Holding

The High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court’s acquittal and upholding the convictions because the trial court’s findings were perverse and the appellate court may re‑appreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

Summary

The appellants, Achhar Singh and Budhi Singh, were acquitted by the trial court of charges including murder, grievous hurt and rioting, but the Himachal Pradesh High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted them based on eye‑witness testimony and medical evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could lawfully interfere with an acquittal under Section 378 of the CrPC when the trial court's findings were deemed perverse. It held that the appellate court may re‑appreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal and is not barred by the presumption of innocence if the lower court’s decision ignores material, consistent evidence. The Court analysed the credibility of exaggerated eyewitness statements, concluding that exaggeration does not render the entire testimony inadmissible and that the consistent core of the evidence supported conviction. It also rejected the appellants' arguments about the axe’s recovery, non‑examination of certain witnesses, and alleged contradictions, finding no fatal flaw in the prosecution case. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s convictions.

Issues considered

The scope of power of a High Court to interfere with an acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.
Whether appellate re‑appreciation of evidence is permissible when the trial court's findings are perverse.
The effect of exaggerated eyewitness statements on the admissibility and weight of evidence.
The relevance of the presumption of innocence in appeals against acquittal.
The impact of non‑examination of certain witnesses on the validity of a conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 378
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113-B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 323, s. 326, s. 452

Subjects

appeal against acquittalpresumption of innocencere‑appreciation of evidenceperverse findingeye‑witness testimonyexaggerationIPC offencescriminal jurisprudence

Judgment

[2021] 5 S.C.R. 243 243

ACHHAR SINGH A
v.
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1140 –1141 of 2010)
MAY 07, 2021 B
[N.V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT AND
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 378 – Appeal in case
of acquittal – Exercise of power by the High Court under – On
facts, the High Court convicted two accused-appellants for offences C
u/s. 452, 326 and 323 and u/ss. 302 and 452 IPC, respectively,
setting aside the acquittal by the trial court – Interference with –
Held: High Court rightly interfered with the perverse findings of
the trial court and prevented miscarriage of justice by convicting
the appellants – High Court went through the consistent evidence D
against some of the accused which were overlooked by the trial
court amid the chaos in evidence, and on basis of the evidence,
convicted one accused u/s. 302 IPC and other u/ss. 326 and 323
IPC – Trial court erred in overlooking the credible and consistent
evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the
exaggerated statements made by the eye-witnesses belie their version E
– Trial court due to many contradictions failed to identify and
appreciate material admissible evidence against the accused – Thus,
the finding of the trial court in ignorance of the relevant material
on record was perverse and called for interference from the High
Court – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302, 323, 326, 452 – Evidence – F
Eye witnesses.
Criminal jurisprudence: Cardinal rule – Held: Every person
is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty – It is obligatory on
the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused save where the
presumption of innocence has been statutorily dispensed with – This
G
presumption of innocence is doubled when a competent Court
analyses the material evidence, examines witnesses and acquits the
accused – When two reasonable and possible views arise, the one
favourable to the accused is adopted – In such cases, interference
is not thrusted unless perversity is detected in the decision-making
H
243
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A process – However, it cannot be interpreted that the “contours of
appeal” against acquittal u/s 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether
or not the trial court’s view was impossible – There is no bar on the
High Court’s power to re-appreciate evidence in an appeal against
acquittal.
B Criminal trial: Appreciation of evidence – Held: Homicidal
deaths cannot be left to the judgment of god-judicium dei – Court in
their quest to reach the truth ought to make earnest efforts to extract
the credibility – When the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to
reach a firm conclusion, it extends the benefit of doubt.
C Evidence: Admissibility of – When witnesses tend to exaggerate
– Held: In case of exaggerations, the court being mindful of
distinction between truth and falsity, is duty bound to disseminate
‘truth’ from ‘falsehood’ – Evidence given by a witness cannot be
discarded as a whole on the ground that it is exaggerated – It is
only in a case where evidence are so inextricably intertwined that
D in their separation no real evidence survives, that the whole evidence
can be discarded.
Words and phrases: Expression ‘exaggeration’ – Meaning of.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
E HELD: 1. The High Court was merited to interfere with
the perverse findings of the trial court and has prevented
miscarriage of justice by separating grain from the husks leading
to the conviction of the appellants. AS’s conviction under Sections
452, 326 and 323 IPC and BS’s conviction under Sections 302
F and 452 IPC by the High Court are maintained. [Para 37, 38]
[267-B-D]
2.1 It is fundamental in criminal jurisprudence that every
person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, for criminal
accusations can be hurled at anyone without him being a criminal.
The suspect is therefore considered to be innocent in the
G
interregnum between accusation and judgment. History reveals
that the burden on the accuser to prove the guilt of the accused
has its roots in ancient times. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi
(1792–1750 B.C.), one of the oldest written codes of law put the
burden of proof on the accuser. Roman Law coined the principle
H
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 245

