SHEO POOJAN AND OTHERSversusSTATE

                                                Reserved on 24.08.2026
                                                Delivered on 08.09.2026

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 271 of 1985

Sheo Poojan and others
                                                          …..Appellant(s)

                                Versus

State
                                                        …..Respondent(s)


Counsel for Appellant(s)          : Ashok Kumar Jaiswal,          Keshav
                                    Sahai, Siddarth Jaiswal
Counsel for Respondent(s)         : A.G.A.



Court No. - 93

            HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.


1. Heard Sri Siddarth Jaiswal, learned counsel for the surviving accused-
appellants and learned A.G.A. for the State, and perused the record.

2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated
07.02.1985 passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria, in
Sessions Trial No. 529 of 1981 (State Vs. Sheo Nandan and others),
whereby the learned trial court convicted and sentenced the ten accused
persons, namely, (1) Sheo N a n d a n , (2) Mahadeo, (3) Kali Charan,
(4) Rama Nand, (5) Sheo Poojan, (6) Ram Chandra, (7) Ram Pratap, (8)
Ram Dutt, (9) Ramakant and (10) Thag, as follows:
                                    2



 Accused-Appellant         Conviction                   Sentence
 Sheo Poojan (deceased) Ss. 148 and 307 I.P.C.          2 years' R.I.
                                                        (S.148) and 3
                                                        years' R.I.
                                                        (S.307)
 Sheo Nandan, Mahadeo, S. 147 I.P.C.                    1 year's R.I. each
 Kali Charan, Rama
 Nand, Ram Chandra,
 Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt,
 Ramakant
 Sheo Nandan, Mahadeo, S. 307/149 I.P.C.                3 years' R.I. each
 Kali Charan, Rama
 Nand, Ram Chandra,
 Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt,
 Ramakant
 Sheo Nandan, Mahadeo, Ss. 325/149 and 323/149          3 years’ R.I. and 6
 Kali Charan, Rama     I.P.C.                           months'
 Nand, Sheo Poojan,                                     R.I. respectively
 Ram Chandra, Ram
 Pratap, Ram Dutt,
 Ramakant
 Ram Chandra               S. 379 I.P.C.                1 year's R.I.
 Thag                      S. 411 I.P.C. and S. 25      1 year's R.I. and
                           Arms Act                     6 months' R.I.


All sentences were directed to run concurrently. The trial court acquitted
none of the accused; all ten stood convicted in some measure.


3. During the pendency of this appeal, accused-appellant nos. 1 (Sheo
Poojan), 2 (Mahadeo), 4 (Rama Nand), 5 (Sheo Poojan) and 6 (Ram
Chandra) have died, as borne out from the reports placed on record. In
view of Section 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appeal
abated qua accused-appellant nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 vide order dated
19.09.2025. Consequently, this Court is not required to, and does not,
examine the correctness of the conviction and sentence recorded against
the said deceased appellants any further, and the findings recorded by the
trial court qua them shall not be treated as having merged into any
finding of this Court.
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4. Briefly stated, the prosecution case was that a dispute over agricultural
land situate in village Karntikar/Khadesar, Pargana and District Deoria,
existed between the complainant Bhagwan Dutt's family and the family
of accused Shital (father of accused-appellants nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). On
the evening of 14.05.1980, an altercation took place when the sons of
Shital objected to the complainant ploughing the disputed field. The next
morning, i.e. 15.05.1980 at about 7:00 a.m., when the complainant
Bhagwan Dutt, along with Sheo Nath and Vishwanath, went to the field
for levelling ("patela"), the accused persons, armed with lathis, dandas
and a country-made pistol/katta, are alleged to have assaulted them.
Accused Sheo Poojan is alleged to have fired his pistol, injuring one
Harendra, who had rushed to the spot on hearing the alarm; Vishwanath
thereafter brought his licensed gun, which was snatched from him by
accused Ram Chandra after Ram Chandra assaulted him with a lathi. The
gun and cartridges so snatched were later allegedly handed over by Ram
Chandra to accused Thag, from whom they were recovered. Cross-
versions were also registered, giving rise to a cross-case (Sessions Trial
No. 124 of 1982), which was tried separately by the same court.

5. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses- complainant Bhagwan Datt
(P.W.1), the injured eye-witnesses Harendra (P.W.2) and Sheo Nath
(P.W.3), the medical evidence of Dr. M.B. Singh (P.W.4) and Dr. H.K.
Jaiswal (P.W.6), the recovery witness Om Prakash (P.W.5), and the two
Investigating Officers (P.W.7 and P.W.8).

