Bombay High Court
Kamal Nilkant NaikversusVPK Urban Co operative Credit Society Ltd
- Disposal
- Rule made absolute
Holding
The High Court held that the petitioner’s application does disclose a probable defence and that the trial and sessions courts erred in refusing permission for cross‑examination under Section 145(2).
Summary
Mrs. Kamal Nilkath Naik was sued by VPK Urban Co‑operative Credit Society for dishonour of a cheque issued towards repayment of a Rs.45 lakh loan, invoking Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. She filed an application under Section 145(2) of the same Act seeking permission to cross‑examine the complainant, alleging that the cheque was forged and that there was no enforceable debt. The Judicial Magistrate and the Sessions Court rejected her application, holding that it did not disclose a probable defence. The petitioner challenged these orders by filing a criminal writ petition. The High Court examined the statutory provision and a series of Supreme Court and High Court precedents, concluding that the petitioner’s allegations of forgery and lack of enforceable debt constitute a probable defence, and that the trial courts erred in refusing cross‑examination. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, directing that the petitioner be permitted to cross‑examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Issues considered
- Whether the petitioner’s application under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act discloses a probable defence sufficient to warrant permission for cross‑examination of the complainant.
- Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the application on the ground that it was vague and did not demonstrate a probable defence.
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 45
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — s. 138, 145(2)
Subjects
- Negotiable Instruments Act
- Section 138
- Section 145(2)
- Cheque bounce
- Cross‑examination
- Probable defence
- Criminal writ petition
- Summary trial
Judgment
2026:BHC-GOA:1848
(1) wpcr-62-2025.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.62 OF 2025
MRS. KAMAL NILKANTH NAIK
Aged 60 years, Indian National
resident of H. No.106/A, Haveli,
Curti, Ponda, Goa 403401. ..Petitioner
Versus
VPK URBAN CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETY
Having its head office at Mardol,
Ponda, Goa, and Branch at Curti,
Ponda, Goa, represented herein by
its authorised officer, Shri. Siddhesh
Thanu Madkaikar, aged 41 years,
Indian National, resident of H. No.
117, Dutale Madkaim, Ponda – Goa. ..Respondent
…
Mr. Vibhav Amonkar with Mr. Omkar Bhave, Advocates for Petitioner.
Mr. Jatin Ramaiya with Mr. Omkar Parab, Advocate for Respondent.
…
CORAM : S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : 19th AUGUST, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 11th SEPTEMBER, 2026.
JUDGMENT:-
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With consent of parties,
matter is heard finally at admission stage.
2. The present petitioner impugns order dated 02.05.2023 passed by
Judicial Magistrate First Class, ‘B’ Court at Ponda in Criminal Case
No.352/OA/NIA/2020/B, whereby petitioner’s application filed under
Section 145(2) of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred
as ‘N.I. Act’) seeking permission to cross-examine complainant came to
be rejected.
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3. The respondent (orig. complainant) instituted proceeding under
Section 138 of N.I. Act alleging that petitioner availed of a loan of
Rs.45,00,000/- from respondent and willfully and intentionally
defaulted in making repayment as agreed. It is further case of
respondent that petitioner had issued Cheque No.152053 for amount of
Rs.24,48,000/- dated 04.08.2020 drawn on Canara Bank, Curti Branch
as part payment of said loan. The said cheque dishonored on
presentation. The petitioner failed to comply demand notice, as such,
committed an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
4. The petitioner filed application under Section 145(2) of N.I. Act
disclosing specific defences taken by her. The application was
contested by respondent. The Trial Court after considering rival
submissions, passed impugned order dated 02.05.2023 rejecting
petitioner’s application. Aggrieved petitioner preferred Criminal
Revision Application No.60/2024 before Sessions Court. However,
same has been rejected vide order dated 23.05.2025 observing that it is
not maintainable.
