SUSHIL KUMAR KUSHWAHAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                  CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 7553 of 2026

Sushil Kumar Kushwaha
                                                           .....Appellant(s)
                                  Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                         .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)             :   Sharad Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)            :   G.A., Mukesh Kumar Pandey

Court No. - 93
                      HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.

1. Heard Shri Sharad Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri
Mukesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA
for the State.

2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant to set aside
the summoning order dated 17.01.2024 passed by learned Special Judge
(S.C./S.T. Act), Etawah of Complaint Case No.804 of 2023 (Ranjeet
Singh vs. Sushil Kumar Kushwaha) under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC
and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, P.S.-
Bakewar, District- Etawah.

3. In the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it has been stated
that the accused-appellant, Sushil Kumar Kushwaha, who was working as
the Secretary of Gram Panchayat Gudera, had pressurized and intimidated
the complainant, Ranjit Singh, to withdraw the RTI application filed by
him. It is further alleged that the accused-appellant used casteist slurs
against the complainant and also caused injuries to him.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
summoning order dated 17.01.2024 is unsustainable, having been passed
mechanically without proper consideration of the complaint and the
statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. It is contended
that the prosecution arose out of a dispute concerning the complainant's
RTI application and is actuated by mala fide intention to pressurise and
harass the appellant. The alleged incident dated 26.04.2023 is rendered
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highly improbable by the contemporaneous certificate of the Gram
Pradhan showing that the appellant was performing official duties
elsewhere till 5:30 p.m. It is further submitted that there is no medical or
other independent evidence supporting the allegation of assault and that
no specific averment satisfies the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r),
3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, particularly the requirement of
intentional caste-based humiliation in public view. Learned counsel for
the appellant further submits that the mandatory provision of Section 197
Cr.P.C. has not been duly complied with in the present case, wherein prior
sanction of the competent authority is required to initiate proceedings
against the public servant, as the accused-appellant was working as the
Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. The allegations are vague and
unsupported by independent material, hence, no prima facie case is made
out. Continuation of the proceedings would therefore amount to abuse of
the process of law, warranting quashing of the impugned summoning
order and consequential proceedings.

5. Per contra, learned AGA and learned counsel for the opposite party
no.2 submit that the complainant, being a member of the Scheduled Caste
community, was subjected to caste-based abuse, assault and criminal
intimidation by the appellant when he refused to withdraw his RTI
application. The complainant's version is supported by the statements of
the witnesses recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., which
disclose sufficient prima facie material for summoning the appellant. It is
contended that the defence of the appellant, including the alleged official-
duty certificate and the plea of false implication, relates to matters of
evidence which cannot be conclusively adjudicated at the stage of
summoning. The learned Trial Court, upon considering the complaint and
the supporting statements, rightly found sufficient ground to proceed
against the appellant. Accordingly, no interference is warranted at this
stage and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

6. Admittedly, no injury report has been clearly submitted in this case.
Further, either in the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or in
the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, no specific
averment has been stated anywhere as to what kind of injury was
sustained by the complainant in the present case. Furthermore, there is no
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reliable material either in the application filed under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., which was treated as a complaint, or in the statement recorded
under Section 200 Cr.P.C., to show that the accused-appellant had used
casteist slurs against the complainant in order to insult or humiliate him
on the sole ground that he belongs to the SC/ST category. It is also an
admitted fact that the place of occurrence has not been clearly mentioned
in the statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., though the place of
occurrence has been mentioned in the application filed under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. However, the said application does not corroborate with
the statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. with regard to the place
of occurrence.

7. In the case of Swaran singh Vs State (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon'ble
Apex Court drew a clear distinction between the expressions "public
place" and "any place within public view." A private place may still be a
place within public view if the incident is visible to members of the
public. Conversely, merely because an incident occurs in a public
building does not automatically satisfy the requirement if it is not within
public view. The Supreme Court held that words such as "Chamar",
though originally denoting a caste, may amount to an offence if used as a
casteist abuse with intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes.
The Court emphasized that words should be understood in their popular
and social meaning, not merely their etymological meaning. For attracting
Section 3(1)(x) (now Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)), there must be
intentional insult or intimidation, and intent to humiliate the victim
because he or she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Mere
abuse or quarrel, without the requisite intention contemplated by the Act,
is insufficient. The Court reiterated that criminal proceedings should
continue only where the allegations disclose a prima facie offence against
the particular accused. Proceedings may be quashed where the FIR does
not disclose the essential ingredients against an accused.

8. In Gorige Pentaiah Vs state of AP & Ors 2009 Cri.L.J. 350, Honble
Apex court held "when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in
the complaint, then permitting such complaint to continue and to compel
the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally
unjustified leading to abuse of process of law." In the case of Hitesh
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Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Hon'ble Suprme
Court held that 'a dispute that arose inside the private house of a
complainant over the possession of the land without the presence of
independent public witnesses, does not satisfy the statutory threshold of
Section 3(1)(r).

9. In the case of Shajan Skraria vs. State of Kerala and another, 2024
SCC Online SC 2249, the Hon'ble Apex Court by quoting the cases of
Hitesh Verma (Supra) has held as under:

     "13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the
     ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to
     humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All
     insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act
     unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to
     Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve
     the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
     Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under
     the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of
     the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The
     assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either
     the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to
     avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or
     his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
     Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the
     parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure
     established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is
     a member of Scheduled Caste."

     In Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763

     "15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to
     attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have
     been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a
     member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Thus, the dictum as laid
     aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not
     established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a
     Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to
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     humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such
     community. In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that
     every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is
     not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who
     belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section
     3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person
     who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
     On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the
     reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is
     subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. I say so
     because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
     stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
     towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of
     their caste status."

10. Having considered the rival submissions, the material brought on
record, and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid decisions, this Court finds that the allegations contained in the
First Information Report and the material collected during investigation
do not prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of the offences
punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.
No injury report has been clearly submitted in this case. Further, either in
the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or in the statements
recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, no specific averment has
been stated anywhere as to what kind of injury was sustained by the
complainant in the present case. In the absence of any specific allegation
of intentional caste-based insult or humiliation attracting the provisions of
the SC/ST Act, permitting the criminal proceedings to continue would
amount to an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the impugned
charge-sheet and the summoning order cannot be sustained in the eyes of
law.

11. Consequently, the summoning order dated 17.01.2024 passed by
learned Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Etawah of Complaint Case No.804
of 2023 (Ranjeet Singh vs. Sushil Kumar Kushwaha) under Sections 323,
504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST
Act, P.S.- Bakewar, District- Etawah, is hereby set aside.
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                                    12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

                                    13. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate the instant order to
                                    the court concerned through District and Sessions Judge, Etawah by e-
                                    mail/FAX within 48 hours.


                                                                                             (Santosh Rai,J.)
                                    September 14, 2026
                                    Ankit.




Digitally signed by :-
ANKIT VISHWAKARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad