A. SREENIVASA REDDYversusRAKESH SHARMA AND ANR.

                [2023] 12 S.C.R. 932 : 2023 INSC 682


                             CASE DETAILS
                       A. SREENIVASA REDDY
                                      v.
                    RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR.
                    (Criminal appeal No. 2339 of 2023)
                            AUGUST 08, 2023
             [B. R. GAVAI AND J.B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]

                              HEADNOTES

      Issue for consideration: Whether the appellant, an Assistant General
Manager of a Nationalised Bank is removable from his office save by or
with the sanction of the Government so as to make s.197, CrPC applicable;
and if he can be proceeded against for offences punishable under the IPC
despite the sanction u/s.19, PC Act, 1988 to prosecute him for the offences
thereunder was declined.
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – When not attracted:
      Held: Although a person working in a Nationalised Bank is a public
servant, yet the provisions of s.197 would not be attracted at all as s.197 is
attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable
from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government – Appellant,
an Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Overseas Bank is not
holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or
with the sanction of the Government – Thus, even if it is alleged that he is
a public servant, still the provisions of s.197 are not attracted – Protection
of s.197(1) is available only to such public servants whose appointing
authority is the Central Government or the State Government and not to
every public servant – Banking sector being governed by the RBI and
considered as a limb of the State u/Art.12 and also by virtue of s.46A,
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the appellant is deemed to be a “public
servant” under the PCAct, 1988 however, the same cannot be extended to
the IPC – Further,sanction contemplated u/s.197, CrPC concerns a public
servant who “is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed
by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
                                      932
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 933


duty” whereas, the offences contemplated in the PC Act, 1988 cannot be
treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge
of his official duties – Offences under the IPC and the PC Act, 1988 are
different and distinct – A distinction is to be drawn between an order of
sanction required for prosecuting a person for commission of an offence
under the IPC and the PC Act, 1988 – Thus, although, the appellant was
discharged from the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988 yet for the
IPC offences, he can be proceeded further in accordance with law. [Paras
41, 45, 49, 53-55 and 58]
     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19 – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Statutory requirements – Difference between:
       Held: In the prosecution for the offences exclusively under the PC
Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory qua the public servant – In cases under
the general penal law against the public servant, the necessity (or otherwise)
of sanction u/s.197, CrPC depends on the factual aspects – The test in the
latter case is of the “nexus” between the act of commission or omission and
the official duty of the public servant. [Para 59]
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.216 – Importance given to
sanction – Discussed. [Para 44]
     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19 – Sanction under, if
declined on the ground that prosecution against the accused could be
frivolous or vexatious, its effect on the trial of the IPC offences:
      Held: This question is not being gone into in the present matter as
sanction initially was not declined on the ground that the prosecution against
the appellant was frivolous or vexatious but on the ground that what was
alleged were mere procedural irregularities in discharge of essential duties
– Whether such procedural irregularities constitute any offence under the
IPC or not will be looked into by the trial court – The issue highlighted may
be examined by Supreme Court in some other litigation at an appropriate
time. [Para 60]
     Words and Phrases – ‘sanction’ in s.197, CrPC – Meaning:
      Held: In s.197, CrPC, the word ‘sanction’ has been used as a verb and,
therefore, it will mean to assent, to concur or approval. [Para 43]
934         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2023] 12 S.C.R.



       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      K. Ch. Prasad v. Smt. J. Vanalatha Devi and Others (1987) 2 SCC
52: [1987] 2 SCR 216; S.K. Miglani v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 6 SCC
111: [2019] 6 SCR 1158; Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, (1998)
6 SCC 411: [1998] 3 SCR 961; Lalu Prasad alias Lalu Prasad Yadav v.
State of Bihar (2007) 1 SCC 4 – relied on.
     Parkash Singh Badaland Another v. State of Punjab and Others (2007)
1 SCC 1: [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 197; A. Srinivasulu v. The State rep. by
the Inspector of Police, Criminal Appeal No. 2417 of 2010 decided on
15.06.2023 Station House Officer, CBI/ACB/Bangalore v. B.A. Srinivasan
and Another (2020) 2 SCC 153: [2019] 14 SCR 513 – referred to.
     U.S. v. Tillinghast D.G., 55 F.2d 279; Gokulchand Dwarka Das
Morarka v. King AIR 1948 PC 82; Gokulchand Dwarka Das Morarka v.
King AIR 1948 PC 82 – referred to.

       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2339 of 2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 20.06.2022 of the High Court for
the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 6782 of 2019.
      Appearances:
     D. Ramakrishna Reddy, Ms. D. Tejaswi Reddy, Hrithik Manchanda,
Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Madhav
Sinhal, Ms. Megha Karnawal, Sabarish Subramanayam, Anil Hooda, Arvind
Kumar Sharma, Ajay Sharma, Shafik Ahmad, Ms. Anju, Varun Mishra,
Siddharth Sangal, Ms. Nilanjani Tandon, Chirag Sharma, Lalit Allawadhi,
Ms. Richa Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 935



