SHEETALKUMAR SUDHAKAR MANEREversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

                                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
                                     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                            WRIT PETITION NO. 4617 OF 2025


                        Sheetalkumar Sudhakar Manere
                        Age: 59 years, Occu.: Business,
                        R/o ‘Narayani’, 20/738/3, Yasholaxmi Road,
                        Ichalkaranji – 416 115, Dist. Kolhapur
                        (Maharashtra)                                            ..PETITIONER
           Digitally
           signed by
           SHAILAJA
SHAILAJA   SHRIKANT
SHRIKANT
HALKUDE
           HALKUDE
           Date:
                              VERSUS
           2026.09.17
           17:41:09
           +0530


                        1. State of Maharashtra.
                           Through Hatkanagale Police Station

                        2. Sanjay Danchand Ghodawat
                           Age: 60 years, Occu.: Business,
                           R/o Yashwant Housing Society,
                           Jaysingpur, Tq. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur
                           At Present – Majale, Tq. Hatkanangale,
                           Dist. Kolhapur                                    ..RESPONDENTS
                                                               ....
                        Mr. Sanjeev Kadam, Senior Advocate (Through V.C.) a/w Ms. Varsha Thorat,
                        Ms. Vrunali Vilankar, Mr. Aarya Ambulkar, Mr. Nilabh Toshnival and Mr.
                        Piyush Toshnival, Advocates i/b Mr. Ashish Pawar, Advocate for Petitioner.
                        Mrs. P.S. Rane, A.P.P. for Respondent No. 1 – State
                        Mr. Nitin Gaware Patil a/w Ms. Tanvi Tapkire and Ms. Purva Patil, Advocates
                        for Respondent No. 2
                                                              .…

                                                                    CORAM : ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.
                                                                    DATE : 10th SEPTEMBER, 2026
                        ORAL JUDGMENT :


                        1.         The Petitioner challenges the order dated 23 rd July, 2025, passed

                        by the learned Judicial Magistrate First-Class Ichalkaranji (for short, “ learned

                                                           1 / 27
Magistrate”) below Exhibit 106 in Regular Criminal Case No.367 of 2021,

whereby the learned Magistrate allowed the application (Exh.106) filed by

Respondent No.2 / Complainant seeking further investigation in Crime No.

334 of 2021 and directed Police Inspector of Hatkanangale Police Station to

appoint Investigating Officer to investigate regarding participation of the

proposed accused i.e. the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza as per Section 173

(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”).

2.          Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard learned counsel for

both the parties at length and perused the impugned order, the documents

pointed out by learned counsel for the respective parties and learned A.P.P. as

well as the judgments relied upon by them in support of their submissions.

3.         Factual Matrix :-

(a)        Respondent No. 2 is the original complainant, who lodged the

F.I.R. on 24th June, 2021 against one V.P. Singh and Ramesh Thakkar, alleging

that they both, in collusion with others, hatched the conspiracy and prepared

the forged documents and demanded an extortion amount of Rs. 5 crores from

him. They also threatened to kill him, his family members, as well as his

partner – Nilesh Bagi. Based on these allegations, police registered Crime No.

334 of 2021 against V.P. Singh and others for the offences punishable under

Sections 384, 387 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short

“I.P.C.”). During the investigation, the Investigating Officer found that V.P.
                                   2 / 27
Singh, along with six other accused, had been involved in the present crime.

Accordingly, after completing the investigation, he filed a charge-sheet against

all of them in the Trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 381,

384, 386, 387, 120-B, 467, 468 r/w 34 of the I.P.C. and Section 67 of the

Information Technology Act, which was numbered as R.C.C. No. 367 of 2021.

Thereafter, on 24th September, 2022, the Investigating Officer filed a

supplementary charge-sheet in the present crime.


(b)        On 26th October, 2021, the Investigating Officer filed an

application (Exh.88) in R.C.C. No. 367 of 2021, stating that from the

statements of Mangesh Chavan, Milind Dongre and Sachin Gorle, some

material has been found against the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza. Therefore,

permission was sought for further investigation under Section 173 (8) of the

Cr.P.C. in connection with the same crime. After hearing the parties, on 13 th

November, 2021, the learned Magistrate granted permission to carry out

further investigation under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C., as prayed.