of actori incumbit (onus) probatio (the burden of proof weighs A
on the plaintiff) i.e., presumed innocence of the accused.
[Para 13][257-D-E]
2.2 A characteristic feature of Common Law Criminal
Jurisprudence in India is also that an accused must be presumed
to be innocent till the contrary is proved. It is obligatory on the B
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused save where the
presumption of innocence has been statutorily dispensed with,
for example, under Section 113–B of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Regardless thereto, the ‘Right of Silence’ guaranteed under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution is one of the facets of presumed
innocence. The constitutional mandate read with the scheme of C
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 amplifies that the
presumption of innocence, until the accused is proved to be guilty,
is an integral part of the Indian criminal justice system. This
presumption of innocence is doubled when a competent Court
analyses the material evidence, examines witnesses and acquits D
the accused. Keeping this cardinal principle of invaluable rights
in mind, the appellate courts have evolved a self–restraint policy
whereunder, when two reasonable and possible views arise, the
one favourable to the accused is adopted while respecting the
trial court’s proximity to the witnesses and direct interaction with
evidence. In such cases, interference is not thrusted unless E
perversity is detected in the decision–making process. It is thus
a well crystalized principle that if two views are possible, the High
Court ought not to interfere with the trial court’s judgment.
However, such a precautionary principle cannot be overstretched
to portray that the “contours of appeal” against acquittal under F
Section 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial
court’s view was impossible. It is equally well settled that there
is no bar on the High Court’s power to re-appreciate evidence in
an appeal against acquittal. The CrPC does not differentiate in
the power, scope, jurisdiction or limitation between appeals
against judgments of conviction or acquittal and that the appellate G
court is free to consider on both fact and law, despite the self–
restraint that has been ingrained into practice while dealing with
orders of acquittal where there is a double presumption of
innocence of the accused. [Paras 14, 15][257-G; 258-A-G]
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A 2.3 The expressions “exaggeration” and “exaggerate”
unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an ‘exaggerated
statement’ lies in a true fact, to which fictitious additions are made
so as to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore,
has the ingredients of ‘truth’. No exaggerated statement is
possible without an element of truth. On the other hand,
B
expression false is also defined. There is, thus, a marked
differentia between an ‘exaggerated version’ and a ‘false version’.
An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas
a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the ‘opposite’
of ‘true’). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill,
C the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being
mindful of such distinction is duty bound to disseminate ‘truth’
from ‘falsehood’ and sift the grain from the chaff in case of
exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff
are so inextricably intertwined that in their separation no real
evidence survives, that the whole evidence can be discarded.
D
[Para 24][262-A-D]
Cambridge Dictionary; Merriam-Webster; Concise
Oxford Dictionary; Advance Law Lexicon; Oxford
Concise Dictionary – referred to.
E 2.4 There is no gainsaid that homicidal deaths cannot be
left to judicium dei. The Court in their quest to reach the truth
ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of
black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is
only when the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to reach
a firm conclusion that the benefit of doubt is extended.
F [Para 26][263-B]
3.1 The trial court in the instant case rightly observed that
the evidence was chaotic with regard to many accused persons
and no definite view could be formed regarding their participation.
The High Court also shared the view of the trial court and
G expressed concern regarding the exaggerations and
contradictions within the evidence. Keeping in mind the attempts
by the prosecution witnesses to implicate numerous people, the
High Court delineated the strands of consistent evidence against
some of the accused which were overlooked by the trial court
H amid the chaos. [Para 16][258-G; 259-A-B]
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 247

3.2 A meticulous reading of the statements makes it clear A
that even if the exaggerations of multiple axe blows being given
to the deceased were discarded, the allegation that BS entered
the house of the victims armed with an axe and hit SD on her
head, and that SD died due to a head injury was consistent and
undisputed throughout the FIR and the deposition by prosecution
B
witnesses. The same is also supported by the post–mortem report
stating one fatal injury to the head by a sharp–edged weapon and
the medical officer’s testimony that her injury could have been
caused by the axe shown in Court. Considering this, the trial
court’s confusion as to who caused SD’s fatal injury was
unwarranted and uncalled for. The fact that BS executed an axe C
blow on SD’s head knowing fully well that an axe blow on an old
woman’s vital body part would in all probability cause her death,
justifies his conviction for the offence under Section 302 IPC. As
for AS, the injuries sustained by BR (incised wounds on the face
and posterior skull along with fracture in the facial bone) being a
D
combination of grievous and simple injuries were opined to have
been caused by both sharp and blunt edged weapons. Considering
that all the witnesses have been consistent about AS’s attack on
BR with an axe, his conviction under Sections 326 and 323 IPC
cannot be found faulty and deserves to be upheld. [Para 21,
22][261-A-E] E
3.3 The appellants’ contention that the testimony of P.W.1,
P.W.11 or P.W.12 was wholly unbelievable and inconsistent with
the evidence of the Doctor (P.W.3) and the post-mortem report,
is unacceptable. The prosecution witnesses have given an over-
exaggerated version of the injuries suffered by the deceased. F
They have, however, consistently deposed that the head injury
which proved to be fatal, was caused by BS. Their statement, to
this extent, is consistent and in conformity with the medical
evidence on record. Despite the fact that the presence of many
persons inside the room of occurrence created chaos and some
of such persons were bystanders or fence sitters, the G
eye-witnesses have been able to see that the fatal blow to the
deceased was caused by none else than BS. [Para 23][261-E-G]
3.4 An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The
statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be
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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference
between exaggeration and falsity. The truth can be effortlessly
extracted from their statements. The trial court apparently fell in
grave error and overlooked the credible and consistent evidence
while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated
statements made by the eye-witnesses belie their version. In
B
the instant case, the trial court being overwhelmed by many
contradictions failed to identify and appreciate material admissible
evidence against the appellants. The trial court misdirected itself
to wrong conclusions. The finding of the trial court in ignorance
of the relevant material on record was undoubtedly “perverse”
C and called for interference from the High Court. [Para 27–29]
[263-C-E; 264-A]
3.5 While testing the ‘possibility’ of the conclusion drawn
by the trial court, it has to be kept in mind that neither is there a
reason on record nor have the appellants led any defence evidence
D to suggest as to why NT (P.W.1), his wife MD (P.W.11) or his
father BR (P.W.12) would allow the real culprits to go scot–free
and instead falsely implicate the appellants to settle scores on
trivial issues. Rather, from the very beginning (FIR) till their last
deposition, the complainant and other two injured/eye witnesses
have been consistently accusing BS for committing murder of
E SD and AS for grievously hurting BR. Their ocular version
is duly corroborated by the medical evidence on record.
[Para 30][264-B-D]
3.6 The appellants submitted that since the axe was
recovered from a public place it should not have been held to be
F in the possession of BS or that an axe was also recovered from
NS (with whom parity was sought), it is clear from the facts that
this was a farming community in rural Himachal where tools like
axes are found in everyone’s homes. The submission that the
spot of incident was doubtful as there was a blood trail outside
G the house as deposed by P.W.16-ASI, carries no force. The
presence of random blood marks elsewhere could not put in doubt
the fact that the incident happened in the house of the complainant
from where the same witness recovered sticks, blood–stained
stone, glass splinters, pieces of wood and leftover food, etc. The
fact that the ASI did not find it necessary or even material to
H investigate the blood marks shows that they had no legal impact
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 249