       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                               JUDGMENT
     J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:
     1. Leave granted.
      2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court for the State of Telangana dated 20.06.2022
in the Criminal Petition No. 6782 of 2019 filed by the appellant herein by
which the High Court rejected the petition and thereby declined to quash
the criminal proceedings instituted against the appellant for the offence
punishable under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 468 and 471 respectively of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’).
     FACTUAL MATRIX
      3. The appellant herein (Original Accused No. 2) at the relevant point
of time was serving as an Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India,
Overseas Bank (Bank), Hyderabad. He is alleged to have conspired with
other co-accused to cheat the Bank by sanctioning a corporate loan of Rs.
22.50 crore in favour of M/s Sven Genetech Limited, Secunderabad (Original
Accused No. 1).
       4. It appears from the materials on record that the company referred to
above had applied for loan for the purpose of purchase of new equipments/
implementation of the expansion programme. The company had also applied
with the Bank for loan credit limit of Rs. 5 crore for the purpose of purchase
of raw material from the domestic market and cash credit limit of Rs. 20
crore for using as working capital. It is the case of the prosecution that the
facilities sanctioned by the Bank were not utilised by the company for the
purposes for which it was sanctioned and the company diverted the funds
for its personal benefits and to clear its old debts.
      5. The case against the appellant herein is that he was instrumental
in approving the release of corporate loan without compliance of all the
principle/disbursement conditions. He is also alleged to have approved the
release of cash credit limit of Rs. 10 crore on the recommendation of one
Shri Kuppa Srinivas (Original Accused No. 3 Regional Manager), despite
having knowledge of non-instalment of machinery proposed to be purchased
936          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


out of the corporate loan amounts. It is also alleged that the appellant herein
hastily approved the release of Rs. 10 crore out of the sanctioned cash credit
limit of Rs. 20 crore with the fraudulent intention to cause wrongful gain to
the Original Accused Nos. 1-4 and others.
      6. In the aforesaid context, the Central Bureau Investigation (CBI)
registered a First Information Report dated 30.10.2013 bearing Crime No.
RC 6(E)/2013 against the appellant herein and other co-accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 120-B r/w 420, 468 and 471 respectively
of the IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act, 1988’).
      7. Upon conclusion of the investigation by the CBI, chargesheet was
filed in the Court of the Principal Special Judge (CBI Cases) at Hyderabad
on 30.12.2014 against in all six persons including the appellant herein.
     8. It appears that by an order dated 13.02.2015, the Chief General
Manager (MCG-I), SBI declined to accord sanction under Section 19 of the
PC Act, 1988 to prosecute the appellant herein for the offences punishable
under the PC Act, 1988.
      9. The very same authority referred to above, who had earlier declined
to accord sanction, later reviewed its earlier order dated 13.02.2015 referred
to above and by an order dated 11.04.2015 accorded sanction to prosecute
the appellant herein for the offences punishable under PC Act, 1988. Such
sanction was accorded under the provisions of Section 19 of the PC Act,
1988. No sooner, the order according sanction referred to above came on
record, then the Special Court at Hyderabad took cognizance of the offence
enumerated above against the appellant herein and 13 other co-accused. It
appears that the appellant herein questioned the legality and validity of the
order of grant of sanction before the High Court of Telangana by filing the
Writ Petition No. 33297 of 2016.
      10. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by the appellant herein holding that the sanctioning authority once
having declined to accord sanction could not have taken its earlier order
in review and granted fresh sanction to prosecute the appellant. The High
Court ultimately by order dated 30.10.2018 allowed the writ petition and
quashed the order of grant of sanction.
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 937
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

     11. It appears that the CBI being aggrieved with the above referred
order passed by the learned Single Judge of High Court preferred the Writ
Appeal No. 119 of 2019 and questioned the legality and validity of the
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge.
      12. The Intra-Court appeal filed by the CBI failed vide order dated
15.07.2019 and thereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge came
to be affirmed.
     13. The CBI accepted the order passed by the High Court and thought
fit not to carry it further.
      14. Pursuant to the orders dated 30.10.2018 and 15.07.2019 respectively,
referred to above, the appellant preferred a discharge application before the
Special Court under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for
short, ‘the CrPC’).
      15. The Special Court at Hyderabad by its order dated 30.08.2019
discharged the appellant herein from the prosecution under the PC Act, 1988
for want of sanction. The Special Court, however, declined to discharge the
appellant for the offences under the IPC. The Special Court relied on the
decision of this Court in the case of Parkash Singh Badal and Another v.
State of Punjab and Others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 1.
        16. The relevant part of the order passed by the Special Judge reads
thus:
        “Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of
        the orders of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in
        W.P. No. 33279/16 dated:30.10.2018, the sanction proceedings issued
        against A2 for the offences under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC
        Act are set aside and as such A2 is liable to be discharged for the said
        offence under 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act,
        1988. As far as the offences alleged against A2 under the provisions
        of IPC, the same are to be continued and the accused No. 2 is to be
        tried for the said offence along with other accused since the sanction
        under Section 197 is not required to prosecute the accused No. 2 for
        the alleged offences, in view of the above referred judgment of Hon’ble
        Apex Court in Prakash Singh Badal’s case.
938          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      Therefore, the accused No.2 is discharged for the off ence under
      Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, in view of the orders of the
      Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 33297/16
      dt.30.10.2018 and as far as the offences under Section 120-B, 420,
      468 and 471 of IPC are concerned the accused No.2 is liable to be
      prosecuted along with other accused.”
      17. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid, the appellant herein went
before the High Court by filing the Criminal Petition No. 6782 of 2019
with a prayer that he should be discharged from the entire prosecution or
to put in other words, he should also be discharged for the offences under
the IPC as there is no sanction accorded by sanctioning authority under
Section 197 of the CrPC.
      18. The High Court adjudicated the Criminal Petition No. 6782 of 2019,
filed by the appellant herein and by its impugned order dated 20.06.2022
rejected the same.
     19. The relevant findings recorded by the High Court, while rejecting
the petition filed by the appellant herein reads thus:
      “23. It is relevant to note that in the order dated 30.08.2019 in
      C.C.No.17 of 2015, the trial Court has specifically mentioned that
      the discharge application vide Crl.M.P.No.519/2015 filed by the
      petitioner herein for the IPC offences is pending. During the course
      of arguments, the said facts were admitted by the learned counsel for
      the petitioner herein. Therefore, the petitioner herein cannot pursue
      parallel remedies. As discussed supra, the Investigating Officer has
      recorded the statements of 65 witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
      and collected 545 documents. On consideration of the same only, he
      has laid charge sheet against the petitioner and other accused. The
      contents of the charge sheet constitutes the offences alleged against the
      petitioner herein. The defences taken by the petitioner herein cannot
      be considered in a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The
      petitioner herein has to face trial and prove his innocence.
      24. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the decision rendered by the
      Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. The State
      of Maharashtra (AIR 2019 SC 847), wherein the Apex Court has
A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 939
               [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

