Bombay High Court

SHRI. VIJESH TILAKRAM AGARWALversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH MINISTER OF STATE EXCISE, MUMBAI AND ORS

Decided: 22 June 2026
Disposal: Disposed Off
Bench: M M SATHAYE

Holding

The transfer fee is payable because the petitioner’s choice of a new premises rendered the transfer voluntary, and the later notifications are not applicable retrospectively.

Summary

The petitioner, a liquor retailer, challenged an order directing him to pay full transfer fees for shifting his liquor licence after his shop was demolished for road widening. He argued that the transfer was involuntary and that later notifications exempting such transfers should apply retrospectively. The State contended that the petitioner voluntarily chose a new premises and that the later notifications could not be applied retrospectively. The court held that, despite the road widening, the petitioner’s decision to shift to a self‑selected location made the transfer voluntary, rendering the fee payable, and that the subsequent notifications could not be applied retroactively. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the transfer fee for a liquor licence is payable when the transfer is necessitated by a development scheme such as road widening.
Whether subsequent notifications exempting fee for such transfers can be applied retrospectively to orders made before their issuance.

Legislation cited

Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 — s. 138

Subjects

liquor licence
transfer fee
voluntary transfer
road widening
Bombay Prohibition Act
Article 226
Article 227
retrospective application
notifications
privileges fees

Judgment

29-WP-7601-2011 @.doc

Digitally signed
by
HUSENBASHA
HUSENBASHA RAHAMAN
RAHAMAN
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NADAF
NADAF
Date:
2026.06.23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
10:39:10 +0530
WRIT PETITION NO. 7601 OF 2011

Shri. Vijesh Tilakram Agarwal ....Petitioner
V/s
State Of Maharashtra,
Through Minister Of State Excise, Mumbai & Anr. ....Respondents

***
Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud a/w. Mr. Vinayak Salokhe & Ms. Megha
Jani and Mr. Darshan Patankar for the Petitioner.
Mr. S.L. Babar, AGP for the Respondent / State.
***

CORAM : M.M. SATHAYE, J.
DATE : 22nd JUNE, 2026
P.C. :

1. Invoking Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the
Petitioner is challenging an order dated 22.10.2007 passed by the
Respondent No.2-Collector of Mumbai, by which he is directed to pay
Rs.4,39,500/- along with correction fee of Rs.10/- in respect of FL-2
liquor licence and Rs.93,200/- with correction fee of Rs.10/- for CL-3
licence as transfer-fee for shifting from one place to another, which
order is confirmed in revision by the State. The Petitioner is also
seeking a direction to Respondents to refund with interest, the
amount already paid.

2. The dispute arises out of transfer of liquor licenses. The
Petitioner had a liquor shop initially at Adarsh Nagar, Panjarpole
Road, Vashi Naka, Mumbai which was shifted another place viz. Shop
No. 4, near Hira Jewellers, Vashi Naka, R. C. Marg, Chembur,

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Mumbai.

3. Brief background of the dispute is as that the Petitioner was
carrying on business of selling liquor (both foreign as well as
country) from the earlier address. The said shop was required to be
demolished during road widening and an alternative premises was
offered to the Petitioner. The Petitioner filed a suit seeking direction
to the Respondent-State to furnish certain documents and records
relating to the alternative premises offered and for reasonable time to
apply to the excise authorities for grant of licence in respect of newly
allotted premises. In the said suit, a motion was taken out for interim
injunction, which was rejected. This resulted into the Petitioner filing
Appeal from Order (AO) No.223 of 2007. The said AO was heard by
this Court and disposed of under order dated 26.04.2007, accepting
the statement made in affidavit of the concerned Executive Engineer
that the alternative premises offered were not within 75 meters of a
temple and directing issuance of allotment letter to the Petitioner
within a week. Also, time was granted to the Petitioner to vacate the
existing structure and to shift to newly allotted premises.