(c)        On 17th August, 2022, the Investigating Officer submitted a

preliminary report stating that they had carried out the investigation; however,

till date nothing has emerged against the Petitioner herein, and the

investigation concerning Oza is going on. Therefore, he submitted to the Court

that the investigation against the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza is ongoing

                                   3 / 27
and, after ascertaining the material against them, he will take further steps in

the matter; accordingly, arrangements were made to file a further report.


(d)        Prior to submitting the report by the Investigating Officer, on 21 st

/22nd June, 2022, Respondent No.2 filed an application before the learned

Magistrate seeking direction against the Investigating Officer to carry out

further investigation in the matter. On 05th November, 2022, the Investigating

Officer filed a reply to the said application and contended that a thorough

investigation is necessary in the present crime. The Petitioner filed an

intervention application in the said proceeding on 19 th August, 2023, and

requested permission to intervene and argue the matter.             The learned

Magistrate, after considering the submission and material on record, allowed

the application (Exh.106) and directed the Police Inspector, Hatkanangale

Police Station, to appoint an Investigating Officer to investigate the

participation of the proposed accused, i.e., the present Petitioner and one

Mahesh Oza, as per Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. In paragraph no. 6 of the

impugned order, the learned Magistrate stated that, in view of Section 156(3)

of the Cr.P.C., the proposed accused/Petitioner has no locus standi to argue the

application. Therefore, he was not permitted to argue the said application.

Being aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner has preferred this petition.




                                   4 / 27
4.         Having heard the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the

respective parties and learned A.P.P. and having gone through the record as

pointed out by respective learned counsel and the judgments relied upon by

them, the following points fall for consideration :-

           (i)     Whether the Petitioner, being a proposed accused, has locus
                   to participate in the application (Exh.106) or challenge the
                   impugned order, i.e., the order passed by the learned
                   Magistrate on the said application?

           (ii)    Whether Respondent No. 2, being a complainant/informant,
                   has locus to file an application before the learned
                   Magistrate for seeking further investigation in the crime,
                   under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.?

           (iii)   Whether the learned Magistrate was empowered to direct
                   further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.
                   after taking cognizance of the matter?

           (iv)    Whether the petition is maintainable in view of an alternate
                   remedy available before the learned Sessions Court?

           (v)     Whether any interference is required in the impugned order
                   in the writ jurisdiction?

           (vi)    What order?


5.         Before dealing with the aforesaid points, I would like to reproduce

the undisputed facts of the matter, as under :-

(a)        Respondent No. 2 is the original Complainant. The Petitioner was

working with him in the real estate business. Based on the complaint filed by

the Complainant, a crime was registered against V.P. Singh and Ramesh

Thakkar. Pursuant to the said complaint, the Investigating Officer has carried
                                    5 / 27
out the investigation and filed a charge-sheet against V.P. Singh and six others

and thereafter again filed a supplementary charge-sheet against two more

accused persons.

(b)        It is not in dispute that no charge has yet been framed in the Trial .

Likewise, the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza are not implicated as accused in the

present crime. The charge-sheet indicates that the Investigating Officer

recorded statements of Mangesh Chavan, Milind Dongare, and Sachin Gorle.

Similarly, the learned Magistrate recorded statements of these witnesses under

Section 164 of Cr.P.C. After recording their statements, the Investigating

Officer moved an application on 26th October, 2021, seeking permission to

conduct further investigation against the proposed accused, i.e., the present

Petitioner, and one Mahesh Oza. On 13th November, 2021, the learned

Magistrate granted permission to investigate the crime against the proposed

accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Police Inspector

filed a report before the learned Magistrate.


6.         Respondent No. 2/Complainant, being dissatisfied with the

investigation conducted by the concerned Investigating Officer, filed an

application (Exh.106) on 21st/22nd June, 2022 with the learned Magistrate

contending that the Investigating Officer is evading the Petitioner from being

implicated as an accused. Therefore, the Petitioner requested the learned

Magistrate to appoint a competent officer to carry out further investigation.
                                   6 / 27
The Investigating Officer, by filing his reply, corroborated and supported the

said application, and pursuant thereto, the learned Magistrate passed the

impugned order.