  categorically held that quashing criminal proceedings was called
  for only in a case where complaint did not disclose any offence,
  or was frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. If allegations set out in
  complaint did not constitute offence of which cognizance had been
  taken by Magistrate, it was open to High Court to quash same. It
  was not necessary that, a meticulous analysis of case should be
  done before trial to find out whether case would end in conviction or
  acquittal. If it appeared on a reading of complaint and consideration
  of allegations therein, in light of the statement made on oath that the
  ingredients of the offence are disclosed, there would be no justification
  for High Court to interfere. The defences that might be available,
  or facts/aspects which when established during trial, might lead to
  acquittal, were not grounds for quashing complaint at threshold. At
  that stage, only question relevant was whether averments in complaint
  spell out ingredients of a criminal offence or not. The Court has to
  consider whether complaint discloses that prima facie, offences that
  were alleged against Respondents. Correctness or otherwise of said
  allegations had to be decided only in trial. At initial stage of issuance
  of process, it was not open to Courts to stifle proceedings by entering
  into merits of the contentions made on behalf of Accused. Criminal
  complaints could not be quashed only on ground that, allegations made
  therein appear to be of a civil nature. If ingredients of offence alleged
  against Accused were prima facie made out in complaint, criminal
  proceeding shall not be interdicted.
    ×××                       ×××                        ×××
  26. In view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and in view
  of the above said discussion, coming to the present crime as there are
  serious and specific allegations, this Court is not inclined to quash the
  proceedings against the petitioner herein, A.2 in C.C.No.17 of 2015
  pending on the file of the Special Judge for CBI Cases at Hyderabad.
  27. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. However, as the
  subject Calendar Case is of the year 2015, the Special Judge for CBI
  Cases at Hyderabad, is directed to dispose of the said case (C.C.No.17
  of 2015) in accordance with law within a period of three (3) months
  from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
940          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      20. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
      SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
     21. Mr. D. Ramakrishna Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant vehemently submitted that the sanction under Section 197 of the
CrPC is mandatory to prosecute the appellant for the offences under Sections
120-B, 420, 468 and 471 respectively of the IPC. He would submit that
as sanction to prosecute the appellant under the provisions of the PC Act,
1988 came to be declined, the appellant cannot now be prosecuted for the
offences under IPC without valid sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC.
       22. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant was also
subjected to a departmental inquiry. The departmental inquiry was by and
large on the very same charges on which the appellant is now sought to be
prosecuted in the Court of the Special Judge at Hyderabad. He pointed out
that the appellant came to be exonerated of all the charges in the departmental
inquiry as evident from the report of the inquiry officer dated 09.06.2014.
      23. Mr. Reddy in support of his aforesaid submissions has placed
reliance on three decisions of this Court (i) Parkash Singh Badal (supra),
(ii) A. Srinivasulu v. The State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Criminal
Appeal No. 2417 of 2010 decided on 15.06.2023 and (iii) Station House
Officer,CBI/ACB/Bangalore v. B.A. Srinivasanand Another, reported in
(2020) 2 SCC 153.
     24. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant prayed that continuation of the criminal
prosecution for the offences under the IPC would be nothing but a gross
abuse of the process of law and would lead to serious miscarriage of justice.
He prayed that the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside
and the appellant may be discharged from the criminal prosecution.
    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE CBI (RESPONDENT
NO. 2)
      25. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Additional Solicitor General
(ASG) appearing for the CBI submitted that although the sanctioning
authority declined to accord sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988
to prosecute the appellant for the offences punishable under the provisions of
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 941
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

