Allahabad High Court
RAJA RAM AND ANOTHERversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
- Decided
- Bench
- SANTOSH RAI
Holding
The appeal is dismissed as the trial court correctly rejected the discharge application, having found a prima facie case against the appellants.
Summary
The appellants Raja Ram and another appealed against the order of the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhadohi‑Gyanpur, which rejected their discharge application in a case under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3) of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. They contended that the FIR was filed with a one‑day delay, that no caste‑based insult was made, and that the trial court had not properly considered the evidence. The State argued that five persons were injured, that the statements of the injured parties established the offences, and that the trial court was justified in summoning the accused. The High Court examined the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC and the principle that a strong or grave suspicion is sufficient to frame charges, relying on several Supreme Court precedents. Finding that the prosecution’s material disclosed a prima facie case and that the trial court had acted within its jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the appeal. The appellants were directed to seek bail if required and to consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI for any further relief.
Issues considered
- Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the discharge application under Sections 227/228 CrPC.
- Whether the material on record establishes a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act and the IPC offences.
- Whether the one‑day delay in filing the FIR defeats the validity of the charge.
- Scope of judicial discretion in framing charges under the SC/ST Act and related statutes.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 227, 228
- Indian Penal Code — s. 115(2), 351(3), 352
- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — s. 14A(1), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s)
Subjects
- SC/ST Act
- discharge application
- prima facie case
- Section 227 CrPC
- scheduled caste atrocities
- criminal appeal
- evidence evaluation
- charge framing
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 8849 of 2026
Raja Ram And Another
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Shiv Naresh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Surya Pratap Singh Parmar
Court No. - 93
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. In compliance of order dated 8.9.2026, personal affidavits of
Superintendent of Police, Bhadohi and Investigating Officer/Circle
Officer, Gyanpur, Bhadohi filed, in the Court today, are taken on record.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellants/applicants, learned counsel for
opposite party no.2 and learned AGA for the State.
3. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants with a
prayer to set aside the impugned order dated 20.8.2026 passed by Special
Judge, SC/ST (PA) Act, Bhadohi-Gyanpur in Sessions Case No.518 of
2025 (State vs. Raja Ram & Anr.), arising out of Case Crime No.67 of
2025, under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3) B.N.S. and Sections 3(1)(r),
3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, P.S.- Unjh, District- Bhadohi, whereby the
discharge application of the appellants has been rejected.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that one criminal appeal
No.10964 of 2025 was previously filed by the appellants before this Court
against the summoning order dated 19.9.2025 which was dismissed by
this Court vide following order passed on 2.4.2026:-
"1. Heard Shri Shiv Naresh, learned counsel for the appellants; Ms. Vandana Singh
Parmar, Advocate holding brief for Shri S.P.S. Parmar, learned counsel for opposite
party no. 2; and the learned AGA for the State-respondent.
3. By means of the present criminal appeal under Section 14A(1) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the appellants
CRLA No. 8849 of 2026
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challenge the legality and validity of the summoning order dated 19.09.2025, whereby
the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Bhadohi?Gyanpur, has summoned the appellants to
face trial under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3) of the BNS, and under Sections 3(1)(Da)
and 3(1)(Dha) of the SC/ST Act.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the First Information Report was
lodged by opposite party no. 2 with a delay of one day, for which no explanation has
been provided. It is further submitted that the appellants did not commit any assault
upon opposite party no. 2, and as per the medical report, the injuries sustained are
general in nature. It is also contended that the appellants neither intentionally
insulted nor used caste-based words against opposite party no. 2. The trial court,
without properly considering the documentary evidence and statements of witnesses,
has illegally summoned the appellants, and the order is arbitrary and liable to be set
aside.
5. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 submits that the incident is admitted, and
the appellants committed assault, resulting in injuries to five persons. It is also
submitted that the appellants abused opposite party no. 2 using caste-based remarks,
and therefore, the trial court has rightly summoned the accused appellants.