7.         It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C.,

which reads as under :-

           “173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. -

           (8).    Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further
           investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section
           (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such
           investigation, the officer-in-charge of the police station obtains
           further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the
           Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in
           the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6)
           shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports
           as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section
           (2).”
8.         Bare perusal of the above provision reveals that there is nothing in

Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. to suggest that the Court is obliged to hear the

accused or proposed accused before any such direction is made or passes any

order on application for further investigation. Likewise, there is no bar to the

complainant in filing an application seeking further investigation in the crime.

The Section does not indicate that the accused must be given an opportunity of

hearing before passing any order on application for further investigation. On

the contrary, it is trite law that it is not necessary to give an opportunity of

hearing to the proposed accused as a matter of course while passing an order

on an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.
                                    7 / 27
               As to Point No. (i).

9.             Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 and the learned A.P.P.

strongly raised the preliminary objection that the proposed accused, i.e., the

Petitioner, has no locus to challenge the impugned order, as he has no concern

with the investigation in the crime in question. Therefore, the Court is not

obliged to hear the petitioner before passing any order on the application for

further investigation, as doing so would frustrate the objective of an effective

investigation. Even the proposed accused, i.e., the Petitioner, has no say at this

stage in respect of the application under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. There is

no question of a violation of the accused's personal liberty; therefore, there is

no necessity to hear him. The Petitioner has no concern with the investigation;

therefore, passing the impugned order would not prejudice his rights. On that

ground alone, they urged that the Petitioner has no locus to challenge the

impugned order and that the petition is liable to be dismissed. To buttress his

submission, he relied on the following judgments :-

               (i)      Satishkumar Nyalchand Shah Vs. State of Gujarat1
                        (Paras : 5.2, 9, 10, 11) (for short “Satishkumar”)


               (ii)     Dinubhai Boghabai Solanki Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.2
                        (Paras: 50 to 53). (for short, ‘Dinubhai’)




1    (2020) 4 SCC 22
2    (2014) 4 SCC 626
                                       8 / 27
               (iii)    Union of India & Anr. Vs. W.N. Chadha3
                        (Paras : 89, 90, 92, 94, 98) (for short, ‘W.N. Chadha’)


               (iv)     Manishaben Vrajlal Thakkar Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.4
                        (Paras : 3.8, 5, 8VII, 10, 14, 15, 16). (for short, ‘Manishaben’)
10.            As against this, though learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner

advanced the argument at length, he has not responded specifically to the

submission on the said point. Still, he has only emphasised that the impugned

order specifically directs further investigation naming the present Petitioner,

and therefore the Petitioner has locus to challenge the said order. However, he

did not advance any argument on that point. The thrust of his argument was

that Respondent No. 2 has no locus to file an application seeking further

investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.; therefore, the learned

Magistrate's passing of the impugned order is contrary to settled position of

law. He further canvassed that, by order dated 13 th November, 2021, the

learned Magistrate directed the Investigating Officer to carry out further

investigation, and pursuant to that order, the Investigating Officer has also

filed a report before the learned Magistrate. Therefore, there is no need to

direct further investigation again on the application of Respondent No.2 –

Complainant, who has no locus.

3   1993 Supp (4) SCC 260
4   Order dt. 18.08.2024 in Cri.Rev.Appln. No. 10 of 2024 by Gujarat High Court




                                               9 / 27
11.        While dealing with the aforesaid controversy, it would be

appropriate to take into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for

Respondent No. 2 one by one.

(a)        In Satishkumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically

held that “the appellant against whom no relief is sought in the application

concerned for further investigation has no locus and/or no say regarding the

application for further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. He cannot

be said to be either a necessary or proper party to the application or the

proposed accused against whom further investigation is sought. He is not

required to be heard at this stage. There is no question of hearing the

accused/one of the accused against whom the charge-sheet is already filed,

and trial against whom is in progress, and no relief of further investigation is

sought against him”.


(b)        In Dinubhai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “it is

a settled law that the accused has no right to be heard at the stage of the

investigation or does not have to say in the matter of appointment of an

investigation agency or have any say in regard to the manner and method of

investigation. Similarly, it is held that “the High Court has no obligation

either to hear or to make a potential accused a party to the proceeding before

directing that the investigation be conducted by the CBI”. It is not necessary
                                  10 / 27
to give the proposed accused an opportunity of hearing as a matter of course.

