ANAND SUDHIR SANGHVIversusKISHOR GOPALDAS SANGHVI AND ORS

          Digitally
          signed by
          SAINATH
                                                              -WP-7780-2025.DOC
SAINATH   SANJAY
SANJAY    BODKHE
BODKHE    Date:
          2026.08.11
          21:01:09
          +0530




                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                             WRIT PETITION NO. 7780 OF 2025


   1. C.A. Anand Sudhir Sanghvi
   Age: 40, Occ. Business
   Residing at B-33, Mandhana
   Manor, Mogal Lane, Matunga West,
   Mumbai – 400 016.
   (M) – 9167098055
   Email ID: [email protected]

   2) Sudhir Vinayak Sanghvi
   Age: 71, Occ. Business,
   Residing at B-33, Mandhana
   Manor, Mogal Lane, Matunga West,
   Mumbai – 400 016.
   (M) – 9773782202
   Email ID: [email protected]

   3) Ajit Nandlal Singh
   Age: 42, Occ. Business
   Residing at 9, Manbhau Chawl,
   T.H. Kania Marg, Matunga West,
   Mumbai – 400 016
   (M) – 9619656868
   Email ID: [email protected]                           ...Petitioners

            Versus

   1) Kishor Gopaldas Sanghvi
   Age- Adult, Occupation – NA
   Address – 1201, Sanghvi Majestic CHS Ltd,
   Manmala Tank Road, Matunga (W),
   Mumbai – 400 016
   (M) – 9322994353
   Email ID: NA

   2) Satish Gopaldas Sanghvi

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Age- Adult, Occupation – Business
Address – Bungalow No. ASD/40,
Shrihari, Ashwin Nagar, CIDCO,
Nashik – 422 009, Maharashtra,
(M) - 9422253056
Email ID: [email protected]

3) Devang Kishor Sanghvi
Age- 56, Occupation – Business
Address – Flat No. 1202, 12th Floor,
Sanghvi Majestic CHS, Manmala Tank
Road, Matunga West, Mumbai – 400 016
(M) – 9892505128, Email ID: NA

4) Prashant Kishor Sanghvi
Age- 53, Occupation – Business
Address – Flat No. 1401, 14th Floor,
Sanghvi Majestic CHS, Manmala Tank
Road, Matunga West, Mumbai – 400 016
(M) – 9221424659, Email ID: NA

5) Hemangi S Sanghvi
Age- 73, Occupation – Housewife,
Residing at Bungalow No. ASD/40,
Shrihari, Ashwin Nagar,
CIDCO, Nashik – 422 009.
(M) – NA, Email ID: NA

6) Praful G Sanghvi
Age – 80, Occupation – Doctor,
Address: CC/o Satish G Sanghvi
Bungalow No. ASD/40, Shrihari,
Ashwin Nagar, CIDCO,
Nashik – 422 009.
(M) – NA, Email ID: NA

7) Kashyap B Sanghvi
Age – Adult, Occupation – Business
Residing at : 1103, Sanghvi Majestic
CHS Ltd, Manmala Tank Road,
Matunga West, Mumbai – 400 016
(M) – 9820398114, Email ID- NA.

8) Hansa K Sanghvi

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Age -84, Occupation – Housewife
Address – 1402, Sanghvi Majestic
CHS Ltd, Manmala Tank Road,
Matunga West, Mumbai – 400 016
(M) – NA, Email ID -NA.

9) Vipul G Sanghvi
Age – 48, Occupation – Business,
Address – Nisarg Bungalow, 140/A,
Iskon Ground, Palitana Sugar Mill Lane,
Bhavnagar – 364001.
(M)- NA, Email ID- NA.

10) Pratima D Laiwala,
Age – Adult, Occupation – Housewife,
Residing at Dwarka, 4th Floor,
57, Tagore Road, Santa Cruz West,
Mumbai – 400 054.
(M) – NA, Email ID – NA.

11) The Sanghvi Majestic CHS Ltd,
A society registered under the Maharashtra
Cooperative Societies Act, 1960,
through its Chairman, having its
address at Manmala Tank Road, Matunga
West, Mumbai – 400 016.
(M) – NA, Email ID – NA.

12) Sanghvi Jagmohandas Bhagwandas Trust,
Bearing P.T.R. No. E-3158 (Mumbai),
A Public Trust registered under the provisions
of the Bombay Public Trusts Act,
1950, through its Managing Trustee Kishor G
Sanghvi having its address at Govardhan Baug,
Manmala Tank Road, Matunga (W),
Mumbai – 400 016
Email ID: [email protected]

13) The Chief Officer of M.B.R.R.
Board, Griha Nirman Bhavan, Kala
Nagar, Bandra East, Mumbai – 400 051.

14) Arvind G Sanghvi
Age – Adult, Occ.- Retired,

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L’Avenir-3, Flat No. 4, 2nd Floor,
108, Pappammal Koli Street,
Vaithikuppam, Puducherry – 605001.

