Dr Rakesh Chandra VemuriversusCrown Veterinary Services Pvt Ltd

                                                                      30-WP389-2026.DOC

                                                                                Santosh

                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                     WRIT PETITION NO. 389 OF 2026

                      Dr. Rakesh Chandra Vemuri                           ...Petitioner
                                        Versus
                      Crown Veterinary Services Pvt. Ltd.               …Respondent

                      Mr. Shanay Shah, a/w Manvendra Kane, Amruta Thakur and
                           Rashi Oswal, i/b W. S. Kane & Co., for the Petitioner.
                      Mr. Anosh Sequeira, a/w Karan Fafat, i/b Jani & Parikh, for
                           the Respondent.

                                                     CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                                     DATED: 13th JANUARY, 2026

                      Oral Order:-

                      1.   The challenge in this petition is to an order dated 2 nd

                      December, 2025 passed by the City Civil Court, Greater

                      Bombay, whereby a Notice of Motion taken out by the petitioner

         Digitally
                      to condone the delay in ?ling an af?davit in seeking leave to
         signed by
         SANTOSH
SANTOSH SUBHASH
SUBHASH KULKARNI
KULKARNI Date:
         2026.01.14
                      defend the summary suit came to be dismissed.
         19:12:36
         +0530




                      2.   The Summons for Judgment was served on the Advocate

                      for the defendant on 12 th June, 2025. The defendant ought to

                      have applied for leave to defend on or before 22 nd June, 2025.

                      However, there was a delay of 44 days in seeking leave and,

                      therefore, the defendant took out Notice of Motion No.5407 of

                      2025 seeking condonation of delay. It was, inter alia, contended


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that the defendant could not apply for leave to defend within the

stipulated period as he had to collect the information,

documents and other supporting material to prepare and ?le

the af?davit in support of leave to defend. Since the defendant

resides at Hyderabad, the defendant could not co-ordinate and

brief the Advocate, who is based in Mumbai.


3.    The prayer for condonation of delay was resisted by the

plaintiff.   The justi?ability of the cause ascribed for the delay

was put in contest.


4.    By the impugned order, the learned Judge, City Civil

Court, was persuaded to dismiss the Notice of Motion observing,

inter alia, that the proper procedure was to ?le an application

seeking leave to defend alongwith an af?davit and not a Notice of

Motion. In the view of the learned Judge, the defendant failed to

make out a suf?cient case for the condonation of delay.


5.    Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.


6.    It is trite an application for condonation of delay ought to

receive liberal consideration so as to advance the cause of

substantive justice. In a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of

Civil Procedure, the timeline prescribed therein has a de?nite

object.      Yet, the Court is required to be alive to the


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considerations which govern the determination of an application

for condonation of delay.           The Courts lean in favour of

condonation of delay as it promotes determination of the lis on

merits rather than on the technicalities, lest the procedure

which is a handmaid of justice, does not score a march over

substantive justice.

7.   A useful reference, in this context, can be made to the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan

V/s. M. Krishnamurthy1 wherein the approach to be adopted by

the Court in the matter of condonation of delay was expounded

as under:

     “9.     It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of
     discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not
     say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is
     within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability
     of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the
     shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable
     explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long
     range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
     satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as suf?cient
     it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the
     superior court should not disturb such ?nding, much less in
     reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on
     whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a
     different matter when the ?rst cut refuses to condone the delay.
     In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the
     cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior
     court to come to its own ?nding even untrammeled by the
     conclusion of the lower court.
     10.    The reason for such a different stance is thus:
           The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the
     dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice.
     Time limit ?xed for approaching the court in different situations


1    AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3222,
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in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would
transform into a good cause.
11.    Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. Law of limitation ?xes a life-span for such
legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time
is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During
efFux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer
persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life
span must be ?xed for each remedy. Unending period for
launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on
public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae
up sit ?nis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be
putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively ?xed period of time.
12.    A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result
foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no
presumption that delay in approaching the court is always
deliberate. This Court has held that the words "suf?cient cause"
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice vide
Shakuntala Devi Jain V/s. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575)
and State of W.B. V/s. Administrator, Howrah Municipality
((1972) 1 SC 366).
13.    It must be remembered that in every case of delay there
can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That
alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door
against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala ?des or
it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must
show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is
reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the
party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean
against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay
the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It
must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have
incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary
guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on
the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the
opposite party for his loss.”
                                         (emphasis supplied)




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8.      In the case at hand, the petitioner claimed that the delay

is of 44 days. The learned Counsel for the respondents –

plaintiffs submitted that the delay, according to the plaintiff,

was of 52 days.

9.      In any event, the delay does not appear to be inordinate.

The defendant has ascribed justi?able reasons, which prevented

him from ?ling the application for grant of leave to defend,

within the stipulated period. In these circumstance to advance

the cause of substantive justice, this Court is persuaded to

condone the delay in taking out the application seeking leave to

defend the summary suit lest the defendant would be deprived

of the opportunity to make out a case that he is entitled to

defend the suit. At the same time, the inconvenience and delay

caused to the plaintiff is required to be compensated by

awarding costs.

10.     Hence, the following order:

                            :ORDER:

(i)      The petition stands allowed.

(ii)     The impugned order stands quashed and set aside.

(iii)    The Notice of Motion stands allowed.




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(iv)   The delay in ?ling the af?davit seeking leave to defend

       stands   condoned     subject   to   payment   of   costs   of

       Rs.25,000/- by the petitioner – defendant to the plaintiffs

       within a period of one week.

(v)    The payment of costs shall be a condition precedent.

(vi)   Upon payment of costs, the trial Court shall determine

       the aspect of grant of leave to defend on the basis of the

       material on record.

       The petition stands disposed.

                                            [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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