SHRI. KASHINATH KAMLU SHINDE AND ORS.versusSHRI. MADHUKAR @ BALIRAM LAXMAN DALAL (SINCE DECEASED THROUGH HIS LRS.) AND ANR.

                                                                              wp8350-2017-J.doc


                      AGK
                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                        WRIT PETITION NO.8350 OF 2017

                           1. Kashinath Kamlu Shinde
                           2. Keshav Kamlu Shinde
                           3. Rajendra Kamlu Shinde                      … Petitioners
                                              Vs.
                      Madhukar @ Baliram Laxman Dalal,
                      Since deceased through his LRs.
                      1/1. Manohar Madhukar @ Baliram Dalal
                      1/2. Vijaykumar Madhukar @ Baliram Dalal
ATUL
GANESH                1/3. Shyamsundar Madhukar @ Baliram Dalal
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
                      1/4. Lata Madhukar @ Baliram Dalal
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.08.19
12:04:03 +0530
                      1/5. Geeta Nandkumar Mahajan
                           2. Shantaram Laxman Dalal                     … Respondents

                      Mr. Sunil Karandikar i/by Mr. Aniruddha A. Garge with
                      Mr. Kashyap Bhalerao and Mr. Yesh Gangal for the
                      Petitioners.
                      Mr. Mandar Limaye for Respondent Nos.1/1 to 1/5 and
                      5.


                                          CORAM                  : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                          RESERVED ON            : AUGUST 17, 2026.

                                          PRONOUNCED ON          : AUGUST 19, 2026

                      JUDGMENT:

                      1.      By this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
                      Constitution of India, the Petitioners have challenged the legality,



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validity, and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 8 May
2017 passed by the President, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in
Revision No. TNC/REV/TH/198/2015. By the said order, the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal set aside the Order dated 10 March
2015 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalyan in Tenancy
Appeal No. 5 of 2015, as the Order dated 14 February 2014 passed
by the Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan in Tenancy Case No.
32G/25/2011.

2.    The facts which have given rise to the present writ petition,
as stated by the Petitioners, are as follows. The Petitioners had
filed Tenancy Case No. 32G/25/2011 before the Tahsildar and
A.L.T., Kalyan. They prayed for fixation of the purchase price of the
suit lands under Section 32 of the Maharashtra Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Their case was that, after the
purchase price was fixed, they should be permitted to purchase the
suit lands in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act.
After hearing the parties, the Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan allowed
Tenancy Case No. 32G/25/2011 by Judgment and Order dated 14
February 2014. Being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order
dated 14 February 2014 passed by the Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan,
the Respondents filed Tenancy Appeal No. 5 of 2015 before the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalyan. After hearing the parties, the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Kalyan dismissed the said appeal by Judgment
and Order dated 10 March 2015. The order passed by the
Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan was thus confirmed. The Respondents
challenged the Judgment and Order dated 10 March 2015 passed
by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalyan by filing Revision No.



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TNC/REV/TH/198/2015         before       the   President,   Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal, Mumbai. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal
heard the parties and allowed the revision by its Judgment and
Order dated 8 May 2017. By the said order, the Tribunal set aside
both the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalyan and
the Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan. It is against this order that the
Petitioners have approached this Court by filing the present writ
petition.

3.    Mr.   Karandikar,   learned       Advocate   appearing     for    the
Petitioners, invited my attention to Sections 33B, 33C and 88B of
the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. He
submitted that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal proceeded on
the legal position relating to Section 32F as understood from the
decision in Tukaram Maruti Chavan vs. Maruti Narayan Chavan
(Dead), reported in (2008) 6 Bom CR 570 : AIR 2009 SC 1126.
According to him, however, the legal position concerning
interpretation of Section 32F was subsequently held differently by
the Supreme Court in Vasant Ganpat Padave (Dead) by Legal
Representatives & Ors. vs. Anant Mahadev Sawant (Dead) through
Legal Representatives & Others, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 577.
He submitted that the Supreme Court held that, where the
landlord or the successor of the landlord belongs to any of the
three categories mentioned in Section 32F, namely, a minor, a
widow, or a person suffering from mental or physical disability, an
intimation is required to be given to the tenant before expiry of the
period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the
tenancy under Section 31.