the PC Act, 1988 yet, that by itself is not sufficient to discharge the appellant
even from the offences punishable under the IPC.
      26. The learned ASG further submitted that the sanction required
under Section 197 of the CrPC and the sanction required under the PC Act,
1988 stand on different footings whereas, sanction under the IPC in terms
of the CrPC is required to be granted by the State or Central Government
as the case may be; under the PC Act, 1988, it can be granted also by the
authorities specified in Section 19 thereof.
      27. She submitted that the CBI at no point of time had prayed for
sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC to prosecute the appellant for the
offence under the IPC. All that was prayed for, was for sanction under
Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988, which once was declined and thereafter,
was accorded but ultimately the issue in regard to sanction under Section 19
of the PC Act, 1988 came to be set at rest by the High Court. According to
Ms. Bhati, the entire submission canvassed on behalf of the appellant that
the sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC was also prayed for and was
declined, proceeds on an erroneous impression or footing.
       28. In this regard, Ms. Bhati placed on record the letter dated
21.12.2014 addressed by the CBI to the Chief Vigilance Officer, State Bank
of India, requesting for sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988. The
letter referred to above reads thus:
     “To
     The Chief Vigilance Officer
     State Bank of India
     Vigilance Department,
     Corporate Centre,
     P.B.No.12,
     Mumbai-400 021.
     Sub : CBI Report in RC.6(E)/2013 of CBI, BS&FC, Bangalore
     Sir,
     I am forwarding herewith the CBI Report in the criminal case registered
     vide RC.6(E)/2013-BLR incorporating therein the allegations, facts
     disclosed during investigation, and the result of the investigation.
942          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      2. The investigation has revealed that there is sufficient material
      evidence on record to initiate action against the following persons:
      (i) Prosecution of Shri Venkata Ramana Kalavakolanu (A-1), Managing
      Director, M/s. Sven Genetech Ltd., and M/s Jupiter Bioscience Ltd.,
      Secunderabad; Shri A. Srinivasa Reddy (A-2), Assistant General
      Manager, State Bank of India, Ananthpur Regional Office, Ananthpur,
      Andhra Pradesh; Shri Kuppa Srinivas (A-3), Chief Manager &
      Relationship Manager, State Bank of India, Andhra Pradesh, M/s
      Sven Genetech Ltd. (A-4), No.10-2-71 & 72/1, Road No.3, West
      Marredpally, Secunderabad, Shri M.V. Ravi (A-5), Former Asst. Vice
      President, Marketing, M/s Jupiter Bioscience Ltd., Secunderabad, Shri
      E. Narasimha Reddy (A-6), Managing Director, M/s Roots Medicare
      Pvt. Ltd., No.182, MIGH, Bharath Nagar Colony, Hyderabad, Shri
      P.V. Rama Rao (A-10), formerly worked as Senior Executive Accounts,
      M/s Jupiter Biosciences Ltd., Secunderabad, Shri P. Giridhar Goud (A-
      11), formerly worked as Executive-Accounts, M/s Jupiter Biosciences
      Ltd., Secunderabad, Shri Sunder Hari Prasad (A-12), formerly worked
      as Executive-Accounts, M/s Jupiter Biosciences Ltd, Secunderabad,
      Shri M. Tulsi Ram (A-13), formerly worked as Manager, M/s Jupiter
      Biosciences Ltd., Secunderabad, Shri V.A.R. Chandra Murthy (A-14),
      formerly worked as Accounts Supervisor, M/s Jupiter Bioscience ltd.,
      Hyderabad, Shri Shyam Sunder Suri (A-15), Proprietor, M/s V.R.
      Associates, No.10-3-315, Street No.6, East Marredpally, Hyderabad,
      Shri D.V.S. Suryanarayana (A-16), formerly Proprietor, M/s Themis
      Enterprises, Hyderabad, Shri Rajendra Raju (A-17), formerly
      Proprietor, M/s Suraj Industries, Hyderabad u/s. 120-B r/w 420, 468
      & 471 IPC and U/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act, 1988 and substantive
      offences thereof.
      (ii) Regular Departmental Action for imposition of major penalty
      against Shri G. Suresh, Deputy Manager, State Bank of India,
      Yerraguntla (M), Kadappa District, Andhra Pradesh.
      (iii) Such Action against Shri U. Sudesh Kumar (A-7), Chief Manager,
      SBI, Commercial Branch, Koti, Hyderabad and Shri K.D. Menon,
      DGM, SBI, SAM, Corporate Centre, Mumbai.
A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 943
               [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

