Holding

Ananda Marga is a Hindu religious denomination, the Tandava dance is not an essential religious rite, and repetitive orders under Section 144 exceed the statute’s temporary purpose, leading to dismissal of the writ petitions.

Summary

The petitioners, members of the Ananda Marga socio‑spiritual organization, sought a writ directing the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, to allow them to hold public processions accompanied by the Tandava dance. They claimed that Ananda Marga is a separate religion and that the Tandava dance is an essential religious rite protected by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Court held that Ananda Marga is a religious denomination within Hinduism, not a distinct religion, and that the Tandava dance is not an essential rite of the faith. Consequently, the Constitution does not guarantee a right to perform the dance in public. The Court also examined the repeated prohibitory orders under Section 144 of the CrPC, finding that such orders are intended for temporary emergencies and cannot be made repeatedly, as that would amount to an abuse of power. However, the specific order of March 1982 had already lapsed, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

The nature of Ananda Marga: whether it constitutes a separate religion or a religious denomination within Hinduism for the purposes of Articles 25 and 26.
Whether the Tandava dance is an essential religious rite of Ananda Marga, thereby falling within the protection of Articles 25 and 26.
The validity and legality of repetitive prohibitory orders issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 107, s. Section 134, s. Section 144, s. Section 145
Constitution of Indias. Article 25, s. Article 26

Subjects

religious denominationArticle 25Article 26essential religious riteSection 144public orderAnanda MargaTandava dancefreedom of religionabuse of power

Judgment

ACF1ARYA JAGDISHWARANAND AVADHUTA; ETC.
A
v.
··COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CALCUTTA & ANR.

October 20, 1983 B
(P.N. BHAOWATI, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND
RANOANATH MiSRA, JI.]
.. Constitution of India-Arts. 25 and 26-Scope of. Religious denomina· C
lion-What is ? Whether a particular rite or observance is an essential
religious rite of a religion-Court can decide.

Constitution of India-Arts. 25 and 26-Whether protection of Arts. 25
and 26 available to Ananda Marga-A soc.lo-Spiritual organisation. - Ananda
Marga not a separate religion but a religious denomination. Performance of
Tandava dance in procession tn public streets not an essential religious rite of D
Ananda Marga. ""

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-S.144-Scope of. Prohibitory Order
under s.144-Mtant to meet emergent situation-Order. 1101 permanent or semi·
permanent in character-Making of rep~titive orders amounts to abuse of
power.

Wqrds and Ph;ases 4 Religlous deno.mination'.

Respondent No. 1 was alleged to have been making repetitive orders
under s.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 from August 1979
directing that no member of a procession or assembly of five or niore persons
• should ~.arry any fire arms, explosives, -swords, spears, knives, tridents, lathis
11
_or any article which may be used as weapon of offence or any article likely
' to cause annoyance to the public, for example skuUs. A writ petition was
filed in the High Court for a direction on the respondents n6t to impose such.
restraints on· the followers of Ananda Marga. The High Court dismissed the
writ petition. The resporident No. 1 Qiade a similar order on March 2·9. 1982.
An appli_cation for permission to take out a prQcession in the public ·streets G
by the followers "or Ananda Marga accompanied with Tandava· dance was
rejected., The petitioner filed writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
for a direction to the respondent No. 1 and the State to allow processioQ. to be
carried in the public streets and meetings to be held· in public places by the
followers of the Ananda Marg8. accompaqied by the performance of Tandava
dance within the State of West Bengal. The petitioner submitted that Anandll a·
Marga was a socio-spiritual organisation dedicated to the service of humanity
in different spheres of life such as physical, mental and spiritual, irrespective
of caste. creed or colour; one of the prescriptions of the religious rites to be
448 SUPREME· COURT REPOllTS (1984) 1 !.C.R.
performed by an Ananda Margi was Tandava dance which was to be pcrforincd.
A with a skull, a small symbolic knife, ·a trishul, and a damroo; and at intervals
processions were intended to be 'taken otit in public places accompanied by the
Tandava Dance as a religious practice. The petitioner conten'.ded that Tandava
Dance was an essential part of the religious rites ·or Ananda Margis· and that
they were entitled to practice the same both in private as also in public plaCes
and interference by the respondent was opposed to the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The petitioner also
B contended that repetitive ·orders under s.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ·
were not contemplated by the Code and, therefore, making of such orders was
an abuse of the" law· and should not be coulltenanced·.

