Allahabad High Court
JWALA PRASAD AND 3 OTHERSversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 3 OTHERS
- Decided
- Bench
- RAJIV LOCHAN SHUKLA
Holding
The Court held that a prima facie case of cheating and forgery exists and the charge‑sheets cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The applicants sought quashing of two charge‑sheets (Nos. 123/2015 and 124/2015) filed for offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 506 IPC arising from a property dispute over six shops. They claimed the FIRs were a malicious counter‑blow to a civil suit, that the alleged sale deed was unregistered and forged, and that the summoning order was a non‑speaking order. The State argued that the FIRs were based on a prima facie case of cheating and forgery, that the owner Dayawati had been examined and denied the deed, and that the charge‑sheets were properly framed. The Court examined the Supreme Court guidelines on quashing proceedings under Section 482 CrPC and held that the material disclosed a prima facie case of offence, that the applicants had not challenged the cognizance or summoning orders, and that the application was filed after the charge‑sheet stage without amending pleadings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, finding no ground to quash the charge‑sheets.
Issues considered
- Whether the charge‑sheets under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 506 IPC can be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC.
- Whether the FIRs disclose a cognizable offence warranting investigation and prosecution.
- Whether the summoning order, being non‑speaking, is liable to be set aside.
- Whether the proceedings are an abuse of process or malicious prosecution.
- Whether an application under Section 482 can be entertained after charge‑sheet framing without amendment of pleadings.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 155(2), 156(1), 156(3), 164, 204, 482
- Indian Penal Code — s. 420, 468, 471, 506
Subjects
- quash
- charge sheet
- Section 482 CrPC
- forgery
- property dispute
- malicious prosecution
- prima facie case
- summoning order
- criminal proceeding
Judgment
Reserved on:- 03.02.2026
Delivered on :- 12.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 9588 of 2016
Jwala Prasad And 3 Others
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 3 Others
.....Opposite
Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Firoz Haider, S.M. Iqbal Hasan, Syed
Badshah Husain Naqvi
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A., R.P.S. Chauhan
Court No. - 72
HON'BLE RAJIV LOCHAN SHUKLA, J.
1. Heard Sri S.M. Iqbal Hasan, Learned counsel for the applicants, Sri
R.P.S. Chauhan, Learned counsel for the opposite party Nos.2 to 4, Sri
Devesh Nath Tiwari, Learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the
material brought on the record.
2. The applicant Nos.1 and 4 are stated to have died and the application as
for the applicant Nos.1 and 4 is dismissed as abated.
3. This application has been filed with a prayer to quash the entire charge
sheet No.123 of 2015 dated 29.12.2015 (arising out of case crime No.174
of 2015), under Sections 420, 468, 471, 506 I.P.C., Police Station-
Faizganj, Behta, District- Badaun as well as charge sheet No.124 of 2015
dated 29.12.2015 (arising out of case crime No.174A of 2015), under
Sections 420, 468, 471, 506 I.P.C., Police Station- Faizganj Behta,
District- Badaun.
4. The brief facts for the adjudication of the present case as appearing
from the record, are given as follows:-
(i) The opposite parties Nos.2 & 3 filed separate applications under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for lodging the First Information Report against
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the applicants. The contentions raised in the applications under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. are almost similar in all respects. The two applications
which were filed, were filed by the opposite party Nos.2 & 3 as they had
purchased part of the disputed property through different sale deeds. The
said First Information Report has been lodged against the same set of
accused persons with same allegations. The allegations in brief are that
the informants had purchased four shops at Orchi Chauraha from one
Rakesh Kumar. After purchasing the said shops, when the informant
supposedly went to take possession of the same then the accused Mahandi
Hasan, Bhure Khan, Bhuri Begum and Jawla Prasad did not let the
informant take possession of the shops. They instead supposedly showed
a photocopy of a fake sale deed and threatened the informant with dire
consequences. The informant is said to have verified the sale deed, so
given, to him by the accused persons and the vendor Dayawati, who is
said to have executed the said sale deed told the informant that it was
fake. These applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was then directed
to be registered as an F.I.R and a First Information Report being Case
Crime No.174 of 2015 was lodged at Police Station- Faizganj Behta,
District- Badaun, for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 506
I.P.C. The informant so far as Crime No.174/2015 is concerned, was the
opposite party No.2 and for 174A/2015, was the opposite party No.3. The
accused mentioned in the First Information Reports were then charge-
sheeted and summoned to face trial. The First Information Report resulted
in the filing of a charge-sheet being Charge-sheet No.123 of 2015, under
Sections 420, 468, 471 & 506 I.P.C. and another Charge-sheet No.124 of
2015 arising out of Case Crime No.174A of 2015, under Sections 420,
468, 471 & 506 I.P.C. was filed, which is subject matter of challenge
before this Court. This Court initially vide order dated 1.4.2016 refused to
quash the charge-sheets and dismissed the application. The Supreme
Court in Criminal Appeal No.829 of 2016 (Jwala Prasad and Ors. Vs. State
of U.P. and Ors.), vide its order dated 17.08.2016 set aside the order passed
by this Court with the following directions:-
"We find that while considering the petition of the appellants under Sections 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court has passed stereotyped order
without even taking note of the aforesaid facts and contentions raised by making
general remarks that at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is make out against
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the appellants. We may also record at this stage that cases after cases are coming to
this Court from the High Court of Allahabad and in all such cases we find
stereotyped orders, worded in identical terms, are passed. It is the minimum
requirement that contentions raised in such petitions are noted and dealt with
specifically. However, no such attempts are made. We are constrained to set aside the
impugned order and remit the case back to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits
by giving reasoning.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly."