on the investigative conclusions. It is pertinent to note that A
independent witness P.W.14 also corroborated the recovery of
broken pieces of the door, broken bulb, stones, blood–stained
soil etc. from the house of the complainant. [Para 31][265-A-D]
3.7 Non-examination of many alleged bystanders is well-
explained as it is clear from the facts that the complainant’s family B
had prior litigation with some people in the village and most of
them had socially boycotted the victim’s family. The fact that nine
persons who were initially accused in the FIR but not charge-
sheeted subsequently, were not arrayed as prosecution witnesses
is understandable. It is not necessary for the prosecution to
examine every cited or possible witness. So long as the C
prosecution case can withstand the test of proof beyond doubt,
non–examination of all or every witness is immaterial.
[Para 32][265-D-F]
3.8 Similarly, the doubt cast on the actual time of death
relying on P.W.3- doctor’s statement does not inspire confidence D
as he besides stating that the time between the death and the
post–mortem was ‘within 10 hours’, also deposed that the time
between the death of SD and the injury was ‘within 5-10 minutes’,
thereby supporting the prosecution witnesses who deposed that
she died on the spot owing to the injuries. [Para 34][266-D] E
3.9 As regards, NS, whose acquittal was upheld by the High
Court also, it is imperative to point out that the FIR, though not
an encyclopedia of the entire incident, is the most spontaneous
account of it. It is very hard to believe that the complainant who
walked seven hours overnight to reach the police station to record F
his account of the incident would forget to mention a fatal attack
with a deadly weapon on his deceased mother by NS as well. Such
a major omission on the complainant’s part is very material to
contradict his testimony in Court with regard to his belated
allegations against NS. The medical evidence has also not
substantiated such allegations against NS. The High Court has G
only acted on consistent and corroborated evidence against
BS and AS which was conspicuously missing in the case of NS.
[Para 35][266-E-G]

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250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A 3.10 The submission relying on P.W.11’s statement that the
police could not have arrived before the FIR was filed does not
defeat the case of the prosecution as it is a minor contradiction
considering that P.W.16 ASI has deposed that he reached the
house of the complainant at 1PM on 24.02.1996. The submission
that there was no reason for BS to start a fight with his neighbours
B
on the day of his daughter’s wedding also does not help the
appellants. The High Court has specifically pointed out that his
daughter’s wedding was solemnized two days prior to the date of
the incident and there is no credible evidence as to whether a
wedding function was underway at the relevant time. Even
C BS did not say so in his statement under Section 313 CrPC.
[Para 36][266-G-H; 267-A-B]
Murugesan v. State (2012) 10 SCC 383 : [2012] 13
SCR 1; Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 : [2009]
14 SCR 1081; Salim Akhtar v. State of UP (2003) 5
D SCC 499 : [2003] 3 SCR 470; SheikhHasib @ Tabarak
v. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773; Dharma Rama
Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 1 SCC 537 :
[1973] 3 SCR 92; State of UP v. Kishan Chand (2004)
7 SCC 629 : [ 2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 640; Leela Ram v.
State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : [1999] 3 Suppl.
E SCR 435; GangadharBehera v. State of Orissa (2002)
8 SCC 381 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 183; Prabhu Dayal
v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 8 SCC 127; Chandrappa
v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : [2007]
2 SCR 630; State of Andhra Pradesh v. M.
F Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15 SCC 582 : [2008] 14
SCR 1170; Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh
2020 SCC OnLine SC 869; Hari Chand v. State of Delhi
(1996) 9 SCC 112; Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab
(2003) 7 SCC 643: [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 35; Babu v.
State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189: [2010] 9 SCR 1039;
G Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp (3) SCC
665:[1994] 3 Suppl. SCC 665; Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418: [2019] 6 SCR 555;
Mohd. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam(2019) 19 SCC 567;
Laltu Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (2019) 15 SCC 344;
H
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 251

Khurshid Ahmed v. State of J&K (2018) 7 SCC 429 : A
[2018] 6 SCR 1121; Shanmugam v. State (2013) 12 SCC
765 : [2013] 10 SCR 99; Sarwan Singh v. State of
Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 369; Dalip Singh v. State of
Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364 : [1954] SCR 145 – referred
to.
B
Woolmington v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions [1935]
AC 462 (HL) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2012] 13 SCR 1 referred to Para 8
C
[2009] 14 SCR 1081 referred to Para 8
[2003] 3 SCR 470 referred to Para 8
(1972) 4 SCC 773 referred to Para 8
[1973] 3 SCR 92 referred to Para 8
D
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 640 referred to Para 11
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 435 referred to Para 11
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 183 referred to Para 11
(2018) 8 SCC 127 referred to Para 11 E
[2007] 2 SCR 630 referred to Para 13
[2008] 14 SCR 1170 referred to Para 13
(1996) 9 SCC 112 referred to Para 25
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 35 referred to Para 24 F
[2010] 9 SCR 1039 referred to Para 28
[1994] 3 Suppl. SCC 665 referred to Para 29
[2019] 6 SCR 555 referred to Para 29
[1954] SCR 145 referred to Para 30 G
(2019) 19 SCC 567 referred to Para 30
(2019) 15 SCC 344 referred to Para 30
[2018] 6 SCR 1121 referred to Para 30
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252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A [2013] 10 SCR 99 referred to Para 30
(1976) 4 SCC 369 referred to Para 33
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1140-1141 of 2010.
B From the Judgment and Order dated 12.05.2010 & 27.05.2010 of
the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.
281 of 1998.
With
Criminal Appeal No. 1144 of 2010
C
J.S. Attri, R. Basant, Sr. Advs., Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, R.
Anand Padmanabhan, Vishnu Pazhanganat, Shashi Bhushan Kumar,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Abhinav Mukerji, AAG. for the Respondent.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURYA KANT, J.
The appellants Achhar Singh and Budhi Singh are aggrieved by
the judgment and order dated 12.05.2010/27.05.2010 passed by the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh whereby their acquittal by the Addl. Sessions
E Judge, Mandi dated 24.02.1998 has been set aside. Consequently, Achhar
Singh has been convicted for offences under Sections 452, 326 and 323
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for five years along with fine, while Budhi Singh has been
convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 452 IPC and sentenced
F to undergo imprisonment for life along with fine.
FACTS:
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on the night of 23.02.1996,
the complainant Netar Singh’s wife (Meera Devi, P.W.11) and mother
(Swari Devi) had attended the marriage function in a nearby village at
G the house of the bridegroom with whom their neighbour Budhi Singh’s
daughter got married. Both the ladies returned home with ‘Dhaam’
(traditional food served on social events). It is relevant to mention here
that owing to their social boycott by Budhi Singh and some other villagers,
Netar Singh’s family did not attend any marriage function at the former’s
house. At about 8 pm when the complainant and his family were taking
H
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 253
[SURYA KANT, J.]