Dismlssing the writ petitions,

c HELD : The Anarida Marga is not a. separate religion by itself.
~herefore, application of Art. 25 of the Constitution is not attracted. Th~
petitioner asserted that Ananda Marga' was not an institutionalised religion
.but was a religious denomination. The writings of the founder of the Ananda
Marga are essentially lounded upon the essence of the Hindu philosophy.
The test indicated in (1966) 3 S.C.R. 242 and the admission in· para 17 of the
D writ petition that Ananda Margis belong to ·the Shaivite order lead to the
Clear conclusion that Anailda Ma~gis belong to the Hindu religion.
[455 E·456 CJ

Sastri Yagnapuruslzadji &: Ors. v. .Muldas Bhudar dils Vaishya. & Anr-.,
[1966] 3 S.C.R.. 242, referred to.
E The words {religious denominatiorl' .in Art. 26 of the Constitution must
take ·their colo'ur from i~e word •religion' and if ihis be so, the expression
religious denornjnation' must also satisfy three condi.tipns :

(1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system Qf
beliefs or doctrlnes which they reg,ard as conducive to their
F spirltual ~ell-being, tha.t is, a conimon faith; .

(2) conimo_n organisation~ and

(3) desig~ation by a distin~tive name.

G In the instant case Ananda Marga appears to satisfy all the three
conditions.' Ananda Marga, therefore, can be appropriately . treated as a
religious denomination within the Hindu religion. [456 G-457 C]

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious. Endown1ents, Madras v. Sri
H Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar or Sri Sh/rur Mutt, [1954] S.C.R. 1005 at 1021;
The ·Durgah Con1mi1tte Ajmef & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Or~ .• [1962]
I S.C.R. 383; and S.P. Milla/ etc. v. Union of.India & Ors., [1983] I S,C.R. 729
at 774 referred to_.
A,j, A\1ADHUTA V. COMMR; OF POLICE

Article 26 ~f the QJnstitutiPn provides that subject to public orde.r,
morality and health, everY religious deno~ination or any section thereof shall
have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Courts have
the power to determine whether a particular rite or observance is regarded as
essential by the tenets of a partic~laf religion. '[457 c..n, 458 HJ
i
' Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors., [1954] S.C.R.
1055; and Tilkayat Shri Govind!alji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors~, 8
[1964] 1 S.C.R. 561 referred to.

Jn the instant case the Tandva dance was not accepted as an- essential
religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955 the Ananda Marga order was
first established .... It is the specific case of the petitioner that Shri Allanda
Murti, founder of Ananda Atiarga, introduced· Tandva as a part of religious
rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious order is
c
of recent origin and Talldva dance as a part of retigious rites of that order is
still more recent. It is doubtful as to whether in such circu_mstances Tandva
dance can be taken as an essential religious rite of the Ananda M~rgis. Even
conceding that Tandva dance has been prescribed as a religious rite fOr every
follower of the Ananda Marga it does.not follow aS a necessary Corollary that
"Tandava dance to be Perforn1ed in the ·public in a religious procession is a D
matter of religious rite. In fact, thei:e is no justification in any of the writings
Of Shri Ananda Murti that Tand~va dance must be perfor.med in public. ·
ThCrefore, performance· of Tandava dance in procession in the public streets
or in gatherings in public placea is not an essential religious rite of the follo-
wers of the Ananda 1v1arga. Thus, the cl"aim'that the Petitioner has. a funda-
. mental right within the meaning of Arts, 25 or 26 to perform Tandava dance ·
in public st.reets and public pla~es has to be rejected. (459 E-460 E] · E

An ordef made under s.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
intended to niect an emergent situation. - The order is not intended to be
either permanent or semi-pefmanent in character. The order is to remain
valid for two months frQm the date of its making as piovided in sub-s.(4) ·of
s.144. 'The proviso to sub-s'.(4) 9f s:t44 which gives the state Govern·mrnt p
jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum· period bf six
·. mollths beyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly indicative
of the: position that Parliament never intended the life of the order undCr · s.144
of the Code to remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate.
The scheme of.that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and ill case
the situatiOn So warrants steps have to be taken under other provisions of the
law such as s.107 or s.145 of the Code when individual disputes are raised and G
to meet a situation such as in this case, there are provisions fo be· found in the
· Police Act. If repetitiVe orders are m,ade it would clearly amount -to abuse 0£
the power conferred by s:144 of the Code. [461 D-462 DJ

Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhrani, ILR 5 Cal. 7; Bishessur R
Chuckerbutty & Anr. v. Emperor, A.LR. 1916 Cal. 47; Swaminatha Mudaliar. v.
Gopalakrishna Naidu, A.LR. 1916 M_ad. 1106; Ttituram · sahu v. The Stale of
Orissa, A.~.R. -1953 Orissa 96; Ram Das Gaur y. The City Magistrate,· Var0nasi~
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 1 S.C.R.
A.LR. 1960 All. 397; and 11.am Narain Sah & Anr. v. Parmeshwar• Prasad Sah
& Ors., A.J.R. 1942 Pat. 414, approved.

Babula/ Parate v. State of Mahara•htra & Ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 423 at 437;
and Gu/am Abbas & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1981] 2 Cr. L.J. 1835 at.1862, '-'
referred to. 1'

D ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ '.Petition~ Nos. 6890, 7204 of
19.82 and 3491 of 1983.

