Allahabad High Court
RAMDATT YADAVversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
- Decided
- Bench
- SANTOSH RAI
Holding
The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act and therefore discharged the appellant of that charge.
Summary
The appellant, Ramdatt Yadav, was charged under the Indian Penal Code for assault and under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act for allegedly insulting a Scheduled Caste victim inside a room. The appellant argued that the FIR was lodged after an unjustified two‑day delay, that the medical evidence did not link the injuries to the alleged assault, and that the incident did not occur in a place "within public view" as required by the SC/ST Act. The State contended that the FIR, statements, and medical reports established a prima facie case and that the Special Judge was correct in taking cognizance. The High Court examined the statutory requirement of a public‑view location and intentional caste‑based insult, relying on Supreme Court precedents, and found no reliable material to support the charge under Section 3(1)(r). Consequently, the court discharged the appellant of the SC/ST offence but allowed the trial on the remaining IPC charges to proceed. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the material on record discloses a prima facie case under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
- Whether the charge‑sheet and cognizance order for the SC/ST offence should be quashed.
- Whether the delay in lodging the FIR warrants dismissal of the prosecution.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code — s. 115, 127(2), 351(2), 352
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — s. 3(1)(r)
Subjects
- SC/ST Act
- Section 3(1)(r)
- public view
- caste based insult
- assault
- prima facie case
- quash
- abuse of process
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 473 of 2025
Ramdatt Yadav
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Dinesh Kumar Maurya, Kamala
Shanker Yadav
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 93
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Ankit
Tiwari, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA for the State.
2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant with a prayer
to quash the chargesheet no.571 of 2024 dated 17.8.2024 and cognizance
order dated 3.12.2024 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kannauj as well
as quash the entire proceedings of Session Case No.1033 of 2024 (State of
U.P. vs. Ramdatt Yadav), arising out of Case Crime No.575 of 2024 under
Sections 115, 352, 351(2), 127(2) BNS and 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, P.S.- Kotwali Kannauj,
District- Kannauj. He further prays to stay the proceedings in the aforesaid
case.
3. As per the first information report, the allegation against the accused-
appellant, Ramdatt Yadav, is that when the complainant/informant
demanded his wages from the accused-appellant, he detained the
informant/victim inside a room and caused injuries to him. Furthermore the
accused-appellant also subjected the complainant to electric current.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the FIR was lodged after an
unexplained delay of two days. Though injuries are mentioned in the
medical report of Ram Ashrey, there is no reliable material connecting the
said injuries with the alleged incident, whereas, in respect of Rama Kant,
admittedly no visible injury was found and there was only a complaint of
pain. The allegation that the informant/victim was subjected to electric
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current is also not corroborated by any specific medical finding. Further,
there is no reliable material to attract Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, as the
alleged incident admittedly took place inside a room and not at a place
within public view. Thus, the prosecution material, considered as a whole,
does not disclose sufficient grounds for summoning the appellant. It is,
therefore, prayed that the impugned charge-sheet and
cognizance/summoning order be set aside.
5. Learned A.G.A. opposed the submissions of learned counsel for the
appellant and submits that the delay of two days in lodging the FIR is not, by
itself, sufficient to discard the prosecution case, particularly when the FIR,
the statements of the informant/victim, injured and independent witnesses
recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, the medical examination reports,
and the material collected during investigation clearly disclose the
commission of cognizable offences by the appellant. The injuries found on
Ram Ashrey provide prima facie corroboration to the allegation of assault,
while the absence of visible injury on Rama Kant and the medical evidence
regarding electric current are matters of appreciation of evidence to be
considered during trial. The Investigating Officer, upon finding sufficient
prima facie evidence, rightly submitted the charge-sheet, and the learned
Special Judge rightly took cognizance of the offences. At the stage of
cognizance, meticulous appreciation of evidence is impermissible, and the
defence raised by the appellant involves disputed questions of fact which are
to be examined during trial. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
6. In the statements of the complainant and injured witnesses, specific and
distinct roles have been attributed to the accused-appellant in causing
injuries, which are prima facie corroborated by the medical evidence
available on record. The statement of the doctor is also on record. From a
perusal of the medical report, it appears that injured Ram Ashrey sustained
an abrasion and stitched wounds, whereas, in the case of the other injured,
Rama Kant, there was only a complaint of pain and no visible injury was
found. So far as the offences under the relevant provisions of the BNS, in
respect of which cognizance has been taken, are concerned, a prima facie
case is made out against the accused-appellant. However, with regard to the
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, it is admitted that the
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alleged incident took place inside a room. For summoning an accused under
Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act, it is necessary that the alleged caste-related
insult or derogatory words were uttered with the intention of insulting or
humiliating a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place
within public view. From the statements of the complainant/victim and
injured witnesses, as well as the other material available on record, it appears
that the alleged incident took place inside the house. Thus, considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, there is no reliable material available on
record to take cognizance of or summon the accused-appellant for the
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act.
