AHER MAYA VISA AND OTHERSversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Citation
- 1992 INSC 247
- Decided
- 15 September 1992
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K JAYACHANDRA REDDY
Holding
An appellate court may set aside an acquittal when the trial court's finding is contrary to the weight of evidence and based on surmise, and the High Court was correct in overturning the acquittal.
Summary
The accused were charged with murder of two brothers under Sections 302 and 34 IPC. The trial court acquitted them, relying on a purported custom of the Aher community that a widow should not leave her house for 45 days after her husband's death, and finding the eye‑witnesses' testimony doubtful. The State appealed, and the Gujarat High Court set aside the acquittal, holding that the custom was not codified, the eye‑witnesses' accounts were credible and corroborated, and the trial court’s reasoning was based on surmise. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court should not have interfered with the trial court’s finding. The Supreme Court held that an appellate court may overturn an acquittal when the lower court’s finding is contrary to the weight of evidence and rests on conjecture, and that the High Court was justified in its interference. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the convictions upheld.
Issues considered
- The scope of appellate power to interfere with a trial court's order of acquittal under CrPC Section 378.
- Whether the trial court's reliance on a community custom and doubts about eye‑witness credibility amounted to a reasonable view of the evidence.
- Whether the eye‑witness testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated to sustain conviction.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
A AHER MAYA VISA AND OTHERS
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT
SEPTEMBER 15, 1992
B [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G.N. RAY, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Section 378-Appeal against ac-
quittal-Interference by appellate Coun-Circumstances.
c P.W.3The prosecution case was that the two deceased persons visited
to mourn the death of her husband. They were staying with P.W.1,
their relation, at P.W.3's village.
On the morning of the date of occurrence, the deceased persons
again went to the house of P.W.3 and after taking tea at her place, they left
D for the bus stand. P.W.3 and her son (P.W.2) and daughter (P.W.4)
accompanied the deceased persons to the bus stand, because P.W.3 and
P.W.2 wanted to go with P.W.4 to the village, where P.W.4 was married.
The deceased persons and P.Ws.3,4, and 2 travelled in the same bus
and all got down at Borda bus stand at about 7.30 in the morning. As soon
E as the bus left the bus stand, four accused persons (the appellants) came
with axes and attacked the deceased persons by giving blows. Both the
deceased persons expired on the spot.
P.W.3 requested her son (P.W.2) to go to the village of P.W.l to
inform him. P.W.l was informed by P.W.2. P.W.l and P.W.2 came to place
F of occurrence. Thereafter P.W.l went to the Police Station and lodged the
first information report at about 10 A.M. on the same day.
P.W.13, Police Officer, Incharge of the Police Station, registered the
offence and started the investigation. The appellants were committed to
G Session Trial for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C.
for causing death of the deceased persons.
The Sessions Judge was of the view that in view of the custom
prevalent in the Aber community, to which the eye witnesses belonged,
P.W.3, who lost her husband only four days back was not to move out of
H the house for about 1 1/4 months. The Sessions Judge also noted that the
532
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE 533
injury on P.W.3 at the hands of the accused persons was not reported by A
P.W.2 to P.W.1 and it was not mentioned in the F.I.R. The Sessions Judge
by indicating him reasonings came to the finding that prosecution case
suffered from various infirmities and the appellants were acquitted inter
alia. on the finding that the case against them could not be established
beyond reasonable doubt.
B
An appeal against the acquittal was preferred by the State before the
Division Bench of the High Court.
Referring the decisions of this Court in Pala Singh and another v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 2679 and KGopal Reddy v. State of Andhra C
Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 387, the High Court was of the view that the view
taken by the Sessions Judge was not a reasonable and probable view, and
that there was compelling reason to distrub the finding made by the
Sessions Judge by reappreciating the evidence. The High Court set aside
the acquittal order passed by the Sessions Judge and.the appellants were
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code D
and they were sentenced to imprisonment for life.
In this appeal, the accused persons challenged the conviction order
of the High Court.
'.be appellants contended that the High Court was not justified in E
interfering with the finding made by the Sessions Judge; that on appreciat-
ing the evidences adduced in the case, the Sessions Judge had given cogent
reasons for coming to the finding that it was improbably rather doubtful
that the eye-witnesses had at all lravelled by the same bus and they had
any occasion to see the murderous assault committed by the accused F
persons; that such view of the Sessions Judge was not a perverse view; that
if on appreciation of the evidences, the view which was taken by Sessions
Judge, was also possible in an appeal against acquittal, interference by the
High Court was not called for; that under normal circumstances, it was
not expected that the widow within 4 to S days of the death of her husband G
should leave her house against the prevalent custom of Aber community
and would accompany the daughter to leave her in her husband's place at
a distant village; that there was no occasion for the High Court to reap-
praise the evidences of the eye-witnesses and to substitute its own findings;
that such finding could have been made by the High Court bad there been
no verdict of acquittal; that the Sessions Judge, on consideration of the H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A totality of the effect of the Improbabilities infirmities and discrepancies In
the evidences, came to the finding that evidences of the eye-witnesses were
doubtful and on such doubtful evidences, conviction on a charge of mur-
der was not jvstlfied.
The State submitted that the High Court had given good reasons as
B to why the interference against the order of acquittal in the facts of this
case was warranted; that the alleged custom of the Aher Community was
not noted In the written Code of Conduct and the alleged custom was also
not accepted by the High Court for good reasons; that even assuming that
there was such a custom and if a widow did not conform to the custom
C and decided to accompany her daughter, the case could not be disbelieved,
merely because the conduct was contrary to the custom; that the evidences
of eye-witnesses got ample corroboration by other facts as noted by the
High Court and as such the same were not liable to be rejected on an
assumption of improbabilities without any real basis; and that no lnter-
D ference was called for in this appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.01. In an appeal from the order of acquittal, the court of
appeal should be careful enough in weighing the reasonings of the Ses-
E sions Judge and it need not reappreciate the evidences to substitute Its
own finding when the other finding is also a possible one and not contrary
to the evidences. [544-A]
1.02. If, it transpires that the finding made by the Sessions Judge is
contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced and facts established in the
F trial and such finding is inherently based on surmise and conjecture and
improper and irrational inferences have been drawn from the facts estab-
lished, it will not only be just and proper to discard the Judgment of
acquittal, but it will be the duty of the appellate court in exercise of its
appellate power to consider the evidences and materials on record to come
G to its own finding. (544-B]
1.03. The view taken by the Sessions Jndge has-its foundation more
in the realm of surmise and conjecture than on reasonable inferences
drawn on facts established. (543-G]
H 1.04. The F .I.R. has been lodged within less than three hours, al-
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE [RAY,J.] 535
though (P.W.l) got the information from (P.W.2) at his own village which A
was three kilometers away from the place of occurrence and thereafter be
came to the place of occurrence on foot and then went to the Police Station
at some distance. [543-C]
1.05. There is no material warranting a finding that the eye-wit-
nesses bad any motive to falsely implicate the accused persons on a charge B
of murder. The evidence of the eye-witnesses appear to the quite natural,
straight forward and trust-worthy. There is hardly any occasion to hold
that such evidences are cooked up. The evidences of the eye-witnesses got
ample corroboration from other facts established in the trial by the
prosecution. [543 B-C,G] C
Pala Singh andAnotherv. State ofPunjab, AIR 1972 SC 2679; K. Gopal
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 387 and Sheo Swamp and
Others v.King Emperor, AIR 1934 P.C. 227, referred to. [539-H]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. D
663 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.8.1980 of the Gujarat High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1114 of 1979.
T.U. Mehta, Harish Ram Chandra and S.C. Patel for the Appellants. E
D.A. Dave, Jitendra Singh, Biinal Roy Jad, Venkateswar Rao and
Anip Sachthey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
G.N. RAY, J. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of the
High Court of Gujarat dated August 4, 1980 passed in Criminal Appeal
No. 1114 of 1979 by which the Judgment of acquittal in favour of the
accused/appellants passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar on
July 25, 1978 in Sessions Case No. 100 of 1977 was set aside and the
appellants were convicted under Section 302 read with Sectin 34, Indian G
Penal Code and each of the said accused was sentenced for imprisonment
for life. The appellants were committed to Sessions Trial for an offence
under Section 302 read with Section 34 l.P.C. for causing death of Samat
Mansur and his brother, Vajsur Mansur on October 7, 1977. The prosecu-
tion case in short is that the said two deceased persons had. gone to the H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A house of one Nathiben at village Bodki to mourn the death of her husband.
Both the said decesed persons stayed at the house of one Rajabhai, P.W.1.
The said Rajabhai was a relation of the deceased persons because the
deceased, Vajsur was married to the sister of Rajabhai. On the morning of
October 7, 1977, the said deceased persons again went to the house of
Nathiben and after taking tea at her place, they had left for the bus stand.