Dhaam, Budhi Singh, Achhar Singh along with some other villagers A
shouted for the complainant and his father (Beli Ram, P.W.12) to come
out. When they neared the door, they sensed the intention of the accused
to kill the complainant party. The appellants and other villagers started
pelting stones at the complainant party which forced them to rush back
to the house and bolt their door. The assailants, however, broke open the
B
door and entered the house bearing arms. Budhi Singh and Achhar Singh
had axes, while the other accused were armed with sickles, spears and
sticks. It is alleged that Budhi Singh executed an axe blow on Swari
Devi’s head causing her death on the spot and Achhar Singh hit Beli
Ram with an axe due to which the latter fainted. The complainant was
also allegedly beaten with sticks by other villagers after which he C
somehow managed to escape to the roof. Meera Devi begged the
assailants for mercy and they left threatening that the complainant’s
family will be killed if they tried to leave the house.
3. Meanwhile, some villagers including Govind Ram (D.W.2) and
Bahadur who were standing outside intervened and called on the accused D
persons to stop the violence whereupon the accused were forced to
leave the place of incident. Afterwards, at around 2:00 AM the complainant
went to the house of the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat (Beasa Devi -
D.W.1) to inform her about the assault. She advised the complainant to
contact the police. Since phone lines were down in the village and no
buses plied at night, the complainant walked 24 kms to Jogindernagar E
police station and lodged FIR No. 36 of 1996 against sixteen villagers
including the appellants at 9:30 AM on 24.02.1996. The police after
investigation found that only seven persons out of the lot were involved
in the attack against whom charge-sheet was filed. The accused persons
were committed to stand trial for offence under Sections 147, 148, 452, F
506, 323, 302 and 326 of the IPC.
4. The Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi acquitted all the accused
vide judgment dated 24.02.1998. The trial Court while observing prior
enmity and extensive litigation between the parties, did not rule out the
possibility of false implication. The belatedly exaggerated allegations by G
the prosecution witnesses, were held to be an attempt by the complainant
party to rope in as many people as possible. In regard to the role of
present appellants, it was pointed out that according to the FIR, Swari
Devi died owing to a single axe blow inflicted by Budhi Singh and the
post-mortem report also showed only one head injury on her person.
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254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A However, three prosecution eye-witnesses, namely, Netar Singh – P.W.1
(the complainant), Meera Devi – P.W.11 and Beli Ram – P.W.12 deposed
that Budhi Singh gave two axe blows on her head and then Narinder
Singh (co-accused) also hit the deceased’s left ear with an axe twice. It
was further noticed that while the complainant initially stated that his
father was attacked on the face by Achhar Singh and Prakash (co-
B
accused), but in their depositions the injured or eyewitnesses have
attributed attacks to other co-accused persons also which were not
corroborated by the medico legal report of Beli Ram. They also changed
the nature of attack attributed to co-accused Prakash.
5. The trial Court also observed that eyewitness – Govind Ram
C (D.W.2) did not support the prosecution story and the Gram Panchayat
Pradhan (Beasa Devi – D.W.1) stated that the complainant only informed
her about a minor dispute after which she advised him to contact the
police. Noting that no evidence was put forth by the complainant to
establish the unavailability of telephone network in the neighbouring village,
D the Court found the delay in registering the FIR to be fatal to the
prosecution. The spot of occurrence was also doubted observing that
bloodstains were noticed in the passage leading to the village. Keeping
in view the conflicting exaggerations by the prosecution witnesses coupled
with the allegation that about sixteen persons entered a small room and
started attacking the complainant party with various deadly weapons,
E the trial Court could not attribute any specific injury to any of the accused
and thus acquitted them all by giving the benefit of doubt.
6. The High Court upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence,
set aside the acquittal of the appellants Achhar Singh and Budhi Singh
though it has upheld the acquittal of the rest of the five accused. While
F acknowledging the contradiction between the contents of FIR, the witness
testimonies and the medical reports, the High Court stated that a thread
of consistent evidence against the appellants could still be extracted from
the material on record, howsoever messy it was. Disregarding the
exaggerations and improvements made by the complainant party, the
G High Court observed that the allegation of the first axe blow by Budhi
Singh on the head of Swari Devi was corroborated by the FIR, the
prosecution witnesses, the post-mortem report which mentioned one fatal
head injury by a sharp weapon and the recovery of axe from him. The
High Court noted that the allegations against Achhar Singh with regard
to his assault on Beli Ram with an axe were also consistent, and medical
H evidence showed that some injuries could have been caused by an axe.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 255
[SURYA KANT, J.]