6. The statements of accused appellants were recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C., where they denied the allegations levelled against them
by the prosecution and pleaded false implication on account of land
dispute.

7. Briefly stated, the grounds urged in the present appeal are that the
conviction of the appellants is contrary to the weight of the evidence
available on record and is otherwise bad in law. The sentence
awarded to the appellants is excessive and disproportionate to the
facts and circumstances of the case.
                                     4


8. Learned counsel for the surviving accused-appellants, namely, Kali
Charan, Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt, Ramakant and Thag, does not seriously
press the appeal on the question of guilt, and confines his submissions to
the question of sentence. It is submitted that: (i) the occurrence is of the
year 1980 and the appeal has remained pending in this Court for about
46 years; (ii) the appellants are all presently aged more than 60 years;
(iii) the appellants have no other criminal antecedent brought on record
either before or after the incident; (iv) the injuries attributed to firearm
use are squarely attributable to co-accused Sheo Poojan, who has since
died, and not to the surviving appellants; (v) the dispute arose out of a
bona fide land controversy between two branches of the same family,
and a cross-case arising from the very same transaction was also
registered; and (vi) keeping in view the long lapse of time, the advanced
age of the appellants, and the protracted mental agony of a pending
criminal case hanging over them for over four decades, the ends of
justice would be served by releasing the surviving appellants on
probation of good conduct under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958,
instead of sending them to prison at this belated stage.

9. Learned A.G.A., per contra, supports the judgment of the trial court
and submits that the offence, particularly under Section 307/149 I.P.C., is
a grave one, involving use of firearm and multiple injuries, and that the
trial court's appreciation of evidence does not suffer from any infirmity
warranting interference.

10.   Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having examined
the record, this Court finds no reason to disturb the concurrent
appreciation of evidence made by the trial court on the question of guilt.
The testimony of the injured eye-witnesses Harendra (P.W.2) and Sheo
Nath (P.W.3), duly corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W.4 and
P.W.6 and by the recovery of the firearm, sufficiently establishes the
occurrence and the participation of the accused persons in the manner
found by the trial court. The conviction of the surviving accused-
appellants under Sections 147, 307/149, 325/149, 323/149 I.P.C. (as
                                     5


applicable to Kali Charan, Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt and Ramakant) and
under Sections 411 I.P.C. and 25 of the Arms Act as applicable to Thag
is, accordingly, affirmed.

11. Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are
reproduced below for ready reference:
      4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation
      of good conduct.— (1) When any person is found guilty of
      having committed an offence not punishable with death or
      imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is
      found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the
      circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence
      and the character of the offender, it is Ramexpedient to
      release him on probation of good conduct, then,
      notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
      time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing
      him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on
      his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear
      and receive sentence when called upon during such period,
      not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in
      the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
       Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an
      offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety,
      if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in
      the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in
      which the offender is likely to live during the period for
      which he enters into the bond.
       2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court
      shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the
      probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
      3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court
      may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender
      and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a
      supervision order directing that the offender shall remain
      under the supervision of a probation officer named in the
      order during such period, not being less than one year, as
      may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order
      impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due
      supervision of the offender.
      (4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section
      (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter
                                     6


      into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the
      conditions specified in such order and such additional
      conditions with respect to residence, abstention from
      intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having
      regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to
      impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a
      commission of other offences by the offender.
      (5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section
      (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of
      the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the
      supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if
      any, and the probation officer concerned.
      5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay
      compensation and costs.—(1) The court directing the
      release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it
      thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing
      him to pay—
      (a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for
      loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of
      the offence; and
      (b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks
      reasonable.
      (2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1)
      may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the
      provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code.
      (3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same
      matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into
      account any amount paid or recovered as compensation
      under sub-section (1) in awarding damages.”


12. In Sitaram Paswan and Another vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 13 SCC
110, the Apex Court has held as under:
      “For exercising the power which is discretionary, the court
      has to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of
      the offence and the character of the offender. While
      considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a
      realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which
      the offence had on the victim. The benefit available to the
      accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act
      is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and
                                   7


     the word "may" clearly indicates that the discretion vests
     with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of
     the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of
     Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence
     and the character of the offender and overall circumstances
     of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of
     Offenders Act vest with the court when any person is found
     guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death
     or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by
     the courts while finding the person guilty and if the court
     thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case,
     including the nature of the offence and the character of the
     offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the
     power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or
     revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing the
     appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.”