B Nathiben, P.W.3, has a daughter named Raniben, P.W.4 and she has also
a son, Bhikha, P.W.2. Nathiben, his son Bhikha and the daughter Raniben
also accompanied the deceased persons to the bus stand because Nathiben.
and Bhikha also wanted to go with Raniben to the village Bhagura where
Raniben was married. To reach Bhagura one has to get down at Borda bus
C stand for a change. The deceased persons and Nathiben, Raniben and
Bhikha travelled in the same bus and all got down at Borda bus stand at
about 7.30 in the morning. It is the case of the prosecution that as soon as
the bus left the bus stand four accused persons came with axes and
attacked the deceased persons by giving blows and first of all inflicted axe
D blows on Samat. Nathiben tried to intervene and in the process she
received an injury and thereafter desisted from intervening. Seeing Mansur
being attacked, Vajsur started runing but he was chased by all the accused
persons and was also given blows with axes and he also fell down about 14
feet away near a house which was under construction. Both the deceased
persons expired on the spot. Nathiben, thereafter, requested her son,
E Bhikha, to go to the village Bodki and inform Rajabhai. Raja was informed
by Bhikha and Raja and Bhikha both came to Borda bus stand and
thereafter Raja went to Datha Police Station and lodged the first informa-
tion report at about 10 A.M. on the same day. P.W. 13, Police Officer,
Incharge of the Police Station, registered the offence and sent two con-
stabls at the place of occurrence. The Officer also reached the place of
F offence at about 1.00 P.M. and prepared inquest panchnama. The dead
bodies of the two persons were sent for post mortem examination. After
recording the statement of Nathiben, she was sent to Mahuva hospital for
treatment. The Police Officer also recorded statements of Bhikha and
some other persons. Later on, the statements of the Driver and the Con-
G ductor of the bus were also recorded. On October 9, 1977, the acc.ised
persons were arrested and on that day the statement of Raniben was also
recorded. All the said four accused persons were committed for Se~ions
Trial in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar. The learned
Sessions Judge, however, by his Judgment dated July 25, 1978 acquitted all
H the four accused persons inter a/ia on the finding that the case againH the
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE [RAY, J.] 537
accused persons could not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the A
evidences of the eye witnesses, namely, P.W. 2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 could not
be accepted. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that in view of
the custom prevalent in the Aher Community to which the eye-witnesses
belong, Natbiben who lost her husband only four days back was not to
move out of the house for about 1 1/4 months. The learned Sessions Judge
also noted that although, according to the prosecution case, Natbiben also B
suffered injury at the hands of the accused persons, Bhikba, another
eye-witness being present at the place of occurrence must have seen such
assault on bis mother. Hence he could not have missed to report such
incident to Raja, P.W.1. As such incident was not reported to Raja, in the
F.I.R. lodged by him, such fact was not stated by Raja. The learned C
Sessions Judge by indicating his reasonings had come to the finding that
the case as sought to be made out by the prosecution suffered from various
infirmities. As such it was not possible to come to a finding that the said
eye-witnesses were actually present at the time of occurrence and as such
they could give evidences about the commission of offence by the accused
persons. In that view of the matter, the Judgment of acquittal was passed D
by the learned Sessions Judge.
As aforesaid, on the appeal against the acquittal being preferred by
the State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No.1114 of 1979 came up for
consideration before the Division Bench of the High Court of Gnjarat. The E
High Court has noted that the place of occurrence is undisputed because
admittedly the dead bodies were found at the spot mentioned in F.l.R. The
nature of the injuries, as noted at the time of post mortem examination,
also tallied with the prosecution case, namely, infliction of injury by axe.
The High Court has indicated that in the light of such admitted position,
the evidences of all the eye-witnesses are to be appreciated. The High F
Court has indicated that the evidences of the said eye-witnesses were not
accepted by the learned Sessions Judge because, according to the learned
Sessions Judge, Natbiben bad lost her husband only four or five days back
and the entire family was in mourning and mourners had been calling on
the family. Precisely for the said reason, the deceased had been to the G
house of Nathiben one day earlier. In such circumstances, the learned
Sessions Judge was of the view that it was not expected that Nathiben
would come out of the house and accompany the daughter, Raniben
(P.W.3), to the house of her husband in a distant village. For the same
reason, the learned Sessions Judge was also of the view that shortly after H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A the death of the father it was not expected that Raniben should leave her
widowed mother and would intend to go back to her husband's house. It
was for this reason, the learned Sessions Judge had doubted the correct-
ness of the prosecution case that Nathiben and her son, Bhikha, had
accompanied Raniben and they had travelled in the same bus by which the
accused persons also travelled and by that process got down at the bus
B stand at the village Borda where the murder had taken place. The learned
Sessions Judge, considering the evidences adduced on behalf of the eye-
witnesses that there is a custom in the Aher Community that the widow
does not leave the house at least for a period of 45 days after the death of
the husband, held that it was all the more improbable that Nathiben had
C in fact left her house and accompanied her daughter. The High Court has,
however, held inter alia that in the written Code of Conduct of the Aber
Community, there is no mention that widow should not leave the house for
a period of little over one month from the date of the death of the husband.
