Bombay High Court
THOGYA RUPA VALVI AND OTHERSversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
- Disposal
- DISMISSED
- Bench
- MEHROZ K PATHAN
Holding
The Court held that criminal proceedings under Section 145 are not maintainable when a civil suit concerning the same property is pending, and that a revision under Section 397 is maintainable as the order is final, leading to dismissal of the writ petition.
Summary
The Valvi family filed a criminal writ petition seeking to quash an order dated 29 January 2021 in which the Tahsildar, acting under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, held the respondents in possession of disputed agricultural land. The petitioners argued that the revision under Section 397 CrPC was not maintainable because a civil suit for partition of the same land was already pending before the civil court. The State contended that the order under Section 145 was a final order and thus subject to revision. The High Court examined Supreme Court precedents, holding that when a civil suit concerning possession is pending, parallel criminal proceedings under Section 145 cannot continue, and that the order under Section 145 is a final order, not interlocutory, making revision under Section 397 permissible. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.
Issues considered
- Whether a revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code against an order passed under Section 145 is maintainable.
- Whether proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code are maintainable when a civil suit for partition/possession of the same property is pending.
- Whether the Tahsildar can determine possession under Section 145 while a civil suit is pending.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 145, 397
- Constitution of India — s. 227
Subjects
- Section 145 CrPC
- Section 397 CrPC
- civil suit pending
- parallel proceedings
- possession dispute
- revision
- criminal writ petition
- land dispute
- Tahsildar
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:8452
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
944 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.540 OF 2023
1] Thogya Rupa Valvi
Age: Adult, Occu : Agriculture
2] Imra Rupa Valvi
Age: Adult, Occu : Agriculture
3] Bablya Ditya Valvi
Age: Adult, Occu : Agriculture
4] Vasant Irma Valvi
Age: Adult, Occu : Agriculture
All R/o. Nandalwad Tq. Akrani,
Dist. Nandurbar. .. PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1] The State of Maharashtra
Through Tahsildar, Akrani
Tq. Akrani, Dist. Nandurbar.
2] Diwtya Satya Valavi,
Age: 60 years, Occu : Agri
3] Bhamtya Satya Valavi
Age: 58 years, Occu : Agri
4] Selya Satya Valavi
Age: 60 years, Occu : Agri
5] Dewlya Satya Valavi
Age: 54 years, Occu : Agri
6] Kella Gonya Valavi
Age: 60 years Occu : Agri
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7] Deka Saya Valvi
Age: 45 years, Occu : Agriculture
8] Dilip Bhamta Valvi
Age : 32 years, Occu : Agriculture
All R/o. Nandalwad, Tq. Akrani
Dist. Nandurbar. .. RESPONDENTS
...
Advocate for the petitioners : Mr.Syed Azizoddin R.
APP for Respondent-State : Mr.P.D.Patil
…
CORAM : MEHROZ K. PATHAN, J.
DATE : 17.02.2026
ORDER :
1] The petitioners have filed the present Writ
Petition thereby praying for quashing and setting aside the
order dated 29.1.2021 passed in Criminal Revision
Application No.16/2018, whereby the order passed by the
Tahsildar, Akrani in a proceeding initiated under Section
145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the instance of
the Officer incharge of Dhadgaon Police Station, came to be
quashed and set aside thereby holding that the respondents
herein are in possession of the disputed land bearing Survey
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No. 44 area 4.29 Hectors and Survey No.48 area 3.13
Hectors.
2] The learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that the revision against an order passed in exercise of
powers under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure is
not maintainable.
3] The learned APP strongly opposed the said
submission on the ground that the order passed under
Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure finally decides
the right of the parties and is not an interlocutory order and
as such revision under Section 397 of the Criminal
Procedure Code is maintainable.
4] I have gone through the impugned order dated
29.11.2021 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Shahada in Criminal Revision No.16/2018. The learned
Revisional Court has considered in detail objections raised
by the respondents to the proceedings under Section 145 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated at the behest of the
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Police Officer particularly when the petitioners herein have
already filed Regular Civil Suit No.2 of 2017 for partition
before the learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Dhadgaon.
The Executive Magistrate / Tahsildar, Dhadgaon, thus,
ought not to have passed the impugned order under Section
145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in view of pendency of
the said suit between the parties.
5] The learned Revisional Court has further relied
upon the provisions of Section 145 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and has come to the conclusion that in view
of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 145 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the concerned Magistrate shall
not go into merits or the claims of any of the parties to
possess the disputed property and is required only to decide
as to which party was in possession of the subject of the
dispute on the date of the order made by him under sub-
Section (1).
