ANIL GAJANAN MANEversusTHE THANE JANATA SAHAKARI BANK LIMITED

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                   AGK
                          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                   WRIT PETITION NO.2901 OF 2011

                   Anil Gajanan Mane,
                   Jagannath Complex, Chinchwad
                   Station, Pune 411 019                             … Petitioner

                                         Vs.

                   The Thane Janata Sahakari Bank Ltd.,
                   Prestige Complex, 3rd Floor,
                   Acharya Anand Rishi Marg,
                   Chinchwad, Pune 411 019                           … Respondent

ATUL
GANESH             Mr. Nitin A. Kulkarni for the petitioner.
KULKARNI
                   Ms. Gunjan Thakkar for the respondent-Bank.
Digitally signed
by ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.04.30
11:50:27 +0530



                                      CORAM                    : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                      RESERVED ON              : APRIL 17, 2026.

                                      PRONOUNCED ON            : APRIL 30, 2026

                   JUDGMENT:

                   1.    By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
                   227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the
                   judgment and order dated 7 December 2010 passed by the
                   Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No. 54 of 2009.

                   2.    The facts and circumstances giving rise to the filing of the
                   present writ petition, as set out by the petitioner, are that the




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petitioner came to be appointed in service as a Peon on 19
September 1995 with the erstwhile bank, namely Shri Sadguru
Jangli Maharaj Bank Limited. Thereafter, on 31 March 1999, the
petitioner instituted a complaint alleging unfair labour practice
before the Industrial Court at Pune, inter alia claiming the relief of
permanency. The said complaint came to be allowed by the
Industrial Court by judgment and order dated 17 July 2001,
whereby permanency was granted in favour of the petitioner. It is
the case of the petitioner that during the pendency of the aforesaid
complaint, his services came to be terminated by the Bank with
effect from 31 March 1999. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioner
filed a complaint before the Labour Court in the month of January
2002 challenging the termination order dated 26 March 1999. In
the meantime, the erstwhile Shri Sadguru Sahakari Bank came to
be merged and amalgamated with Thane Janata Sahakari Bank
Limited on 17 July 2007. The Labour Court, by its judgment and
order dated 20 March 2009, partly allowed the complaint and
directed the Bank to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of
service, though without back wages. In the alternative, in lieu of
reinstatement with continuity of service, the Labour Court directed
payment of compensation of Rs.75,000/- to the petitioner together
with costs quantified at Rs.1,000/-. Being dissatisfied with the said
order, the petitioner preferred a revision application challenging
the same. The Bank also instituted a separate revision application
in the month of May 2009 questioning the order passed by the
Labour Court.




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3.    By the common judgment and order dated 7 December
2010, the Industrial Court was pleased to quash and set aside that
part of the Labour Court’s order directing reinstatement with
continuity of service, though without back wages, and instead
enhanced the compensation payable to the petitioner to a lump
sum amount of Rs.2,00,000/-. Being aggrieved by the said
judgment and order, the petitioner has preferred the present writ
petition.

4.    Mr. Kulkarni, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner,
submitted that the Industrial Court has not disturbed the
categorical findings recorded by the Labour Court that the
respondent Bank had engaged in unfair labour practice falling
under Item 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. According
to him, once such finding was maintained, the consequential relief
ought ordinarily to have followed. He further contended that the
Labour Court declined back wages only on the ground that there
was    no   specific   averment       in   the   complaint   regarding
unemployment of the petitioner after termination. However, the
Labour Court failed to take into consideration the affidavit filed by
the petitioner at Exhibit U-8, wherein it was specifically stated on
oath that the petitioner was not gainfully employed anywhere and
was, therefore, entitled to full back wages. It was urged that once
such sworn statement was placed on record, the burden shifted
upon the employer to establish that the petitioner was gainfully
employed elsewhere. Since no such evidence was adduced by the
Bank, the denial of back wages was unsustainable. Learned
counsel further submitted that after observing that the order of the



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Labour Court was contrary to Section 30(1)(b) of the Act, the
Industrial Court ought to have granted full relief. He submitted
that once non-compliance of Section 25(F) of the Industrial
Disputes Act was also noticed, and the findings of the Labour
Court were not held perverse, there was no justification to
substitute reinstatement by compensation.