If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing have to be given in every

criminal case before taking any action against the accused person, it would

frustrate the entire objective of an effective investigation.”

(c)        In W.N. Chadha (supra), it is observed that ‘the audi alteram

partem’ rule is attracted where decision/action results in violation of life and

personal liberty, but where investigation is conducted in strict compliance

with statute, the rule cannot be invoked as natural justice is being followed.

The accused has never been prejudiced and deprived of his right to property

due to the alleged non-compliance of the principle of audi alteram partem.”

(d)        In Manishaben Thakkar (supra), the Gujarat High Court, after

considering the various judgments, has held in Paragraph no. 14, as under :-

      “Indeed, the complainant has a right to draw the attention of the Court
      seeking further investigation to prevent miscarriage of justice; and to
      unearth the truth; but that right cannot be misused by filing repeated
      applications where the Court already noted the subjective satisfaction to
      its conscience that no further investigation is required.”


12.        A bare perusal of the mandate in the above judgments would

abundantly clear that it would not be necessary to give an opportunity of

hearing to the proposed accused. As a matter of course, if an opportunity of

hearing has to be given in every criminal case before taking any action against

the accused person, it would frustrate the entire objective of an effective

investigation.
                                       11 / 27
13.         Undisputedly, in the case at hand, the Petitioner was not impleaded

as an accused at the time when the learned Magistrate passed the impugned

order, but he was shown as a proposed accused. The complainant sought

further investigation against him and one Mahesh Oza, as the statements of

Milind Dongare, Mangesh Chavan and Sachin Gorle prima facie point the

finger of suspicion at the Petitioner. It is trite law that it is not necessary to

give the proposed accused an opportunity of hearing as a matter of course

while passing an order on an application for further investigation under

Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. Based on the statements of witnesses, the

learned Magistrate passed the impugned order.

14.        The Petitioner was/is not an accused in the present crime.

Therefore, he need not worry about the order permitting the Investigating

Officer to carry out further investigation. Why is he shying away from facing

the investigation? If he has not done anything, he has no reason to object to

the direction for further investigation, but he may assist the investigation as

the complainant’s associate.

15.        It is worth noting that the offence committed in the case at hand is

of a serious nature, and the accused persons, in a predetermined and

preplanned manner, hatched a conspiracy and committed the offence in

question. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth, punish the

guilty and protect the innocent. Finding the truth is a herculean task in such

                                   12 / 27
offences, as accused persons, in a predetermined and preplanned manner, have

committed the crime. Therefore, the duty is cast upon the Court to be

extremely careful and cautious in dealing with the complaint and must

consider the realities. The allegations in the complaint need to be scrutinised

with great care and circumspection. Had the Petitioner had no concern with the

alleged crime, he need not worry if the Court has permitted further

investigation. Indeed, the complainant has the right to draw the attention of the

Court and seek further investigation to prevent miscarriage of justice and unearth

the truth.

16.          Moreover, the Court owes a duty to look beyond the mere face

value of F.I.R. or complaint, as it is not enough to simply examine if the

written averments mechanically disclose ingredients of the alleged offence.

Instead, the Court must meticulously scrutinise all attending circumstances

emerging from the record, exercise due care and circumspection, and read

between the lines to ascertain the truth. On the contrary, the Petitioner’s own

conduct in filing the Intervention Application/this Petition and thereby trying

to obstruct the investigation/legal process leads to draw an adverse inference,

because if he genuinely has no concern with the alleged crime, there should be

no anxiety or fear regarding conducting a thorough investigation.

17.          In the light of the above discussion and the dictum laid down in the

above-cited judgments and the mandate in Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., in my

                                    13 / 27
view, the Petitioner has no locus to intervene in the application (Exh.106) and

to argue the same or no locus to challenge the same in this writ petition. On

that ground alone, the petition needs to be dismissed. Accordingly, I answer

Point (i) in the negative.

              As to Point Nos. (ii) and (iii).

18.           While dealing with Points (ii) and (iii), I would like to rely on

Paragraph No.14 in the judgment of Manishaben Thakkar (supra), which is

reproduced hereinabove, bare perusal of which reveals that the complainant,

being an aggrieved person, has every right to draw the attention of the Court

for seeking further investigation to prevent miscarriage of justice and to

unearth the truth. Apart from that, Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. does not bar

the complainant from moving an application seeking further investigation.