15) Purvi A Sanghvi,
Age – Adult, Occ.- Business,
L’Avenir – 3 Flat No. 4, 2nd Floor,
108, Pappammal Koli Street,
Vaithikuppam, Puducherry – 605001.
Mob – 9344291785

16) Sumeet A Sanghvi
Age – Adult, Occ.- Business,
C/0 Arvind G Sanghvi,
L’Avenir – 3 Flat No. 4, 2nd Floor,
108, Pappammal Koli Street,
Vaithikuppam, Puducherry – 605001.

17) Suresh Anant Gambhir,
Age – Adult, Occupation – NA,
Address – 2301, Shreeji Heights,
T.H. Kataria Marg,
Opp. Ganga Vihar Hotel, Mahim,
Mumbai – 400 016.
(M) – 9867255070.

18) The Ld Charity Commissioner
Maharashtra State, Mumbai, Office
of the Charity Commissioner,
2nd Floor, C/o Sasmira Institute
Studies & Research, Sasmira Road,
Worli, Mumbai – 400 030.

19) The State of Maharashtra
Through the Government Pleader
High Court, Appellate Side Civil.
                                                     …Respondents



Mr. Prathamesh Kamat, with Kayush Zaiwalla, i/b Suresh Kamble,
      Shashank Thatte and Yuvaraj Takale, for the Petitioners.
Mr. Girish Godbole, Senior Advocate, i/b Aditya Joshi & Niharika
      Chandurkar, for Respondent No.1.
Ms. Savina Crasto, AGP, AGP, for the Respondent-State.

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                             CORAM :         N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                       RESERVED ON :         22nd JULY 2026
                  PRONOUNCED ON :            11th AUGUST 2026


JUDGMENT:

1.    Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the consent of

the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2.     By this Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the

Petitioners take exception to an order passed by the learned Joint

Charity Commissioner, Mumbai, whereby the Application, being

Application No. 26 of 2022, filed by the Petitioners seeking injunctive

reliefs in respect of Sanghvi Jagmohandas Bhagwandas Trust, under the

provisions of Section 41E of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950

(“the Trusts Act, 1950”), came to be rejected on the ground that the

Petitioners-Applicants were not the persons having interest in the Trust.

3.    The background facts leading to this Petition can be stated in

brief as under:

3.1   Late Gopaldas Bhagwandas Sanghvi, the great grandfather of

Petitioner No.2, had settled the Trust under the Indenture of Trust

dated 8th December 1965, in the memory of his elder brother,

Jagmohandas Sanghvi, under the name and style of “Sanghvi

Jagmohandas Bhagwandas Trust”. The Trust came to be registered as a

public charitable trust under the provisions of the Trusts Act, 1950, on

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24th December 1965. Advancement of education, health and social

works were the objects of the Trust. A first board of trustees, comprising

Respondent No.1, Vinayak Sanghvi, Rasiklal Sanghvi and Gulabben

Sanghvi was constituted by the settlor.       The surviving trustees were

empowered to fill in the vacancies in the office of the trustees; the

number of which shall not be less than two and more than seven.

3.2   The Petitioners preferred an Application under Section 41E of the

Trusts Act, 1950, alleging, inter alia, that Petitioner No.1 is the son of

Petitioner No.2. Late Vinayak, father of Petitioner No.2, was one of the

first trustees. Petitioner No.3 resides in the vicinity of the trust property.

The Petitioners are thus the “persons having interest”, within the

meaning of Section 2(10) of the Trusts Act, 1950. The Petitioners

asserted that they were also entitled to take the benefits as per the

objects of the Trust enumerated in the Indenture of Trust.

3.3   Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were the persons whose names

appeared as the trustees in the Schedule I of the Trust. Respondent

Nos. 3 and 4 were subsequently inducted as the trustees of the Trust.

The Petitioners professed to file the Application seeking injunctive

reliefs for protecting the trust property as there was imminent danger of

the wasting, damaging and improper alienation of the trust property.

3.4   Respondent Nos. 3 to 10 were stated to be the near relatives of

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent Nos. 3 to 10 had allegedly taken


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undue benefits, and caused loss and damage to the property of the

trust. Certain allegations were made in regard to the transactions

between the Trust and Respondent No.12- a cooperative housing society

of the occupants of the property developed on behalf of the Trust.

Attributing the acts of commission and omission to the Respondents, the

Petitioners sought certain prohibitory and mandatory injunctions

against the Respondents.

3.5      Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 appeared and filed Application (Exhibit

“89”) seeking rejection of the main Application under Section 41E of the

Trusts Act, 1950, questioning the locus standi of the Petitioners to file

such Application. It was, inter alia, contended that, in an Application

under Section 36 of the Trusts Act, 1950, being Application No. 1 of

2024, Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 herein had sought impleadment by filing

an Application (Exhibit “7”) and the said Application was rejected by

the learned Joint Charity Commissioner observing that the Petitioners

were not persons having interest in the Trust, nor were Petitioner Nos. 1

and 2, the beneficiaries of the Trust. Even otherwise, the Petitioners

were neither the ‘persons having interest’ in the Trust nor the

‘beneficiaries’ of the Trust.

3.6      The Petitioners resisted the Application by filing a Reply (Exhibit

“90”).