5.    Learned counsel further submitted that the legal position
relating to grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement stands
well settled. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Tapas Kumar Paul v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited,
reported in (2014) 15 SCC 313, wherein it has been held that
compensation in place of reinstatement can be awarded only when
justifiable   circumstances   exist.   Such   circumstances      were
illustratively stated to be where the industry has closed down,
where the employee has already superannuated or is on the verge
of retirement with no effective service period remaining, where the
workman has become incapacitated and is unable to discharge
duties, or where he has lost the confidence of the management in
relation to the discharge of duties. It was submitted that none of
these circumstances existed in the present matter.

6.    It was then urged that neither before the Labour Court nor
before the Industrial Court was any factual foundation laid by the
respondent Bank to bring the case within the recognised
exceptions warranting compensation instead of reinstatement.
According to the petitioner, no finding of fact has been recorded by
either Court that any of the aforesaid grounds existed. In such
circumstances, the Labour Court was justified in directing



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reinstatement, and the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with that part of the order.

7.    Learned counsel next submitted that the Industrial Court set
aside the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service merely
on the basis that the petitioner had rendered about three years of
service prior to termination and that litigation had remained
pending for nearly eleven years, and therefore reinstatement was
stated to be impracticable. According to him, such reasoning runs
contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Deepali
Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya,
reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324, wherein it has been held that in
cases of wrongful termination, reinstatement with continuity of
service is the normal rule. It was further submitted that for
claiming back wages, the employee is only required to state before
the adjudicating authority that he was not gainfully employed,
which requirement stood satisfied in the present case. He
contended that the orders passed by both the Labour Court and
the Industrial Court are contrary to settled principles of law and
deserve modification by directing reinstatement of the petitioner to
his original post with continuity of service and full back wages. It
was submitted that awarding mere compensation in lieu of
reinstatement would amount to granting premium to the employer
for resorting to unfair labour practice. Reliance was also placed
upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Constable Uma
Shankaran v. Union of India, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 6903-
6904/2020 decided on 19th January 2026 wherein it was observed
that if an employer, by an illegal act, deprives an employee from



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performing duties and the termination is ultimately held
unsustainable, the employee has a legitimate claim to be restored
to all benefits which would have accrued but for such illegal
exclusion from service. It was, therefore, prayed that the writ
petition be allowed, the order of the Industrial Court be quashed
and set aside, and the petitioner be reinstated with full
consequential benefits.

8.   Per contra, Ms. Thakkar, learned Advocate appearing for the
respondent Bank, submitted that the Industrial Court has
committed neither perversity nor any error apparent on the face of
the record while exercising revisional jurisdiction. She contended
that judicial pronouncements over a period of time have
consistently recognised that reinstatement with back wages is not
an automatic consequence, particularly in cases involving daily
wagers or temporary employees after long lapse of time. According
to her, several relevant considerations are required to be
examined, namely, the length of service rendered, nature of
employment,    absence    of   proper   pleadings   regarding    non-
employment elsewhere, feasibility of reinstatement, and the
substantial time gap between termination and final adjudication.
She submitted that all such factors were duly considered by the
Industrial Court while modifying the order of the Labour Court. It
was further contended that, having regard to these circumstances,
both Courts rightly declined unconditional reinstatement. In
support of her submissions, apart from authorities referred to by
the Industrial Court, reliance was also placed on the judgment of
the Delhi High Court in Pal Singh v. NTPC, reported in 96 (2002)



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DLT 877.

9.     Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even
assuming such formula were to be applied, the compensation in
the present case would not exceed the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. It was
further urged that the alternative relief granted by the Labour
Court, namely reinstatement or compensation, squarely falls
within the scope of Section 30(1)(b) of the MRTU & PULP Act. She
also invited attention to the fact that the respondent Bank
accepted the judgment of the Industrial Court and, by letter dated
8     February   2011,   offered   payment   of   compensation          of
Rs.2,00,000/- to the petitioner, which offer was declined. On these
grounds, she prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

10.    I have carefully considered the rival submissions, the
material placed on record and the reasons recorded by the Labour
Court as also by the Industrial Court.