Un<)er article 32 of the Constitution of India

c Ram Jethmalani, V.M. Tarkunde and R.
Petitioner.
Dwivedi for the
,.

M.K. Ramamurthi, D.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for the
Respondents State of West Bengal.

'D K.K. Venugopal, M/s. lnderjit Sen and G.S. Chatterjee for the-
Respondent.

Danial A. Latiffi and R.S. Sodhi for the Intervener, All India .....
Lawyers Union. ·
E·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. The petitioner in Writ' Petition No.

F
6890/82, a monk of the ~nanda Marga, and currently General
Secretary, Public Relations Department of the Ananda Marga
Pracharak Sangh, has filed this petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution for a direction to the Commissioner of Pohce, Calcutta
--
and the State of West Bengal to allow processions to be carried in
the public streets and meetings to be 1ield in public places by the
foll!'wers of the Ananda Marga cult accompanied by the performance
of Tandava dance within the State of West Bengal. There are two
G
connected writ petitions being Writ Petition Nos. 7204/82 & 3491/83
by the Diocese Secretary of West Bengal Region and another follower
of Ananda Marga. All these Petitions raise this common' question
and have been heard' at a time. For convenience the petition by the
.H General Secretary, Public Relations Department of the Ananda Marga
Pracharak Sangh
. .
has been treated as the main petition and ·references
in the j udgm~nt have been confined to it.
A.J. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLJCB'(Ranganath Misra, J.). 451

In the original petition cer ain factual assertions have been
made and after counter ~ffidavits were. filed several further affidavits A
have been placed before the Court on behalf of the petitioner and
rounter affidavits too have been filed. Shorn of unnecessary details,
i the averments oi:i behalf of the respective contenders are as follows :
•
Sbri Pravat Ranjan Sarkar otherwise known as Shri Ananda Q
Murti, founded a socio-spiritual organisation claimed to have been
dedicated to the service of humanity in differ!lllt spheres of life
such as physical, mental and spiritual, irrespective of caste, creed or
colour, in the year 195). In the initial period the Headquarters of
this organisation was lotated ·near Ranchi in the State of Bihar but C
later it has b,een shifted to a 1place within \he City of Calcutta in
West Bengal. It bas been pleaded tbat.Ananda Marga contains no
dogmatic beliefs and teaches the yogic and spiritual science to every
aspirant. In order to ·realise the Supreme, Anand.a Marga does
not believe that it is necessary to abandon home, profession or
occupation and spiritual sadhana is possible at any place and con- D
currently with fulfilling all duties and responsibilities of family life.
It has been pleaded that Ananda Marga shows the way and explains
the methods for. spiritual advancement and this helps man to practice
his dharma. According to the petitioner Lord Shiva had performed
Tandava Dance in 108 forms but Shaivite literature has given details Ill
of 64 kinds only. · Seven forms out of these 64 appear to have been
commonly accepted and they are called Kalika, Gouri, Sandhya,
Sambhara, Tripura, Urdhava and Ananda: The first of these forms
elaborates the main aspects of sbiva while the seventh, i.e. the Ananda
Tanda1•a portrays all the manifold responsibilities of the Lord. Ananda
Tandava is clai'!led .to ha','.e taken place at Til!ai, the ancient name of IF
Cbidambaram now situated in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is the
petitioner's stand' that the word Tandava is deri>1ed from the root
Tandu which means to jump about and Shiva was the originator of
Tandava abont·6500 years ago. Ananda Murtiji, as the petitioner
maintaius, is the Supreme Father of the Ananda Margis. It is custo- G
mary for every Ananda Margi after being duly initiated to describe
Ananda Murtiji as his father. One of the prescriptions of religious
rites to be daily performed by an Ananda Margi is Tandava Dance
and this is claimed to have been so introduced from the year 1966 by
the preceptor. This dance is to be performed with a skull,. a small, U
symbolic knife and a Trishul. It is also customary to hold a lathi
and a damroo. It is explained that the knife or the sword symbolises
the force which cuts through the fetters of the. mundane world and ·
452 SUPREME COURT REPORts (1984) I s.~.R.

allows· humarr beings to transcend towards perfection; the trishul or
A. the trident symbolises· the fight against static forces in the three
·different spheres of human existence - spiritual, 'mental and physical;
the lathi which is said to be a straight stick stands out as the symbol
of straightforwardness or simplicity; the damroo is the symbol to
· bring out rhytmic harmoµy between eternal universal music and the .
entitative sound; and the skull is the symbol of death reminding every
B
man that life is short and, therefore, every ·moment of !i'j'e should be
utilised in the service of mankind . and salvation should be sought.
The petitioner has further maintained that Ananda Margis greet their
spiritual preceptor Shri Ananda. Murti with a dance of Tandava·
wherein' one or two followers use the skull· ahd the symbolic knife.
c and dance for two or three minutes. At intervals proc:essions are
intended to be iaken out in public places accompanied by the ,Tandava
dance as a religious practice: . ·