19.           The crux of the arguments of learned Senior Counsel for the

Petitioner is that Respondent No. 2 - Complainant does not have locus to seek

further investigation and therefore, cannot seek further investigation in the

crime. Secondly, he propounded that the learned Magistrate has taken

cognisance of the matter and therefore has no power to direct further

investigation. To substantiate his submissions, he relied on the following

judgments :-

             (i)       Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel
                       and Ors. 5 (Paras : 48, 49, 50, 51). (for short, ‘Amrutbhai’)

5   (2017) 4 SCC 177
                                       14 / 27
               (ii)     Janata Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit Vs. State of
                        Maharashtra 6 (for short, ‘Janata Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha’)
               (iii)    Ravindra Rajnarayan Pandey @ Dabba Pandey Vs. State of
                        Maharashtra and Anr. 7 (Paras : 17, 19, 20, 21, 22). ( for short,
                        ‘Ravindra Pandey’)
               (iv)     Umesh Pandurang Gore Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 8 (for
                        short, ‘Umesh Gore’)

20.            Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 – Complainant

strenuously opposes the same, contending that the dictum laid down in

Amrutbhai (supra), Athul Rao Vs. State of Karnataka 9 and Bikash Ranjan

Rout Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 10 have been held to be contrary, and the Hon’ble

Supreme Court overruled them in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors. Vs.

State of Gujarat and Anr.11, and therefore, the dictum laid down in the said

judgment is hardly of any assistance to the Petitioner in support of his

submissions. He drew my attention to Paragraph Nos. 10, 14, 17, 38 to 40, and

42 to 44 of the said judgment. As such, he submitted that in view of the law

laid down in the said judgment, the learned Magistrate is empowered to direct

further investigation in the offence until the trial commences, i.e. charges are

framed. In the case at hand, no charge has been framed; therefore, passing an

order by the learned Magistrate is just and proper. He further placed reliance


6    2021 SCC OnLine Bom 4652
7    Cr. W.P. No.4128 of 2019 dt. 08.01.2024 (Bombay High Court)
8    W.P. No.4539 of 2018 dt. 22.04.2022 (Bombay High Court)
9    (2018) 14 SCC 298
10   (2019) 5 SCC 542
11   (2019) 17 SCC 1




                                             15 / 27
on the judgments of Anant Thakur Karmuse Vs. State of Maharashtra &

Others12, Dineshkumar Gokuldas Kalantry Vs. State of Maharashtra and

Anr.13, Siby Paul Paulose, Manavalan Vs. State represented by S.I. of Police

and Anr.14 and Manishaben (supra), and submitted that, to prevent miscarriage

of justice and unearth the truth, it is necessary to direct the Police Inspector of

the concerned police station to appoint an Investigating Officer to conduct

further investigation. Therefore, he submitted that the law laid down in Janata

Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha (supra), Ravindra Pandey (supra) and Umesh Gore

(supra) is hardly of any assistance to the Petitioner in support of his

contention. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned order passed by the

learned Magistrate is just and proper and there is no need to interfere with it.

21.         While considering the above issues, it appears that the Investigating

Officer recorded statements of witnesses, i.e. Mangesh Chavan, an Advocate,

who states that, on instructions of the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza, he

prepared the draft of a document. However, in the said draft, some

alteration/modification had been made, and he categorically stated that the

draft document given by him and the document prepared are different. Second

witness, Milind Dongare, a Notary Advocate, stated that he did not notarise

the said document, but that his forged signature and stamp were affixed to it.

12 (2023) 5 SCC 802
13 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5532
14 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4273


                                   16 / 27
The said document was not registered with him; therefore, the Investigating

Officer, by application dated 26th October, 2021 (Exh.88), sought permission

to conduct further investigation in the matter, and the learned Magistrate

granted permission.     The report submitted by the Investigating Officer

indicates that the investigation against the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza is

still ongoing, and after ascertaining the material against them, he will take

further steps in the matter; accordingly, arrangements were made to file a

further report.