  3. You are requested to obtain the sanction for prosecution of Shri
  A. Srinivasa Reddy (A-2), Assistant General Manager, State Bank of
  India, Ananthpur Regional Office, Ananthpur, Andhra Pradesh and
  Shri Kuppa Srinivas (A-3), Chief Manager & Relationship Manager,
  State Bank of India, Anaparthi East, Godavari District, Andhra
  Pradesh, from the competent authority as mandated u/s 19(1)(c) of
  the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  4. The draft Articles of Charges and draft statements of imputation
  together with list of witnesses, list of documents, copies of statements
  of witnesses and copies of documents, for initiating departmental
  proceedings for imposition of major penalty against the accused
  person mentioned at Para No.2 (ii); are enclosed herewith. It is also
  requested to intimate the outcome of the RDA instituted against the
  above said officers on quarterly basis and immediately after final
  disposal of the RDA proceedings along with copy of the order of the
  Disciplinary Authority.
  5. The CBI Report may please, be treated as a Confidential Document,
  and no reference of the same may be made in the charges, statement
  of imputations, or order for initiating departmental proceedings, if
  any, on the above said delinquent officials. Since the CBI is exempted
  under RTI Act,2005, vide Notification No. F. No.1/3/2011-IR dated
  09.06.11 of the Govt. of India, in case, any applicant seek copy of the
  CBI Report or part thereof under the RTI Act, 2005, the same may
  be refused.
  6 . A copy of the CBI Report alongwith its enclosures has also been
  forwarded to the Joint Secretary, Banking Division, Department
  of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India,
  Jeevandeep Building, Sansad Marg, New Delhi and to the Director,
  Central Vigilance Commission, Satarkta Bhavan, GPO Complex,
  Block-A, INA, New Delhi, for information and necessary action.
  7. The sanctioning authority, if required, may call for the Investigating
  Officer to explain the evidence, as that would help the sanctioning
  authority in appreciating the evidence properly and also to give
  evidence before the jurisdictional court during the trial, at a later stage.
944          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      8. In order to prove the sanction for prosecution, it is requested that
      the name of the officer working under the sanctioning authority who is
      conversant with the case and can prove the signatures and application
      of mind by the sanctioning authority may be intimated to this office, to
      cite him as a witness. You are requested to provide certified copies of
      relevant extract of the delegation of powers to establish the competence
      of the issuing authority to accord sanction for prosecution.
      9 . The receipt of the CBI Report may kindly be acknowledged.

                                                             Yours faithfully,
                                                     (Dr. Surya Thankappan
                                                             Head of Branch
                                                               CBI, BS&FC,
                                                                Bangalore)”
      29. The aforesaid letter has been incorporated by us in our judgment
only to indicate that there is no reference of Section 197 of the CrPC in it.
      30.. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASG prayed
that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.
    SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE BANK (RESPONDENT
NO. 1)
      31. Mr. Sidharth Sangal, the learned counsel appearing for the Bank
vehemently submitted that the application of the appellant, seeking discharge
from the offences under the PC Act, 1988 has already been allowed, however,
his application, seeking discharge from the offences under the IPC has been
dismissed by order dated 26.07.2022 of the Ld. CBI Court and the said order
is not under challenge before this Court.
     32. He further submitted that the High Court in its impugned order
dated 20.06.2022 clearly records that by proceedings dated 13.02.2015, the
sanction to prosecute was refused under the provisions of PC Act, 1988 and
vide proceedings dated 11.04.2015 the sanction to prosecute was accorded
under the provisions PC Act, 1988, thus, it is clear that no sanction was
sought for or accorded or refused, specifically, under Section 197 of the
CrPC with regard to the offences punishable under the IPC.
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 945
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      33. The learned counsel further submitted that the consistent stand of
the CBI before the CBI Court and the High Court has been that no prior
sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC is required to prosecute the appellant
for offences punishable under the IPC, as there is no legal obligation for
seeking such a sanction.
      34. It was submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant
to state that he has been exonerated in the departmental proceedings. The
appellant, was ultimately, given ‘Administrative Warning’ in respect of
the charges against him which were levied for the appellant’s failure to
discharge his duties with utmost devotion and diligence and acting in a
manner unbecoming of a Bank Official and highly prejudicial to the Bank’s
interest – the said charges were neither of Sections 420, 468, 471 or 120-B
of the IPC.
      35. It was also argued that in any case, the charges not being identical,
the fate of the departmental proceedings cannot weigh at all in respect of
criminal proceedings based on trial. Thus, the appellant cannot rely on the
outcome of the departmental proceedings to seek quashing of the criminal
case against him.
     36. In the last, the learned counsel argued something very important.
It was submitted that a bare reading of Section 197 of the CrPC clearly
indicates that the Section 197 of the CrPC is only applicable to those ‘public
servants’ who are removable with the sanction of the Government and to
no other ‘public servants’. Relying on the decision of this Court in the case
of S.K. Miglani v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2019) 6 SCC 111, it
was submitted that the Manager of a Nationalised Bank though a public
servant yet not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of
the Government and hence cannot claim protection under Section 197 of
the CrPC.
      In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being no merit in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.
     ANALYSIS
      37. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials placed on record the following questions
of law fall for our consideration:
946           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      (i)   Whether the appellant, serving in his capacity as an Assistant
            General Manager, State Bank of India, Overseas Bank, is
            removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the
            Government so as to make Section 197 of the CrPC applicable?
      (ii) Is it permissible for the Special Court (CBI) to proceed against
           the appellant for the offences punishable under the IPC despite
           the fact that the sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 to
           prosecute the appellant for the offences under the PC Act, 1988,
           is not on record as the same came to be declined?
      SECTION 197 OF THE CRPC
      38. Section 197 of the CrPC reads as under:
      “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—
      (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public
      servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction
      of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been
      committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
      of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
      except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the
      Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)--
            (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case
            may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence
            employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the
            Central Government;
            (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be,
            was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in
            connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:
      Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person
      referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation
      issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in
      force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State
      Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government"
      were substituted.
A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 947
               [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

