MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED (MSEDCL), THROUGH EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (EEversusM/S. AVINASH EQUIPMENTS PVT. LTD. AND ANR

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                      Shabnoor
                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                        WRIT PETITION NO.5871 OF 2013

                      Maharashtra State Electricity
                      Distribution Company Limited
         Digitally
         signed by
         SHABNOOR     Through Executive Engineer                    … Petitioner
SHABNOOR AYUB
AYUB
PATHAN
         PATHAN
         Date:
                                  V/s.
         2026.03.04
         16:56:47
         +0530        M/s. Avinash Equipments Pvt. Ltd.
                      & Anr.                                        … Respondents

                      Mr. Rahul Sinha, Soham Bhalerao, Harchit Tyagi i/b
                      DSK Legal, for the Petitioner.
                      Mr. Mahendra Agvekar a/w Shraddha Chavan, for
                      Respondent No.1.


                                                   CORAM      : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                                   DATED      : MARCH 4, 2026
                      P.C.:

                      1.      The petitioner has brought this petition challenging the order
                      passed by Respondent No.2. By that order Respondent No.2 has
                      taken the view that the petitioner can issue electricity bills only for
                      a period of two years. It was further observed that if the petitioner
                      intends to recover electricity charges for the period prior to June
                      2010, then such recovery cannot be made through the billing
                      mechanism under the Electricity Act.

                      2.      According to Respondent No.2, for that earlier period the
                      petitioner must approach the civil court and seek recovery through
                      a civil suit. The effect of this direction is that the petitioner’s
                      authority to raise and recover electricity charges through statutory



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billing has been confined only to a limited time frame of two years.
The petitioner contends that such a restriction directly affects its
statutory powers under the Electricity Act and therefore the
legality of the order requires examination by this Court.

3.    The main grievance of the petitioner is that Respondent No.2
has misunderstood the scope of the statutory powers available to
the electricity distribution licensee. The petitioner submits that
under the scheme of the Electricity Act it has a clear authority to
issue bills for electricity supplied to the consumer. According to the
petitioner, this authority cannot be artificially restricted by holding
that the bill must necessarily relate only to consumption within the
preceding two years. The petitioner further points out that in many
situations the actual amount payable may become clear only later.
This may happen because of revision of tariff, correction of earlier
billing errors, or issuance of a supplementary or revised bill after
verification of records. In such circumstances the liability of the
consumer becomes crystallised only when the revised bill is issued.
Therefore the petitioner argues that the date of consumption
cannot automatically be treated as the date when the amount
becomes due. If such a rigid view is taken, it would unnecessarily
defeat the statutory scheme under which the electricity supplier is
permitted to raise revised or supplementary bills whenever a
legitimate correction becomes necessary.

4.    This Court has recently examined a similar question in
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. v. Reenu
Mohandas & Anr (Writ Petition No. 1731 of 2011, decided on 14
January 2026). In that decision the Court considered the true



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meaning of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the stage
at which the amount can be said to have become first due. While
dealing with that issue the Court referred to earlier judicial
pronouncements and explained the position in paragraphs 6 and 7
of the judgment. The Court noted that the Division Bench in the
case of Rototex Polyester had interpreted the expression “the date
when such sum becomes first due.” It was held that this expression
refers to the date on which the consumer receives a valid and
lawful bill. In other words, the liability of the consumer becomes
payable when the bill is raised and communicated to the
consumer. The Court also noted that this interpretation has been
consistently followed and no contrary material was placed before
the Court to suggest a different understanding of the provision.

5.    The Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court
in Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs. Rahamatullah Khan(2020) 4
SCC 650. The Supreme Court clarified that Section 56(2) does not
prohibit the electricity supplier from raising a supplementary bill
even after the expiry of two years. What the provision restricts is
only the power to disconnect electricity supply for non payment of
dues that are more than two years old. The judgment makes it
clear that although disconnection is restricted after the lapse of
two years, the electricity company is still free to adopt other lawful
methods for recovery of the dues. Thus, the statutory provision
does not extinguish the liability itself. It only limits the coercive
step of disconnection.

6.    When the present case is examined in light of the above legal
position, the reasoning adopted by Respondent No.2 cannot be



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sustained. In the present matter the petitioner issued a revised bill
on 1 June 2012. Once that revised bill was issued, the amount
mentioned in that bill became payable from that date. Therefore,
the relevant point of time for considering the liability was the date
of issuance of the revised bill and not the earlier date on which
electricity might have been consumed. Respondent No.2, however,
proceeded on the assumption that the two year period must always
be counted from the date of consumption. Such an approach
overlooks the interpretation placed by the courts on the expression
“sum becomes first due.” The law, as clarified in the decisions
referred to above, clearly indicates that the liability becomes due
when a valid bill is issued. Hence there was no legal justification
for restricting the petitioner’s right to issue bills merely by
calculating the period of two years from the date of consumption.
The impugned order, to that extent, proceeds on an incorrect
understanding of the statutory provision and therefore cannot be
sustained.

7.    At the same time, it is necessary to clarify the consequence
flowing from Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act. Even though the
electricity supplier may raise a bill or supplementary bill at a later
point of time, the power to disconnect electricity supply is subject
to a statutory limitation. If the dues relate to a period that is more
than two years old from the date when the bill was issued, the
electricity supply cannot be disconnected for recovery of such
amount. Therefore, while the petitioner may pursue recovery of
the dues through lawful means, the petitioner would not be
entitled to disconnect the electricity supply of Respondent No.1 for



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recovery of amounts which are more than two years old from the
date of issuance of the bill.

8.    The impugned order stands modified to the aforesaid extent.

9.    The writ petition stands disposed of in above terms.

10.   There shall be no order as to costs.


                                             (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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