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4.    Mr. Karandikar submitted that Chapter III-A, dealing with
termination of tenancy by certain landlords and purchase of lands
by tenants in respect of lands to which Section 88C applies, was
introduced by Maharashtra Amendment No. 9 of 1961. He
submitted that Section 33A, for the purpose of Sections 33B and
33C, defines a “certificated landlord” as a person holding a
certificate issued under sub-section (4) of Section 88C. However, it
does not include a landlord falling within the meaning of Chapter
III-AA, even though such landlord may hold a similar certificate.
He submitted that the earlier order dated 12 December 1960
against the tenant was passed at a time when Sections 33A to 33C
had not yet been introduced in the Act. According to him, this
aspect   has   material   importance.   He    submitted    that    the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not consider the proviso to
Section 33B(4). Under the said proviso, even if one of the persons
belongs to any of the categories mentioned in Section 33B(4), the
benefit of that provision would not be available where any
member of the joint family does not belong to those categories.

5.    According to Mr. Karandikar, the case of the Respondents is
that only one out of the three landlords was a certificated landlord.
He, therefore, submitted that the provisions of Section 33B(4),
particularly its proviso, were required to be considered before
coming to the conclusion reached by the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal.

6.    Mr. Karandikar then invited my attention to Section 33C. He
submitted that the notice contemplated under the said provision
was required to be served upon the tenant before 1 January 1962.



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Where an application under Section 88C was pending, such notice
was required to be given within three months from the date of
receipt of the certificate. He submitted that sub-section (5) of
Section 33C makes it clear that Sections 32 to 32R would apply to
the purchase of land by an excluded tenant under that provision.
According to him, therefore, the effect of Section 33C and its
different sub-sections was required to be considered while
deciding whether the Petitioners were entitled to seek fixation of
the purchase price under Section 32G.

7.    On the other hand, Mr. Limaye, learned Advocate appearing
for the Respondents, submitted that an earlier application filed by
the Petitioners had been rejected on 12 December 1960. According
to him, once such application had been rejected, a fresh
application could not be maintained merely because Sections 33A
to 33C were subsequently introduced in the Act. He submitted that
this was the view correctly taken by the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal. Mr. Limaye submitted that even the successor-in-interest
of a widow is entitled to claim the benefit available to a
certificated landlord who is a widow. In support of this submission,
he relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Parvatibai Ramchandra Rokade vs. Mahadu Tukaram Varkhede,
reported in AIR 1967 Bom 428 : 1967 SCC OnLine Bom 33,
particularly paragraphs 11 and 13 thereof. He submitted that the
expression “certificated landlord” appearing in Sections 33A to
33C is wide enough to include the successors-in-interest of such
landlords. According to him, therefore, the Respondents were
entitled to claim the benefit flowing from the status of the original



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landlord, even after succession.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS:

8.    I have considered the submissions made by the learned
Advocates appearing for both sides, the orders passed by the
Tahsildar and A.L.T., the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal, the provisions of law and the judgments relied
upon by the respective parties. In my view, the main dispute can be
decided by considering the scheme of Sections 32F, 33A to 33C
and 88, along with the effect of the earlier proceedings which
came to be decided on 12 December 1960.

9.    Since the learned Advocates for the parties have placed
much reliance on Sections 33A, 33B and 33C, it is necessary to
refer to these provisions. These provisions are found in Chapter II-
A of the Act. This Chapter deals with termination of tenancy by
landlords and purchase of lands by tenants in respect of lands to
which Section 88C applies. The relevant provisions are reproduced
below:

      “(II-A) Termination of tenancy by landlords, and purchase by
      tenants, of lands to which section 88C applies.
      33A. Definitions.—For the purposes of Sections 33-B and 33-
      C,—
      (i) ‘certificated landlord’ means a person who holds a
      certificate issued to him under sub-section (4) of Section 880
      but does not include a landlord within the meaning; of
      Chapter III-AA holding a similar certificate; and
      (ii) ‘excluded tenant’ means a tenant of land to which
      Sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive) do not apply by virtue of