7. It was noticed that Govind Ram (D.W.2) being the son-in-law A
of the appellant Budhi Singh could not have deposed against him. While
dealing with the delay in filing the FIR, the High Court considered the
unavailability of buses at night, terrain of the area and the distance between
the complainant’s house and Jogindernagar police station (24 kms) while
concluding that he could not have reached there until next morning. With
B
regard to the trial Court’s confusion about the spot of the occurrence, it
was held that the evidence regarding the broken windowpanes, scattered
articles in the room, plates with leftover food etc. was enough to conclude
that the occurrence took place inside the room and the presence of
random blood marks elsewhere ought not to be given undue credit. It
was also observed that since the marriage of Budhi Singh’s daughter C
was solemnized on 21.02.1996, no marriage function could have been
underway at Budhi Singh’s house on the night of the incident. While
observing that the evidence on record did not suggest a common intention
to kill Swari Devi or cause grievous hurt to Beli Ram, the appellants
were held to be liable for their individual acts. Budhi Singh was thus
D
convicted for offences under Sections 302 and 452 IPC and Achhar
Singh was convicted for the offences under Sections 452, 326 and 323
IPC. They have now come to this Court against their conviction by the
High Court.
CONTENTIONS:
E
8. Relying on Murugesan v. State1, Learned Senior Counsel for
Budhi Singh contended that so long as the trial Court’s view was a
‘possible view’, further scrutiny by the High Court in exercise of powers
under Section 378 CrPC was not called for. While citing Aruvelu v.
State2,it was urged that the trial Court’s judgment cannot be set aside
merely because the appellate Court’s view is more probable and that to F
merit interference by the High Court there has to be perversity in the
trial Court’s judgment. It was also pressed that owing to their proximity
to the witnesses, the trial Courts are at an advantage to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and make intangible observations. Learned
Senior Counsel highlighted the prosecution witnesses’ tendency to G
exaggerate and falsely implicate, and pointed out that the four head injuries
to the deceased as alleged by the eye-witnesses were falsified by the
medical evidence which showed only one head injury. It was also
1
(2012) 10 SCC 383.
2
(2009) 10 SCC 206. H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A accentuated that nine persons who were mentioned in the FIR were let
go at the stage of charge as bystanders. The contention was that the
prosecution also ought to have arrayed these nine persons as witnesses.
Salim Akhtar v. State of UP3 was cited to urge that since the axe was
recovered from a public place, it could not be held that Budhi Singh was
in possession of the article recovered. Additionally, no conclusive presence
B
of blood on the axes recovered was stated in the FSL report.
9. Highlighting the fact that there was a marriage function going
on in Budhi Singh’s house, it was urged that he had no reason to leave
mid-celebration and attack his neighbours. Doubt was also cast on the
actual spot of the incident contending that P.W.16 – ASI Jaisi Ram had
C deposed that there was a blood trail outside the house. It was further
contended that Narinder Singh had also been accused of inflicting a
head injury on the deceased with an axe and despite recovery of an axe
from him, the High Court has not interfered with his acquittal. Suspicion
was cast on the actual time of lodging the FIR (lodged at 9:30AM) as
D P.W.11 - Meera Devi had stated in her cross examination that the police
arrived at 8-9 AM in the morning. It was then asserted that the police
could not have arrived before the FIR had been lodged. Doubt was also
cast on the exact time of death of the deceased as the prosecution
witnesses stated that she died on the spot whereas according to P.W.3 –
Dr. D.D. Rana who conducted the post-mortem, the time between the
E death and the post-mortem (on 25.02.1996 at 11am) was ‘within 10
hours’.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for Achhar Singh also reiterated these
very contentions and made a pointed reference to the statements of
eye-witnesses according to which, some other accused besides Achhar
F Singh, too had hit Beli Ram with their respective weapons. It was claimed
that trial Court rightly expressed its inability to identify the definite architect
of individual injuries.
11. On the other hand, counsel for the State while placing reliance
on Sheikh Hasib @ Tabarak v. State of Bihar 4&Dharma Rama
G Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra5, canvassed that the FIR was not a
substantive piece of evidence and could be used for contradicting or
corroborating only its maker and not other witnesses. He contended that
3
(2003) 5 SCC 499, ¶ 11-12.
4
(1972) 4 SCC 773.
5
H (1973) 1 SCC 537.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 257
[SURYA KANT, J.]

the credibility of the witnesses cannot be called into question merely A
because they were related to the deceased (while citing State of UP v.
Kishan Chand 6) or because there were minor discrepancies or
exaggerations (relying on Leela Ram v. State of Haryana7). While
bringing out attention to this Court’s observations in Gangadhar Behera
v. State of Orissa8 and Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan9 it was
B
urged that inconsistent evidence by the prosecution witnesses against
one accused cannot be capitalised to give the benefit of doubt to another.
ANALYSIS:
12. The question which falls for consideration in these appeals is
whether the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 378 C
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) was justified in
interfering with the acquittal by the trial Court?
13. It is fundamental in criminal jurisprudence that every person
is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, for criminal accusations
can be hurled at anyone without him being a criminal. The suspect is D
therefore considered to be innocent in the interregnum between
accusation and judgment. History reveals that the burden on the accuser
to prove the guilt of the accused has its roots in ancient times. The
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (1792-1750 B.C.), one of the oldest
written codes of law put the burden of proof on the accuser. Roman
Law coined the principle of actori incumbit (onus) probatio (the burden E
of proof weighs on the plaintiff) i.e., presumed innocence of the accused.
In Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions10, the House of
Lords held that the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt
was the “golden thread” throughout the web of English Criminal Law.
Today, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article F
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights all mandate presumption
of innocence of the accused.
14. A characteristic feature of Common Law Criminal
Jurisprudence in India is also that an accused must be presumed to be G
innocent till the contrary is proved. It is obligatory on the prosecution to
6
(2004) 7 SCC 629.
7
(1999) 9 SCC 525.
8
(2002) 8 SCC 381.
9
(2018) 8 SCC 127.
10
[1935] AC 462 (HL) H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A establish the guilt of the accused save where the presumption of innocence
has been statutorily dispensed with, for example, under Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act, 1872. Regardless thereto, the ‘Right of Silence’
guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution is one of the facets of
presumed innocence. The constitutional mandate read with the scheme
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 amplifies that the presumption
B
of innocence, until the accused is proved to be guilty, is an integral part
of the Indian criminal justice system. This presumption of innocence is
doubled when a competent Court analyses the material evidence,
examines witnesses and acquits the accused. Keeping this cardinal
principle of invaluable rights in mind, the appellate Courts have evolved
C a self-restraint policy whereunder, when two reasonable and possible
views arise, the one favourable to the accused is adopted while respecting
the trial Court’s proximity to the witnesses and direct interaction with
evidence. In such cases, interference is not thrusted unless perversity is
detected in the decision-making process.
D 15. It is thus a well crystalized principle that if two views are
possible, the High Court ought not to interfere with the trial Court’s
judgment. However, such a precautionary principle cannot be
overstretched to portray that the “contours of appeal” against acquittal
under Section 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial
Court’s view was impossible. It is equally well settled that there is no
E bar on the High Court’s power to re-appreciate evidence in an appeal
against acquittal11. This Court has held in a catena of decisions (including
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka12, State of Andhra Pradesh v. M.
Madhusudhan Rao 13and Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal
Pradesh14,) that the CrPC does not differentiate in the power, scope,
F jurisdiction or limitation between appeals against judgments of conviction
or acquittal and that the appellate Court is free to consider on both fact
and law, despite the self-restraint that has been ingrained into practice
while dealing with orders of acquittal where there is a double presumption
of innocence of the accused.
G 16. The trial Court in the instant case rightly observed that the
evidence was chaotic with regard to many accused persons and no