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3.7   In the wake of the pleadings and material on record, the learned

Joint Charity Commissioner framed two points for determination,

namely, whether the issue as to the tenability of the main application

under Section 41E of the Trusts Act is a pure question of law, and

whether the Petitioners proved that they were the persons having

interest in the Trust or were the beneficiaries of the Trust.

3.8   Answering the first point in the affirmative and the second in the

negative, the learned Joint Charity Commissioner rejected the main

Application. The learned Joint Charity Commissioner was of the view

that the Petitioners failed to plead and demonstrate as to how the

Petitioners were the persons having interest in the Trust or the

beneficiaries thereof.   The claim of the Petitioners that they were

entitled to avail the services of a pathology laboratory run by the Trust

would not render them the beneficiaries of the Trust.

3.9   Being aggrieved, the Petitioners-Applicants have preferred this

Petition.

3.10 An Affidavit in Reply has been filed on behalf of the Respondents.

4.    I have heard Mr. Prathamesh Kamat, the learned Counsel for the

Petitioners, and Mr. Girish Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate, for

Respondent No.1, at some length. With the assistance of the learned

Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record.




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5.     Mr. Kamat, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, took a slew of

exceptions to the impugned order. First and foremost, Mr. Kamat would

urge, that the learned Joint Charity Commissioner committed a grave

error in law in holding that the question as to whether the petitioners

were the “persons having interest” in or the “beneficiaries” of, the Trust

is a pure question of law and could be determined without recording

evidence. In the very nature of the inquiry that is required to be

conducted to determine that aspect, Mr. Kamat would urge, the

question can be said to be firmly rooted in facts. At best, it could be a

mixed question of law and fact. Secondly, the learned Joint Charity

Commissioner, on the one hand, observed that, the question of locus of

the petitioners was a pure question of law and, on the other hand, non-

suited the petitioners by observing that, the petitioners failed to

produce any evidence to prove; at least prima facie, that they were the

persons having interest in, or the beneficiaries of, the Trust. Thirdly, the

learned Joint Charity Commissioner also recorded that, the question

whether a particular person has an interest in the Trust is one of fact

and must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case.

Thus, the impugned order suffers from manifest contradictory findings.

6.    Mr. Kamat next urged that, the petitioners had filed an

application under Section 41E of the Trusts Act, 1950 and furnished all

the particulars as mandated under Rule 25AA of the Maharashtra Public


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Trust Rules, 1951 (“Trust Rules, 1951”). The learned Joint Charity

Commissioner completely misread the averments in the application

under Section 41E of the Trusts Act, 1950 to return a factually incorrect

finding that, the petitioners had nowhere pleaded that they were the

beneficiaries as per the objects of the Trust.

7.    Mr. Kamat further submitted that, the aspect of locus to seek

relief in order to protect the Trust property or the larger public interest,

has received a liberal construction. Under the indenture of Trust, all the

persons were entitled to the benefits of the activities for securing health.

It was not absolutely necessary for the petitioners to actually avail the

benefits as per the objects of the Trust. The pivotal question was

whether the petitioners were entitled to receive the benefits as per the

objects of the Trust. The learned Joint Charity Commissioner, thus,

completely misdirected himself in holding that, the petitioners were

neither the persons having interest in the Trust nor the persons entitled

to receive the benefits as per the objects of the Trust.

8.    To lend support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Kamat placed

strong reliance on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Shree

Khambhati Modh Vanik Samaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & ors.1, Ashok




1     2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2725
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Shreekrishna Beharay vs. Joint Charity Commissioner & anr. 2, and

Mataprasad Durgaprasad Rai & ors. Vs. Girish Mulji Vora & anr3.

9.    Per contra, Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for the

Respondent No.1, supported the impugned order. Mr. Godbole

submitted that, the learned Joint Charity Commissioner has correctly

appreciated the question as to whether the petitioners can be said to be

the persons having interest in, or the beneficiaries of, the Trust. Mr.

Godbole submitted that, the mere fact that the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2

are the descendants of one of the trustees of the Trust, does not confer

the status of “persons having interest” upon the petitioners. The learned

Joint Charity Commissioner was, thus, well within his rights in

discarding the claim of the petitioners on the said count, which is, in

essence, the substratum of the claim of the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2.

10.   Mr. Godbole strenuously submitted that, the Petitioner Nos. 1 and

2 disguised as the “persons having interest” or “beneficiaries” are

pursuing a private cause against the respondents. The Petitioner Nos.1

and 2 have left no stone unturned in putting hindrances in the

development of the trust property. Apart from instituting the

proceedings before the other forums, the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 tried to

intervene in the application under Section 36 of the Trusts Act, 1950,

which turned out to be abortive. Having failed in their endeavors, the


2     2025 SCC OnLine Bom 3993
3     2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3369
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Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have filed the application under Section 41E of

the Trusts Act, 1950. This litigative streak of the Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2,

with an oblique motive of putting hindrances in the affairs of the Trust,

ought to enter the judicial determination.