The High Court was of the view that Nathiben had no enmity so far as the
D accused persons are concerned and it is not expected that the said eye-wit-
nesses should falsely implicate innocent persons on a charge of murder.
The High Court has noted that even if it is assumed that there is a custom
in the Aber Community that a widow does not leave her house for some
period after the death of the husband, simply because Nathiben had left
the house by ignoring the custom, the veracity of the statement of Nathiben
E should not be doubted. The High Court has noted that essentially all the
said eye-witnesses have stated how the murder had taken place and there
is consistency in their depositions. According to the High Court, failure on
the part of the Bhikha to inform Raja that her mother also suffered injury
when she tried to prevent the murderous assault is not at all improbable
and for such lapse his evidence is not to be discarded. The High Court has
F also held that an injury on the forehead of Nathiben which was likely to be
caused by a sharp cutting instrument, was noted by the Medical Officer on
the date of murder when she was sent by the Police for medial examination.
Such injury also conforms with the case of the prosecution that she had
also suffered injury at the hands of the assailants when she tried to prevent.
G The High Court has referred to the deposition given by the Conductor of
the bus, Musabhai {P.W.5). He has stated that at village Borda 7 persons
got down and 4 passengers boarded the bus and in the cross-examination,
he had admitted that the bus had reached Borda at about 7.10 to 7.15 A.M.
According to the prosecution case seven persons travelled including the
H deceased persons because from the village Borda two of the deceased
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE [RAY, .T.] 539
persons and Nathiben, Bhikha and Raniben and her two children boarded A
the bus and all of them had got down at the bus stop of Borda. The
prosecution case therefore, stands corroborated by the evidence of the
conductor. A strong adverse inference was derawn by the learned Sessions
Judge against the prosecution case because the incident of death was not
reported to a relation of one of the deceased who had been married in the
village Borda. The High Court has held that Raja was also a very close B
relative of the deceased and he was living in the village Bodki which was
also quite close to village Borda and if Nathiben had decided that Raja
should be informed first of all, there was nothing improbable or peculiar.
It may be noted here that as a matter of fact on being asked by the Court
Nathiben has stated in her deposition that she could not remember at that C
time that there was also a relation of one of the deceased in the village
Borda, The High Court has also noted that the village Bodki is at a distance
of only three kilometers. If after being informed by Bhikha about the said
incident Raja had again travelled three kilometers distance to reach the
place of occurrence and thereafter had been to the Police Station and
lodged the F.l.R. by 10.00 A.M., it must be held that no delay was caused D
in lodging the F .l.R. The High Court has also held that the learned Sessions
Judge drew an adverse inference against the prosecution case becuase
Nathiben could not state as to by whom she sustained the injury. According
to the High Court when four persons were attacking the deceased persons
and in the process of her attempt to intervene she has received an injury, E
it is quite likely that she may not be able to know as to by whom she
received the injury. On the contrary, her evidence appears to be truthful.
The High Court is of the view that the prosecution has been able to
establish that the said eye-witnesses had travelled with the deceased per-
sons in the bus and they had to got down at the Borda bus stop. The
evidences adduced by the eye-witnesses are natural and trustworthy and F
they have not been shaken in cross-examination. The High Court has held
that from the nature of the injuries inflicted on the deceased persons and
from the fact that Vajsur was chased and was also done to death by
inflicting a::e blows at a distanace of 14 feet from the bus stop, the case of
common intention of the accused persons to murder both the brothers was G
established The High Court has referred to a decision of this Court in the
case of Pala Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1972
SC 2679 and also another decision of this Court made in the case of
K.Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 387 where
occasion for interference by the High Court in an appeal against the order H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTSfl992] SUPP. I S.C.R.
A of acquittal was taken into consideration and the principles laid down by
the Privy Council in the decision reported in AIR 1934 Privy Council 227
were discussed. In Pala Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court has
observed that "substantial and compelling reasons" good and 'sufficiently
cogent reasons' tended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to
B come to its own conclusion but in doing so the appellate court should
consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact
and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its own Judgment
which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.