22.        Respondent No. 2, being dissatisfied with the investigation, made

an application contending that the Investigating Officer is evading the

investigation against the Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza, and therefore, he has

moved an application to appoint an Investigating Officer to conduct further

investigation.

23.        On 05th November, 2022, the Investigating Officer filed a reply to

the said application and consented to the same and asserted that a thorough

investigation is necessary in the present crime. The learned Magistrate, after

considering the submission and material on record, allowed the application

(Exh.106) and directed the Police Inspector with Hatkanangale Police Station

to appoint an Investigating Officer to investigate the participation of the

proposed accused, i.e., the present Petitioner and one Mahesh Oza, as per

Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C.
                                 17 / 27
24.       While determining the controversy, it is necessary to consider the

dictum laid down in Vinubhai Malviya (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in

Paragraph No. 10, framed the question of law as to “whether, after a charge-

sheet is filed by the police, the learned Magistrate has the power to order

further investigation and, if so, up to what stage of a criminal proceeding?”

While replying to the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph Nos. 42,

43 and 44 dealt with the same and categorically held that the learned

Magistrate is empowered to order further investigation until charges are

framed under Section 156(3) read with Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. I would like

to reproduce Paragraph Nos. 42, 43 and 44 as under :-

          “42.         There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as
          to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly
          cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the
          Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further
          investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences.
          Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court,
          in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay
          Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra)
          having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance
          is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any
          importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of
          the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair
          and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation would
          lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of
          course, to the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8), to further
          investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory
          jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-
          trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases
          may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not
          wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is
          not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of
                                    18 / 27
the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to
Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of
the CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all
stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be
exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of
each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is
within the discretion of the learned Magistrate, who will exercise such
discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for
example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or
exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial
justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further
delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held
in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the
judgments in Amrutbhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and
Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled.
Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration)
(1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
(2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.

43.         We now come to certain other judgments that were cited
before us. King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 was
strongly relied upon by Shri Basant for the proposition that, unlike
superior Courts, Magistrates did not possess any inherent power under
the CrPC. Since we have grounded the power of the Magistrate to order
further investigation until charges are framed under Section 156(3) read
with Section 173(8) of the CrPC, no question as to a Magistrate exercising
any inherent power under the CrPC would arise in this case.

44.          Union of India and Anr. v. W.N. Chadha (1993) Supp. 4 SCC
260 is a judgment which states that the accused has no right to
participate in the investigation till process is issued to him, provided
there is strict compliance with the requirements of fair investigation.
Likewise, the judgments in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalongappa
Konjalgi & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 736, Prabha Mathur and Anr. v. Pramod
Aggarwal & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 469, Narender G. Goel v. State of
Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 65 and Dinubhai Bhogabhai Solanki v. State
of Gujarat & Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 626, which state that the accused has
no right to be heard at the stage of investigation, have very little to do
with the precise question before us. All these judgments are, therefore,
                         19 / 27
           distinguishable. Further, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2010) 12
           SCC 254, is a judgment which distinguishes between further
           investigation and re-investigation, and holds that a superior court may,
           in order to prevent miscarriage of criminal justice if it considers
           necessary, direct investigation de novo, whereas a Magistrate’s power is
           limited to ordering further investigation. Since the present case is not
           concerned with re-investigation, this judgment also cannot take us much
           further. Likewise, Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753,
           held that an accused cannot ask to change an investigating agency, or to
           require that an investigation be done in a particular manner, including
           asking for a court-monitored investigation. This judgment also is far
           removed from the question that has been decided by us in the facts of
           this case.”

25.        In Paragraph No. 42, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically

held that, to the extent that judgments in Amrutbhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao

(supra) and Bikash Rout (supra) have been held to be contrary, they stand

overruled, and therefore, in Paragraph No. 43, held that the learned Magistrate

is empowered to direct investigation until charges are framed.

26.        The judgments in Janata Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha Maryadit

(supra) and Umesh Gore (supra), on which the Petitioner is relying, have

passed the order based on the dictum laid down in Amrutbhai Patel (supra).