11.   To lend support to the submission that, the mere fact that a

person is a descendant of the settlor or trustee, does not clothe such

person with the character of ‘a person having interest’ in the Trust, or a

‘beneficiary’, Mr. Godbole placed reliance on the judgment of a learned

Single Judge in the case of Maganlal Himatram Barfiwala & ors. Vs.

Mridangraj Hiralal Suchak4.

12.   Refuting the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that, in any

event, they were the beneficiaries as per the objects of the Trust, Mr.

Godbole submitted that, in accordance with the object of the Trust

under the Indenture of the Trust, the promotion of the health facilities

was meant for poor and needy persons. It is not the case of the

petitioners that, they have ever availed the facilities nor the petitioners

have asserted that their financial condition is not sound and they are

otherwise required to avail the benefits of the facilities provided by the

Trust. In the absence of such a clear assertion in the application, the

bald claim that, the petitioners are entitled to receive the benefits as per

the objects of the Trust, is not sufficient to hold that, the petitioners



4     2019 SCC OnLine Bom 336
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were the beneficiaries. Thus, no fault can be found with the impugned

order, urged Mr. Godbole.

13.   In the light of the aforesaid pleadings and submissions, the core

controversy revolves around two questions. First, whether the learned

Joint Charity Commissioner was justified in holding that, the question

of locus of the petitioners to file an application under Section 41E of the

Trusts Act, 1950 was a pure question of law ? Second, whether, in the

facts of the case at hand, the application under Section 41E of the

Trusts Act, 1950 could have been dismissed at the threshold on the

ground that, the petitioners were not the persons having interest in the

Trust and, thus, not entitled to maintain such an application ?

14.   Before adverting to explore answers to the aforesaid questions, it

may be advantageous to note the relevant provisions of the Trusts Act,

1950 and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 41E of the Trusts Act,

1950 empowers the Charity Commissioner to act in protection of the

charities. The relevant part of Section 41E of the Trusts Act, 1950, reads

as under :-

       “41E.Power to act for protection of Charities

       (1)    Where it is brought to the notice of the Charity

       Commissioner either by the Deputy or Assistant Charity

       Commissioner through his report or by an application by




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       at least two persons having interest supported by

       affidavit:

              (a)   that any trust property is in danger of

              being wasted, damaged or improperly alienated

              by any trustee or any other person, or

              (b)   that the trustee or such person threatens or

              intends to remove or dispose of that property,

              the Charity Commissioner may by order grant a

              temporary injunction or make such other order

              for the purpose of staying and preventing the

              wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or

              disposition of such property, on such terms as to

              the duration of injunction, keeping an account,

              giving security, production of the property or

              otherwise as he thinks fit.”


15.   A bare perusal reading of the aforesaid section would indicate

that, if it is brought to the notice of the Charity Commissioner that there

is a danger of waste, damage, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of

the property of the Trust, either by any Trustee or any other person, the

Charity Commissioner in exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction has been

empowered to grant temporary injunction or make such order to stay



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and prevent such waste, damage, alienation, removal or disposition of

the Trust property.

16.   Two modes of initiation of action under Section 41E of the Trusts

Act, 1950 are specified in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section

41E. First, on the basis of the reports by the Deputy or Assistant Charity

Commissioner. Second, by an application by at least two persons having

interest in the Trust. The legislature thus considered it appropriate to

provide that, the action under Section 41E of the Trusts Act, 1950 for

protection of charities can be on the basis of the information provided

by the Authorities under the Trusts Act, 1950, or on an application by

two or more persons having interest. It is quiet conceivable that,

unbeknownst to the Authorities under the Trusts Act, 1950 or

surreptitiously the trustee or any other person may by act or omission,

jeopardize the trust property and thereby threaten to defeat the object

of the Trust. To address such a situation, the legislature has conferred

locus on two or more persons having interest to move the Charity

Commissioner seeking injunctive or other orders.

17.   That brings to the fore the question as to who can be said to be a

person having interest in the Trust. The expression, ‘person having

interest’ finds place in a number of provisions of the Trusts Act, 1950,

especially in regard to the initiation of the proceedings before the




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Charity Commissioner. Thus, Section 2(10) of the Trusts Act, 1950

defines, “person having interest”, as under :-

         “S.2(10) “person having interest includes” includes -

         (a) in the case of a temple, person who is entitled to

         attend at or is in the habit of attending the performance

         of worship or service in the temple, or who is entitled to

         partake or is in that habit of partaking in the

         distribution of gifts thereof,

         (b) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math or a

         person of the religious persuasion to which the math

         belongs,

         (c) in the case of a Waqf, a person who is entitled to

         receive any pecuniary or other benefit from the Waqf

         and includes a person who has right to worship or to

         perform any religious rite in a mosque, idgah,

         imambara,       dargah,   maqbara        or   other   religious

         institution connected with the Waqf or to participate in

         any religious or charitable institution under the Waqf,

         (d) in the case of a society registered under the Societies

         Registration Act, 1860, any member of such society, and

         (e) in the case of any other public trust any trustee or

         beneficiary.”