4. It appears that thereafter, the Petitioner's application for
transfer of liquor licence was considered and he was directed to pay
transfer charges by charging 100% (full amount) of licence fees, as
narrated above, under order dated 22.10.2007. The Petitioner filed
revision (FLR1209/RA-10/EXC-2) before the State Government
through Minister of State Excise, Mantralaya, Mumbai (Respondent
No. 1) under Section 138 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (‘the
said Act’, for short). The Respondent No.1 by order dated 11.08.2011

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rejected the said revision, thereby confirming the original order dated
22.10.2007 directing payment of transfer charges.

5. The Petitioner has thereafter filed the present petition
challenging the original order and also raising grounds against the
order passed in revision, thereby, in essence, challenging the same.

6. Learned counsel Mr. Chandrachud for the Petitioner submitted
as under.

6.1. That at the relevant time when the original order was passed,
the Notification dated 20.06.2005 issued by Home Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai was in force, which provided for charging fees
for transfer of licence from one site to another. He submitted that the
case of the Petitioner is covered under Rule 4(b) of the Bombay
Prohibition (Privileges Fees) Rules, 1954 (‘the Rules of 1954’, for
short) which provides for charging transfer fees equivalent to the
amount chargeable for grant of license i.e. 100%.

6.2. He submitted that though the said Rule does not indicate
anything about the reason for transfer from one site to another, the
transfer has to be read as a ‘voluntary transfer’. That since in the
present case, the transfer is necessitated by road widening affecting
the Petitioner’s shop, it cannot be treated as a voluntary transfer and
therefore, he should not be charged with the transfer fee.

6.3. He invited the Court's attention to subsequent Notifications
dated 04.06.2009 and 07.07.2010 whereunder it was directed that a
licence whose premises are affected by implementation of

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Development Scheme such as road widening. He submits and
therefore the rationale behind his argument is ultimately
incorporated under the Rules of 1954, albeit by subsequent
notification.

6.4. He submitted that though it is admitted position that the
Petitioner did not accept the alternative premises offered by the
Respondent and shifted the shop to another location, the same will
not have any effect on the core issue involved i.e. the transfer is not a
voluntary transfer and is necessitated because of the development
undertaken by the State of road widening. He relied upon following
judgments in support of his case.

i. Sylvia Leo Carvgalno Vs. Collector of Mumbai 2000(2) Mh.L.J.
781.
ii. Jyoti Partab Lalwani and Anr. Vs. Collector of Mumbai and Anr.
2004(1) Mh.L.J. 955.
iii. A judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Appeal No. 362
of 2000 (The Collector of Mumbai and Anr. Vs. Sylvia Leo
Carvalho) order dated 12.06.2006.

6.5. He would submit that in the said judgments, transfer of liquor
licence from the name of the deceased to the name of heir, was held
as ‘not voluntary’ and therefore Rule 5 of the Rules of 1954 has been
interpreted to mean that transfer charges are not applicable.

7. On the other hand, learned AGP appearing for the Respondent-
State supported the impugned order. Relying on the affidavit-in-reply
filed by Deputy Superintendent of State Excise, Mumbai Suburban
dated 04.11.2011, he submitted that admittedly Petitioner had filed a

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suit in City Civil Court challenging the order of alternative
accommodation and pursuant to the order passed in AO No.223 of
2007, new premises were allotted by M.M.R.D.A. to the Petitioner. He
submitted that Petitioner was offered alternative accommodation on
two occasions by the local authority but he did not accept it. He
submitted that the Petitioner himself selected a new site/location
near Hira Jewellers and applied for transfer of licence; therefore, he
is covered by the Notification dated 20.06.2005 which does not
qualify the term ‘transfer’. He submitted that the Petitioner has paid
the amount as per impugned order/direction. He submitted that the
subsequent Notifications of June 2009 and July 2010 amending the
Rules, is a taxing provision and therefore applicable prospectively and
cannot be applied to the Petitioner's case in retrospective manner. He
submitted that when the impugned direction is issued, the
notification holding the field provided for transfer and it cannot be
interpreted differently for voluntary or involuntary transfers.