  Explanation.--For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no
  sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any
  offence alleged to have been committed under section 166A, section
  166B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section
  354D, section 370, section 375, section 376A, section 376AB, section
  376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB or section 509 of
  the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
  (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been
  committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while
  acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except
  with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
  (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the
  provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of
  the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public
  order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and
  thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the
  expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression
  "State Government" were substituted.
  (3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court
  shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed
  by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public
  order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
  his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under
  clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except
  with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
  (3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code
  or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by
  the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such
  sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August,
  1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on
  which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991 (43 of
  1991), receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence
  alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation
  issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force
  in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central
948           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to
      take cognizance thereon.
      (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case
      may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which,
      and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge,
      Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the
      Court before which the trial is to be held.”
      39. The Law Commission in its 41st Report has observed:
      “15.123. Section 197, as it now stands, applies to a public servant of the
      specified category only when he is holding office as such public servant.
      It does not apply to him after he has retired, resigned or otherwise
      left the service……………….It appears to us that protection under
      the Section is needed as much after retirement of the public servant
      as before retirement. The protection afforded by the Section would
      be rendered illusory if it were open to a private person harbouring a
      grievance to wait until the public servant ceased to hold his official
      position, and then to lodge a complaint. The ultimate justification for
      the protection conferred by Section 197 is the public interest in seeing
      that official acts do not lead to needless or vexatious prosecutions. It
      should be left to the Government to determine from that point of view
      the question of expediency of prosecuting any public servant.”
      40. Section 197 of the Cr PC provides that when any person who is
or was a public servant, not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Central Government or State Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting
to act in the discharge of his official duties, no Court shall take cognizance
of such offence, except with the previous sanction of the appropriate
Government.
      41. Sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the CrPC shows that sanction
for prosecution is required where any person who is or was a Judge or
Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with
the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have
been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his
official duty. Article 311 of the Constitution lays down that no person, who is
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 949
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

a member of a civil service of the Union or State or holds a civil post under
the Union or State, shall be removed by an authority subordinate to that by
which he was appointed. It, therefore, follows that protection of sub-section
(1) of Section 197 of CrPC is available only to such public servants whose
appointing authority is the Central Government or the State Government
and not to every public servant.
      42. The word ‘sanction’ has not been defined in the CrPC. The
dictionary meaning of the word ‘sanction’ is as under:—
     “Webster's Third New Internal Dictionary: Explicit permission or
     recognition by one in Authority that gives validity to the act of another
     person or body; something that authorizes, confirms, or countenances.
     The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary: Explicit permission given by
     someone in Authority.
     The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Encouragement given to an action etc.,
     by custom or tradition; express permission, confirmation or ratification
     of a law etc; authorize, countenance, or agree to (an action etc.)
     Stroud's Judicial Dictionary: Sanction not only means prior approval;
     generally it also means ratification.
     Words and Phrases: The verb ‘sanction’ has a distinct shade of meaning
     from ‘authorize’ and means to assent, concur, confirm or ratify. The
     word conveys the idea of sacredness or of Authority.
     The Law Lexicon by Ramanath Iyer: Prior approval or ratification.”
      43. In 78 Corpus Juris Secundum at Page 579 different meanings have
been given to the word as a noun and as a verb. As a noun it means penalty
or punishment provided as a means of enforcing obedience to a law and
in a wider sense an authorisation of any thing and it may convey the idea
of authority. As a verb ‘sanction’ is defined as meaning to assent, concur,
confirm or ratify. In U.S. v. Tillinghast D.G., reported in 55 F.2d 279, it was
held that where legal rights are involved it is doubtful whether it should be
construed as requiring less than an unmistakable expression of approval. In
Section 197 of the CrPC, the word ‘sanction’ has been used as a verb and,
therefore, it will mean to assent, to concur or approval.
950           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      44. The legislature has given great importance to sanction as is evident
from the Scheme of the CrPC. Section 216 of the CrPC gives power to the
Court to alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced
but sub-section (5) thereof provides that if the offence stated in the altered
or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction
is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is
obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the
same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded. This
was also emphasised by the Privy Council in the leading case of Gokulchand
Dwarka Das Morarka v. King, reported in AIR 1948 PC 82, where in para
9 it was observed as follows at Page 85:—
      “… The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes
      a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the
      Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their
      sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought,
      concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case
      against the person sought to be prosecuted. …”
       45. The appellant was serving as an Assistant General Manager,
State Bank of India, Overseas Bank at Hyderabad. State Bank of India is
a Nationalised Bank. Although a person working in a Nationalised Bank
is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197 of the CrPC would
not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the
public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or
with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the appellant is
not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by
or with the sanction of the Government. In this view of the matter, even if
it is alleged that the appellant herein is a public servant, still the provisions
of Section 197 of the CrPC are not attracted at all.
      46. The question as to whether a Manager of Nationalised Bank can
claim benefit of Section 197 of the CrPC is not resintegra. This Court in
K. Ch. Prasad v. Smt. J. Vanalatha Devi and Others reported in (1987) 2
SCC 52, had the occasion to consider the very same question in reference
to one who claimed to be a public servant working in a Nationalised Bank.
The application filed by the appellant therein questioned the maintainability
of the prosecution for want of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC, was
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 951
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