Though in subsequent affidavits and in the course of argument
an attempt was made by Mr. Tarktinde. to assert that Ananda Marga
D is a new religious order, we do' not think there is any justification to
accept such a co~tention when it runs counter to the pleadings in'
paragraphs 4 and 17 of the writ petition. In· paragraph 4 it was
·specifically pleaded that:'Ananda Marga is· more a denomination
than an institntionalised religion", and in paragraph 17 it was pleaded
' that "Ananda Margis are Shaivites ... " We shall, therefore, proceed
to deal with this petition on the footing that, as pleaded by the
petitioner, Ananda Marga .is a religious denominati"n of the Shaivite
order which is a well known segment of Hindu .religion.

• Though the petitioner had pleaded that Tandava dance has been
F practiced and performed by every Ananda Margi for more than three
decades, it has been conceded in the course of the hearing that·
Tandava Dance . was introduced for the first t'ime as a religious
rite ,for Ananda Margis in or around 1966. Therefore, by the time
of institution of this wdt petition the practice was at best prevalent
for about 16 years.
G
The Commissioner of Police, respondent 1 befor~ us is alleged
to have made repetitive orders under section J44 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure; 1973 ('Code' for short) from August 1979,
directing that "no member of a procession or asse!Jlbly .0£ ·five or
H more persons should carry any fire arms, explosives, swords, spears,
knives, tridents, lathis or any article which may be used as weapon
of offence or ..any. article. likely
. to . cause
-~ . annoyance to the
.
A.I. AVADl!U'rA ~. COMMll.. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 453

public·, for example skulls ...... " A petition was filed before
the Calcutta High Court under Artii'le 226 of the ·Constitution .A,
by the General Secretary of Ananda Marga for a writ of mandamus
against the respondents for· a direction nc;it to interefere with or place.
~ testraints on the freedom of conscience and fr~e profession, practice
and propogation of their religion, including Taodava Dance, iq matter
No. 903 of 1980. The Calcutta High Court rejected the said petition B
on September 23, 1980. and observed : ' ·

"It is open to any one in this country to practice any
religion bµt the religious practice must npt be inconsistent
with the susceptibility or sensibility or fairness or public
· order: Tandava dance as such may not be objectionable.
In-the streets of Calcutta all kinds of demonstrations and
procession are being held every day which may on ·many
. occasions cause disturbance to others . and interrupt the
free flow of traffic. In spite of the same, such demons•
!rations and grocessions ar,e allowed to take place parti·
cularly every - day by the authority concerned. If the
petitioners or any member of their.group want to hold a
procession or reception or demonstration accompanied by
any dance or music, that by itself may not be objectionable.
However, brandishing fire torches or skulls or daggers in
the public places including · streets cannot come under
the. same category. Here other things are involved. The
interests of other members of the public are involved, the
sense of security of the others is ·also involved. The
authorities concerned have to keep in mind the ~question ·
of the feelings of other members of the public and the
question of the'!Jossibility of any attempt to retaliate or
counter-act to the same are also to be considered. Taking
into considera_tion all these factors I .~m of the op/nion
. that the petitioners de not have any legal right arid they
have not established any legal right to carry 'fire torches,
skulls and dagger• in public places or public streets and
G,
do not intend to pass any order entitling the petitioners
to do so. However, the petitioners shall be entit)ed to
go in Procession or bold any.demonstration' without any
such fire tourches, daggers Cir skulls. However,· this H
would .be subject to prevailing law of ·the land. in the
particular area. For example, in. the High Court,
Dalhousie Square and Assembly order under section 144
454 "suPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) I s.c.a.

of the Criminal Procedure Code is. promulgated from
time to time. This order would not entitle the petitioners
to hold any such procession, demonstration in violation
of such. promulgation, if any. This order would also
not entitle the petitioners to hold any proc.ession or
demonstration without the permission of the authority .
B concerned when such permission is required for such
purposes under any existing Jaw." ,

On March 29, 1982, respondent I made a fresh order under s.144
of the Code wherein the same restraints as mentioned· in the earlier
order were imposed. An application for permission to take out a
C processfon on the public street accompanied with Tandava dance
was rejected and that led to the filing Of this P,etition. ·
. . ?
The petitioner.as.serts that tandava dance is. an essential part
· of the religioJ}S rites of-the Ananda Margis and that they are entitled
to practise the same both in private as · also in public places and
D interference by the respondents is opposed to the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 ofthe Constitution. The order
under s.144. of the Code has been assailed mainly on the ground that
it does not state the material facts of the case though the statute
requires such statement as a condition precedent to the making of
E the order. Repeiitive orders under s.144 of the Code, it. has been
contended, are not contemplated by the Code and, therefore,
making of such orders is an abuse of the Jaw and should not be
countenanced. ·