6. Upon perusal of the record, it transpires that five persons were injured in the
incident, which supports the prosecution case. The Investigating Officer has recorded
the statements of the injured persons, which prima facie establish offences under
Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3) of the BNS and Sections 3(1)(Da) and 3(1)(Dha) of the
SC/ST Act.
7. In view of the above, there is no illegality or infirmity in the order passed by the
trial court summoning the accused appellants.
8. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
9. The appellants are at liberty to file a bail application before the concerned trial
court and may also file an appropriate application in light of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51. If such an
application is filed, the concerned trial court shall pass an order in accordance with
law."
5. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants further submits that the
accused appellants have moved a discharge application before the trial
court, which, after considering the material available on record, rejected
the same. From the perusal of the FIR and the statements of the informant
and injured persons recorded under Sections 180 B.N.S.S., it appears that
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3
there are sufficient material on record to make out a prima facie case
against the appellants.
6. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, even a strong
suspicion is sufficient to proceed against the accused, and the correctness
or sufficiency of the evidence is not to be meticulously examined. At the
stage of consideration of discharge or framing of charge, the Court is
required to evaluate the material placed on record by the prosecution, if
the material available on record is strong regarding the commission of the
offence by the accused, the charge is liable to be framed.
7. In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
under:-
"………. While framing charges, court is required to evaluate materials
and documents on record to decide whether facts emerging therefrom
taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to
go deep into the probative value of materials on record. It needs to
evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that accused had
committed offence. But it should not evaluate sufficiency of evidence to
convict accused. Even if there is a grave suspicion against the accused
and it is not properly explained or court feels that accused might have
committed offence, then framing of charges against the accused is
justified. It is only for conviction of accused that materials must indicate
that accused had committed offence but for framing of charges if
materials indicate that accused might have committed offence, then
framing of charge is proper. Materials brought on by prosecution must be
believed to be true and their probative value cannot be decided at this
stage. The accused entitled to urge his contentions only on materials
submitted by prosecution. He is not entitled to produce any material at
this stage and the court is not required to consider any such material, if
submitted. Whether the prima facic case made out depends upon facts and
circumstances of each case. If two views are possible and materials
indicate mere suspicion, not being grave suspicion, against accused then
he may be discharged. The court has to consider broad probabilities of
CRLA No. 8849 of 2026
4
case, total effect of evidence and documents produced before it. The court
should not act as mouthpiece of prosecution and it is impermissible to
have roving enquiry at the stage of framing of charge."
8. In Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, (2006) 4 SCC 51, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held, by quoting the decision in State of Bihar
vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) SCC (Cri) 533, as under:-
"Reading [Ss. 227 and 228] together in juxtaposition, as they have got to
be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial
the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor
proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight
to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory
for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh
in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and
judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding
regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be
applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section
228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is
sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure
to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof
of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is
a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open
to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to
adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if
any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will
be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial."
9. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and
Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657, the Apex Court held as under:-
"21. This Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC
4, considered the scope of enquiry a Judge is required to make while
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considering the question of framing of charges. After an exhaustive
survey of the case law on the point, this Court, in para 10 of the
judgment, laid down the following principles:
"10. ... (1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing
a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that
the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will
be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior
and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a post office or
a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence
and the documents produced before the Court, any basic
infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however
does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry
into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial."
23. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, this Court had an
occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The
principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21
as under:
CRLA No. 8849 of 2026
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"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227
and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under
Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie
case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion
against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will
be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court,
any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an
opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the
charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the
material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the
court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and
must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was
possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate
the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all
the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose,
sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to
accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed
to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
CRLA No. 8849 of 2026
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(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion
only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be
empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see
whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
10. Thus, having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the
case, the material and evidence available on record, the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed herein above, I am of the
considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly dismissed the
discharge application filed by the appellants/applicants. The impugned
order is well reasoned and does not suffer from any illegality, perversity
or infirmity warranting interference by this Court.
11. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed.
12. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to serve a copy of this order by
FAX/e-mail to the court concerned through District & Sessions Judge
concerned within 48 hours.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
September 23, 2026
RA
Digitally signed by :-
RAZIQ ALI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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