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinubhai Malviya (supra) has overruled the

finding recorded in Amrutbhai Patel (supra) to that extent. Therefore, the

dictum laid down in Janata Nagari Sahakari Pat Sanstha (supra) and Umesh

Gore (supra) is hardly of any assistance to the Petitioner in support of his

submissions that the learned Magistrate is not empowered to order further

investigation after he takes cognizance of the matter or the complainant cannot
                                   20 / 27
file an application seeking further investigation. On the contrary, the

complainant, being an aggrieved person and the one who brought the matter to

the Court's notice, has the right to draw the Court's attention and seek further

investigation to prevent miscarriage of justice and unearth the truth. Section

173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. does not bar the complainant from seeking further

investigation, as observed above. The ultimate object of justice is to find out

the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. If the Petitioner is

innocent, then he need not worry about the impugned order if the investigation

goes on further. It is also necessary to consider that the said offence was

committed in a preplanned and predetermined manner; therefore, finding out

the truth is a herculean task. Therefore, further investigation is required in the

crime.

27.        This Court, in Dineshkumar Kalantry (supra), after considering

various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court including Amrutbhai,

Vinubhai, has categorically held that “the complainant’s application under

Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. is maintainable even after framing of charge”.

28.        The Kerala High Court in Siby Paul (supra), in Paragraph No.14,

has held that “the learned Trial Court can order further investigation under

Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. on the basis of application preferred in this regard by

the de facto complainant at any stage irrespective of the stage of pre-

cognizance or post-cognizance stage”.

                                    21 / 27
29.          Besides, it is a settled law that the learned Magistrate is empowered

to pass the order for further investigation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vinubhai Malviya (supra) has laid down, “there is no good reason given by the

Court in Amrutbhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Rout (supra) as

to why a Magistrate’s powers to order further investigation would suddenly

cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the

Magistrate; while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate

the offence continues till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would

not accord with the earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sakiri,

Samaj Parivartan Smudaya, Vinay Tyagi, and Hardeep Singh; having clearly

held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only

after charges are framed.”

30.          In Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat15, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that “if there is a necessity for further investigation when

fresh facts come to light, then the interest of justice is paramount and trumps

the need to avoid any delay being caused to the proceeding”. The Court

therefore held that “whether a further investigation is warranted, the hands of

the investigating agency or the Court should not be tied down on the ground

that further investigation may delay the trial, as the ultimate object is to arrive

at the truth.”
15 (2004) 5 SCC 347




                                    22 / 27
31.         In Anant Thakur (supra), the facts were that initially the

chargesheet was filed against accused No.1 to 10 on 07-12-2020. Thereafter,

the prosecution filed a supplementary chargesheet against accused No.11 and

12 on 28-08-2021. Accused No.13 was not even charge-sheeted in the

supplementary chargesheet. The Court then framed charges against accused

Nos. 1 to 12 on 28-08-2021. Only thereafter, the second supplementary

charge-sheet was filed against accused No. 13 on 05-03-2022. According to

the state investigating agency, further investigation was still required on

certain aspects. As such, this court held that “the victim has a fundamental right

of fair investigation and fair trial. Therefore, mere filing of the chargesheet and

framing of the charges cannot be an impediment in ordering further investigation,

if the facts so warrant.”

32.         Apart from the above discussion, on plain reading of Sections

156(3) and 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., it is clear that the power of the Magistrate is

very wide. For this, the judicial authority must be satisfied that the police have

conducted a proper investigation; and to ensure that a proper investigation

takes place in the sense of a just investigation by the police, the Magistrate is

empowered to pass an order of further investigation.

33.         Even assuming the case at hand, on the application of Respondent

No.2 – Complainant, the learned Magistrate, after satisfying himself, has

passed the order and it is not the case that merely based on the application

                                    23 / 27
filed by Respondent No.2 – Complainant, the learned Magistrate has passed

the order without giving any reason. The ultimate aim of investigation and

enquiry, whether by police or by the Magistrate, is to ensure that those who

have actually committed a crime are correctly booked, and those who have not

are not arraigned to stand trial. This is the minimal procedural requirement that

is the fundamental requirement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and

cannot be doubted.