Two separate returns h.ave been made to the rule nisi. Respon-·
dent 1 has filed a counter affidavit alleging that Ananda Marga is
an organisation which believes' in violence and if Ananda Margis
are permitted to carry open swords or daggers in public processions
it is bound, or" likely, to disturb public peace and tranquillity and is
fraught with the likelihood of breach of . public order and would
a,ffect public morality. Carrying of human· skulls and indulging in
G provocatjve dances with .human skulls is not only repulsive to public
taste and morality, but is bound, and is likely, to raise fears in the
minds of the people particularly children thereby affecting public
order, morality, peace and tranquility. It has been further pleaded
H that the petitioner, or for the niatter of that, Ananda Margis can
have no fundamental right to carry weapons in the public; in
procession or otherwise, nor have they any right to perform tandava
dance with daggers and human. skulls. It is stated· that -Ananda
•

A.1· AVADHUTA '· COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 455

Marga· is a politico-religious organisation started · in 1961 by Shri
Pravat Ranjan Sarkar alias· Sri Ananda Murti, who is a self-styled A
tantrik yogi. · Reference has been made to an incident of 1971
which led to prosecution of Sri Ananda Murti and some of his
<t followers. It Ois stated that militancy continues to be the main
feature of the organisation. Prior to. promulgation of the prohibi·
tory orders, it has been pleaded, Ananda Margis took out processions B
·carrying leihal weapons like tridents, lathis as well as human skulls
and knives from time to time and caused much annoyance to the
public in gener~I and onlookers· in partic~lar, and this tended to •
disturb public peace, tranquillity and. public order. In spite of the
prohibitory orders in force from August 10, 1979; a procession was
taken out on the following day 'within the city of Calcutta by c
Ananda Margis with lathis, tridents, knives, skulls, and the proces-
sion became violent. The assembly was declared unlawful and the
police force was obliged to 'intervene. The police personnel on duty
including.· a Deputy Commissioner of Police rec.eived injuries.
Reference to several other incidents has also been made in the D
· counter-affidavit of the Police Commissioner. The State Government
has supported the stand of the Police Commissioner in its separate
affidavit.

We have already indicated that the claim that Ananda Marga
is a separate religion is not acceptable in view of the clear assertion .E
that is was not an institutionalised religion but was a religious .
·denomination. The principle indicated by · Gajendragadkar, CJ,
while speaking for the Court in Sastri Yagnapurushadji & Ors• .v.
Muldas Bhudardos Vaishya & Anr.,(1, also supports the conclu.sion that
. Ananda Marga cannot be a separate religion by itself. In . that case
the question for consideration was whether the followers of Swaml- F
narayan belonged to a religion different from that of Hinduism. 'I'he
· 1earned Chief Justice observed : 1

,.I "Even a cursory study ·of the 11rowth and development
.of Hindu religion through the ages shows that whenever G
a saint or a religious reformer attempted the task of
reforming Hindu r~ligion and fighting irrational or
corrupt practices which had crept into it, . a sect was born
which was governed by its own tenets, but which basi•
cally subscribed to the fundamental notions of Hindu H
~eligion and Hindu philosophy. '

(1) [1966) 3 S.C.R. 242
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.R

The averments in the writ petition would seem to indicate a situation
A ' Of this type. We have also taken into consideration the writings of
Shri Ananda Murti in books like Carya-Carya, Namah Shivaya
.. Shantaya, A Guide to Human Conduct; and Ananda Vachanamritam.
These writings by Shri Ananda Murti are essentially founded upon •
the essence of Hindu philosophy. The iest indicated by the .!earned ~·
8 Chief Justice in the case referred to above and the admission in
. #.
paragraph i 7. of the writ petition that Ananda Margis belqng to the
Shaivite order lead. to the ·<:!ear conclusion that, Ananda Margis
belong to the Hindu religion. Mr. Tarkunde for the petitioner had
claimed protection· of Article.25 of the Constitution but in view ·of
our finding that Ananda Marga is noi a separate religion, application
0 of Article 25 is not attracted.

The next aspect for consideration iS whether · Ananda Marga
·.can be acceptea"to be a religious denomination. In The Commissionir
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra · Thirtha ' .
D . Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,(') Mukherjee, J. (as the learned Judge
then was), spoke for the Court thus :

"As regards article 26,. the first question .is, what is. •the
precise meaJ!ing ?r connotation of 'the expression •
'religious denomination' and whether a Math could come ,,
E.
··within this expression. The word 'denomination' ha~
.been defined in. the Oxford Dictionary to mean 'a·
collection or'individuals classed together under the same
name : a religious sect or -body having a common faith
and organisation and designated by a distinctive name'."
F
.iest has been rono'wed in The Durgoh Commitiee, Ajmer .& Anr.
.• ·.This
v, Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.( In the majority judgment, in S. P.
2
)
Mittal etc. v. Union of India & Ors.( 8) reference to this aspect has
also been made and it has been stated : '
G "The words 'religious denomination' in Article 26 of the
Constitution ·must take their colour from .the word
;religion' and if this be so, the expression 'religious
denomination' must also satisfy· three conditions : ·

