COWTOWN INFOTECH SERVICES PVT. LTD.versusM/S. SETH INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

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                      Sayali
                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     WRIT PETITION NO.2874 OF 2018

                      Cowtown Infotech Services Pvt. Ltd.,
                      having its registered address at 412,
                      Floot-4, 17G, Vardhaman Chamber,
                      Cawasji Patel Road, Horniman Circle,
                      Fort, Mumbai 400 001                     … Petitioners
                                            Vs.
                        1. Seth Industries Private Limited,
SAYALI
DEEPAK                     having its registered office at
UPASANI
Digitally signed by
                           Sadhana Rayon House, 2nd Floor,
SAYALI DEEPAK
UPASANI
Date: 2026.04.18           D.N. Road, Fort, Mumbai 400 001
12:13:41 +0530


                        2. R.S. Ghodeswar
                        3. Mumbai Textile Mazdoor Sabha
                        4. Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha
                        5. Maharashtra Samarth Kamgar
                           Sangathana
                        6. Bajirao Khajan Wadkar
                        7. Narayan Jivan Deshmukh
                        8. Prabhunath Ramdhani Yadav
                        9. Michel D’Souza
                       10. Vithal Kotian
                       11. Harun Nawab Pathan
                       12. Ramashankar S/o. Late Kedarnath
                           C. Yadav
                       13. Hansa Datta R. Joshi
                       14. Ravindra Ramsurendra Pandey
                       15. Lalta Abhilakh Yadav




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16. Ramachandra Rajaram Yadav
17. Chhabinath Ramgarib Sharma
18. Jeenakram P. Prajapati
19. Phulchand B. Sharma
20. Ramashankar B. Sharma
21. Jiyalal Baljeet Yadav (brother
    late Sahadev B. Yadav
22. Jayshree Anjanlekar (Wife)
    Late Ashok Arjun
23. Mukesh Harikaran Rajbhar
    late Harikaram Rajbhar
24. Padma Balappa Naidu (Wife)
    late Balappa Bhugappa Naidu
25. Adya Prasad Singh
26. Daisy Aveline D’Souza
27. Prabhavati Devi (wife)
    late Lahor Prasad R. Yadav
28. Malti Kaluram Rajbhar (wife)
    late Kaluram Dukharam Rajbhor
29. Aditya Prasad Surajbali Upadhyay
30. Ramashankar Ramsawar Singh
31. Baburam Ram Surat
32. Jokhan Sukharaj
33. Gulab S/o Pujan
34. Mithaee s/o Ganga Rajbhor
35. Shivraj Prasad s/o. Ramdas Varma
36. Ramsiromani s/o. Fatay Tiwari
37. Ramawadh s/o Ramadev Yadav
    Late Ramadev R. Yadav
38. Inraj s/o. Modha Yadav



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 39. Ramsingar s/o. Shivnath Sharma
 40. Balwant s/o. Ramdular Rajbhar
 41. Shiv Shankar s/o. Dinanath Jaiswar
     late Dinanath Jaiswar
 42. Vihagar S. Harijan
 43. Rangaswami G. Gowda
 44. Shreeniwas S/o. Subbayya
 45. Nusarat Hussain Mulani (wife)
     late Hussain Mohd. Mulani
 46. Cherian Assariyathy John
 47. John Koshy
 48. Molly John Kurien (wife)
     late A.J. Qurian
 49. Varghese Verkey                             … Respondents


Mr. Atharva A. Dandekar with Mr. Tejas Gupta for the
petitioners.
Mr. Mayuresh Modgi for respondent Nos. 6 to 8.


                   CORAM                   : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                   RESERVED ON             : APRIL 16, 2026.

                   PRONOUNCED ON           : APRIL 18, 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.    By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner calls in question the
legality and correctness of the judgment and order dated 16
August 2017 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane in Complaint
(ULP) No. 19 of 2007.



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2.    The factual matrix giving rise to the present petition, in brief,
is that the original complaint came to be instituted in January
2007 by respondent Nos. 6 to 11 along with five other employees
of respondent No. 1. The grievance raised therein pertained to the
discontinuation of manufacturing activities by respondent No. 1 as
far back as in the year 1986, as also to a tripartite settlement dated
1 November 2006 entered into between the petitioner, respondent
No. 1, and the employees’ unions. According to the petitioner, the
complaint is ex facie untenable in law; firstly, on account of the
inordinate delay in seeking to challenge an event of the year 1986
after a lapse of more than two decades, and secondly, on the
settled legal position that a tripartite settlement cannot ordinarily
be subjected to challenge by way of a complaint alleging unfair
labour practice.

3.    By the impugned order dated 16 August 2017, the Industrial
Court allowed an application preferred by respondent Nos. 6 to 49
in January 2017 seeking their impleadment as complainants in the
pending complaint. This application was filed nearly 31 years after
the discontinuation of the manufacturing activities and about 10
years after the institution of the complaint itself. It is significant to
note that the said application did not disclose any cogent or
satisfactory explanation for such gross and unexplained delay.
Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court.

4.    Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Atharva Dandekar,
contended that the Industrial Court failed to appreciate that the
impleadment application was founded merely on bald assertions
that the applicants were employees of respondent No. 1 and that



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they were interested in contesting the complaint on account of
alleged non-payment of dues. It was urged that apart from these
general and unsubstantiated averments, no material particulars
were furnished to justify their impleadment at such a belated
stage. The application, according to the petitioner, lacked
necessary details which would warrant their addition as parties to
the proceedings. It was further submitted that the Industrial Court,
in paragraph 11 of the impugned order, has itself recorded that the
impleadment application was completely silent as regards the
period of delay in approaching the Court. Despite such a finding,
the Court failed to draw the necessary legal consequence that the
claim was hit by delay and laches and was also barred by
limitation. It was emphasized that the cause of action, if any, arose
in   April   1986   when    the   manufacturing     activities    were
discontinued, whereas the respondents sought to be impleaded
only in January 2017, after an inordinate lapse of nearly 31 years.