rejected by the Metropolitan Magistrate and revision to the High Court also
met the same fate. This Court, while dismissing the appeal held that though
a person working in a Nationalised Bank is a public servant, the provisions
of Section 197 are not attracted at all. In para 6 of the judgment, following
has been held : (SCC p. 54)
     “6. It is very clear from this provision that this section is attracted
     only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable
     from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not
     disputed that the appellant is not holding a post where he could not be
     removed from service except by or with the sanction of the government.
     In this view of the matter even if it is held that the appellant is a public
     servant still provisions of Section 197 are not attracted at all.”
                                                          (Emphasis supplied)
      47. The aforesaid decision of this Court in K. Ch. Prasad (supra) has
been quoted with approval in a later decision in the case of S.K. Miglani
(supra). In this case, the appellant was working as a Manager in the Bank of
Baroda, Faridabad Branch. A complaint in writing was lodged by the Director,
Housing against the appellant. On the strength of the said complaint, the
Kotla Mubarakpur Police Station registered a First Information Report for
the offences under Sections 201, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
respectively of the IPC. It was the case of the prosecution that the appellant
therein and another co-accused in collusion with each other acted on a
fake request of original allottee for cost reduction of a flat from Rs. 10.66
lakh to Rs. 7.77 lakh with the approval of the competent authority. Many
other allegations were levelled in the said FIR. Upon completion of the
investigation, chargesheet was submitted. The appellant filed an application
before the ACMM, Saket Court, New Delhi in the FIR referred to above,
stating that he being a public servant employed with the Nationlised Bank
as a Manager, it was mandatory to seek sanction against him in terms of
Section 197 of the CrPC.
      48. It was argued before the Court that he may be discharged on account
of non-compliance under Section 197 of the CrPC. The Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate (South), Saket Court rejected the application filed by the appellant
therein, seeking discharge for want of sanction. The matter reached up to
this Court. This Court held in paras 10 and 12 respectively as under:
952          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      “10. The appellant being a Manager in a nationalised bank whether
      can claim that before prosecuting him sanction is required under
      Section 197. The CMM having come to the opinion that the appellant
      having not satisfied that he was a public servant not removable from
      his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, Section 197
      CrPC was not attracted with regard to the appellant. After coming
      to the above conclusions, it was not necessary for the CMM to enter
      into the question as to whether the acts alleged against the appellant
      were discharged in performance of official duty.
        ×××                       ×××                        ×××
      12. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not adverted to the
      above aspect and has only confined to the discussion as to whether
      the acts alleged of the appellant were in discharge of official duty. The
      High Court also had relied on the judgment of this Court in Parkash
      Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC
      1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] . We, having come to the conclusion that
      the appellant being not a public servant removable from his office save
      by or with the sanction of the Government, sanction under Section
      197 CrPC was not applicable. The appellant cannot claim protection
      under Section 197 CrPC. We are of the view that examination of further
      question as to whether the appellant was acting or purporting to act in
      the discharge of his official duty was not required to be gone into, when
      he did not fulfil conditions for applicability of Section 197(1) CrPC.”
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
      49. It is pertinent to note that the banking sector being governed by the
Reserve Bank of India and considered as a limb of the State under Article
12 of the Constitution and also by virtue of Section 46A of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949, the appellant herein is deemed to be a “public servant’
for the purpose of provisions under the PC Act, 1988. However, the same
cannot be extended to the IPC. Assuming for a moment that the appellant
herein should be considered as a “public servant” for the IPC sanction also,
the protection available under Section 197 of the CrPC is not available to
the appellant herein since, the conditions in built under Section 197 of the
CrPC are not fulfilled.
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 953
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

      50. Unfortunately, in the case on hand, the High Court also missed or
overlooked the aforesaid aspect and confined its adjudication as to whether
the acts alleged of the appellant were in discharge of the official duty.
     Question No. 1 is answered accordingly.
     QUESTION NO. 2
      51. It was vociferously argued by the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant that as sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 has not
been granted, the appellant cannot not be prosecuted for the offences under
the IPC alone and he should be discharged from the criminal proceedings..
     52. Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 reads thus:
     “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—
     (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
     sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public
     servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided
     in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—
     (a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be,
     was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in
     connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from
     his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of
     that Government;
     (b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was
     at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection
     with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save
     by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
     (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to
     remove him from his office:
     Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a
     police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law
     enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or competent
     authority, as the case may be, for the previous sanction of such
     Government or authority for taking cognizance by the court of any of
     the offences specified in this sub-section, unless—
954           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      (i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court about the
      alleged offences for which the public servant is sought to be prosecuted;
      and
      (ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under section 203 of
      the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the
      complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution against the public
      servant for further proceeding:
      Provided further that in the case of request from the person other
      than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other
      law enforcement authority, the appropriate Government or competent
      authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a public servant
      without providing an opportunity of being heard to the concerned
      public servant:
      Provided also that the appropriate Government or any competent
      authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal requiring sanction for
      prosecution of a public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to
      convey the decision on such proposal within a period of three months
      from the date of its receipt:
      Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of sanction
      for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such period may, for
      the reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by a further period
      of one month:
      Provided also that the Central Government may, for the purpose of
      sanction for prosecution of a public servant, prescribe such guidelines
      as it considers necessary.
      Explanation.--For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression
      "public servant" includes such person--
      (a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged
      to have been committed; or
      (b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged
      to have been committed and is holding an office other than the office
      during which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 955
               [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