13. In Lakhanlal alias Lakhan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2021) 6 SCC 100, the Apex Court held as under:

      “10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal v.
      State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444 while examining the
      provisions of the 1958 Act held that in case the offenders
      are below 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not
      to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that
      having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not
      desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the
      1958 Act but in respect of offenders who were above age of
      21 years, the Court has absolute discretion to release such
      offenders either after admonition or on probation of good
      conduct. The Court held as under:
      "4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern
      liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the
      result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of
      criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than
      to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes
      offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age,
      and offenders who are guilty of having committed an
      offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and
      those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case
      of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute
      discretion is given to the court to release them after
      admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the
                              8


conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the
Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an
injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to
imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, including the nature of the
offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable
to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act."

11. This Court in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar
(1972) 2 SCC 633 explained the rationale of the provision
as to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into
obdurate criminals as a result of their association with
hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful
offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail.
The Court held as under:

"6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958
with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain
categories on probation or after due admonition and for
matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to
prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate
criminals as a result of their association with hardened
criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are
sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The above
object is in consonance with the present trend in the field of
penology, according to which effort should be made to
bring about correction and reformation of the individual
offenders and not to resort to retributive justice. Modern
criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born
criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of
socio-economic milieu. Although not much can be done for
hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on
bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very
serious offences and of preventing their association with
hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to
the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful
offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain
circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can
be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person
even though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an
offenec punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear
from the language of Section 6 of the Act."”
                                      9


14. In Mohd. Hashim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 2 SCC
   198, the Apex reiterated the exercise of discretionary power of the court
   under Probation of Offenders Act as under:

               “21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other
        authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court
        under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Parkash v.
        State of H.P.9, while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act
        in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
        1954, the Court opined that the word "may" used in Section
        4 of the PO Act does not mean "must". On the contrary, as
        has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in
        categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act
        distinguish offenders below 21 years of age and those above
        that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an
        offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and
        those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the
        Court has proceeded to observe:
              "7.... While in the case of offenders who are above the
        age of 21 years. absolute discretion is given to the court to
        release them after admonition or on probation of good
        conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years
        an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to
        imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the
        circumstances of the case, including the nature of the
        offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable
        to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Rattan
        Lal v. State of Punjab and Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar.)"
               Be it noted, in the said case, keeping in view the
        offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
        1954, the Court declined to confer the benefit under Section
        4 of the PO Act.
        22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the
        point that the court before exercising the power under
        Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of
        offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of
        the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana
        it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only
        if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release
        the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being
        had to the circumstances of the case and one of the
        circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the
        said opinion is "the nature of the offence". The Court has
                                   10


     further opined that though the discretion has been vested in
     the court to decide when and how the court should form
     such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient
     indication that releasing the convicted person on probation
     of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient.
     Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus:
         “9. … The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully
     employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as
     "apt and suitable to the end in view". In Black's Law
     Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as "suitable and
     appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object"
     besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of
     Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabril a two-Judge Bench of this
     Court has considered the word "expedient". The learned
     Judges have observed in para 21 thus:
        21.... Again, the word "expedient" used in this provision,
     has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense,
     "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable to the end in
     view", "practical and efficient": "politic"; "profitable";
     "advisable", "fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of
     the case". In another shade, it means a device "characterised
     by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special
     advantage rather than to what is universally right" (see
     Webster's New International Dictionary)'.
        10. It was then held that the court must construe the said
     word in keeping with the context and object of the
     provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word
     "expedient" is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the
     context of casting a duty on the court to take into account
     "the circumstances of the case including the nature of the
     offence...". This means Section 4 can be resorted to when
     the court considers the circumstances of the case,
     particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its
     opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing
     a specified object that the offender can be released on
     probation of good conduct."

15. In Chellammal and Another vs. State represented by the Inspector
of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461, where the Sessions Judge has
acquitted the appellants (mother-in-law and husband) of the charge
under Section 304-B IPC but convicted them under Section 498-A, the
Apex Court held as under:
                                    11


      “Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an
      offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a
      matter of right but having noticed the object that the
      statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation
      and the several decisions of this Court on the point of
      applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold
      that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the
      circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the
      Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to
      omit from its consideration release of the offender on
      probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon
      the court to consider whether the case before it warrants
      releasing the offender upon fulfillment of the stated
      circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be
      decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion
      decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon
      considering the report of the probation officer impose such
      conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the
      answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper
      for the court to record the reasons therefor.”- Probation
      rulings.