5. Mr. Vibhav Amonkar, learned Advocate appearing for petitioner
would submit that Section 145(2) of N.I. Act requires accused to
demonstrate probable grounds of defence. The petitioner has disclosed
sufficient grounds of probable defences in her application. However,
Trial Court failed to appreciate probable grounds of defences as well as
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prepositions of law flowing from series of judgment of Supreme Court
as well as this Court. He would, therefore, urge to allow Writ Petition
by setting aside impugned order and permit petitioner to conduct cross-
examination of complainant and/or his witnesses. In support of his
contentions, he relies upon observations of Supreme Court as well as
High Court in cases of Indian Bank Association and Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Ors.1, M/s. Meters and Instruments Private Limited & Anr.
Vs. Kanchan Mehta2, Nizam Shamshuddin Ladji Vs. VPK Urban Co-
operative Credit Society Ltd.3, Rakesh Singh Vs. Anil Madanmohan
Gulati & Anr. (Criminal Writ Petitions No.34 and 35 of 2023 decided
on 09.05.2023), Mr. Kishor Biradmal Bhandari Vs. Mr. Chandrakant
Krishna Gawas (Criminal Writ Petition No.54/2023 decided on
23.08.2023), Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Nimesh B. Thakore 4,
K. Narsimulu Vs. Naguesh C. Dandi5.
6. Per contra, Mr. Jatin Ramaiya, learned Advocate appearing for
respondent/complainant justifies impugned order. He would submit that
it is well settled that only when accused demonstrates probable defence
before Magistrate, which he wants to put forth before by way of cross-
examination of complainant and Magistrate records his satisfaction
about availability of defence, opportunity to cross-examine complainant
can be given. However, in present case petitioner’s application does not
1 2014 5 SCC 590.
2 (2018) 1 SCC 560.
3 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 4850.
4 AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1402.
5 2010 Mh.L.J. (4) 220.
(4) wpcr-62-2025.odt
disclose any probable defence. The application is full of vague and bald
statements without crystallizing nature of defence to be put into service.
The Trial Court has applied mind to averments in application and found
no substance in application under Section 45(2) N.I Act. The Trial
Court has further observed that Bank Cheque Return Memo gives only
reason as ‘insufficient funds’. The signatures on cheques were never
doubted. In support of his contentions he relies upon observations of
Supreme Court in cases of Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Meters
and Instruments Private Limited & Anr. (supra).
7. Having considered submissions advanced by learned Advocates
appearing for respective parties, in light of exposition of law on the
point of right of accused to cross-examine complainant or his witnesses
in terms of Section 145(2) of N.I. Act, this Court finds that Section 145
of N.I. Act provides that evidence of complainant may be given by him
on affidavit and may, subject to all just exceptions be read in evidence
in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding. The sub-clause (2) of Section
145 stipulates that Court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, on application of
the prosecution or accused, summon and examine any person giving
evidence on affidavit as to facts contained therein. The aforesaid
provision has been interpreted in catena of decision rendered by
Supreme Court as well as this Court.
(5) wpcr-62-2025.odt
8. In case of Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra), Supreme
Court observed in paragraph no.16 as under:
“Section 143 makes it possible for the complaints under
Section 138 of the Act to be tried in the summary manner,
except, of course, for the relatively small number of cases
where the Magistrate feels that the nature of the case is
such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is,
for any other reason, undesirable to try the case
summarily. It is, however, significant that the procedure
of summary trials is adopted under Section 143 subject to
the qualification “as far as possible”, thus, leaving
sufficient flexibility so as not to affect the quick flow of
the trial process. Even while following the procedure of
summary trials, the non-obstante clause and the
expression “as far as possible” used in Section 143
coupled with the non-obstante clause in Section 145
allows for the evidence of the complainant to be given on
affidavit, that is, in the absence of the accused. This
would have been impermissible (even in a summary trial
under the Code of Criminal Procedure) in view of Section
251 and 254 and especially Section 273 of the Code.