11
Sangappa v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 686, ¶ 10.
12
(2007) 4 SCC 415, ¶ 42.
13
(2008) 15 SCC 582, ¶ 20 – 21.
14
H 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869, ¶ 11.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 259
[SURYA KANT, J.]

definite view could be formed regarding their participation. The High A
Court also shared the view of the trial Court and expressed concern
regarding the exaggerations and contradictions within the evidence.
Keeping in mind the attempts by the prosecution witnesses to implicate
numerous people, the High Court delineated the strands of consistent
evidence against some of the accused which were overlooked by the
B
trial Court amid the chaos. While analysing the witness statements and
other evidence, we will now consider whether the High Court did so
correctly.
17. Complainant Netar Singh (P.W.1), deposed that when the
accused persons broke open the door and entered their house, Budhi
Singh, Achhar Singh, Narinder Singh were armed with axes, Prakash C
had a spear, Sodha Ram had a sickle and other accused (Jai Singh and
Hem Singh) were bearing sticks. While mentioning the present appellants
he said that “Budhi Singh accused gave two axe blows on the head
of my mother, while Narender accused gave two axe blows one above
the left ear and second below the left ear of my mother, and my D
mother Swari Devi died on the spot... Achhar Singh and Sodha
also gave blows of drat and axe to my father. As a result of the
beatings my father became unconscious and fell down. Hem Singh
and Jai Singh accused gave me danda blows”. It was also mentioned
that the accused had broken the door, windows and utensils. He then
described how he went to the Pradhan’s house at 2:00 AM and later to E
the far away police station (Jogindernagar) on foot and lodged the FIR
at about 8-9 AM the next morning. He also mentioned that prior animosity
existed between the parties because Budhi Singh and Narinder Singh
wanted to purchase the land where he had constructed a house and that
his father - Beli Ram had previously filed a case against the accused F
persons in which they had been acquitted.
18. Meera Devi – P.W.11, the daughter in law of the deceased
stated in her testimony that Budhi Singh and Narinder Singh were armed
with axes, while Prakash carried a spear and Sodha Ram carried a
sickle. She said that “Budhi Singh accused gave two blows of axe on G
the head of my mother-in-law Smt. Swari Devi on which my mother-
in-law raised cry. Narinder Singh accused gave two blows of axe
on the ear of my mother-in-law and my mother-in-law fell down and
died. Narinder Singh gave blow from backside of the axe to Beli
Ram on his face and Achhar Singh gave blow of axe on the neck of
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A Beli Ram. Sodha Ram gave drat blow on the leg of my father-in-law
Beli Ram…Jai Singh and Hem Singh gave danda blow to my husband
Netar Singh.” She stated that her husband escaped to the roof, reported
the matter to the Pradhan and came back with the police the next day.
Her husband and father-in-law were taken for medical examination and
her mother-in-law’s body was sent for post-mortem. During her cross-
B
examination, she mentioned that the police came at about 8-9AM in the
morning.
19. Injured witness, Beli Ram (P.W.12) was also examined and
he stated that Budhi Singh, Narinder and Achhar Singh came bearing
axes, while Prakash had a spear, Sodha Ram had a sickle and Jai and
C Hem Singh were armed with sticks. While describing the attacks, he
said that “Budhi Singh gave two blows of axe on the head of my
wife, Swari Devi and two blows of axe were given by Narinder near
the ear of my wife and my wife died on the spot. Achhar Singh
accused gave axe blow on the backside of my head while Sodha
D accused gave drat blow on my leg….Netar Singh was given beatings
by Jai Singh and Hem Singh with danda and stones.” He added that
his son escaped through the roof. It was mentioned that the accused
persons had formed a committee to boycott them and thus nobody from
the village gave evidence in their favour.He also disclosed that “Narinder
Singh accused also gave blow blunt side of the axe on my face near
E ear.” Thereafter, he fell unconscious and was medically examined at
the hospital.
20. Dr. DD Rana, who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased
and medically examined the injured (Netar Singh and Beli Ram) was
examined as P.W.3. with regard to Swari Devi, he described one incised
F wound on the left temporal region, which he stated, could have been
caused by the axe shown in Court. On medically examining Beli Ram,
he stated that he found incised wounds on the face and the back of his
skull, a lacerated wound on the right foot, fracture in the facial bone and
a black eye. He said that the incised wounds were possible by the axe
G shown in Court and the rest were possible by stick blows. During cross-
examination, he added that the incised injuries on Beli Ram could be
inflicted by falling on a sharp-edged stone and other injuries were possible
from falling on a hard surface. After medically examining Netar Singh
(P.W.1), he is stated to have found abrasions on the right foot, left leg
and forehead. He added that such injuries were possibly a result of stick
H blows and could also be from a fall.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 261
[SURYA KANT, J.]