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18.   Evidently, if a Trust does not fall within the specified classes

covered by clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(10), such Trust would be

governed by clause (e) for which, ‘person having interest’ means any

trustee or beneficiary.

19.   Sub-section (2A) of         Section 2,      which was       inserted by

Maharashtra Act No. 55 of 2017 w.e.f. 10th October, 2017, defines

“beneficiary” as under :-

       “(2A)        “beneficiary” means any person entitled to

       any of the benefit as per the objects of the trust

       explained in the trust deed or the scheme made as per

       this Act and constitution of the trust and no other

       person”


20.   In the case of Shree Khambhati Modh Vanik Samaj (supra), this

Court had an occasion to consider the import of the provisions

contained in Section 2(10) and Section 2(2A) which defined the

expressions, “person having interest” and “beneficiary”, respectively.

The observations in Paragraph Nos. 31 to 35 of the said judgment are as

follows :-

         “31. The object of conferment of locus on “person having
         interest” becomes clear if the nature of the authority of the
         trustees is appreciated. As noted above, the property of the
         trust vests in the trustees for the benefit of beneficiary or for

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         the discharge of the object of the trust. It is quite conceivable
         that the trustees may discharge their duties in furtherance of
         the object of the trust or in derogation thereof. In a given
         case, the trustees may not be available or may have become
         defunct or rendered themselves disabled or even might be
         acting against the interest of the trust. Therefore, the persons
         who have an abiding interest in the affairs of the trust have
         been conferred the locus to seek remedies and participate in
         the proceeding, so that the object of the trust and, ultimately,
         public interest are not defeated.


         32.        Evidently, under sub section 2(10) of the Act, the
         definition, “the person having interest” is inclusive. It would
         be contextually relevant to note that the word, “includes” in
         section 2(10) came to be substituted for the word, “means”
         by Bombay 28 of 1953. It is trite, the use of the word,
         “includes” in a definition gives the term an expansive
         meaning. In contrast the legislature uses the word, “means”
         to give a precise and definite meaning. In substituting the
         word, “includes” for “means”, the legislative intention of
         expanding the scope of the term, “person having interest”
         becomes explicitly clear. An inclusive definition, as is trite,
         covers in its fold the matters which are not specifically
         enumerated in the said definition.


         33.        A profitable reference in this context can be made
         to a Division Bench judgment in the case of Digambar
         Pralhad   Jot   and    Others    vs.    Satyanarayan    Biharilal
         Zunzumwala and Others (AIR 1978 Bom 196). The Division
         Bench adverted to the legislative change brought by
         substituting the word, “includes” for the word “means” and
         emphasized that the definition of the phrase, “the person

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         having interest” is not exhaustive. The observations of the
         Division Bench read as under:-
               7] …. ……. Initially in this definition clause in
               place of the word 'includes' the word 'means' was
               used by the Legislature. The word 'includes' was
               substituted by Bombay Act No. 28 of 1953. It is
               well settled that the word 'include' in the
               interpretation   clause     is    intended   to     be
               enumerative and not exhaustive. It has an
               extending force and it does not limit the meaning
               of the term to the substance of the definition.
               When it is intended to exhaust the signification of
               the words interpreted, the word 'means' is used: --
               See Chandrabhagabai Ashtekar v. State oil
               Bombay (1958 Nag LJ J72).
                                          (emphasis supplied)


         34.       The import of the phrase, “person having interest”
         came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the
         case of Shree Gollaleshwar Dev and Ors. vs. Gangawwa
         Shantayya Math and Ors. (1985) 4 SCC 393. The correctness
         of the view of the Full Bench decision of Karnataka High
         Court that, the expression “person having interest in the
         trust” occurring in section 2(10) and section 50 of the Trust
         Act, 1950 does not include the trustees when they institute
         the suit in their capacities as trustees for vindicating their
         private rights, was challenged before the Supreme Court.
         After adverting to the provisions of section 2(10) and 2(18),
         which defines “a trustee”, and section 50 of the Act, 1950,
         the Supreme Court did not approve the view of the Full
         Bench of the Karnataka High Court. It was, inter alia,
         observed as under :-

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               12] … …… The definition of the words “person
               having interest" in section 2(10) of the Bombay
               Public Trust Act, as amended in 1953 was made
               inclusive to set at rest all doubts and difficulties as
               to the meaning of these words, which were
               intended and meant to be used in a generic sense
               so as to include not only the trustees but also the
               beneficiaries and other persons interested in the
               trust. The definition of the expression person
               having interest in section 2(10) is wide enough to
               include not merely the beneficiaries of a temple,
               math, Waqf etc. but also the trustees. Therefore
               appellants Nos. 2 and 3 who undoubtedly are
               members of the founder’s family i.e. beneficiaries,
               are entitled to attend at performance of worship or
               service in the Distribution of offering to the also
               entitled to partake in the distribution of offering to
               the deity and thus answer the description "person
               having inter" as defined in Section 2 (10) of the
               Act.
                                            (emphasis supplied)


         35.          In the case at hand we are primarily concerned
         with clause (e) of section 2(10) of the Act under which
         “person      having   interest”    includes,   “any   trustee   or
         beneficiary”. As noted above, the definition of “beneficiary”
         came to be inserted by Amendment Act, 2017. Interestingly,
         the legislature has used the word, “means” while defining,
         “beneficiary”. Thus, the “beneficiary” means, any person
         entitled to any of the benefits as per the object of the trust
         explained in the trust deed or the scheme made as per the

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         said Act and constitution of the trust. What makes the
         legislative intent abundantly clear is the use of the
         expression, “and no other person”. This implies that the
         legislature made a conscious effort to exclude a person other
         than the one who is entitled to obtain any benefit under the
         objects of the trust, from the definition of “beneficiary”.
         There is no scope to expand the meaning of the term,
         “beneficiary” under section 2(2A). The legislative intent that
         the term “beneficiary” is restricted to that class of persons
         who are entitled to obtain benefit under the trust is
         underscored by the exclusionary clause “and no other
         person”. It is in the backdrop of these provisions, the import
         of the term, “person having interest” deserves to be
         construed. To qualify as “person having interest”, under
         clause (e) of section 2(10) in the class of beneficiary, the
         person must derive benefit under the trust.”




21.   Having noticed what signifies, “person having interest” or

“beneficiary”, it would be appropriate to consider the question whether

the learned Joint Charity Commissioner was justified in holding that,

the question of locus could be determined as a pure question of law. The

learned Joint Charity Commissioner has, after referring to the

provisions contained in Rule 7 of the Trust Rules, 1951, which provides

for the conduct of inquiries including, an inquiry under Section 41E(3)

of the Trusts Act, 1950, as far as possible in the Greater Bombay region

in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the trial of suits under

the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, and, elsewhere under the

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provisions of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, held that, the

provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“Code,

1908”) including, under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, 1908, were

attracted to the inquiry under Section 41E of the Trusts Act, 1950. Thus,

applying the test for determination of an application for rejection of the

plaint, the learned Joint Charity Commissioner proceeded to decide the

question of locus as a pure question of law. Whether the aforesaid

approach of the learned Joint Charity Commissioner, is sustainable ?

22.   In the context of the definition of ‘person having interest’ under

Section 2(10) r/w Section 2(2A) of the Trusts Act, 1950, if a person

invokes the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner under Section 41E

of the Trusts Act, 1950 on the premise that, he is the trustee of the

Trust, the controversy may assume the character of an objective inquiry

in the sense that, if such person who is not a trustee, he cannot claim to

be a person having interest in the Trust. However, where two or more

persons also approach the Charity Commissioner with a case that they

are the beneficiaries of the Trust, in the considered view of this Court,

the controversy assumes a different complexion. Whether a person is

indeed a beneficiary of the Trust, though capable of determination on

the basis of the averments in the application, yet, cannot be said to be a

pure question of law. What is question of law need not detain the Court.




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The distinction between the pure question of law and a mixed question

of law and fact is well marked.

23.   The question of law arises when the conclusion can be arrived at

on the application of the rules and the principles of law to certain

proved facts and circumstances. Ordinarily, the question of law signifies

a question that can be decided by applying the principles of law to the

given facts without determining the factual controversy.

24.   In the case of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti V/s. Prabhakar

Maruti Garvali and Anr.5, the Supreme Court observed that a question of

law would arise when the same is not dependent upon the examination

of evidence, which may not require any fresh investigation of fact.

25.   In a majority of the cases, whether a person is entitled to receive

benefit as per the objects of the Trust would hinge upon the facts. A

minimal investigation into facts to ascertain whether the claim of

entitlement of such person to the benefits as per the objects of the Trust,

may be warranted. Indeed, a bald assertion in the application that, the

applicants are the beneficiaries as per the objects of the Trust, by itself,

is not sufficient. Whether there are particulars indicating the nature of

the interest or the benefit which the applicants are entitled to receive as

per the objects of the Trust, is required to be spelled out as mandated by

clause (e) of Rule 25AA(1) of the Rules, 1951. The said Rule enjoins the

applicant to furnish particulars as to the nature of the applicant’s

5     (2007) 11 SCC 668
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interest in the Trust. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as an absolute

proposition of law that, the question whether the applicants are persons

having interest in the Trust is a pure question of law; more often than

not, the question would be a mixed question of law and fact and, at

times, heavily rooted in facts. Therefore, the finding of the learned Joint

Charity Commissioner that, the question of locus of the petitioners was

a pure question of law, cannot be sustained.

26.   This takes me to the question as to whether the material on

record sustains the claim of the petitioners that, they are the persons

having interest in the Trust. Since the learned Joint Charity

Commissioner proceeded to decide the issue of locus, at the threshold,

the averments in the application were required to be taken as they

stand on the principle of demurrer. In the application, after furnishing

the particulars of the circumstances in which the Trust in question came

to be formed, the petitioners have asserted that, the Petitioner No.1 is

the son of Petitioner No.2. The father of Petitioner No.2 late Vinayak

was one of the first trustees of the Trust. The Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are

the descendants of late Gopaldas Sanghavi, the settlor of the Trust. The

Petitioner No.3 is a businessman and resides in the vicinity of the Trust

property at Matunga. The petitioners were competent and entitled to

take the benefits as per the objects of the Trust enumerated in the

indenture of the Trust. The petitioners had a bonafide interest in the


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Trust and their main object was to protect the property of the Trust from

the respondents. They did not have an interest which was adverse to the

Trust.