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sub-section (1) of Section 88-C.
33B. Special right of certificated landlord to terminate
tenancy for personal cultivation.—
1)    Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 31, 31-
A or 31-B a certificated landlord may, after giving notice and
making an application for possession as provided in sub-
section (3) terminate the tenancy of an excluded tenant, if
the landlord bona-fide requires such land for cultivating it
personally.
(2) The notice may be given and an application made by a
certificated landlord under sub-section (3), notwithstanding
that in respect of the same tenancy an application of the
landlord made in accordance with sub-section (2) of Section
31—
(i) is pending before the Mamlatdar or in appeal before
the Collector or, in revision before the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, on the date of the commencement of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1960
(Mah. IX of 1961), (hereinafter referred to in this section as
‘the commencement date’), or
(ii) has been rejected by any authority before the
commencement date.
(3) ……………………….
(a) ……………………..
(b) ………………………..,
(4) Where the certificated landlord belongs to any of the
following categories, namely:—
(a)   a minor,
(b)   a widow,
      ***



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(d)    a person subject to any physical or mental disability.
………………………………………………...—
(A)    ……………………………………...,—
(i)    ……………………………….;
iii)   ……………………….; and
(B) in the case of a widow, by the successor-in-title within
one year from the date on which widow's interest in the land
ceases:
       Provided that, where a person belonging to any
category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this
sub-section shall not apply if any one member of the Joint
family does not belong to any of the categories mentioned in
this sub-section, unless the share of such person in the joint
family has been separated by metes and bounds before the
31st day of March 1958 and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is
satisfied that the share of such person in the land is
separated, (having regard to the area, assessment,
classification and value of the land) in the same proportion
as the share of that person in the entire joint family property,
and not in a larger proportion.
(5)    ……………………………………………………..,—
(a)    ………………………………………………………..
(b)    ……………………………………………
(c)    ……………………………………………..
(6)    …………………………………………………..
(7)    ………………………………………………..
33C. Tenants of lands mentioned in section 88C to be
deemed to have purchased land and other incidental
provisions.—




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(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
of Section 88-C, every, excluded tenant holding land from a
certificated landlord shall, except as otherwise provided in
sub-section (3), be deemed to have purchased from the
landlord, on the first day of April 1962, free from all
encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land
held by him as tenant, if such land is cultivated by him
personally, and
(i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of
tenancy in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 33-B,
or
(ii) the landlord has given such notice, but has not made
an application under Section 29 for possession as required by
the said sub-section (3), or
(iii) the landlord, not belonging to any of the categories
specified in sub-section (4) of Section 33-B, has not
terminated the tenancy on any of the grounds specified in
Section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not
applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March
1962 under Section 29 for possession of the land:
      Provided that, where the landlord has made such
application for possession, the tenant shall, on the date on
which the application is decided, be deemed, to have
purchased the land which he is entitled to retain in
possession after such decision.
(2)(a) ……………………………………
(b)   ………………………….…
(3) Where the certificated landlord, belonging to any of
the categories specified in sub-section (4) of Section 33-B,
has not given notice of termination of the tenancy of an,
excluded tenant in accordance with sub-section (3) of that
section, or has given such notice but has not made an
application under Section 29, for possession is required by


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      the said sub-section (3), such excluded tenant shall hate the
      right to purchase the land held by him as tenant within, one
      year from the expiry of the period specified in sub-section
      (4) of Section 33-B:
      Provided that, where the tenancy is terminated and
      application for possession is made in accordance with the
      provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 33-B, the tenant
      shall, within one year from the date on which such
      application is decided be entitled to purchase the land which
      he is entitled to retain in possession after such decision.
      (4) An excluded tenant desirous of exercising] the right
      conferred on him under sub-section (3) shall accordingly
      inform the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed
      manner within the period of one year during which he is
      entitled to exercise such right under sub-section (3).
      (5) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive)
      shall; so far as may be applicable, apply to the purchase of
      land by an excluded tenant under this section."
10.   Section 33A, in simple words, tells the meaning of the
expressions “certificated landlord” and “excluded tenant” for the
purpose of Sections 33B and 33C. A certificated landlord means a
person holding the certificate contemplated under Section 88C(4),
subject to the exclusion which is mentioned in that provision. An
excluded tenant means a tenant to whom the usual provisions
regarding purchase of land under Sections 32 to 32R do not apply
because of Section 88C(1). Section 33B then gives a special right
to such certificated landlord for terminating the tenancy of an
excluded tenant, where the land is bona fide required for personal
cultivation. However, this right is not available without conditions.
The landlord has to follow the procedure prescribed in the section.