16. On the question of sentence, however, this Court is persuaded to
take a different view. It is well settled that the discretion to grant the
benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act,
1958 is available even in respect of an offence under Section 307 I.P.C.,
since that provision does not mandate a sentence of death or
imprisonment for life; the availability of the benefit has to be judged on
the facts of each case, having regard to the circumstances of the offence
and the character of the offender. In the present case: (a) the occurrence
is over four decades old, having taken place on 15.05.1980; (b) the
appeal itself has remained pending for approximately 46 years, a delay
not attributable to the appellants; (c) all the surviving appellants are now
aged more than 60 years; (d) the incident arose out of a family/land
dispute in which both sides were shown to have sustained injuries and
cross-versions were registered; (e) the specific act of firing, which
caused the more serious gunshot injuries, is attributed to co-accused
Sheo Poojan, who has since died, and not to the appellants Kali Charan,
Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt and Ramakant, whose role is confined to the
vicarious/constructive liability flowing from Section 149 I.P.C.; and (f)
                                     12


no material has been placed on record to show that any of the surviving
appellants has been involved in any offence in the more than four
decades since the occurrence. In these circumstances, sending the
appellants to prison at this stage, after such an extraordinarily long
pendency and at their present age, would not sub-serve the ends of
justice; the protracted anxiety of the pending prosecution itself may be
taken to have served a substantial part of the punitive and deterrent
purpose of sentencing.

17. For the reasons aforesaid, while affirming the conviction, this Court
deems it appropriate to extend the benefit of probation of good conduct
under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to the surviving
accused-appellants Kali Charan, Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt, Ramakant and
Thag, in lieu of the substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed by
the trial court, subject to the conditions recorded below.

18. The appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and order dated
07.02.1985 passed by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria, in
Sessions Trial No. 529 of 1981 is modified as follows:

      (i) The conviction of accused-appellants Kali Charan, Ram
   Pratap, Ram Dutt and Ramakant under Sections 147, 307/149,
   325/149 and 323/149 I.P.C., and of accused-appellant Thag under
   Sections 411 I.P.C. and 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, as recorded by
   the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Deoria, in Sessions Trial No.
   529 of 1981 vide judgment dated 07.02.1985, is hereby confirmed

   (ii) The substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed on
   accused-appellants Kali Charan, Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt,
   Ramakant and Thag is set aside and, in modification thereof, each
   of them is directed to be released on probation of good conduct
   under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on
   furnishing a “fresh” personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with
   one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial
   court, undertaking to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for
   a period of one years.
                                       13


   (iv) Invoking Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, each
   appellant shall pay Rs.10,000/- [total compensation of Rs.50,000/-
   (Rupees Fifty Thousand) to the injured/complainant Bhagwan
   Datt, Harendra, Vishwanath and Sheo Nath equally, within a
   period of one month from today.In case of death of
   injured/victim(s), the appellants shall pay the same to their legal
   heirs.

   (v) The appellants shall deposit above compensation amount of
   Rs.50,000/- before the trial court concerned within stipulated
   period and the trial court, after notice and verification, shall give
   the amount to the victim(s)/his legal heirs through bank accounts.
   (vi) In the event of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the
  accused-appellants Kali Charan, Ram Pratap, Ram Dutt, Ramakant
  and Thug shall be liable to undergo the sentence as provided under
  the impugned judgment and order of the trial court.

19. Trial court shall ensure compliance and seek report from the
Probation Officer for supervision.

20. In view of the modification of sentence and release of the appellants
on probation, the bail bonds and sureties furnished earlier during
trial/appeal shall stand discharged.

21. The appellants are directed to appear before the trial court within two
weeks from today to furnish the requisite bonds. In case of default, the
trial court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, including
issuance of coercive process.

22. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted within a week to the trial
court concerned along with trial court record for compliance.

23. The Registrar (Compliance) is also directed to serve a copy of this
order within 48 hours by FAX/e-mail to the concerned court through
District & Sessions Judge, concerned for compliance.


                                                           (Santosh Rai,J.)
September 08, 2026/Asha
                                        14




Digitally signed by :-
ASHA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad