Bombay High Court
Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation LtdversusNath Resorts Pvt Ltd
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
Holding
The writ petition is not maintainable; the High Court dismissed it, holding that the arbitral tribunal’s procedural orders are not subject to writ jurisdiction.
Summary
Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation filed a writ petition challenging orders of an arbitral tribunal that recalled a prior procedural order directing payment of tribunal fees and later extended the time for such payment. The petitioner argued that the tribunal, having become functus officio after the claimant’s failure to pay fees, lacked authority to grant an extension and that the earlier order should stand, resulting in dismissal of the claim. The High Court held that the fee‑payment order is a procedural matter governed by Section 32(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which the tribunal may recall and modify, and that such orders are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that aggrieved parties must pursue remedies under Section 34 of the Act after the arbitral proceedings, not through a writ petition. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, the Court found the petition to be a dilatory tactic lacking substantive merit. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with costs.
Issues considered
- Whether a peremptory procedural order of an arbitral tribunal directing payment of fees and its consequences is reviewable by a High Court under writ jurisdiction.
- Whether an arbitral tribunal can recall and extend time for payment of its fees after a party defaults.
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to relief in the form of reinstatement of the earlier order or dismissal of the claim.
- Whether the appropriate remedy for aggrieved parties is a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s. 32(2), 34
Subjects
- arbitration
- arbitral tribunal
- fees
- procedural order
- writ jurisdiction
- Section 32
- Section 34
- review
- default
- extension of time
- High Court
Judgment
36 WP-4000-26.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4000 OF 2026
Maharashtra Tourism Development
Corporation Ltd. ..Petitioner
Versus
M/s. Nath Resorts Pvt. Ltd. & anr. …Respondents
Mr. Kaustubh Patil, a/w Ms. Mansi Shah, for the Petitioner.
Mr. Deelip Patil Bankar, a/w Ms. Pooja Deelip Patil, for
Respondent No.2.
CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.
DATE : 16th SEPTEMBER 2026
SAINATH
SANJAY ORDER :-
BODKHE
Digitally signed by
SAINATH SANJAY
BODKHE
Date: 2026.09.18
19:17:06 +0530
1. Heard Mr. Kaustubh Patil, the learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Deelip Bankar, the learned Counsel for the
Respondent No.2.
2. The challenge in this petition is to the orders passed by
the Arbitral Tribunal recalling an earlier order dated 05 th
January, 2026 to the extent it directed that, if the claimant
committed default in payment of the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal
on or before 11th February, 2026, the statement of claim should
stand dismissed without further reference to the Arbitral
Tribunal and that no extension of time to pay the fees of the
SAINATH, PA 1/5
36 WP-4000-26.DOC
Arbitral Tribunal shall be granted to either party, and the
subsequent orders whereby the Arbitral Tribunal declined to
make any clarification as regards the payment of fees and the
seat of arbitration.
3. The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view that, the application
seeking extension of time was filed before the expiry of the time
stipulated by the Arbitral Tribunal for payment of fees, and
since there was delay of about 6 days only in the deposit of the
Arbitral Tribunal fees, the order dated 05th January, 2026, being
a procedural order, the Tribunal was empowered to review and
recall the same.
4. Mr. Patil, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted
that, by an order dated 27th April, 2026, on an application
preferred by the claimant seeking extension of time to deposit
the fees of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Arbitral Tribunal had
unilaterally extended the time to pay the fees, despite the
peremptory and self-operative order dated 05th January, 2026.
On account of the failure of the claimant to deposit the fees with
the Arbitral Tribunal, the statement of claim stood dismissed
and the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was automatically
terminated. Having become functus officio, the Arbitral Tribunal
SAINATH, PA 2/5
36 WP-4000-26.DOC
could not have extended the time to deposit the fees and
resumed arbitral proceedings.
5. The submissions canvassed by Mr. Patil, do not deserve
countenance. Indeed, the order dated 05th January, 2026
directing the parties to deposit the Arbitral Tribunal’s fees
provided the consequences that would entail failure to deposit
the fees was processual. At best, the termination of the
proceedings was referable to the provisions contained in Section
32(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (“Act, 1996”).
Such a peremptory order especially in the matter of payment of
fees of the Arbitral Tribunal, can only be said to be procedural.
It can hardly be urged that, the Arbitral Tribunal is denuded of
the power to recall and review the processual order. By no
stretch of imagination, the impugned order dated 27 th April,
2026, assumes the character of substantive review.
6. It is imperative to note, the Arbitral Tribunal has recorded
that the claimant has deposited the fees with the Arbitral
Tribunal with a delay of 6 days only and, in the circumstances
of the case, the Arbitral Tribunal was persuaded to condone the
delay upon compliance with the direction to deposit the fees.
Moreover, by the orders passed by the Court, the mandate of the
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36 WP-4000-26.DOC
Arbitral Tribunal has been extended. A challenge to such order
cannot be entertained in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.
7. The impugned order dated 27th April, 2026, cannot be said
to be legally infirm, much less, afflicted with perversity that
stares in the face. Nor can the petitioner be said to have been
rendered remediless so as to warrant exercise of writ
jurisdiction during the currency of arbitral proceedings, which
can only be resorted to as a matter of rarity.
8. In the case of Harshbir Singh Pannu & anr. Vs. Jaswinder
Singh1, on which reliance was placed by the Arbitral Tribunal,
the Supreme Court has enunciated that, if a favourable order is
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal for recommencing arbitration
proceedings, the only option available to a party aggrieved
therefrom, would be to participate in the proceedings and
thereafter, challenge the final award under Section 34 of the Act,
1996.
9. The challenge to the subsequent order dated 15 th June,
2026 (Exh. C) as amended by the order of even date dated 15 th
June, 2026 (Exh. D) stands on an even weaker foundation. The
aspect of the dispute as to seat of arbitration sought to be raised
in an indirect manner, is subjudice before the High Court of
1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2742
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36 WP-4000-26.DOC
Bombay at Aurangabad Bench as the petitioner has purportedly
assailed an order passed by the Court at Aurangabad to extend
the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal was,
thus, justified in holding that, it did not owe any clarification to
the parties either with regard to the payment of fees or the seat
of arbitration, having already passed the orders in that regard.
10. This Court gains an impression that, applications and
proceedings are being filed as a part of litigative strategy to delay
the disposal of the arbitral proceedings.
11. Therefore, this Writ Petition, being devoid of substance,
stands dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited by
the petitioner with the Maharashtra State Legal Services
Authority, Bombay within a period of four weeks from today.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
SAINATH, PA 5/5
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