(ii) It is after the above-mentioned directions that the matter has been
placed before this Court for decision. Before proceeding to consider the
rival contentions raised before this Court at the time of the arguments, it
would be appropriate to record in this order the observations of the
Supreme Court with respect to the contentions raised before it on behalf
of the applicants:-
"The appellants are facing trial in charge-sheet No.123/2015 dated 29.12.2015 in
case No.112/2015 filed under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 506 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) as well as charge-sheet No. 124/2015 dated 29.12.2015 in case
No.113/2015 filed under Sections 420, 468, 471 & 506 IPC. Thus, both the charge-
sheets are under the same provisions and based on identical allegations. The
appellants filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
for quashing of these charge-sheets. The case set up by the appellants was that they
had entered into a sale deed dated 24.02.2005 with respondent No.4. As per the sale
deed respondent No.4 had agreed to sell the scheduled property consisting of 5 shops
to the appellants. It was also stated that the appellants were in possession of these
shops since 1990 and the possession was given by respondent No. 4. The appellants
carried out construction these shops and the cost of construction was to be adjusted
against rent that are payable. As per the appellants, this sale deed could not be
registered due to the dilatory tactics adopted by respondent No.4. It was also stated
that respondent No.4 came to these shops on 18.09.2007 with one Rakesh Kumar and
two others and tried to take physical possession of the shops alleging that she had
sold these shops to Rakesh Kumar. In these circumstances, the appellants were forced
to file a suit for injunction against respondent No.2, 4 and Rakesh Kumar. It
transpired that vide sale deed dated 14.03.2013 Rakesh Kumar had sold 1/4th of his
purported share in the 5 shops and vide sale deed dated 26.02.2014 he also sold his
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remaining share to respondent No.2 and respondent No.3. It is only thereafter
respondent No.2 lodged FIR No.174/2015 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 506
IPC against the appellants alleging therein that when respondent No.2 went to take
physical possession of the shops, she was resisted by the appellants. It was alleged
that the appellants showed forged and fabricated documents. To similar effect is the
second FIR lodged by respondent No.3. It may also be mentioned that the appellants
had even field a case for cancellation of sale dead dated 14.03.2013 on 29.05.2015.
Giving this background, the case set up by the appellants before the High Court was
that the FIRs were nothing but a counterblast and the prosecution cases were filed
with mala fide intentions just to harass the appellants who are in possession of the
said shops since 1990 and thereafter even agreement to sell was executed between
them and respondent No.4 on 24.02.2025."
(iii) Some further facts which appear from the perusal of the record
indicate that civil suits have also been filed by the parties and a civil suit
being O.S. No.194/2007 has been filed by the applicant Mahandi Hasan,
against Dayawati, Vikky, Rakesh Kumar and Vinay Kumar. The said civil
suit was filed seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants for
prohibiting them from taking possession of the property demarcated in the
plaint without following due procedure prescribed under the law. Another
civil suit said to have been registered as Misc. Case No.165 of 2015 is
said to have been filed by the applicants for cancellation of the sale deed
dated 14.03.2013 executed in favour of Lalit Kumari by Rakesh Kumar,
the opposite party No.2. The previous owner of the property, Rakesh
Kumar, whose claim is being contested by the applicants, had filed four
suits being O.S. No.98 of 2010 against the applicant No.3 Smt. Bhoori
Begum, O.S. No.99 of 2010 against the applicant No.1 Jwala Prasad, O.S.