21. A meticulous reading of the above statements makes it clear A
that even if the exaggerations of multiple axe blows being given to the
deceased were discarded, the allegation that Budhi Singh entered the
house of the victims armed with an axe and hit Swari Devi on her head,
and that Swari Devi died due to a head injury was consistent and undisputed
throughout the FIR and the deposition by prosecution witnesses. The
B
same is also supported by the post-mortem report stating one fatal injury
to the head by a sharp-edged weapon and the medical officer’s testimony
that her injury could have been caused by the axe shown in Court.
Considering this, the trial Court’s confusion as to who caused Swari
Devi’s fatal injury was unwarranted and uncalled for.
22. The fact that Budhi Singh executed an axe blow on Swari C
Devi’s head knowing fully well that an axe blow on an old woman’s vital
body part would in all probability cause her death, justifies his conviction
for the offence under Section 302 IPC. As for Achhar Singh, we find
that the injuries sustained by Beli Ram (incised wounds on the face and
posterior skull along with fracture in the facial bone) being a combination D
of grievous and simple injuries were opined to have been caused by both
sharp and blunt edged weapons. Considering that all the witnesses have
been consistent about Achhar Singh’s attack on Beli Ram with an axe,
his conviction under Sections 326 and 323 IPC cannot be found faulty
and deserves to be upheld.
E
23. The appellants’ contention that the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.11
or P.W.12 was wholly unbelievable and inconsistent with the evidence
of the Doctor (P.W.3) and the post-mortem report, is unacceptable. As
noticed earlier, the prosecution witnesses have given an over-exaggerated
version of the injuries suffered by the deceased. They have, however,
consistently deposed that the head injury which proved to be fatal, was F
caused by Budhi Singh. Their statement, to this extent, is consistent and
in conformity with the medical evidence on record. Despite the fact that
the presence of many persons inside the room of occurrence created
chaos and some of such persons were bystanders or fence sitters, the
eye-witnesses have been able to see that the fatal blow to the deceased G
was caused by none else than Budhi Singh.
24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines
“exaggeration” as “the fact of making something larger, more
important, better or worse than it really is”. Merriam-Webster defines H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A the term “exaggerate” as to “enlarge beyond bounds or the truth”.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as “enlarged or altered
beyond normal proportions”. These expressions unambiguously
suggest that the genesis of an ‘exaggerated statement’ lies in a true fact,
to which fictitious additions are made so as to make it more penetrative.
Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of ‘truth’. No
B
exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the
other hand, Advance Law Lexicon defines “false” as “erroneous,
untrue; opposite of correct, or true”. Oxford Concise Dictionary states
that “false” is “wrong; not correct or true”. Similar is the explanation
in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differentia between
C an ‘exaggerated version’ and a ‘false version’. An exaggerated statement
contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of
truth in it (being the ‘opposite’ of ‘true’). It is well said that to make a
mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A
Court of law, being mindful of such distinction is duty bound to disseminate
‘truth’ from ‘falsehood’ and sift the grain from the chaff in case of
D
exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so
inextricably intertwined that in their separation no real evidence survives,
that the whole evidence can be discarded.15
25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar
Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of
E the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused, conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari
Chand v. State of Delhi16 held that:
“24. …So far as this contention is concerned it must be kept
in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a
F criminal trial especially in a case of eyewitnesses the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply and the
court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff.It is
of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated
in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve
G many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not
found acceptable the remaining part of evidence has to be
scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether
the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from
15
Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, ¶ 18.
16
H (1996) 9 SCC 112.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 263
[SURYA KANT, J.]

other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be A
safely relied upon...”
(emphasis supplied)
26. There is no gainsaid that homicidal deaths cannot be left to
judicium dei. The Court in their quest to reach the truth ought to make
earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn B
duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its
best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of doubt is
extended.
27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The statements
of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be analysed accordingly, C
while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity.
We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements.
The trial Court apparently fell in grave error and overlooked the credible
and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that
the exaggerated statements made by the eye-witnesses belie their version. D
28. As regard to the appellants’ contention that an appellate Court
is not justified in reversing the trial Court’s judgment unless it was found
to be “perverse”, it is important to point out that in the instant case, the
trial Court being overwhelmed by many contradictions failed to identify
and appreciate material admissible evidence against the appellants. The E
trial Court misdirected itself to wrong conclusions. Suffice it to cite Babu
v. State of Kerala17 where this Court observed that:
“12. …While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the
appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record,
so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial F
court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate
court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding
of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration
admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the
evidence brought on record contrary to law…”
G
(emphasis supplied)
29. There are numerous later decisions (including Aruvelu v. State
(supra),Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE18and Basalingappa v.
17
(2010) 9 SCC 189.
18
1994 Supp (3) SCC 665, ¶ 3. H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A Mudibasappa19) where this Court has firmly held that a finding contrary
to the evidence is “perverse”. The finding of the trial Court in ignorance
of the relevant material on record was undoubtedly “perverse” and ripe
for interference from the High Court.
30. While testing the ‘possibility’ of the conclusion drawn by the
B trial Court, it has to be kept in mind that neither is there a reason on
record nor have the appellants led any defence evidence to suggest as
to why Netar Singh (P.W.1), his wife Meera Devi (P.W.11) or his father
Beli Ram (P.W.12) would allow the real culprits to go scot-free and
instead falsely implicate the appellants to settle scores on trivial issues.
Rather, from the very beginning (FIR) till their last deposition, the
C complainant and other two injured/eye witnesses have been consistently
accusing Budhi Singh for committing murder of Swari Devi and Achhar
Singh for grievously hurting Beli Ram. Their ocular version is duly
corroborated by the medical evidence on record. This Court in Dalip
Singh v. State of Punjab20 opined that:
D “26….Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.It is
true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for
enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person
against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty,
but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere
E fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a
sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any
sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its
own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is
so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of
prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be
F
limited to and be governed by its own facts.”
(emphasis supplied)
This decision has been usually followed by this Court in various
cases such as, Mohd. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam21, Laltu Ghosh v.
G State of West Bengal 22, Khurshid Ahmed v. State of J&K23 and
Shanmugam v. State24.
19
(2019) 5 SCC 418, ¶ 31.
20
AIR 1953 SC 364, ¶ 26.
21
(2019) 19 SCC 567, ¶ 14.
22
(2019) 15 SCC 344 ¶ 14.
23
(2018) 7 SCC 429, ¶ 29.
H 24
(2013) 12 SCC 765, ¶ 13.
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 265
[SURYA KANT, J.]