7. In the case of Swaran Singh vs State (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon'ble
Apex Court drew a clear distinction between the expressions "public place"
and "any place within public view." A private place may still be a place
within public view if the incident is visible to members of the public.
Conversely, merely because an incident occurs in a public building does not
automatically satisfy the requirement if it is not within public view. The
Supreme Court held that words such as "Chamar", though originally
denoting a caste, may amount to an offence if used as a casteist abuse with
intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes. The Court
emphasized that words should be understood in their popular and social
meaning, not merely their etymological meaning. For attracting Section
3(1)(x) (now Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)), there must be intentional insult or
intimidation; and intent to humiliate the victim because he or she belongs to
a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Mere abuse or quarrel, without the
requisite intention contemplated by the Act, is insufficient. The Court
reiterated that criminal proceedings should continue only where the
allegations disclose a prima facie offence against the particular accused.
Proceedings may be quashed where the FIR does not disclose the essential
ingredients against an accused.
8. In Gorige Pentaiah vs state of AP & Ors 2009 Cri.L.J. 350, Honble
Apex court held "when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the
complaint, then permitting such complaint to continue and to compel the
appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally
unjustified leading to abuse of process of law." In the case of Hitesh Verma
vs. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Hon'ble Suprme Court held
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that 'a dispute that arose inside the private house of a complainant over the
possession of the land without the presence of independent public witnesses,
does not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 3(1)(r).
9. In the case of Shajan Skraria vs. State of Kerala and another, 2024
SCC Online SC 2249, the Hon'ble Apex Court by quoting the cases of
Hitesh Verma (Supra) has held as under:
"13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would
indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation
with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person
will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or
intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve
the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil
rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out
when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is
subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The
assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not
due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment.
Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in
accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family
members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court,
then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance
with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for
the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled
Caste."
In Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763
"15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such
so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act.
The offence must have been committed against the person on
the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is
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that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not
established merely on the fact that the complainant is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless
there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the
reason that he belongs to such community. In other words, it
is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of
intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is
not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a
person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because
it is committed against a person who happens to be a member
of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary,
Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason
for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person
who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe. I say so because the object behind the
enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent
provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status."
10. Accordingly, having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and upon a careful scrutiny of the entire material available on
record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed
to disclose even a prima facie case attracting the provisions of Section
3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. The material collected during inquiry does not indicate that
the alleged words or conduct were actuated by the caste of the informant or
were intended to intentionally insult or humiliate the informant on the
ground that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Equally
absent is any material to establish that the alleged occurrence took place in a
place within "public view", which is a sine qua non for constituting the
offence under the aforesaid provisions, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Swaran Singh (supra) further reaffirmed in Hitesh Verma & Shajan
Skaria (supra).
11. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered
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opinion that the essential ingredients constituting the offence under Section
3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act are conspicuously absent from the material
collected during investigation, and the continuance of proceedings for the
said offences would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Consequently,
the appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act succeeds in part.
12. The chargesheet dated 17.8.2024 and the cognizance order dated
3.12.2024 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Kannauj in Session Case
No.1033 of 2024 (State of U.P. vs. Ramdatt Yadav), arising out of Case
Crime No.575 of 2024 under Sections 115, 352, 351(2), 127(2) BNS and
3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, P.S.- Kotwali Kannauj, District- Kannauj, is modified to the
extent that the appellant stands discharged of the offences punishable under
Sections 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act.
13. However, the medical evidence available on record reveals that appellant
has caused injury to the injured persons. Accordingly, the proceedings
against the appellant under the provisions of Sections 115, 352, 351(2),
127(2) BNS shall continue and be concluded expeditiously in accordance
with law. The trial court shall proceed uninfluenced by any observation
made herein on the merits of the case.
14. With the above observation, the appeal is partly allowed.
15. If the appellant is not enlarged on bail, he is directed to appear before the
court concerned and move bail application, within two weeks from today. It
is made clear that no application seeking extension of the aforesaid period
shall be entertained by this court.
16. In case, the appellant moves bail application before the court concerned,
the same shall be considered and decided by the trial court expeditiously and
preferably on the same day, in light of principles laid down by the Supreme
Court as well as this Court regarding surrender and bail.
17. In case, the appellant fails to appear before the court concerned within
the stipulated period, the trial court will be at liberty to adopt appropriate
coercive proceedings, in accordance with law, for securing the presence of
the appellant.
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18. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to serve a copy of this order by
FAX/e-mail to the court concerned through District & Sessions Judge
concerned within a week.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
September 30, 2026
Vikas Verma
Digitally signed by :-
VIKAS VERMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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