27.      Evidently, the petitioners did not claim that any of them was a

trustee of the Trust. Consequently, their qualification of being the

persons having interest would turn upon their character as the

beneficiaries of the Trust.

28.      The learned Joint Charity Commissioner was of the view that, the

fact that the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were the descendants of the settler

or an erstwhile trustee was of no avail to the petitioners. This view of

the learned Joint Charity Commissioner appears to be rather

impeccable. The settlor has settled the Trust for the advancement of the

charitable objects, namely, education, health and societal matters. The

mere fact that, the petitioners happened to be either the descendants of

the settler or one of the first trustees of the Trust, by itself, was not of

any relevance.

29.      Reliance placed by Mr. Godbole on the judgment of a learned

Single Judge of this Court in the case of Maganlal Himatram Barfiwala

(supra), appears to be well founded. In the said case, the learned Joint

Charity Commissioner had reckoned that the respondents therein was a

‘person having interest’ in the Trust on the ground that he was a

member of Shri. Halai Lohana Mahajan Community and grandson of


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the settlor. A learned Single Judge of this Court found the said

reasoning ex facie perverse. The observations in Paragraph Nos.67 and

68 of the said judgment are material and, hence, extracted below :-

         “67. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned
         Joint Charity Commissioner clearly indicates that the learned
         Joint Charity Commissioner has considered the respondent as
         a person having interest in the trust under section 2(10) of
         the MPT Act as well as the beneficiary under section 2(2-A)
         of the MPT Act on the ground that he is a member of Shri
         Halai Lohana Mahajan community and the grandson of the
         settlor. In my view, this finding of the learned Joint Charity
         Commissioner is ex-facie perverse and contrary to the
         definition of “person having interest” under section 2(10)(e)
         of the MPT Act and also the definition of “beneficiary”
         defined under section 2(2-A) of the MPT Act. The finding of
         the learned Joint Charity Commissioner that considering the
         close relationship between the settlor and the respondent as
         well as he being a member of Shri Halai Lohana Mahajan
         community, the respondent was a person having interest as
         required under section 41-D of the MPT Act is also ex-facie
         perverse and contrary to section 41-D of the MPT Act. In my
         view, in view of the definition of section 2(2-A) of the MPT
         Act, the definition of “person having interest” under section
         2(10)(e) has to be given a restricted meaning. In my view,
         even if a person is a member of the community, he does not
         automatically become a beneficiary defined under section
         2(2-A) of the MPT Act.


         68.   A perusal of the statement of objects and reasons of
         2017 Act clearly indicates that after considering the fact that
         the proceedings under various provisions of the MPT Act
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         remained pending for inordinate long period resulting in
         hindrance in advancement of the public religious and
         charitable objects, various amendments were proposed.
         Insofar as section 41-D is concerned, in my view, the
         definition 'beneficiary' has to be given narrow and restrictive
         meaning. It is thus clear that the legislative intent to insert
         the definition of 'beneficiary” under section 2-A of the MPT
         Act is to restrict the interference with the management of the
         public trust only by the persons having interest in the trust
         including the trustee and beneficiary and more particularly
         the beneficiary defined under section 2(2-A) of the MPT Act
         inserted by 2017 Amendment and no other person.”


30.   In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the petitioners

cannot be permitted to draw any mileage from the fact that they are the

descendants of the settler or the successor in interest of one of the first

trustees of the Trust, appointed by the settler. To sustain an action under

Section 41E, the petitioners were required to demonstrate that, they

were the beneficiaries within the meaning of Section 2(2A) of the Trusts

Act, 1950.

31.   Mr. Kamat, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, made a

painstaking effort to demonstrate that, if the averments in the

application are read in conjunction with the objects of the Trust as

specified in the Indenture of the Trust, the status of the petitioners as

the beneficiaries thereunder, becomes absolutely clear. Emphasis was

laid by Mr. Kamat on the object of the advancement of health, which

reads as under :-
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       “(2) For Health :-

       (ka) For starting Dispensaries or Hospitals of any kind

       and for running the same or helping to run the same or for

       giving grants to _____.

32.   Though in the Application it was not specifically averred that the

Petitioners were entitled to receive the benefit of the health related

services/medical facilities provided by the Trust, a submission was

sought to be canvassed that the Trust runs a pathology laboratory and

the Petitioners were entitled to avail the services of said pathology

laboratory and, therefore, they were the beneficiaries within the

meaning of Section 2 (2A) of the Trusts Act, 1950. From the perusal of

the order passed by the learned Charity Commissioner on an

Application    for     intervention   in     Miscellaneous    Application   No.