H
(1) [1954) S.C.R. 1005 at 1021
(2) [1962] l S.C.R. 383
(3) [1983] l S.C.R. 729 at 774
•
• A.I. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 457
•
(I) It must be a collection of individuals. who
have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they
regard as conducive to their spiritual well-hein11,
that is, a common faith; ·

(2) · common organisation; and

(3)' des~gnation b~ a distinctive name." ' B
Ananda Marga ap·pears to satisfy all the three conditions, viz.,
l ' ..
it is a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs which
they regar1 as conducive to their. spiiitua'J 'well·being; they have a
common organisation and the collection of these individuals has a
distinctive name. Ananda Marga, therefore, can be appropriately
c
treated as a religioiis denomination, within the · Hindu religion.
Article 26 of the Constitution provides that subject to public order,
morality and health, ever.Y religious. detl~mination· or any section
thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in 1Datters of
religion. MukJierjea, J. hi Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar' s case D
(supra) iidverted to the question as. to what were the matters of
religion and stated :

"What then are matters· of religion! The word 're!igien'
has not beeu defined in the Constitution and .it is a term
which is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. In .an
American case (Davie v. Benson, 133 US 333 at 342),
it has been said "that the term 'religion' has reference to
one's views of his· relation to his Creator and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and

... Character and ·of obedience to His will. It is often
· c0nfounded with cultus of form or worship o(a particular
sect, but is distinguishable from the latter".. We do not
· think that the above definition can be regarded as either
F

precise or adequate. Articles 25 aud 26 of our Consti•
tution are based for the most part ·upon article 44(2) · of
the Constitution of Eire and we have great doubt .whether G
a definition of 'religion' as given above could have been in
the minds of our Constitution-makers when they framed
the Constitution. Religion is certainly a matter of faith
· with indivi!1uals or communities and it is not necessarily.
theistic. There are well known religions in India like. B
·:Buddhism and Jainism which do not .believe in God or
in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly
'

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1198411 s.c.R.
. .
.
has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are
re~rded by those who profess that religion as conducive
to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to
. say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief.
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules
..
· · for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and
ol;>servances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are
regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and
observances might extend even to . matters of food and
dr~·ss ... "·

-''Restrictions by the ·State upon free exercise of
c religion are permitted both under Artic1es '25 .and 26 on
grounds of public or.der, morality and health. Clause·
(2) (a) of article 25 reserved the right of the State to
regulate r restrict any economic, financial, poltical. and
other sec - activities which may be ~associated with
religious prac. ce and there is a further right. given ·to the
State by sub·clause (b) under which the State can legislate
for social welfare arid reform even though by so doing it
might interefere with religious practices .. " ·

"The contention formulated in such broad terms
cannot, we think, be supported.· In the first place, what
constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to
be ascertained with reference to the doctrines ·or that (

religion itself. It the tenets of any religious sect of tlie
Hindns prescribe that offerings of food should be given
to the idol at particular hours of the day, . that periodical
F ceremonies.sh,ould be performed in a certain way at cer-
tain periods of the year or that there should. be daily
recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, .all
these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere
fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment
of.priests and servants or the use .of marketable commodi-
tie~ would not make them secular activities partaking of
. a commercial or . economic character; all of them are
religious practices and should be regarded as matters of
religion within the meaning of artide 26(b) ... "

Courts have the power to determine whether a particular rite
or observance is .regarded as essential by the tenets of a particular
A.1. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 459

~·--Ii religion. In Laxshmindra Thirtha Swamiar's case, Mukherjea, .J.
observed:

"This. difference in judicial opm1on brings out
forcibly the difficult task which a Court ·has to perform in
cases of this type where the freedoln of religious convic•

-· tions genuinely entertained by men come into conflict
with the proper politicial attitude which is expected from
citizens in matters of unity and solidarity of the State
organization."
B

The same question arose in the case of Ratilal Panachand
Gandhi v. State of Bombay ~ Ors.(') The Court did go· into the
question whether certain matters appertained to religion and con-
• cluded by saying that "these are certainly not matters of religion
and the objection raised with regard to the validity of these provi-
'
sions seems to be altogether baseless." In Ti/kayat Shri Govint/lalji
Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan & cirs.,( 2 ) this Court went into the
question as to whether tl:Je tenets of the Vallabh denomination and its o·
religious practices require that the worship by the devotees should be

- performed at the private temples and, therefore, the existence of
public temples was inconsisteut with the said tenets and practices,
and on an examination of this question, negatived the plea.