5.    The learned counsel further submitted that even the original
complaint was filed in January 2007, and the present impleadment
application came to be filed ten years thereafter, without any
explanation whatsoever for such delay. It was contended that this
unexplained delay, by itself, constituted a sufficient ground for
rejection of the application. It was also urged that the applicants
had failed to state that their alleged dues were not covered by the
settlements entered into between         the petitioner and the
representative unions of the employees of respondent No. 1. It
was additionally submitted that the Industrial Court failed to
consider that the claims of a majority of the employees had already



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been settled and discharged in terms of the settlements arrived at
between the petitioner and the recognized unions. In these
circumstances, it was contended that the impugned order suffers
from serious infirmities and warrants interference by this Court.

6.    Per contra, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 6 to 8, Mr.
Mayuresh Modgi, submitted that the applicants are either
employees or legal heirs of the employees of respondent No. 1 and
are entitled to receive their lawful dues. It was contended that the
complaint itself involves issues relating to computation and
payment of such dues, and any adjudication therein would
necessarily affect all workmen who were in employment at the
relevant time. Hence, their presence is essential for complete and
effective adjudication of the dispute. It was further submitted that
the respondents have asserted that they were in employment with
the respondent company at the relevant time and, therefore, they
are necessary and proper parties to the complaint. Reliance was
placed on the documents produced on record to contend that,
prima facie, their status as employees is borne out. On this basis, it
was urged that the impugned order does not suffer from any
perversity or illegality so as to warrant interference under the writ
jurisdiction of this Court.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

7.    Having heard the learned counsel appearing for all the
parties and after carefully going through the material placed on
record, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot
be sustained in the eyes of law.




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8.    The petitioner has contended that the complaint was not
maintainable. The complaint sought to challenge an event of 1986
by filing proceedings in 2007. Further, it is pointed out that a
tripartite settlement, which is entered into between employer and
representative unions, cannot ordinarily be made subject matter of
a complaint of unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court was
therefore required to examine these aspects. It was expected to
consider whether such a complaint could survive in law and
whether additional parties could be brought in to such a complaint
at a much later stage. However, the reasoning of the Court below
shows that it proceeded on a assumption that since the applicants
claim to be employees or legal heirs, they may have interest in the
outcome. Mere interest in outcome does not give an automatic
right to be impleaded, particularly when the proceedings are old
and when delay is very large and unexplained.

9.    The record shows that the impleadment application was filed
in January 2017. This is nearly 31 years after the alleged
discontinuation of manufacturing activity and about 10 years after
filing of the complaint. This kind of delay directly affects the
maintainability of the application. The Industrial Court itself has
recorded in paragraph 11 of the impugned order that the
applicants have not explained the period of delay. Once such a
finding was recorded, the Court was required to proceed further
and consider the effect of such delay. Normally, such unexplained
delay attracts the principles of delay and laches. It may attract bar
of limitation depending upon nature of claim. However, the
Industrial Court stopped at noticing the defect and did not carry



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the reasoning to its logical end. The order, therefore, cannot be
sustained.

10.   The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that
the impleadment application was based on general statements also
deserves acceptance. The applicants have only stated that they
were employees or that they have not received their dues. These
statements do not contain necessary details. There is no statement
showing who was employed, during what period, under what
conditions, and what exact amount is claimed by each of them.
There is also no explanation as to why these claims were not raised
earlier. When the Court is dealing with an application filed after
such a long delay, it expects pleadings. Absence of such particulars
weakens the case of the applicants. It affects the foundation of the
request for impleadment.

11.   Further, it is also important to note that the respondents
have not been able to show that their alleged dues are outside the
scope of settlements already entered into between the petitioner
and the representative unions. The petitioner has specifically
stated that majority of the employees have already received their
dues under such settlements. They have not placed any material
to show that their claims are independent or that they were
excluded from such settlements. In absence of such material, the
presumption would be that the settlements have taken care of the
claims of employees generally. A vague assertion that they are still
unpaid is not sufficient to displace that position.




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12.   The delay of ten years even after filing of the complaint
assumes importance. The complaint was filed in January 2007.
The impleadment application came in January 2017. This shows
that even after the complaint was pending, the applicants did not
take steps to join the proceedings for a long period. When a person
remains inactive for long time, the Court must examine the
reasons carefully. In the present case, no reason is given. This
creates      a    presumption     against   the   applicants.   In    such
circumstances, the normal rule would be to reject the application.

13.   In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the
impugned order dated 16 August 2017 is not sustainable. For all
these reasons, the order cannot stand. The writ petition is required
to be allowed and the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

14.   In the result, the following order is passed:

      (i)        The writ petition is allowed;

      (ii)       The impugned judgment and order dated 16 August
      2017 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane in Complaint
      (ULP) No. 19 of 2007, allowing the application for
      impleadment of respondent Nos. 6 to 49, is quashed and set
      aside;

      (iii) The application for impleadment filed by respondent
      Nos. 6 to 49 stands rejected;

      (iv) The proceedings in Complaint (ULP) No. 19 of 2007
      shall now continue before the Industrial Court, Thane only
      with the original parties, in accordance with law;




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      (v)   Rule is made absolute in the above terms. There shall
      be no order as to costs.

15.   Since the Apex Court has already expedited the proceedings,
the complaint shall be decided by the Industrial Court within six
months from today.

                                          (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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