  (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether
  the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be
  given by the Central Government or the State Government or any
  other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or
  authority which would have been competent to remove the public
  servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to
  have been committed.
  (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
  (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be
  reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on
  the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity
  in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion
  of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;
  (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground
  of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the
  authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity
  has resulted in a failure of justice;
  (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other
  ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation
  to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other
  proceedings.
  (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or
  any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned
  or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the
  fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any
  earlier stage in the proceedings.
  Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
  (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
  (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any
  requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified
  authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement
  of a similar nature.”
956          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


     53. Sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC concerns
a public servant who “is accused of any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty” whereas, the offences contemplated in the PC Act, 1988 are
those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly
done in the discharge of his official duties.
     54. The offences under the IPC and offences under the PC Act, 1988 are
different and distinct. What is important to consider is whether the offences
for one reason or the other punishable under the IPC are also required to
be approved in relation to the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988.
     55. It is important to draw a distinction between an order of sanction
required for prosecuting a person for commission of an offence under the
IPC and an order of sanction required for commission of an offence under
the PC Act, 1988.
    56. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, reported in (1998)
6 SCC 411, this Court noted:
      “…The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns
      a public servant who ‘is accused of any offence alleged to have been
      committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
      of his official duty’, whereas the offences contemplated in the PC
      Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even
      purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament
      must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording
      in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially
      imported in the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the
      change made in Section 197 of the Code…”
                                                      (Emphasis supplied)
      57. In Lalu Prasad alias Lalu Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar reported
in (2007) 1 SCC 4, this Court observed as under:
      “10. It may be noted that Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 19
      of the PC Act, 1988 operate in conceptually different fields. In cases
      covered under the Act, in respect of public servants the sanction
      is of automatic nature and thus factual aspects are of little or no
 A. SREENIVASA REDDY v. RAKESH SHARMA AND ANR. 957
                [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

     consequence. Conversely, in a case relatable to Section 197 of the
     CrPC, the substratum and basic features of the case have to be
     considered to find out whether the alleged act has any nexus with the
     discharge of duties. Position is not so in case of Section 19 of the Act.”
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)
     58. Thus, although in the present case, the appellant has been
discharged from the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988 yet for the
IPC offences, he can be proceeded further in accordance with law.
      59. From the aforesaid, it can be said that there can be no thumb
rule that in a prosecution before the court of Special Judge, the previous
sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only
pre-requisite. If the offences on the charge of which, the public servant is
expected to be put on trial include the offences other than those punishable
under the PC Act, 1988 that is to say under the general law (i.e. IPC), the
court is bound to examine, at the time of cognizance and also, if necessary, at
subsequent stages (as the case progresses) as to whether there is a necessity
of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. There is a material difference
between the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 on
one hand, and Section 197 of the CrPC, on the other. In the prosecution
for the offences exclusively under the PC Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory
qua the public servant. In cases under the general penal law against the
public servant, the necessity (or otherwise) of sanction under Section 197
of the CrPC depends on the factual aspects. The test in the latter case is
of the “nexus” between the act of commission or omission and the official
duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can
never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. It is too simplistic
an approach to adopt and to reject the necessity of sanction under Section
197 of the CrPC on such reasoning. The “safe and sure test”, is to ascertain
if the omission or neglect to commit the act complained of would have
made the public servant answerable for the charge of dereliction of his
official duty. He may have acted “in excess of his duty”, but if there is a
“reasonable connection” between the impugned act and the performance
of the official duty, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC
cannot be denied, so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a
cloak for illicit acts.
958            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      60. Before, we close this matter, we would like to observe something
which, this Court may have to consider sooner or later. The object behind
the enactment of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 is to protect the public
servants from frivolous prosecutions. Take a case wherein, the sanctioning
authority at the time of declining to accord sanction under Section 19 of
the PC Act, 1988 observes that sanction is being declined because the
prosecution against the accused could be termed as frivolous or vexatious.
Then, in such circumstances what would be its effect on the trial so far as
the IPC offences are concerned? Could it be said that the prosecution for
the offences under the PC Act, 1988 is frivolous but the same would not be
for the offences under the IPC? We are not going into this question in the
present matter as sanction initially was not declined on the ground that the
prosecution against the appellant herein is frivolous or vexatious but the
same was declined essentially on the ground that what has been alleged is
mere procedural irregularities in discharge of essential duties. Whether such
procedural irregularities constitute any offence under the IPC or not will be
looked into by the trial court. What we have highlighted may be examined
by this Court in some other litigation at an appropriate time.
      61. In overall view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion
that the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.


Headnotes prepared by:                                        Appeal dismissed.
Divya Pandey