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Notice is required to be given to the tenant., an application for
possession has to be made before the Mamlatdar within the period
provided by law. Sub-section (2) of Section 33B is important for
the present dispute. It permits a certificated landlord to give notice
and make an application under Section 33B even in respect of the
same tenancy where an earlier application under Section 31(2)
was pending on the commencement date or had already been
rejected before that date. Therefore, merely because proceedings
under Section 31 were started earlier, whether such proceedings
were pending or came to be rejected, that fact by does not stop the
certificated landlord from taking benefit of Section 33B. Naturally,
the other requirements of that section will still have to be satisfied.
Sub-section (3) provides the time within which notice is required
to be served and the application for possession has to be made.
Where an application under Section 88C was still pending and was
not disposed of by the relevant date, a different period is provided.
Thus, the right under Section 33B has to be exercised in the
manner and within the time which is provided by the section. Sub-
section (4) makes a separate provision for a certificated landlord
who is a minor, widow or a person having physical or mental
disability. If such landlord has not given notice or made the
necessary application during the ordinary period, a period is made
available after the concerned status or disability comes to an end.
In case of a widow, the successor-in-title is permitted to give notice
and make the application within one year from the date on which
the widow's interest in the land comes to an end. However, the
proviso to Section 33B(4) needs proper consideration. Where a




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person belonging to any of these protected categories is a member
of a joint family, the benefit under sub-section (4) does not become
available only because such person is a widow, minor or a person
suffering from disability. If even one member of the joint family
does not belong to any of these protected categories, the benefit
will not be available unless the share of the protected person was
separated by metes and bounds before 31 March 1958. The
Mamlatdar must be satisfied, after inquiry, that the share in the
land was separated in the proportion required under the proviso.
Therefore, while considering a claim for the extended period under
Section 33B(4),it becomes necessary to see whether the
certificated landlord was holding the land separately or as a
member of a joint family. If the landlord was a member of a joint
family and another member did not belong to any of the protected
categories, the proviso may affect the right claimed under sub-
section (4), unless the conditions relating to separation of the
share are shown to have been satisfied.

11.   Section 33C then provides what happens where a certificated
landlord does not terminate the tenancy or, after giving notice,
does not take the steps required for obtaining possession. Subject
to the conditions contained in that provision, an excluded tenant
who is holding the land from a certificated landlord and personally
cultivating it becomes entitled to purchase the land in the
circumstances mentioned therein. Sub-section (1) of Section 33C
deals with different situations where the excluded tenant is
deemed to have purchased the land. This may happen where the
landlord has not given notice under Section 33B(3). It may happen



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where notice is given but the landlord does not make the necessary
application for possession. It deals with a landlord who does not
belong to any category under Section 33B(4), but does not
terminate the tenancy or does not make the required application
within the prescribed time. Where an application for possession is
made, the tenant is deemed to have purchased that land which he
is entitled to retain after the application is decided. Sub-section (2)
concerns a tenant who was not in possession on the relevant date
because he had been evicted before that date. If such tenant
applies for possession within the prescribed period and succeeds
before the competent authority, he is deemed to have purchased
the land on the date when the final order allowing his application
is passed. If he does not apply within the prescribed period, or if
his application is rejected, clause (b) provides for the consequences
in relation to the person who is then holding the land as tenant.
Sub-section (3) of Section 33C is important where the certificated
landlord belongs to one of the categories mentioned in Section
33B(4). If such landlord does not give notice of termination or,
after giving notice, does not make the application for possession as
required, the excluded tenant gets the right to purchase the land
within one year from expiry of the period provided under Section
33B(4). Where the tenancy is terminated and an application for
possession is made according to Section 33B(4), the tenant
becomes entitled to purchase that land which he is entitled to
retain, within one year from the date on which that application is
decided. Sub-section (4) requires the excluded tenant, who wants
to exercise the right under Section 33C(3), to inform the landlord




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and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period of one
year during which such right is available. Sub-section (5) then
provides that Sections 32 to 32R shall apply, so far as they can
apply, to such purchase. Thus, after the right to purchase arises
under Section 33C, the machinery relating to such purchase
becomes applicable. This would include the relevant procedure for
determination and fixation of the purchase price under the
provisions of the Act.

12.   The case of the Petitioners is that the Tahsildar and A.L.T.
was right in entertaining their proceedings under Section 32G and
in fixing the purchase price of the land. The Sub-Divisional Officer
agreed   with   and      confirmed        that   decision.   However,     the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal reversed both these orders on the
ground that an earlier application concerning the tenancy was
rejected on 12 December 1960 and the Petitioners could not again
claim any right to purchase the land.

13.   Mr. Karandikar submitted that the approach adopted by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is not proper. According to him, the
earlier order was passed on 12 December 1960, whereas Sections
33A to 33C were brought into the Act only by Maharashtra Act IX
of 1961. He submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the
particular language used in Section 33B(2). He submitted that the
Tribunal did not consider the proviso to Section 33B(4),
particularly because, according to the Respondents, only one out of
the three landlords was a certificated landlord.




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14.   On the other hand, Mr. Limaye submitted that the earlier
rejection dated 12 December 1960 had concluded the matter.
According to him, merely because Sections 33A to 33C were
subsequently introduced, it did not give any fresh or separate right
to the Petitioners to again open the tenancy dispute. He relied
upon the decision in Parvatibai Ramchandra Rokade and submitted
that the benefit available to a certificated landlord continues even
in favour of the successor-in-interest of such landlord.

15.   Therefore, the first question which requires consideration is
whether the earlier order dated 12 December 1960 can prevent the
Petitioners from claiming a right which is stated to have arisen
under provisions introduced subsequently.

16.   In my view, the answer to this question has to be found from
the provisions of Section 33B. Section 33B was introduced as part
of a separate scheme dealing with certificated landlords and
excluded tenants. It appears that the Legislature was aware that,
before these new provisions came into force, proceedings under
Section 31 may be pending or may even have been rejected. It is
for this reason that Section 33B(2) provides that notice may be
given and an application may be made under sub-section (3),
notwithstanding that, in respect of the same tenancy, an
application made by the landlord under Section 31(2) either “is
pending” before the competent authority or “has been rejected by
any authority before the commencement date.” The words “has
been rejected by any authority before the commencement date”
show that the Legislature had considered a case where proceedings
concerning the same tenancy were rejected before the new



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provisions came into force. Even in such a case, the certificated
landlord   was   permitted,   subject   to   compliance    with     the
requirements of Section 33B, to take steps under the new
provision. Therefore, merely because some earlier proceedings
concerning the same tenancy were rejected before 2 September
1961, it cannot mean that every right arising under the provisions
subsequently introduced stood finished. If the Legislature intended
that an earlier rejection should close the matter in every case,
Section 33B(2)(ii) would have no useful purpose.

17.   Thus, the submission of Mr. Limaye that the order dated 12
December 1960 closed every issue concerning the tenancy cannot
be accepted in such a wide manner. The earlier order may bind the
parties in respect of the issue which was decided in those
proceedings. However, it cannot prevent operation of a later
provision which takes into account a case where an earlier
application had been rejected before commencement of the new
law. At the same time, the submission of Mr. Karandikar cannot be
accepted to the extent that introduction of Sections 33A to 33C
gave the Petitioners an unrestricted right to seek fixation of
purchase price. The right to purchase under the new provisions
can arise only when the conditions prescribed by the statute are
satisfied. The earlier proceedings may not be a complete bar. But
the subsequent right must still arise in accordance with Sections
33B and 33C.

18.   This takes the Court to the effect of Section 88C and the
meaning    of    the   expression    “certificated   landlord.”    The
Respondents have relied upon Parvatibai Ramchandra Rokade.



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Paragraph 11 of the said judgment records that the amended
Section 88C did not provide “that the exemption granted by that
section would cease to be operative on the death of the person
who obtained a certificate of exemption from the Mamlatdar.” The
Division Bench held that “[t]he certificate was clearly to inure to
the benefit of the person's successors-in-interest.” Paragraph 13 of
the same judgment considered the position after Sections 33A to
33C were introduced. The Division Bench found that, before these
provisions were introduced, the exemption obtained by a landlord
by securing a certificate under Section 88C “continued after his
death and inured for the benefit of his successor-in-interest.” The
Court observed that there was nothing in Sections 33A to 33C to
show that the Legislature intended to change this position. The
conclusion of the Division Bench was stated in clear terms. It was
held that “in the absence of any express provision to the contrary,
that the term ‘certificated landlord’ in those sections includes the
successors-in-interest of those landlords.”