11.    I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for both sides.
I have also carefully seen the papers, pleadings, earlier orders, and
record produced before this Court. This dispute has travelled
through many stages and over many years. It started when the
petitioner was working as a peon in the old Bank. Thereafter, he
approached the Industrial Court claiming permanency. That
complaint came to be allowed on 17 July 2001. After that came
the dispute regarding termination. Then the Labour Court passed
its order. Thereafter, revision was filed and the Industrial Court
passed the final order on 7 December 2010. Therefore, this Court



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is dealing with a chain of events extending over long period.

12.   The record shows that the petitioner joined service on 19
September 1995 as a peon in Shri Sadguru Jangli Maharaj Bank
Limited, which was the earlier Bank. This fact is not disputed. It is
also clear that while in service, the petitioner felt that he was being
continued without permanent status, and therefore he approached
the Industrial Court complaining unfair labour practice and asking
for permanency. That complaint was allowed on 17 July 2001, and
permanency was granted to him. This means the petitioner was
not casual worker having no connection with the establishment. A
competent Court had already recognised that his service deserved
permanency. Therefore, when the Bank argues that he had no
regular relation with service, such stand becomes difficult to
accept. However, the permanency order alone does not solve every
later dispute. It helps the petitioner on status, but still the Court
must separately examine what relief should follow after
termination and after passage of many years.

13.   The next question for consideration is about what relief
should be given. Even if termination or removal is found illegal, it
does not mean in every case the worker must be taken back in
service automatically. Labour Courts have never followed such
fixed rule. Relief has to be decided after seeing facts of the case,
conduct of both sides, type of job, atmosphere in establishment,
and whether old service relation can start again. Therefore, it is
necessary to see the accepted grounds where reinstatement may be
refused and compensation or some fair relief may be granted. This
becomes more important where unfair labour practice is not



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proved, because in such matters the blame on employer is lesser
and the Court gets wider scope to balance justice.

14.   The petitioner has relied upon the fact that the Labour Court
found breach of law and that findings regarding unfair labour
practice were not disturbed by the higher forum. Normally, if a
worker is removed illegally, the first relief often considered is
reinstatement. The petitioner also points out that he filed affidavit
saying he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. According to
him, once such statement on oath was filed, the burden shifted on
employer to prove otherwise. This argument also has some
support. But this Court cannot decide the matter by looking at only
one point. The full picture must be seen. The petitioner had
worked for around three years before termination. After
termination, litigation continued for very long period. By the time
the Industrial Court decided the revision, more than eleven years
had passed. Such delay changes the nature of remedy. In
employment matters, after many years, staff changes, management
changes, vacancies change, and practical conditions become
different. Therefore, relief cannot be granted by ignoring passage
of time.

15.   The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgments
such as Deepali Gundu Surwase and Tapash Kumar Paul. There can
be no quarrel with the principles stated in those decisions. Those
judgments say that when termination is wrongful, reinstatement is
generally the normal rule. They also say compensation instead of
reinstatement should not be granted as routine. In Tapash Kumar
Paul, it has been stated that compensation may be proper in



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justified cases such as closure of establishment, retirement,
incapacity, loss of confidence, or similar reasons. But these
judgments do not create one blind formula for every case. They
also require the Court to see facts of each matter. Therefore, even
where reinstatement is a normal rule, the Court must still ask
whether in the present facts the same relief remains practical.

16.   In the present case, one important fact cannot be ignored.
The original Bank was merged and amalgamated with Thane
Janata Sahakari Bank Limited on 17 July 2007. Thus, the employer
institution itself underwent change. The petitioner was working as
peon in the earlier setup. After merger staffing pattern, and
organisational needs may not remain the same. Therefore, the
issue is not whether some office still exists. The real issue is
whether the same employment relationship can reasonably be
revived after many years in a changed institution. The Industrial
Court considered this aspect and concluded that reinstatement
with continuity was no longer suitable relief. This Court does not
find such conclusion unreasonable. When service was short,
dispute was old, and employer had changed by merger, the Court
below was justified in considering compensation as more practical
remedy.