CC/01/2024, it becomes clear that, that was also the precise submission

canvassed     before    the   learned      Joint   Charity   Commissioner    to

demonstrate the interest of Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in the Trust. The

learned Charity Commissioner was of the view that the mere fact that

Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2-proposed interveners therein might in the future

visit the pathology laboratory to get some medical tests done would not

make them beneficiary of the Trust.

33.   It is true, the actual availment of the benefit as per the objects of

the Trust as specified in the Trust Deed is not a sine qua non. In Section


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2(2A), the legislature has thus advisedly used the expression, “person

entitled to any of the benefit”.

34.    Thus, the person who claims to be a person having interest need

not necessarily actually avail the benefit as of the date seeking relief

from the Charity Commissioner. The test is, whether such person is

entitled to receive any of the benefits as per the objects of the Trust. The

imminent possibility of availing the benefit may clothe the person with

the character of a beneficiary of the Trust. However, a mere theoretical

probability of availing the said benefit may not be sufficient as that

would expand the scope of “beneficiary” too widely. The intendment of

the Legislature in using the expression “and no other person” would

then   become    redundant.        It   is    a   well-recognized   principle of

interpretation of statute that no word in the statute can be construed to

be a surplusage and such interpretation ought to be adopted as does not

render any word used by the Legislature redundant. The use of the

word, “means” coupled with the negative expression, “and no other

person” restricts the meaning of the word “beneficiary” to the class of

persons who are entitled to any of the benefits as per the object of the

Trust. Therefore, too expansive a construction of the term beneficiary

under Section 2(2A) may not be in consonance with the legislative

intendment.




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35.   The submission of Mr. Godbole that there are no averments in the

Application that the Applicants/Petitioners were required to avail the

benefit of the medical services offered by the Trust, is required to be

appreciated in the light of the intention of the settlor, the objects of the

Trust and the status of the Petitioners; especially Petitioner Nos. 1 and

2. The intent of the settlor was to promote charities by providing

educational, health related and other societal development services to

the deserving persons. The objects of the Trust, if considered in

juxtaposition with the intention of the settlor, make it explicitly clear

that the facilities were to be made available to the persons who could

not afford the same for want of resources or other constraints. The

status of the members of the settlor’s family in a Public Charitable Trust,

in contradistinction to a Private Trust, is ordinarily that of a benefactor

rather than a beneficiary.

36.   From the aforesaid standpoint, the absence of the averments in

the Application regarding the necessity of the services for the Petitioners

and the imminent possibility of availment of those services cannot be

said to be immaterial or inconsequential. The learned Joint Charity

Commissioner was, therefore, justified in construing the averments in

the Application to hold that the mere possibility of the availing of

services at the pathology laboratory run by the Trust may not confer the

character of beneficiary upon the Petitioners.


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37.     The situation which thus, emerges is that, on the meaningful

reading of the averments in the application under Section 41E of the

Trusts Act, 1950, it becomes clear that the Petitioners did not satisfy the

test of being the beneficiaries as per the objects of the Trust. Instead,

the claim of the Petitioners, especially the Petitioner Nos.1 and 2,

stemmed from their perceived interest in the Trust’s property on the

basis of their status as the successors in interest of the settlor and one of

the first trustees.   The assertion of the rights had its genesis in the

creation of the trust. In view of the mode of succession provided in the

Trust, without reserving any hereditary right in the members of the

settler’s family, or, for that matter, the successors of the trustees in the

first board of trustees, the essential qualification to be the person having

interest’ in the Trust, would only be in accordance with the scheme

envisaged by Section 2(10) read with Section 2(2A) of the Trusts Act,

1950.     Since the Petitioners failed to make out that case in the

application, the finding of the learned Joint Charity Commissioner that

the Petitioners lacked the locus, appears to be unquestionable.

38.     The fact that the learned Joint Charity Commissioner determined

the said issue by holding that, it could be determined as a pure question

of law, though questionable, yet does not detract materially from the

ultimate finding rendered by the learned Joint Charity Commissioner. It

is trite, if the ultimate finding is justifiable, this court in exercise of its


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corrective writ jurisdiction need not interfere with such finding.               A

profitable reference in this context can be made to the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Garment Craft V/s. Prakash Chand Goel6,

wherein the Supreme Court enunciated the approach to be adopted by

the High Courts where the ultimate order is justified, though it may

suffer from some legal flaw. The following observations are instructive,

and, hence, extracted below :

              “15…….The         High   Court     exercising    supervisory
              jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to
              reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon
              which the determination under challenge is based.
              Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error
              of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is
              justified or can be supported. The High Court is not
              to   substitute    its   own     decision   on   facts   and
              conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. 7
              The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of
              correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction
              of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental
              principles of law or justice. The power under Article
              227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like
              when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the
              finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can
              possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or
              tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such
              discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there
              is no miscarriage of justice”. (emphasis supplied)

6     (2002) 4 SCC 181
7     Celina Coelho Pereira V/s. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217
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39.     The conspectus of aforesaid consideration is that the impugned

order does not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory

jurisdiction. The Writ Petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

40.     Hence, the following order:

                               :ORDER:

(i)     The Petition stands dismissed.

(ii)    Rule discharged.

(iii)   No costs.

                                          [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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