No.100 of 2010 against the applicant No.4 Mahandi Hasan and O.S.
No.101 of 2010 against the applicant No.2 Bhurey Khan, for seeking
possession over the shops in question. The suits in question are said to
have been decreed on 21.03.2016 and restoration applications were filed
separately by the defendants/applicant Nos.1, 3 & 4, which were allowed
by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Fast Track Court, Badaun
vide separate orders dated 23.08.2017. These orders have been set aside
by the District Judge, Badaun in separate orders dated 17.02.2018 passed
in Civil Revision No.41 of 2017 (Rakesh Kumar Vs. Jwala Prasad), Civil
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Revision No.42 of 2017 (Rakesh Kumar Vs. Bhoori Begum), Civil Revision
No.43 of 2017 (Rakesh Kumar Vs. Mahandi Hasan) and the matter was
remitted back for reconsidering the restoration applications. Execution
Nos.1 of 2016, 2 of 2016 and 3 of 2016 are said to have been filed for
O.S. Nos.100 of 2010, 98 of 2010 and 99 of 2010, respectively before the
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Fast Track Court, Badaun. Another
execution case being Execution Case No.4 of 2016 was filed for
execution of decree passed in O.S. No.101 of 2010, in which the applicant
Bhurey Khan is said to have entered into a compromise and on the basis
of the said compromise, physical possession of the shop in question was
handed over to Mr. Rakesh Kumar and the Execution Case was finally
decided vide order dated 14.11.2018. Another fact which is necessary to
be noticed here, which has been brought forth on record by means of the
counter affidavit is that one of the beneficiaries of the unregistered deed,
which was to be executed by Dayawati as contended by the applicants
before the Supreme Court, Shubhash Chandra s/o Naurangi Lal purchased
one shop from Rakesh Kumar through a registered deed dated 20.5.2013.
The said sale deed executed by Rakesh Kumar in favour of Shubhash
Chandra has not been challenged.
5. The Learned counsel for the applicants has reiterated the submissions
as recorded in the order of the Supreme Court and has further contended
that the proceedings are malicious. The First Information Report was not
lodged by Smt. Dayawati. The summoning order is a cryptic order which
shows non application of mind. Two suits had been filed, one for
permanent injunction and second for the cancellation of sale deed, as
such there was no question of the applicants being an illegal occupants.
There was no evidence of any assault. The document i.e. the unregistered
sale deed was executed by Smt. Dayawati and she had not authorized the
opposite party Nos.2 & 3 to file any suit.
6. Learned counsel for the informant, Sri R.P.S. Chauhan stated that it is a
case of grabbing of property by the accused applicants. Relying upon
the Khatunies of the property in question, he contends that the property
was admittedly recorded in favour of Smt Dayawati and Rajendra Kumar.
The property, he argues was purchased jointly by Smt. Dayawati and her
husband Rajendra Kumar from its earlier owners Abdul Hussain and Ali
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Sher, sons of Khuda Baksh through a registered sale deed dated
27.8.1987. The names of Smt. Dayawati and her husband Rajendra
Kumar were mutated in the revenue records by the order of the competent
authority. It is further contended that after the death of Rajendra Kumar,
Smt. Dayawati became the absolute owner of the property. Over the
property in question, 6 shops had been constructed and one shop was sold
by Smt. Dayawati to Mr. Brijendra Kumar resident of Village -
Nawabpura, Tehsil - Bisauli, District Budaun. The other five shops were
sold by Smt. Dayawati, the opposite party No.4, to Rakesh Kumar son
of Lakshmi Narayana through a registered sale deed dated 24.8.2007. The
said sale deed has not been cancelled by any Court and the registered sale
deed executed by Smt. Dayawati in favour of Sri Rakesh Kumar has not
been challenged by the applicants before any competent Court of law.
7. The Learned counsel for the informant further contends that in the civil
suit for permanent injunction being O.S. No. 194 of 2007, the sale deed
dated 24.08.2007 has not been challenged. He further contends that the
disputed document i.e. the unregistered sale deed that has been filed as
Annexure No.1 to the affidavit dated 23.12.1999 is a forged document
and in the Forensic Sciences Report, the signatures of Smt. Dayawati
were found to be forged. Learned counsel for the informants further
contends that Smt. Dayawati had also stated on oath before the Learned
Magistrate in the statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein
she clearly denied the stamp papers shown by Mahandi Hasan and others.