C In Gopa/ Reddy's case this Court has noticed that if two reasonable
and probable views, on the appreciation of evidence, are possible, then one
must necessarily concede the existence of reasonable doubt. But fanciful
and remote possibility must be left out of account. Referring to the said
decisions, the High Court is of the view that the view taken by the learned
D Sessions Judge is not at all a reasonable and probable view so that there
is compelling reason not to disturb the finding made by the learned
Sessions Judge by reappreciating the evidence. Accordingly, the order of
acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge was set aside by the High
Court and all the accused persons were convicted under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and they were sentenced to
E imprisonment for life.
Mr. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has very
strenuously contended before us that the High Court was not justified in
interfering with the finding made by the learned Sessions Judge. On
F appreciating the evidences ~dduced in· the case, the learned Sessions Judge
has given cogent reasons for coming to the finding that it was improbable
rather doubtful that the said eye-witnesses had at all travelled by the same
bus and they had any occasion to see the mrderous assault committed by
the accused persons. It cannot be contended that such view of the learned
Sessions Judge is a perverse view or no reasonable man can take such view.
G If on appreciation of the evidences, the view which has been taken by the
learned Sessions Judge, is also possible, the law is well established that in
an appeal against acquittal interference by the High Court is not called for.
The learned counsel has contended that truth may be stranger than fiction
at times but there is no manner of doubt that under normal circumstances,
H \t is not expected that the widow within 4 to 5 days of the death of her
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE [RAY, J.] 541
husband should leave her house against the prevalent custom of Aher A
Community and would accompany the daughter to leave her in her
husband's place at a distant village. Even if there was any necessity that an
adult should accompany the daughter because of her two young children,
Nathiben's son Bhikha, could have been sent and there was no necessity
for the widowed mother to go. That apart, various discrepancies to which B
reference has been made by the learned Sessions Judge were also high·
lighted by the learned counsel for the appellants and he has submitted that
such discrepancies, lapses and some basic infirmities in the evidences
adduced by the alleged eye-witnesses, leave considerable doubt about the
veracity of their statements. If for such facts, the learned Sessions Judge
has not believed the case of the prosecution and has given a verdict of C
acquittal, there was no occasion for the High Court to reappraise the
evidences and to substitute its own finding. The learned <:ounsel has
contended that such finding could have been made by the High Court had
there been no verdict of acquittal but in an appeal against acquittal the
position was different. Mr. Mehta has also contended that each infirmity
may be explained by considering the case from a different angle but it is D
the totality and the cumulative effect of all such infirmities which are
required to be taken into consideration for accepting the case of the
prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge, on consideration of the totality
of the effect of the improbabilities, infirmities and discrepancies in the
evidences, has come to the finding that evidences of the alleged eye-wit- E
nesses are doubtful and on such doubtful evidences, conviction on a charge
of murder is not justified. He has submitted that in the aforesaid facts this
Court should accept the finding made by the learned Sessions Judge by
holding that the total effect of the inconsistencies, improbabilities and
discrepancies in the evidences clearly put the prosecution case in the realm
of doubt and no conviction for murder can be made when such doubt
F
exists. He has submitted that admittedly, tlie village Borda has substantial
population and admittedly the murder had taken place near the bus stop
itself and such murder had taken place at about 7.30 in the morning when
villagers were expected to be out of their houses for their daily cores. In
such circumstances, it is reasonably expected that the act of gruesome G
murder on two persons must have been noted by the villagers and in all
probability the accused persons would have been apprehended. It, there-
fore, appears that the murder had not taken place in the manner alleged
by the prosecution and the case of the prosecution, therefore, should not
have been accepted by the High Court by interfeiing with the order of H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. He has submitted that in
the facts and circumstances of the case it is pre-eminently a fit case for
interference by this Court by setting aside the Judgment of the High Court
and confirming the order of the learned Sessions Judge.