6] Perusal of the order passed by the Tahsildar,
Akrani would show that the Tahsildar, Akrani had found the
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petitioners to be in possession only on the ground that they
are entitled for obtaining possession of the said agricultural
land and accordingly passed the impugned order under
Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code by restraining the
petitioners herein from causing any obstruction to the
petitioners herein in its possession over the said agricultural
lands until the said party is evicted lawfully. No reasoning
stated in the impugned order as to how the Tahsildar has
reached to a conclusion that the petitioners herein were in
possession of the said land. From the record it could be seen
that the respondents were in cultivating possession of the
agricultural land Survey Nos. 44 and 48 since as long back
as on 26.12.1939 through their ancestor Satya Kakdya Bhil
(the father of respondent nos.2 to 5 and grand father of
respondent nos. 6 to 8] and after his death on 16.05.1971,
the respondent nos. 2 to 8 succeeded to the said agricultural
lands and are in cultivating possession thereof. Thus, after
taking into consideration the fact that there is already civil
suit filed for partition and the same is pending before the
Civil Court at Dhadgaon in respect of the said agricultural
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land, the findings arrived at by the learned Tahsildar merely
on the basis of entitlement of the petitioners herein to be in
possession of the land on the date of passing of the order
was rightly set aside by the learned Revisional Court.
7] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of in
case of M. Siddique Vs. Mahant Suresh Das, reported in
(2020) 1 SCC 1 observed as under:-
299. Where a suit is instituted for possession or for
declaration of title before a competent civil court, the
proceedings under Section 145 should not continue. This
Court has analysed the above proposition of law in the
following cases:
299.1. In Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey , (2000) 4
SCC 440, S.N. Variava, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench
of this Court held thus :
“12. … The law on this subject-matter has been
settled by the decision of this Court in Ram Sumer
PuriMahant v. State of U.P (1985) 1 SCC 427. In
this case it has been held as follows :
‘2. … When a civil litigation is pending for the
property wherein the question of possession is
involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly
any justification for initiating a parallel criminal
proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is
no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the
decree of the civil court is binding on the criminal
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court in a matter like the one before us. … parallel
proceedings should not be permitted to continue
and in the event of a decree of the civil court, the
criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its
jurisdiction particularly when possession is being
examined by the civil court and parties are in a
position to approach the civil court for interim
orders such as injunction or appointment of
Receiver for adequate protection of the property
during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of
litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor
should public time be allowed to be wasted over
meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied
that parallel proceedings should not continue….’ ”
299.2. The Court in Amresh Tiwari [Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta
Prasad Dubey, (2000) 4 SCC 440 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 806]
rejected the submission that the principle in Ram Sumer
PuriMahant v. State of U.P. [Ram Sumer PuriMahant v.
State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] will
apply only after the civil court has adjudicated on the
issue:
“13. We are unable to accept the submission that
the principles laid down in Ram Sumer case [Ram
Sumer PuriMahant v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC
427 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 98] would only apply if the
civil court has already adjudicated on the dispute
regarding the property and given a finding. In our
view Ram Sumer case is laying down that
multiplicity of litigation should be avoided as it is
not in the interest of the parties and public time
would be wasted over meaningless litigation. On
this principle it has been held that when possession
is being examined by the civil court and parties are
in a position to approach the civil court for
adequate protection of the property during the
pendency of the dispute, the parallel proceedings
i.e. Section 145 proceedings should not continue.”
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Thus, in view of pendency of the civil suit
between the petitioners and the respondents, particularly
taking into consideration the fact that the civil suit is filed
by the petitioners seeking partition and separate possession,
the proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure
Code was not maintainable. The findings arrived at by the
learned Revisional Court does not call for any interference
of this Court under its supervisory jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Constitution of India.
8] The other ground raised by the petitioner for
interference in the impugned order is that revision under
Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the
order passed by the Magistrate, exercising powers under
Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is not
maintainable. The provisions of Section 397 (2) of Criminal
Procedure Code would clearly show that the only
prohibition for entertaining revision under Section 397 of
the Criminal Procedure Code is in relation to the
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interlocutory order passed in any other appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceedings. The revision filed under Section 397
(1) of Criminal Procedure Code by the respondent herein
was against the final order passed under Section 145 of the
Criminal Procedure Code by the learned Magistrate. The
said prohibition under Section 397 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code against filing of the revision would
therefore not apply in the present case. The order under
Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a final order,
deciding as to who was in possession on the date of passing
of the order and after such decision, the entire proceedings
terminates. Thus, in my opinion the order under Section
145 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be said to be an
interlocutory order for the purposes of the bar under section
397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code . The ground raised
by the learned counsel for the petitioners is, therefore,
misconceived and liable to be rejected.
The Criminal Writ Petition is, therefore, devoid
of merits and liable to be dismissed. Hence, the present Writ
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Petition is hereby dismissed.
9] The observations by this Court are prima facie
made with an intention to decide the present Criminal Writ
Petition against the proceedings initiated under Section 145
of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Police Station Officer
and the same shall not influence any other proceedings
pending before any other Court.
[MEHROZ K. PATHAN]
JUDGE
DDC
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