She has clearly stated that she had not made any signatures on any such
stamp paper and her fake signatures had been made. She in her statement
has clearly stated that she had sold the shops in question to Rakesh Kumar
and thereafter, Rakesh Kumar had sold the same to Lalit Kumari and her
son Vipin Kumar. The Learned counsel for the informants further argues
that the prayer of the application before this Court only challenges the
charge sheet and not the entire proceedings. In the present case, he
submits that neither the cognizance nor the summoning order has been
challenged and even the order framing charges has not been challenged.
He further contends that the statement of P.W.-1 has also been recorded
by the concerned trial Court and as such, this application is not
maintainable as the order framing charges refusing to discharge the
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applicants has not been challenged.
8. The Learned A.G.A. has also supported the contentions raised by the
Learned counsel for the informants and has further contended that once
the statement of witnesses has been recorded, it would not be appropriate
to consider the challenge to the charge-sheet especially in the light of the
fact that no amendment in the pleadings seeking quashing of the order
framing charges or cognizance and summoning has been sought by the
applicants.
9. I have considered the submissions made by the Learned counsels for
the parties and perused the material brought on the record.
10. From the material available on the record, it transpires that admittedly
the property in question belongs to Smt. Dayawati. Both the parties claim
their title from Smt. Dayawati and as such admittedly Smt. Dayawati is
the owner of the said property. The document being relied upon by the
applicants to substantiate the claim regarding the property having been
sold to the applicants and mere registration of the deed was left, has been
denied by Smt. Dayawati. Smt. Dayawati in her statement recorded under
section 164 Cr.P.C.during investigation has stated as follows:-
"्शीमती दयावती पत्नी स्व राजेन््श कुमार वाष्णेय िन० मौ० फरूर् खाबादी बाजार िनकट घंटाघर कस्बा व थाना
चन्दौसी िजला सम्भल- पीिडता/गवाह ्शीमती दयावती पत्नी राजेन््श कुमार वाष्णेय उ्ा 76 वषर् िन०
फरुर् खाबादी बाजार िनकट घंटाघर कसबा व थाना चन्दौसी िजला सम्भल का आई०ओ० अिभलाष त्यागी धारा
164 सी०आर०पी०सी० का बयान दजर् कराने हेतू न्यायालय में उपिस्थत िकया गया। पीिड़ता ने सशपथ बयान
िकया िक मेरे नाम ओरछी चौराहे थाना फैजगंज बेहटा में 6 दुकाने थी मैने यह सब दुकाने िकराये पर उठा रखी
थी मैने यह समस्त दुकाने सन् 2014 में राकेश पु्ऴ ़्ज िकशोर िन० चन्दौसी को बेच दी थी उ्व िकरायेदार
मेंहदी हसन डाक्टर मरफी आिद को मैंने कोई दुकाने नहीं बेची है। न ही मैने इनके प्ष में िकसी िव्वय प्ऴ पर
हस्ता्षर िकये है। अन्य िकरायेदार के नाम मै नहीं बता सकती क्योंिक मेरे पित ही सब काम काज देखा करते
थे अपने पित को मृत्यू के बाद मैने यह दुकाने राकेश को बेच दी थी मेरे पित की मृत्यु को पाँच छः साल हो चुके
है। मेहदी हसन आिद ने जो स्टाम्प िदखाये है। यह सब झूठे है मैने इन स्टाम्प पर कोई हस्ता्षर नही िकये है।
मेरे हस्ता्षर फजर् बनाये गये हैं मैने सुना है िक राकेश ने यह दुकाने लिलत कुमारी व उसके बेटे िविपन कुमार
को बेच दी है। सुनकर तस्दीक िकया हस्ता्षर दयावती पीिड़ता के बोलने पर उसका बयान अ्षरशः मेरे ्षारा
िलखा गया हस्ता्षर मिज०।"
11. Forensic Sciences Laboratory Report with respect to the handwriting
on the disputed document which is said to be the unregistered sale deed
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did not match with the signatures of Smt. Dayawati. This Court, however,
while considering the challenge to the charge sheet would not go into the
correctness of the material that was collected during investigation. Smt
Dayawati, who is undoubtedly the owner of the property, has clearly in
her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. denied the execution of
the said document. Furthermore, the document being relied upon by the
applicants is admittedly an unregistered document. The main thrust of the
challenge, in the opinion of the Court, appears to be that proceedings
relate to civil dispute and therefore, no criminal proceeding would lie.
The facts of the case suggest that the property which admittedly belong to
Smt. Dayawati was sold by Smt. Dayawati to Sri Rakesh Kumar. The
sale deed dated 24.8.2007 by Smt. Dayawati remains unchallenged. The
challenge that has been made is to the sale deed executed by Rakesh
Kumar.
12. Of the five beneficiaries of the sale deed supposedly executed by Smt
Dayawati in favour of the applicants, Subhash Chandra purchased one
shop from Rakesh Kumar through the registered sale deed dated
20.5.2013. Even the applicant No.2 had entered into a compromise and
handed over the possession of the shop to the decree holder Rakesh
Kumar in Original Suit No.101/2010. There is no interim order operating
in favour of the applicants.The suits, as noticed in the earlier part of this
order, were decreed in favour of Rakesh Kumar. In the present case
charges have also been framed and statement of P.W.-1 has also been
recorded before the trial Court. In the opinion of the Court, a prima facie
case of forgery of the said unregistered sale deed is made out against the
applicants from the record.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal,
reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 has laid down the parameters for
quashing of the proceedings and the First Information Report, which
reads as follows:-
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
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and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
14. However, a note of caution has also been mentioned in the above-
mentioned judgement in paragraph No.103, which reads as follows:-
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"103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or
caprice."
15. From the perusal of the material on record, it cannot be said that no
offence is made out against the applicants. The contentions that the
proceedings are malicious in nature and have not been instituted by Smt
Dayawati, in the opinion of the Court, also does not hold force, inasmuch
as Smt. Dayawati was examined during investigation and even her
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded. So far as the
summoning order being cryptic showing non application of mind is
concerned, no amendment had been sought in this application seeking to
challenge the cognizance and summoning order nor has the order framing
charges been challenged before this Court. In the opinion of this Court,
this ground has been raised as an afterthought without making necessary
amendment in the pleadings. The specific contention that two suits have
been filed on behalf of the applicants and they are not illegal occupant, in
the opinion of the Court, is not to be considered as the applicants are
being prosecuted for cheating and forgery, not for illegal occupation of
the property in question. The question regarding Smt. Dayawati having
not authorized the opposite parties to file suit is similarly of no
consequence in these proceedings as Smt. Dayawati had been examined
during investigation and has substantiated the stand taken by the
informants. The assertions that there is no evidence of assault also cannot
be taken note of at this stage, once due opportunity to contend what
offences are made out had been given to the applicants, at the time of
order framing charges and the order framing charges has also not
subjected to challenge before this Court.
16. The Learned counsel for the applicants contends that the summoning
order is a non-speaking order and relies upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of M/s. JM Laboratories And Others Vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 208.
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Specifically paragraph Nos.8 & 9, which relies upon the earlier decisions
of the Supreme Court. Paragraph Nos.8 & 9 of the above-mentioned
decision, are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"8. In the judgment and order of even date in criminal appeal arising out of SLP
(Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled "INOX Air Products Limited Now Known as INOX Air
Products Private Limited and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh", we have
observed thus:
"33. It could be seen from the aforesaid order that except recording the
submissions of the complainant, no reasons are recorded for issuing the
process against the accused persons.
34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another
vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others (1998) 5 SCC 749 (supra):
"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter.
Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that
the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations
in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his
mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to
examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence
both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient
for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It
is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of
preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate
has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even
himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit
answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and
then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
accused."
35. This Court has clearly held that summoning of an accused in a
criminal case is a serious matter. It has been held that the order of the
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his
mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. This Court
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held that the Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations
made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in
support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding
against the accused. It has been held that the Magistrate is not a silent
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before
summoning the accused.
36. The said law would be consistently following by this Court in a catena
of judgments including in the cases of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central
Bureau of Investigation (2015) 12 SCC 420 and Krishna Lal Chawla and
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2021) 5 SCC 435.
37. Recently, a Bench of this Court to which one of us (Gavai, J.) was a
Member, in the case of Lalankumar Singh and Others v. State of
Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383 (supra), has observed thus:
"38. The order of issuance of process is not an empty formality. The
Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground
for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an opinion
is required to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set
aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that
there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that the order
need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect could be
made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v.
Central Bureau of Investigation9, which reads thus:
"51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of
process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an
offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to
commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking
cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or
to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration
of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the
complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any),
thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an
offence, he shall issue process against the accused.
52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and
A482 No. 9588 of 2016
13
it must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into
court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has
been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be
refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a
conviction.
53. However, the words "sufficient ground for proceeding" appearing in
Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply
suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind
that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and
formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order
is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the
conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the
order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be
bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect."
39. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Ashoke Mal
Bafna (supra).
40. In the present case, leaving aside there being no reasons in support of
the order of the issuance of process, as a matter of fact, it is clear from
the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, that there was no
such order passed at all. The learned Single Judge of the High Court,
based on the record, has presumed that there was an order of issuance of
process. We find that such an approach is unsustainable in law. The
appeal therefore deserves to be allowed."
9. In the present case also, no reasons even for the namesake have been assigned by
the learned Magistrate. The summoning order is totally a non-speaking one. We
therefore find that in light of the view taken by us in criminal appeal arising out of
SLP (Crl.) No. 2345 of 2024 titled "INOX Air Products Limited Now Known as INOX
Air Products Private Limited and Another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh", and the
legal position as has been laid down by this Court in a catena of judgments including
in the cases of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and
Others, (1988) 5 SCC 749 : 1997 insc 714, Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of
Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609 : 2015 insc 18, Mehmood U1 Rehman v. Khazir
Mohammad Tunda and Others, (2015) 12 SCC 420 : 2015 insc 983 and Krishna Lal
Chawla and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2021) 5 SCC 435 : 2021
A482 No. 9588 of 2016
14
insc 160, the present appeal deserves to be allowed."
17. The Learned counsel for the applicants further relies upon the
judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Lalankumar Singh &
Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1383.
Paragraph No.28 of the above-mentioned judgment is quoted
hereinbelow:-
"28. The order of issuance of process is not an empty formality. The Magistrate is
required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the
case or not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order
itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming
to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that
the order need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect could be made
to the judgment of this court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of
Investigation*, which reads thus** :
* See (2015) 191 Comp Cas 177 (SC) ; (2015) 4 SCC 609.
** See page 213 of 191 Comp Cas.
"On the other hand, section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if
in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient
ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal
proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the
Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under
section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i. e., the
complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report
of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect
of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused.
A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must
be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into court merely
because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the
Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he
thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction.
However, the words 'sufficient ground for proceeding' appearing in section
204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an
opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient
basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is
A482 No. 9588 of 2016
15
to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is
given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against
the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the
order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect."
18. Relying upon the above-mentioned judgments, the Learned counsel
for the applicants submits that the order taking cognizance and
summoning the accused is not in consonance with the law declared by the
Supreme Court and must necessarily be quashed.
19. As had been noticed above, the order taking cognizance and
summoning the applicants has not been made the subject matter of
challenge before this Court. Even otherwise, once the charges have been
framed and the applicants had an opportunity to seek discharge, the
challenge to the summoning order post framing of charges, that too
without the necessary prayer, in the opinion of the Court, is not liable to
be entertained.
20. The Learned counsel for the applicants relying upon a decision of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.37331
of 2016 (Pannalal Sah @ Pannalal Prasad Vs. Mukesh Singh) has contended
that the change of stage in a criminal proceeding would not render the
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the cognizance order
infructuous. Relying upon Paragraph No.13 of the said decision, he
contends that in the prayer, he has challenged the charge-sheets and all
further proceedings can be quashed by this Court and the present
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has not become infructuous.
21. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. becoming infructuous by
efflux of time or change of proceedings is not the issue that has been
raised by the Learned counsel for the informants. What has been
contended is that the cognizance and summoning order has not been
challenged nor the subsequent order, where charges have been framed. In
the opinion of the Court, once a statutory right to seek discharge was
available to the applicants and they either chose not to exercise the said
right or were unsuccessful in their challenge and thereafter the trial Court
framed charges and the trial is in progress, this Court would not then
exercise its discretionary power to quash the proceedings solely on the
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basis of the material collected in the police investigation. Even otherwise,
this application has been pending since 2016 and there was ample
opportunity to the applicants to move appropriate applications seeking
amendment in the pleadings or invoking the powers of this Court for
challenging the judicial orders taking cognizance and summoning the
accused as well as the order framing charges against them. The applicants
by choosing not to challenge the said orders, would then not be allowed to
contend that merely because the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
does not become infructuous by change of stage of the criminal
proceeding, the proceedings may still be considered on the same materials
and grounds, which have been turned down by a competent trial Court
and whose orders have not been subjected to challenge before the High
Court.
22. On a broad perusal of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, a
prima facie case against the applicants is made out. There is no good
ground for quashing the charge sheet and this application is, therefore,
dismissed.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajiv Lochan Shukla,J.)
May 12, 2026
Sachin
Digitally signed by :-
SACHIN TIWARI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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