondent No.2 proposes to disagree with any part of that

report,   respondent   No.2   shall   record   tentative   reasons   for   such

disagreement and communicate the same to the petitioner along with

the report, grant reasonable time to the petitioner to submit his

representation, consider that representation, and thereafter pass an

appropriate order strictly in accordance with Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules. If

respondent No.2 is of the view that any further inquiry is necessary on



WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                      12 of 13
account of any identified defect or omission in the earlier inquiry, it may

adopt only such course as is permissible under Rule 9(1) of the 1979

Rules and law declared by the Supreme Court; but the order directing a

de novo inquiry by appointing a fresh Inquiry Officer on the same

charge-sheet, as presently made, cannot stand.



17.           Accordingly, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned

order dated 24.12.2025 issued by respondent No.2 is quashed and set

aside. Respondent No.2 shall first furnish copy of the earlier inquiry

report to the petitioner, within two weeks, if not already furnished.

Thereafter respondent No.2 shall be at liberty to proceed from that stage

in accordance with Rule 9 of the 1979 Rules, by recording reasons,

supplying the same to the petitioner, considering his response, and then

taking such further decision as may be permissible in law. It is clarified

that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the

charges levelled against the petitioner. Rule is made absolute in the

above terms. No order as to costs.




(Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.)               (Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.)

B. S. Joshi




WP- 1891-2026.odt                                                   13 of 13