19.   I do not find any difficulty in accepting this legal position. If
a landlord had lawfully obtained a certificate under Section 88C,
death of such landlord would not put an end to the character
arising from that certificate. The successor-in-interest can, subject
to the provisions of the Act, step into the position of the original
certificated landlord. Therefore, Mr. Limaye is right to the extent
he submits that the successor-in-interest of a widow or another
certificated landlord cannot be excluded merely because the
original person in whose name the certificate was issued has died.
The   decision   in   Parvatibai    Ramchandra     Rokade     supports



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continuation of such benefit in favour of the successor-in-interest.
However, this conclusion does not decide the whole case in favour
of the Respondents. There is a difference between saying that the
successor-in-interest continues to get the benefit of the certificate
and saying that, because of such benefit, the tenant can never get
any right to purchase the land. The statute provides how the rights
of the landlord and tenant are required to operate.

20.   Section 33B gives a certificated landlord a special right to
terminate the tenancy for personal cultivation. However, this right
is subject to requirements of the statute. The landlord has to
comply with the requirements regarding notice and application.
Section 33B(3) provides the period within which notice has to be
given and proceedings for possession are required to be started.
Section 33C then deals with the consequence where the
certificated landlord does not take the steps required by law. Thus,
the scheme keeps the special right of the certificated landlord. At
the same time, it protects the excluded tenant by giving him a
right to purchase when the conditions mentioned in Section 33C
are satisfied. The position becomes more relevant where the
certificated landlord belongs to one of the special categories
mentioned in Section 33B(4), namely, a minor, widow or a person
suffering from physical or mental disability. In such cases, a longer
period is provided for giving notice and making an application.
However, the proviso to Section 33B(4) cannot be ignored. It
provides that where a person belonging to any of these categories
is a member of a joint family, the benefit of sub-section (4) will not
apply if even one member of the joint family does not belong to



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those categories, unless the share of such protected person had
been separated by metes and bounds before the specified date and
the Mamlatdar, after inquiry, is satisfied that the requirements
regarding such separation are fulfilled. Therefore, the proviso puts
an important limitation on the extended protection claimed under
Section 33B(4). The mere fact that there is a widow or another
protected person in a joint family does not mean that the entire
tenancy or entire property will get benefit of the extended period
under sub-section (4).

21.   The submission of Mr. Karandikar on this point requires
acceptance. The proviso forms part of the provision and cannot be
ignored while deciding whether the extended period was available.
If the landlord was a member of a joint family and even one
member was not belonging to the protected categories, the benefit
under Section 33B(4) would not be available unless the
requirements regarding separation by metes and bounds are
established. In the present case, it is submitted on behalf of the
Petitioners that, according to the case of the Respondents, only one
out of the three landlords was a certificated landlord. If this is the
factual position, the question whether special protection under
Section 33B(4) was available cannot be decided merely because
one of the landlords was a widow or belonged to a protected
category.

22.   It was necessary to examine the nature and constitution of
the family, the respective interest of the landlords, whether the
holding was joint or separately held, and whether the conditions of
the proviso were satisfied. From the material placed before this



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Court, there is nothing to show that the requirements regarding
separation by metes and bounds, as required by the proviso, were
established. This aspect is important because the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal appears to have proceeded on the basis that the
protected status of the landlord was enough to postpone the
tenant's right. Such an approach does not give full effect to the
proviso to Section 33B(4).

23.   The same principle is found in Section 32F. The proviso to
Section 32F(1)(a) states that where a person belonging to the
protected category is a member of a joint family, “the provisions of
this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint
family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section”
unless the requirements relating to separation of the protected
person's share are satisfied. Thus, both Section 32F and Section
33B show a similar intention of the Legislature. Special protection
is given to a minor, widow or person suffering from disability. But
it does not appear that the Legislature intended that only because
one such person is present in a joint family, the tenant's right in
respect of the entire joint holding should remain postponed.