The accused, however, is fully protected, as under Sub-
section (2) of Section 145 he has the absolute and
unqualified right to have the complainant and any or
all of his witnesses summoned for cross-examination.”
9. Similarly, in case of Rakesh Singh (supra), this Court while
elaborating exposition of law laid down by Supreme Court in case of
Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) further observed that:
“The trial Court, in my opinion, committed error in
observing that the petitioner is silent on the specific
ground of defence or point on which he wishes to cross
examine the complainant. It may be that the petitioner
has an opportunity to lead defence evidence and rebut
the presumption if any, however, that does not mean that
the valuable right of the petitioner to cross examine the
complainant which he is entitled to under Section 145(2)
of the NI Act can be lightly brushed aside.”
(6) wpcr-62-2025.odt
10. Thereafter in case of Narayan Shivdas Kadam s/o Shivdas
Kadam Vs. Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited 6, this Court
observed that accused has an absolute and unqualified right to have
complainant and his witness summoned for cross-examination. It is not
necessary for Court to delve deep into merits of defence which is set up
by accused. The purpose of disclosing defence is not to find out
whether any details are given or to reject it at the threshold thereby
curtailing such right of accused. In paragraph no.34, it has been
observed that main intention of legislature incorporated under Section
145(2) of N.I. Act is to grant an opportunity to accused, in desirable
cases, wherein he shows or demonstrates before the Magistrate that
there is probable defence which he wants to produce before Court by
way of cross-examination of complainant. Such opportunity cannot be
taken away from accused if he satisfies Magistrate about probable
defence.
11. In case of K. Narsimulu (supra) this Court in reference to law
down in case of Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. (supra) observed that
Section 145(2) of N.I. Act protects right of accused to have complainant
and his witnesses cross-examine and he has absolute and unqualified
right to have complainant and any or all of his witnesses summoned for
cross-examination.
6 2024 (2) Mh.L.J. 147.
(7) wpcr-62-2025.odt
12. In case of Apolonius Francisco Luis Vs. Sahajanand
Investments Pvt. Ltd. (Criminal Writ Petition No.838/2021 decided on
12.09.2022), this Court found that cryptic and casual defence was
employed in application filed by accused and, therefore, he was
declined opportunity to cross-examination.
13. In light of aforesaid exposition of law, in present case, if contents
of petitioner’s application filed under Section 145(2) of N.I. Act are
scrutinized, it is discernible that petitioner has disputed signature and
writing on cheque alleging that same is misused by complainant and
cannot be enforced against accused as per document titled as agreement
for loan. According to petitioner, there is no legally enforceable debt.
The complainant illegally possessed cheque in dispute which is required
to be sent for handwriting expert opinion under Section 45 of Indian
Evidence Act. The aforesaid statements of defence appearing in
petitioner’s application would be normally sufficient to make out
probable defence. However, impugned order records otherwise.
14. This Court finds that Trial Court as well as Sessions Court cannot
be justified in holding that defences put forth by petitioner are not
sufficient to make out case to grant permission of cross-examination of
complainant or his witnesses. This Court observes that Trial Court
unnecessarily delved deep into defence while testing its credibility in
light of material tendered by complainant and made erroneous
(8) wpcr-62-2025.odt
observation that there is no denial of signature on cheques or legally
enforceable debt. The Court may be justified in rejecting prayer under
Section 145(2) of Act, only when material on record is sufficient to hold
that issuance of cheque, signatures thereon and legally enforceable debt
cannot be disputed by accused and application of accused seeking
permission for cross-examination is too vague to make out plausible
defence to be put forth by way of effective cross-examination during
trial. In light of aforesaid legal and factual backdrop, this Court finds
that impugned orders cannot be sustained in law.
15. In result, Writ Petition succeeds and allowed in terms of prayer
Clause (A).
16. Rule is made absolute in above terms.
(S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
Devendra/September-2026
Signed by: TARI AMRUT NAGESH
Designation: Private Secretary
Date: 12/09/2026 13:11:26
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