Bombay High Court
JYOTIRLING NAGARI SAHAKARI PATHSANSTHA LTD BORGAON THR ITS CHIARMANversusHAIBATRAO BHIMRAO PATIL
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that intervention to frame a preliminary issue at the interlocutory stage is impermissible and the petition lacks merit.
Summary
The petitioner, Jyotirling Nagari Sahakari Pathsanstha Ltd, sought a writ of certiorari to set aside a Labour Court order that refused to frame a preliminary issue concerning its status as an employee under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition was filed after the Labour Court had already progressed to framing issues and had even conducted cross‑examination of a witness, with the application for a preliminary issue lodged belatedly in June 2023. The High Court examined the contention that the employee‑status question must be decided at a preliminary stage and relied on earlier Supreme Court pronouncements rejecting the practice of fragmentary adjudication. Citing D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, the Court held that intervening at an interlocutory stage to isolate a preliminary issue is impermissible and that all disputes should be decided together to avoid delay. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as having no merit, and costs were awarded to the respondent.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court can intervene under Article 226 to order the Labour Court to frame a preliminary issue at an interlocutory stage.
- Whether the question of employee status under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be decided as a preliminary issue separate from the main dispute.
Legislation cited
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — s. 2(s)
Subjects
- Industrial dispute
- Preliminary issue
- Labour Court
- High Court jurisdiction
- Article 226
- Employee status
- Interlocutory intervention
- Delay
Judgment
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 893 OF 2026
Jyotirling Nagari Sahakari Pathsanstha
Ltd Borgaon Through Its Chiarman ...Petitioner
Versus
Haibatrao Bhimrao Patil ...Respondent
...
Mr. Sanadiip Mutaalik, Advocate a/w Mr. Simran Sameena and Ms.
Ketaki Sahastrabudhe, Advocates for Petitioner
...
CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.
DATE : 4th MARCH, 2026.
P.C:
1. The petitioner raises an exception to the order dated 2 nd August
2025 rendered by the Judge, Labour Court, Sangli, rejecting the
request of the petitioner to frame the preliminary issue in relation to
the status of complaint as an employee as contemplated under Section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue in
relation to the determination of the status of employee goes to the root
of the matter as such it has to be decided at a preliminary stage and in
isolation. In the process, the learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the order of this Court in Johnson and Johnson
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Private Limited Vs. Kawaljeet Singh in Writ Petition (ST) No.92672 of
2020 as well as the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of
Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar Vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board &
Another.1 in support of his contention.
3. Upon hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, it is apparent
that the employee has approached the Labour Court in the year 2021.
Although the written statement was presented, however, the issue of
framing preliminary issue was raised at a belated juncture by
presenting an application below exhibit C-20 in the year 2023 i.e.
precisely on 26 June 2023. By the said time, the proceeding travelled
to the stage of framing of issue and in the process, the cross-
examination of one of the witnesses cited on behalf of complainant is
also conducted.
4. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to make necessary
reference to the Three Judge bench of the Apex Court in the case of D.
P. Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Administration & Ors. 2 paragraph No.1 of the
said judgment is reproduced herein below :
“It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming
devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial
disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various
preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first
instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the
1 (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 394.
2 (1983) 4 Supreme Court Cases 293
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Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a
decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the
meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating
in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour
Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary
objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise
policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have
arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals,
particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour
disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial
peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without
trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in
the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be
decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well
afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by
dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral
issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and
Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of
workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to
decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether
such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will
not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like
Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special
kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled
by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down.
It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction
under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under
Article 136 is primarily supervisory but the court may exercise all
necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of
such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be
too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special
tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.”
Thus, there is an embargo to entertain a petition against
interlocutory interventions in orders rendered by special Tribunals. In
the present case, the Learned Labour Court has already considered the
petitioner’s say and proceeded to frame the relevant issues, including
additional issue. The petitioner's insistence that their objection be
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considered in isolation runs contrary to the established observations of
the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of D. P. Maheshwari (supra) and,
therefore, cannot be sustained.
5. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner does not lend the
support to the contentions, as those cases involved proceedings that
had already concluded before a Special Tribunal. Conversely, the
petitioner here seeks this Court’s intervention at an interlocutory stage,
which is impermissible. Admittedly when the proceeding have traveled
substantially and reached to the stage of cross-examination, as such,
request of the petitioner at this stage to frame preliminary issue and
decide the same, does not warrant consideration.
6. In view of the aforestated circumstances, I am of the considered
view that the petition sans merit and does not warrant interference.
7. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed with costs since
the proceedings before the tribunal are delayed for unjustified reasons.
As such, cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rs. Five Thousand) to be paid by the
petitioner to the respondent, within a period of four weeks from today.
[SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.]
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