24.   The next submission concerns the effect of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Vasant Ganpat Padave. Mr. Karandikar
submitted that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal relied upon an
earlier legal position which cannot continue after the declaration
of law made by the Supreme Court in the said judgment.

25.   The Supreme Court, in paragraph 55.1, held:

      “The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant and



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      applicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by a
      tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from
      mental or physical disability on Tillers' Day.”
26.   The Supreme Court held in paragraph 55.2:

      “The successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to send an
      intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow
      to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase.”
27.   The meaning of this requirement is that the tenant's right is
connected with the event when the special interest or protection of
the widow comes to an end. Unless the tenant is informed that the
widow's interest has ceased, the tenant may not know when his
right to purchase has become capable of being exercised.

28.   The Supreme Court reconsidered the earlier legal position.
Paragraph 55.3 states:

29.   “The decision in Appa Narsappa (Appa Narsappa Magdum v.
Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443) stands overruled.
The decision in Sudam Ganpat (Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v.
Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200) stands
distinguished as stated in para 47 of the judgment. The decision in
Tukaram Maruti (Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan
Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358), to the extent that it follows the law
laid down in Appa Narsappa (Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai
Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443), stands overruled.”

30.   Therefore, to the extent the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal
relied upon Tukaram Maruti Chavan following the principle in
Appa Narsappa, such reasoning cannot now continue. The
declaration of law by the Supreme Court is binding. The issue has



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to be considered by applying the law held in Vasant Ganpat
Padave.

31.   Mr. Limaye is, however, right in one part of his submission.
The decisions in Parvatibai Ramchandra Rokade and Vasant
Ganpat Padave cannot be understood as taking away the rights of
the successor-in-interest of a certificated landlord. The successor
may continue to claim the position which was available to the
original landlord. However, such continuation is subject to the
duties    and   conditions   imposed   by   the   statute   and      the
interpretation subsequently given by the Supreme Court. In
particular, where the tenant's right depends upon cessation of the
interest of a widow, the successor cannot remain silent and
contend that the tenant has lost his right only because time has
passed. Paragraph 55.2 of Vasant Ganpat Padave requires the
successor-in-interest to send an intimation to the tenant regarding
cessation of the widow's interest. Therefore, the legal protection
available to the landlord and the right of the tenant have to
operate together according to the Act. The successor may get the
benefit of the certificate. However, when the conditions for the
tenant's right to purchase arise, such right must be given effect.

32.   The scheme of Section 33C supports this position. Section
33C(1) provides for deemed purchase by the excluded tenant in
the circumstances mentioned therein. Section 33C(3) makes a
separate provision where the certificated landlord belongs to the
categories specified in Section 33B(4). It provides that where such
landlord has not given notice or, after giving notice, has not made
the required application for possession, the excluded tenant will



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have a right to purchase the land within the period prescribed by
law. The proviso to Section 33C(3) keeps alive the tenant's right
after the proceedings for possession are decided. It states that
where the tenancy is terminated and an application for possession
is made according to Section 33B(4), “the tenant shall, within one
year from the date on which such application is decided be entitled
to purchase the land which he is entitled to retain in possession
after such decision.” Section 33C(4) requires an excluded tenant,
who wants to exercise the right to purchase, to inform the landlord
and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the prescribed
period. Section 33C(5) provides that Sections 32 to 32R shall
apply, so far as may be applicable, to such purchase.

33.   Thus, the scheme is clear. The right under Section 33C is not
merely an uncertain right. When the conditions are fulfilled, the
excluded tenant can exercise the right, and the machinery under
Sections 32 to 32R, including the procedure for fixing the purchase
price, becomes applicable.

34.   The contention of the Respondents that the Petitioners could
never invoke Section 32G only because of the order dated 12
December 1960 is, therefore, too wide. The earlier order was
passed before Sections 33A to 33C were introduced. Section
33B(2)(ii) recognises that an earlier application may have been
rejected before commencement of the new provisions. The earlier
order may be relevant for deciding the facts and rights which
existed on 12 December 1960. However, it cannot be treated as a
complete answer to every right which subsequently arose or
became exercisable under the amended scheme.