The question for consideration now; therefore, is whether
performance of Tandava dance is a religious rite or practice essential
to the tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis. We have
already indicated that tandava dance wasnot accepted as an essential
religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955 the Ananda Marga
order was first established, It is tho specific case of the petitioner p
t!tat Shri Ananda Murti introduced tandava as a ·part of religious
rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious
order is of recent origin and tandava dance as a part of religious
rites of that order is still more recent. It is doubtful as to whether
in such circumstances tandav~dance can be' taken as an essential
G
religious rite of the Ananda Margis.• Even concedmg that it is so, it is
difficult to accept Mr. Tarkunde's argument that taking out religious
processions with tandava dance is an essential religious rite of
Ananda Margis. In paragraph 17 of the wri! petition the petitioner
·pleaded that "Tandava Dance lasts for a few minutes where two or H
(I) [1954] S.. C.R. 1055.
(2). [1964j 1 $.CR.. 561,
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19841 l S.C.R

three persons dance· by lifting one leg to the level of the chest, bring·
ing it down and lifting the other." In paragraph 18 it has been
pleaded that "when the An~nda Margis greeUheir spiritua(preceptor
at the airport, etc., they arrange for a brief welcome dance .of tandava
. wherein one or two persons use the skull and symbolic knife and . ~
dance for two or three minutes," In paragraph 26 it has been plea· ·
R' ded that "Tandava is a custom among the sect members and it is
a customary performance and its origin is over ·four thousand years
old, hence it is not a new invel)tion of Ananda Margis." On the
basis of the literature of.the Ananda Marga denomination it has been.
contended that there is prescription of the performance of tandava
dance by every follower of Ananda Marga. llven conceding that
c tandava dance' has been prescribed as a religious rite for every fol·
'lower of the Ananda Marg it does not follow as a ·necessary corollary
that tandava dance to be performed in the public is a .matter of
_religious rite. In fact, there is no justification i,n any of the writin11s
of Shri Ananda Murti that tandava dance must be p!rformed in
publi~. Atleast none could be shown to us by Mr. Tarkunde .despite
an enquiry by us in that behalf. We are; therefore, not in a position to
accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that performance of tandava
dance in a procession or at public places is .an essential religious rite
to be performed by every Ananda· Margi.

E 'once we reach this conclusion', the' claim that the petitioner
has a fundamental right within the meaning of Articles 25 or 26 to
perform tandava dance in public streets·and public places has to be
rejected. In view of this finding it is no more _necessary' ·to consider
whether the prohibitory order was justified in the interest of public
order as provided in Article 25.
ll
. It is the petitioner's definite case 'that the prohibitory orders •
. under-s. 144 of the Code are being repeated at regularintervals from
August 1979. Copies of several prohibitory orders made from time
to time have been produced before us atid it is not the case of the·
.G respondents that such repetitive prohil/itory orders .have not been
made. The order under s. 144 of the Code made in March 1982 has
also been challenged on the ground that the ma~erial facts of the ·
case have not been stated. Section 144 of tbe Code, as far as relevant,
•
provides: "(!) In cases where in the opinion of a District Magistrate,.
H a Sub· Divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate
specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is
sufficient ground for proceeding under this •ection and immediate
preventfon or spee<\y remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a.
j • ' '
A.J. AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (Rangana!h Misra, J.) 461

written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the
manlier provided by section 134, direct .. .'~ It has .been the contention A
·of Mr. Tarkunde that the right to make the order is· conditioned
upon it being a written one and the m·aterial facts of the case being
.~· stated. Some High Courts have taken the view that this is a positive·
requiremeni and the validity of the order depends upon compliance
of this provision. In our opinion it is not necessary to go into this
question as counsel for the respondents conceded that this is
B
one of the requirements of the provision and if the power has to
be exercised it should be exercised in the manner provided on pain
of invalidating for non·conipliance. There is currently in force a
prohibitory order in the same terms and hence the question cannot
be said to be' academic. The other .aspect, viz., th~· propriety of
0
0

repetitive prohibitory orders' is, however, to our mind a serious
matter and since long arguments have been adavanced, we propose
to deal with it. In this case as fact from October 1979 till 1982 •at
the interval of almost two months orders under s. 144 (I) of the Code
have J>een made from time to time. It is not disputed before us that
D
. the power conferred under th!s _section is intended for immediate
preventi.on of breach of peaco. or speedy remedy.· . An order made
under this section is to reilfain valid for two mpnths from the date of
f' its making·as provided in sub•sectkln (4) of s. 144. The proviso to
.
sub-s. (4) authorises the State Government
. '
in case it considers it
necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or E
safety, or for preventing a riot or any affray, to direct by notification
that ari order made by a Magistrate may.remain in.force for a further
period not exceeding six months from the' date on which the order
made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired.
The effect of the proviso, therefore, is that· the ·State Government
would be entitled to give the prohibitory order an additional term of F
life but th"at would be Ii mited to six months l:ieyound the two months'.
period in terms of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 144 of the Code. Several decisions
of different High Courts have rightly ta~en the view that it is not
legitimate to go on making successive orders after earlier ·orders have
lapsed by·effiux of time. A Full Bench consisting of the entire Court G
of 12 Judges in Gopi Mohun ,Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhrani( 1)
examining .the provisions of s. · 518· of the Code of 18(!1
(corresponding to present s. 144) took the view that such an action
was beyond the Magistrate's powers. Making of successive orders
was disapproved by the Divisi.on Bench of the Calcutta High Court
0