8. I have considered the rival submissions carefully and perused
the record.

9. It is not disputed that the original order dated 22.10.2007 is
passed when Notification of June 2005 was applicable. Rule 4 of the
Rules of 1954 as it stood then, provided that the fees for privileges of
having transfer of licence from one site to another shall be equivalent
to the amount chargeable for grant of such licence applicable at the
place of proposed shifting. The word ‘transfer’ in the said
notification/Rules was not qualified by any concession, which was
subsequently introduced under Notifications of June 2009 and July

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2010. It is true that by subsequent notification, Rule 4 of Rules of
1954 has been amended, providing that no fees shall be charged for
transfer of licence from one site to another, if the premises are
affected by implementation of development schemes such as road
widening. However, as rightly pointed out by learned AGP and also
fairly accepted by learned counsel for the Petitioner, the subsequent
notifications cannot be applied retrospectively. Having said that, the
charges as levied are in accordance with the Rules as they stood at
the relevant time, viz. charges equivalent to amount chargeable for
grant of licence i.e. 100%. In that view of the matter, the subsequent
notifications will not be of any assistance to the Petitioner.

10. So far as the submission of learning counsel for the Petitioner
that ‘transfer fees apply only if the transfer is voluntary’ is concerned,
it is important to note that the Petitioner’s shop was affected by the
development work of road widening and alternative premises was
offered. It appears from the record that this action of offering
alternative premises was subject matter of the suit filed by Petitioner.
It further appears that the Petitioner had asked for reasonable time to
apply to excise authorities for grant of licence in respect of newly
allotted premises and to comply with formalities as may be required
to enable the Petitioner to shift and carry on business from an
alternative premises. It is recorded in the order dated 26.04.2007
passed by this Court that in the said suit, there was no substantive
challenge to the proposed action of the Respondents of demolishing
the structure i.e. Petitioner’s shop. It is also clear from the said order
that the parties contested the matter on merits and the contention

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raised by the Petitioner at relevant time about the alternative
premises being within 75 meters from a temple (Hanuman Mandir to
be specific) was considered and not accepted because the Executive
Engineer filed an affidavit clarifying that the alternative premises
offered was not within 75 meters. Having considered the same, this
Court directed that allotment letter be issued in favour of the
Petitioner. It is admitted position that the Petitioner has not taken the
alternative premises, pursuant to said order and has chosen to shift
his shop to a new address/site by choice. In my view, this conduct of
the Petitioner makes the request for transfer of licence a ‘voluntary
action’. Though the transfer is necessitated by the action of the State
by undertaking road widening, the subsequent choice made by the
Petitioner of not transferring it to an alternative premises, despite
being directed by this Court in his own petition, makes the action
voluntary. Therefore the said submission has no merit.

11. This is notwithstanding the fact that at the relevant time the
word ‘transfer’ in Rule 4 was not qualified and therefore, it covered
all transfers, whether voluntary or involuntary.

12. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
Petitioner are in respect of Rule 5 of the Rules of 1954 which
provides for transfer of liquor licence for ‘change of name’ on the
licence. In all the judgments relied upon by the Petitioner, it is found
that it was a case of transfer of licence from the name of a person
who expired to the name of the legal heir / representative. In that
context, when the event of death is under consideration, it is obvious
that the reason for transfer (death) is not voluntary and therefore

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transfer-fees are held as not chargeable. The principle laid down in
the said judgments in the case of ‘transfer of name on licence’ owing
to death of licence holder, cannot be disputed. However, in the
present case, the reason for change of licence is completely different
and involves a voluntary action on behalf of the Petitioner finding out
a new place and seeking transfer of liquor licence there. Therefore,
the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable and therefore
the judgments relied upon by the Petitioner will not advance the case
of Petitioner.

13. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances and for reasons
indicated above, no case is made out for interference in the
impugned order. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is
discharged. No order as to costs.

14. All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed
copy of this order.

(M.M. SATHAYE, J.)

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