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35.   Section 88 does not support the case of the Respondents to
the extent claimed by them. Section 88 provides exemption in
respect of the categories of lands mentioned therein. At the same
time, the scheme shows that when such exemption or special
management position comes to an end, the provisions relating to
termination of tenancy and purchase of land may become
applicable according to the special provisions of the Act.Therefore,
Section 88, Sections 33A to 33C and Section 32F have to be
understood as part of one scheme. A certificate or exemption may
protect the landlord for the period and in the manner provided by
law. At the same time, the Act provides the circumstances in which
the tenant gets a right to purchase the land.

36.   In my view, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not
examine the matter by considering this complete scheme. The
Tribunal appears to have treated the earlier rejection of the
application and the protected status claimed by the Respondents as
sufficient to reject the Petitioners' claim. The effect of Section
33B(2), the proviso to Section 33B(4), the proviso to Section 32F
and the scheme of Section 33C required consideration.

37.   There is one more reason why the decision of the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal cannot be sustained. The reasoning
of the Tribunal, insofar as it is based upon the legal position
derived from Tukaram Maruti Chavan following Appa Narsappa, is
affected by the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Vasant
Ganpat Padave. Paragraph 55.3 states that T ukaram Maruti
Chavan, to the extent it follows Appa Narsappa, “stands
overruled.”



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38.   This Court is required to apply the law declared by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, the question of the tenant's right
cannot now be decided on the basis that no intimation is required
from the successor-in-interest of a widow. Paragraph 55.2 of Vasant
Ganpat Padave has clearly held otherwise. From the material
placed before this Court, there is no basis to hold that the
requirement of giving intimation, as held by the Supreme Court,
was complied with in such manner that the period for the
Petitioners to exercise their right of purchase had started running
against them. The Respondents may continue to be the successors-
in-interest of the certificated landlord. This position follows from
the decision in Parvatibai Ramchandra Rokade. However, this does
not mean that the rights of the Petitioners remain suspended. The
conditions concerning the protected category, the proviso relating
to joint family, the procedure of notice and application, and the
tenant's right to purchase, all have to be given their proper
meaning and effect.

39.   The Tahsildar and A.L.T., whose order was confirmed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer, upheld the entitlement of the Petitioners to
proceed for determination of the purchase price. The Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal set aside those orders. After considering the
scheme and the law subsequently declared by the Supreme Court,
I am unable to sustain the reasoning adopted by the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal. The material before this Court shows that the
main objection of the Respondents is based upon the earlier
rejection dated 12 December 1960 and the continuation of the
certificate in favour of the successors-in-interest. The first objection



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cannot prevail because Section 33B(2)(ii) recognises that an
earlier application may have been rejected before the new scheme
came into force. The second objection is correct only to the limited
extent that the benefit of the certificate may continue in favour of
the successors-in-interest, as held in Parvatibai Ramchandra
Rokade. However, continuation of the certificate does not remove
the conditions imposed by Sections 33B and 33C. It does not
remove the requirement recognised by the Supreme Court in
paragraph 55.2 of Vasant Ganpat Padave that the successor-in-
interest of a widow must intimate the tenant regarding cessation
of the widow's interest so as to enable exercise of the right of
purchase. Further, where the claim for extended protection is
based upon Section 33B(4), the proviso cannot be ignored. On the
material presently available, the Respondents have not shown that
the requirements necessary for claiming the benefit of that proviso
were satisfied. This becomes more relevant in view of the
submission that there were three landlords and only one of them
was claimed to be a certificated landlord.

40.   Considering the matter as a whole, the legal objections
accepted by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal cannot defeat the
proceedings initiated by the Petitioners for fixation of the purchase
price. The right of the Petitioners has to be examined under the
provisions which became applicable. It cannot be rejected merely
by treating the order dated 12 December 1960 as concluding every
consequence which arose.

41.   I, therefore, hold that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was
not justified in setting aside the concurrent orders of the Tahsildar



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and A.L.T. and the Sub-Divisional Officer on the grounds stated by
it. The Judgment and Order dated 8 May 2017 passed by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Revision No. TNC/REV/TH/
198/2015 is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside.
Consequently, the Judgment and Order dated 14 February 2014
passed by the Tahsildar and A.L.T., Kalyan in Tenancy Case No.
32G/25/2011, which was confirmed by the Judgment and Order
dated 10 March 2015 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalyan
in Tenancy Appeal No. 5 of 2015, is restored.

42.   The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the above terms.
Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.


                                            (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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