(I) ILR 5 Cal.. 7,
462 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] l S.C.R.

in .Bisheisur Chuckerbutty & Anr .. v. Emperor.(') Similar view was
0

taken in Swaminatha Muda/iar v. Gopa/akrishna Naidu;('! Taturam
Sahu v. The State of Orissa;(') Ram Das Gaur v. The City
Magistrate, •Varanasi;(') and Ram Narain Sah & Anr. v. Parmeshwar
· Prasad Sah & Ors.('!. We have no doubt that the ratio of these ·f.
decisions represents a correct statement of the legal position. The ~
B proviso to sub-s. (4) of s. 144 which gives the State Government
jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum period
of six months beyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate
is clearly· indicative of the position that Parliament never intended
the life of an order under s. 144 of the Code to remafn. in force
·beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The scheme of
c that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the
s_ituation so warrants steps have. io be taken ' under other provisions
of the law such as s. 107 or s. · 145 of the Code when individual •
' and to meet a situation such as here, there are
disputes are raised
provisions to be found in ·the -Police Act. If repetitive orders are
'made it would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by
D
s. !44 of the Code. It is relevant to advert to the decision of this
Court in Babula/ Parate v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(') where ·the
vires of s. 144 of the Code was challenged. .Upholding the provision,
this Court observed :

E "'Public order _has to be maintained in ~dvance in. . "
order to ensur~ it and, therefore, it is competent to a
, legislature. to pass a. law permitting an appropriate

F
authority to take anticipatory action or place anticipatory
restrictions upon particular kinds of acts in an emergency
for the purpose of maintaining publis order ...... "
-
It was again emphasized :

"But it is difficult to say that an anticipatory action
.
takeit by such an iuthprity in an emergency where danger
to public order is genuinely apprehended is anything other
G . than ;n action done in the .discharge of the duty to
lnaintain Order ...... "_
(

(I) AIR I916 Cal. 47.
( AIR 1916 Mad. 1106.
H (3) AIR 1953 Orissa 96..
(4) AIR 1960 AU.-397.
(5) AIR 1942 Pat. 414.
,<6) (1961] 3 S.C.R. 423 ~t 4n .
A,). AVADHUTA v. COMMR. OF POLICE (R.anganath Misra, J.) 46~

This Court had, therefore, appropriately stresse'd upon the feature
that the provision of s. 144 of the Code was intended to meet an A
emergency. This postulates a situation temporary in character and,
therefore, the duration of an order under s. 144 of the Code· could
never have been intended to be semi-permanent in character.

Similar view was ~xpresse~ by this Court in Gu/am Abbas &
Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ots.,( 1) where it was said that·. "the entire B
basis of action under s. 144 is provided by .the urgency· of the situa•
tion and the power thereunder is intended to be availed of for.
preventing disorders, obstructions and annoyances with a view to
secure the public weal by maintaining ·public peace and
tranquiJiity .... " Certain observations in Gu/am Abbas's decision c
regarding the nf.ture of the order under s. 144 cif the Code ...:.. judicial
or executive - to the extent they run counter to the decision of the
Constitiltion Bench in Babula/ Parate's"case, may require reconside·
ration but we agree that the nature of the order under s. 144 of ·the
Code is intended to meet emergent situation. Thus the clear and
definite view of this Court is that an order under s. 144 of the Code D
is not intended to be either permanent or semi-permanent in charac•
ter. The concensus of jadicial opinion in· the High Courts of the
country is thus in accord with the view expressed by this Court. It is
not nec.essary on that ground to quash the impugned order .of March
'
"' 1982 as by efllux of time it has already ceased to be effective. E

-
It is appropriate to take note. of the fact that the- impugned
order under s. 144 of the Code did not ban processions or gatherings
at public places even by Ananda Margis. The prohibition was with
reference to the carrying of daggers, trishuls and skulls. Even
performan,ce of tandava dance in public plac~s. which we have held
is not an essential part' of religious rites to be obse"ved by Ananda
Margis, without these, has not been. prohibited.
'
The writ petitions have to fail on our finding that performance
.,,,I ,of tandava dance in procession in the public streets or in gatherings
in public places is not an essential religious rite of the followers of G
Ananda Marga. In the cirumstances there will be no order as to
costs.

H.S.K. . , Petitions dismissed

(I) [198112 Cr. L.J. 1835'!!11862.
- H