17.   The fact that permanency was granted on 17 July 2001
certainly strengthens the petitioner’s case. It shows that his service
claim was accepted. It also indicates that the employer had not
dealt with his status properly earlier. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot be treated as a mere casual worker. Yet even then, success
on merits does not always mean one fixed relief. A worker may



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establish that he was wronged, but remedy may still be shaped
according to present circumstances. If after many years the old
arrangement cannot be restored, then another remedy may be
fair.

18.     The petitioner argued that once Section 25(F) of the
Industrial Disputes Act was violated, and unfair labour practice
findings were not set aside, then refusal of reinstatement was
contrary to law. Violation of Section 25(F) certainly makes
termination bad in law. But there is difference between deciding
legality of termination and deciding nature of final relief. The first
asks whether employer acted lawfully. The second asks what
should now be granted. These two questions are related, but not
identical. Law does not say that in every case of illegal
termination, the Court must always direct reinstatement even after
long years and changed circumstances. In the present matter, the
Industrial Court considered short service, long pending litigation,
and changed condition of the Bank.

19.     The respondent Bank submitted that the petitioner was a
peon with short service, and therefore reinstatement with back
wages was not justified. It also pointed out practical difficulties
because of merger and long lapse of time. The petitioner had not
served for decades. He had put in about three years actual service.
The employment relation had broken many years earlier. In such
circumstances, reinstatement may not always heal the injury in
useful manner. Compensation, on the other hand, gives final
monetary relief for the wrong suffered and closes litigation.




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20.    The principle in Tapash Kumar Paul that compensation
instead of reinstatement must rest on justifiable reasons has been
fully kept in mind. First, the petitioner’s actual service period was
not very long. Second, the dispute remained pending for long time.
Third, the employer institution underwent merger. Fourth, the
petitioner had already succeeded earlier in obtaining permanency,
which means his grievance had been recognised in law. Therefore,
the wrong done to him is not denied. Yet the suitable remedy in
present circumstances need not be forced reinstatement after long
gap.

21.    The compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- also cannot be termed
arbitrary in facts of the case. The Labour Court had earlier given
alternative compensation of Rs.75,000/-. The Industrial Court
enhanced the same to Rs.2,00,000/-. This itself shows that the
revisional Court considered the petitioner’s hardship and found
larger amount necessary. It did not reject his grievance. It only
changed the mode of relief. The amount may not satisfy the
petitioner fully, but every lower amount cannot be called arbitrary.
In writ jurisdiction, this Court does not sit as second appeal to
recalculate compensation merely because another figure is
possible. Unless the amount is shockingly low, irrational, or
without reasoning, interference is not warranted. No such case is
shown here.

22.    The petitioner lastly argued that granting compensation
instead of reinstatement would reward the employer for unfair
labour practice. In some cases, such argument may have force,
especially where employer acts with bad faith and reinstatement



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remains fully possible even today. But present facts are different.
Here the petitioner’s rights were recognised. His termination was
not treated as flawless. He has been awarded compensation. The
Bank has not gone free without consequence. It has been directed
to pay monetary amount. Therefore, it cannot be said that
compensation is a prize for employer misconduct. Rather, in
changed and old circumstances, compensation becomes method to
remedy the wrong.

23.   Considering all these aspects together, this Court finds that
the matter is not fit for interference in writ jurisdiction only
because the petitioner seeks reinstatement. Therefore, the order
cannot be upset merely because another view is arguable.

24.   In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:

      (i)    The writ petition stands dismissed;

      (ii)   The judgment and order dated 7 December 2010
      passed by the Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP)
      No. 54 of 2009 is upheld;

      (iii) The direction of the Industrial Court granting lump
      sum compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- to the petitioner in lieu
      of reinstatement is confirmed;

      (iv) The respondent Bank shall, if not already paid, pay the
      said amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the petitioner within a
      period of eight weeks from the date of this order;




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(v)   In the event the aforesaid amount is not paid within
the stipulated period, the same shall carry interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of this order till realization;

(vi) No order as to costs.



                                       (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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