B The learned counsel for the State has, however, submitted that the
High Court has given good reasons as to why the interference against the
order of acquittal in the facts of this case was warranted. He has submitted
that admittedly the deceased persons travelled by the bus and they were
murdered near the bus stop. For the purpose of going to the village of
Raniben, one is required to get down at the Borda bus stop for a change
C and hence travelling by the said bus by Raniben, her mother and brother
and getting down at the said bus stop at Borda was not at all unnatural or
improbable. He has submitted that the alleged custom of the Aher Com-
munity has not been noted in the written Code of Conduct and the alleged
custom was also not accepted by the High Court for good reasons. Even
D assuming that there was such a custom and if a widow has not conformed
to the custom and has decided to accompany the daughter, the case cannot
be disbelieved merely because the conduct is contrary to the custom. He
has submitted that there may be an omission by Bhikha to state the detailed
facts to Raja but in the state of mind after seeing the gruesom murder of
E two persons, it is quite probable that Bhikha failed to narrate to Raja
various details of incident that happended at the time of murder. The
evidences of eye-witnesses got ample corroboration by other facts as noted
by the High Court and as such the same were not liable to be rejected on
an assumption of improbabilities without any real basis. He has, therefore,
submitted that no interference is called for in this appeal and the same
F should be dismissed.
After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances
of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsels for the
G parties, it appears to us that the High Court was not oblivious of the
implication of an order of acquittal and the duties cast on the Court of
appeal while dealing with an order of acquittal. It also appears that the
High Court referred to the decisions of this Court and also a decision of
the Privy Council and keeping in mind the principles to be followed by the
Court of appeal in an order of acquitta~ the prosecution case was con-
H sidered by the High Court.
AHER MAYA VISA v. STATE [RAY, J.] 543
In our view, the evidences adduced by the eye-witnesses do not suffer A
from any material discrepancy, inconsistency or improbabililJ. for which
there was any occasion to hold that the case sought to be made out by the
prosecution was doubtful or the veracity of the eye-witnesses was to be
doubted. In our view, the reasonings given by the High Court in accepting
the evidences are sound. It appears to us that the learned Sessions Judge
proceeded on surmise and conjectures and had drawn adverse inference B
against the prosecution case by analysing the evidences from an erroneous
point of view. There is no material warranting a finding that the eye-wit-
nesses had any motive to falsely implicate the accused persons on a charge
of murder. The F.I.R. has been lodged within a short period after the
murder because the F.I.R. had been lodged within less than three hours, c
although Raja got the information from Bhikha at his own village which
was three kilometers away from the place of occurrence and thereafter he
came to the place of occurrence on foot and then went to the Police Station
at some distance. The injury on Nathiben conforms to the case of the
prosecution that she also sustained injury while she had been trying to
prevent the murderous assault. Any case of cooking up a story by intro-
D
ducing alleged eye-witnesses does not stand scrutiny. It may be noted that
hardly there was any occasion for two ladies and Bhikha to falsely implicate
four innocent persons with a charge of murder. Admittedly the murder had
taken place near the bus stop of a populous village in the morning at about
7.15 A.M. It was quite likely that such incident might have been noticed by E
some other villagers. In such circumstances, it will be a wild imagination
to suggest that in order to cook up a story by lodging a F.I.R. within three
hours, fabrication was meticulously made by introducing two ladies and
another person from a different village as eye-witnesses even at the risk of
exposing unusual behaviour of a widow to leave her residence on the fateful
day. If the story was to be cooked up, Nathiben could have been easily F
excluded so that the case would have been made more convincing. In our
view, the evidences of the eye-witnesses appear to be quite natural straight-
forward and trustworthy and we do not think that there is any OL:Casiun to
hold that such evidences are cooked up. Moreover, the evidences of the
eye-witnesses got ample corroboration from other facts established in the G
trail by the prosecution. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge does
not appear to be acceptance of one of the probable views. The view taken
by the learned Sessions Judge has its foundation more in the realm of
surmise and conjecture than on reasonable inferences drawn on facts
established. In an appeal from the order oLacquittal, the court of appeal H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A should be careful enough in weighing the reasonings of the learned Ses-
sions Judge and it need not reappreciate the evidence to substitute its own
finding when the other finding is also a possible one and not contrary to
the evidences. But if it traspires that the finding made by the learned
Sessions Judge is contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced and facts
established in the trial and such finding is inherently based on surmise and
B conjecture and improper and irrational. inferences have been drawn from
the facts established, in our view, it will not only be just and proper to
discard the Judgment of acquittal but it will be duty of the appeal conrt in
exercise of its appellate power to consider the evidences and materials on
record to come to its own finding. In the aforesaid circumstances, we do
C not find any reason to interfere with the decision pas;ed by the High Court
in convicting and sentencing the accused persons. The appeal, therefore,
fails and is dismissed. The bail bonds stand cancelled and the accused
persons are directed to serve out the sentence.
V.P.R. Appeal dismissed.
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