31. Coming to the arguments of Learned Senior Counsel for the A
appellants that since the axe was recovered from a public place it should
not have been held to be in the possession of Budhi Singh or that an axe
was also recovered from Narinder Singh (with whom parity was sought),
it is clear from the facts that this was a farming community in rural
Himachal where tools like axes are found in everyone’s homes. The
B
argument that the spot of incident was doubtful as there was a blood
trail outside the house as deposed by P.W.16 - ASI Jaisi Ram, carries no
force. The presence of random blood marks elsewhere could not put in
doubt the fact that the incident happened in the house of the complainant
from where the same witness recovered sticks, blood-stained stone, glass
splinters, pieces of wood and leftover food, etc. The fact that the ASI C
did not find it necessary or even material to investigate the blood marks
shows that they had no legal impact on the investigative conclusions. It
is pertinent to note that independent witness P.W.14 - Lauhalu Ram also
corroborated the recovery of broken pieces of the door, broken bulb,
stones, blood-stained soil etc. from the house of the complainant.
D
32. Non-examination of many alleged bystanders is well-explained
as it is clear from the facts that the complainant’s family had prior litigation
with some people in the village and most of them had socially boycotted
the victim’s family. The fact that nine persons who were initially accused
in the FIR but not charge-sheeted subsequently, were not arrayed as
prosecution witnesses is understandable. It is not necessary for the E
prosecution to examine every cited or possible witness. So long as the
prosecution case can withstand the test of proof beyond doubt, non-
examination of all or every witness is immaterial.
33. This Court in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab25 was of the
view that: F

“13.…The onus of proving the prosecution case rests entirely
on the prosecution and it follows as a logical corollary that
the prosecution has complete liberty to choose its witnesses if
it is to prove its case. The court cannot compel the prosecution
to examine one witness or the other as its witness. At the most, G
if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse
inference against the prosecution…The law is well-settled that
the prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as

25
(1976) 4 SCC 369, ¶ 13. H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 5 S.C.R.

A are essential for unfolding of the prosecution narrative. In
other words, before an adverse inference against the
prosecution can be drawn it must be proved to the satisfaction
of the court that the witnesses who had been withheld were
eyewitnesses who had actually seen the occurrence and were
therefore material to prove the case. It is not necessary for
B
the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the
same point; it is the quality rather than the quantity of the
evidence that matters. In the instant case, the evidence of the
eyewitnesses does not suffer from any infirmity or any manifest
defect on its intrinsic merit…”
C (emphasis supplied)
34. Similarly, the doubt cast on the actual time of death relying on
P.W.3 - Dr. D.D. Rana’s statement does not inspire confidence as he
besides stating that the time between the death and the post-mortem
was ‘within 10 hours’, has also deposed that the time between the death
D of Swari Devi and the injury was ‘within 5-10 minutes’, thereby supporting
the prosecution witnesses who deposed that she died on the spot owing
to the injuries.
35. Coming to the case of Narinder Singh, whose acquittal has
been upheld by the High Court also, it is imperative to point out that the
E FIR, though not an encyclopedia of the entire incident, is the most
spontaneous account of it. It is very hard to believe that the complainant
who walked seven hours overnight to reach the police station to record
his account of the incident would forget to mention a fatal attack with a
deadly weapon on his deceased mother by Narinder Singh as well. Such
F a major omission on the complainant’s part is very material to contradict
his testimony in Court with regard to his belated allegations against
Narinder Singh. The medical evidence has also not substantiated such
allegations against Narinder Singh. The High Court has only acted on
consistent and corroborated evidence against Budhi Singh and Achhar
Singh which was conspicuously missing in the case of Narinder Singh.
G
36. Likewise, the contention relying on P.W.11’s statement that
the police could not have arrived before the FIR was filed does not
defeat the case of the prosecution as it is a minor contradiction considering
that P.W.16 - ASI Jaisi Ram has deposed that he reached the house of
the complainant at 1PM on 24.02.1996. The argument that there was no
H
ACHHAR SINGH v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 267
[SURYA KANT, J.]

reason for Budhi Singh to start a fight with his neighbours on the day of A
his daughter’s wedding also does not help the appellants. The High Court
has specifically pointed out that his daughter’s wedding was solemnized
two days prior to the date of the incident and there is no credible evidence
as to whether a wedding function was underway at the relevant time.
Even Budhi Singh has not said so in his statement under Section 313
B
CrPC.
37. In light of the above discussion and upon an in-depth reading
of the trial Court and High Court records, we are convinced that the
High Court was merited to interfere with the perverse findings of the
trial Court and has prevented miscarriage of justice by separating grain
from the husks leading to the conviction of the appellants. C

CONCLUSION:
38. For the above-stated reasons, the appeals are dismissed.
Achhar Singh’s conviction under Sections 452, 326 and 323 IPC and
Budhi Singh’s conviction under Sections 302 and 452 IPC by the High D
Court are maintained. Their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed
to undergo the remainder of their sentence.

Nidhi Jain Appeals dismissed.

E

F

G

H