34.        In Ravindra Pandey (supra), the facts were that the Investigating

Officer had completed the investigation and filed an ‘A’ Summary report

before the Magistrate. The learned Magistrate accepted the same. Respondent

No.2 therein, i.e. the original complainant, did not file any objection, nor did he

challenge the order of the Magistrate granting ‘A’ Summary. Thereafter, on 15th

October, 2015, i.e. after a period of eight years, he filed an application in the

MECR by way of protest petition under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. seeking

directions from the Magistrate to direct the CBI/CID or any other authority to

initiate the inquiry into the fraud committed in MECR No. 5 of 2005. It is

pertinent to note that in the said matter, the complainant has not challenged the

order granting ‘A’ Summary; instead, the complainant has moved an

application to carry out further investigation, i.e., after eight years, accepting

the final report. Moreover, this Court has observed that the supplementary

statement of one witness, Kavita, does not in any way indicate that the

Petitioner was a part of the sex trade. However, the facts in the case at hand
                                    24 / 27
are quite different from those in the said case. In the present case, the police

have conducted the investigation, and the charge-sheet has been filed. During

the investigation, some statements were recorded, and during the recording of

the said statements, they pointed the finger of suspicion towards the Petitioner

and one Mahes Oza; therefore, the Investigating Officer also sought further

investigation, and thereafter the Complainant sought the same, which is

pending. In the case at hand, the question is not whether the order was

challenged after eight years; rather, the supplementary statements of the

witnesses indicate suspicion against the petitioner. Therefore, in my view, the

observations made in the said judgment are hardly of any assistance to the

Petitioner in support of his submission.

35.        In the said judgment, this Court has categorically held that “it is

permissible for the investigating agency to carry out further investigation and

there is no bar to conducting such investigation, and it is not necessary for the

Magistrate to review or recall the order accepting the final report”.

36.         In the wake of the above discussion, at the outset, it appears that in

the case at hand, the charge has yet to be framed. Similarly, the Petitioner is

not shown or implicated as an accused. Respondent No.2, being a

Complainant, is an aggrieved party and has locus to seek further investigation

to prevent miscarriage of justice and unearth the truth. Apart from that, the

Magistrate is empowered to direct further investigation if he is satisfied that it

                                   25 / 27
is necessary. Having considered the law laid down in Vinubhai Malviya

(supra), Amrutbhai Patel (supra), Manishaben Thakkar (supra), and Anant

Thakur (supra), in my view, Respondent No.2, being a complainant, has the

right to draw the attention of the Court seeking further investigation to prevent

miscarriage of justice and to unearth the truth. Also, the learned Magistrate is

empowered to direct further investigation in the crime until the trial is

commenced. Therefore, I do not find substance in the submission of learned

Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that Respondent No. 2 – Complainant has no

locus to file an application seeking further investigation, or that the learned

Magistrate is not empowered to direct further investigation after taking

cognisance. Therefore, his prayer to that extent is turned down. As such, I have

no    hesitation      in   holding   that      Respondent   No.   2,   being   a

complainant/informant, has locus to file an application before the learned

Magistrate seeking further investigation in the crime under Section 173(8) of

the Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate is also empowered to direct further

investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. even after taking cognisance

of the matter. Hence, accordingly, I answer Point Nos. (ii) and (iii) in the

affirmative.

             As to Point No. (iv).

37.            In view of the judgments in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. and

Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.16, Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan

16 (2009) 2 SCC 370
                                     26 / 27
and Ors.17 and Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra18, in my view, despite

the availability of the alternate remedy of filing a Revision U/s 397 of the Cr.

P. C., the petition U/s 482 is maintainable. Hence, I answer Point (iv) in the

affirmative.

             As to Point No. (v).

38.            Perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned Magistrate,
after considering the material placed before him, has rightly passed the order,
and in Paragraph No.6 has rightly held that the proposed accused have no
locus standi to intervene in the application and argue on the application.
Similarly, Paragraph No. 8 dealt with the statement of Mangesh Chavan and
observed that a prima facie accusation appears against the Petitioner and one
Mahesh Oza, and that further investigation is needed in that regard.
Accordingly, the impugned order was passed. Hence, I do not find any
illegality or perversity in the impugned order to warrant interference in it in
the writ jurisdiction. Hence, I answer Point (v) in the negative. Accordingly,
the following order is passed.

39.            As a result, Criminal Writ Petition, being bereft of merits, stands
dismissed.

40.            The Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

41.            The Petition is disposed of.



                                                ( ABHAY J. MANTRI, J. )
SSD


17 (2016) 16 SCC 30
18 (1977) 4 SCC 551

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