AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONversusNAWAB KHAN GULAB KHAN AND ORS.

A               AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
                               v.
                 NAWAB KHAN GULAB KHAN AND ORS.

                                OCTOBER 11, 1996

B              [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)

          Constitutio11 of I11dia, 1950: Articles 19(1)(e) and 21.

          Pavement-Dwellers-U11authorised encroachme11ts of pavements--
C Evictio11 of-Principles of Natural Justice-Complia11ce with-Removal of
  such e11croachments--By Municival Co1poration-Held : such unauthorised
  1:ncroachme11ts affected pedestliallS' light to free passage a11d also created
  u11hygmic ecology, traffic hazards and lisk to lives of pedestlia11S-He11ce,
  Municipal Corporation mtitled to remove encroachments without any delay,
  for, if it allowed encroachers to remai11 for a long pe1iod they might claim of
D semblance of right-But such removal of encroachers must be according to
  the procedure which should be just, fair and reaso11able-Such a procedure
  should be pragmatic lllld realistic to meet given fact-Situation-If encroach-
  ment was of recent origi11 no need to fallow pri11ciples of natural justice-But
  if encroachers were settled for a long time 11onnally 11otice of two weeks or JO
E days would be 11ecessary to meet fairness of procedure-Bombay Municipal
   CorporationAct, 1955---Bombay Provincial Mu11icipal Corporatio11 Act.

         Pavement-Dwellers-Right to shelter-Held : fomzed part of fu11-
  damental rights-Though no person had right to encroach on footpaths,
  pavements or public streets, State/Municipal Corporation had constitution-
F al/statutory duty to provide housing accommodation to the weaker sectio11s
  of society, if necessary by acquiring surplus land under Urban Land Ceiling
  Act-However, in all cases of ejectment of encroachers, it was not obligatory
  to provide alternative accommodation-No absolute pri11ciple of u11iversal
  application could be laid down in this regard and it would depend upon facts
G of each case.
        Articles 38, 39, 46, 243-G, 243-W-Pavement-Dwellers-R.ight to shel-
  ter-Socio-economic justice for SCs, STs, OBCs, rural and urban pooHln-
  authorised encroachment of pavements-Problem of-Held : In view of
  constant migration of people from rural to urban areas resulting in mushroom
H growth of slums and encroachment of pavements, Government should pro-
                                         548
      AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWAB KHAN GULAB KHAN                     549

vide infrastrnctural facilities in rnral areas by proper planning and execu-    A
tion--Local bodies such as Gram Panchayats, Zila Parishads and
Municipalities should prepare plans in accordance with Articles 243-G and
243-W-Scheme J·or housing accommodation should be evolved for SCs, STs,
OBCs and rnral and urban poor as an integral plan-State should eannark
separate allocation in annual budget for implementation of such a
                                                                                B
scheme-Transfer of such housing accommodation allotted to these persons
would be void ab initio--Comprehensive legislation in this regard recom-
mended.

       Articles 32, 226 and 136-Pavement-Dwellers- Encroacher-Right to
approach court-Held : Encroachers of pavement also have right to approach       C
court against their ejectment by Municipal Corporation-Court-Required to
examine if wcroacher had any right to relief-State or local bodies should
assist court by placing factual and legal position.

      Administrative Law:
                                              \.
                                                                                D
        Natural Justice-Audi alteram partem-Applicability of-Held : Grant
of hearing or notice not necessary for undoing an illegality of a recent
origin-High handed and unauthorised acts did not call for opportunity of
hearing which would be a tedious and time consuming process-Only if
illegality was allowed to continue for a long time whereby semblance of right
                                                                                E
could be claimed an opportunity of hearing was necessary.

      The respondents were pavement-dwellers in unauthorised occupa-
tion of footpaths in a main road of the city. The respondents had con-
structed huts thereon. When the appellant- Corporation sought to remove
their encroachments, the respondents approached the High Court by way F
of a writ petition. The High Court directed the appellant-Corporation not
to remove the respondents' huts until suitable· accommodation was
provided to them. The High Court also further held that before removing
the unauthorised encroachments the procedure of hearing, consistent with
the principles of natural justice should be followed. Being aggrieved the G
appellant-Corporation preferred the present appeal.

      The questions before this Court were (1) Whether the respondents
were liable to ejectment from the encroachments of pavements of the roads
and whether the principle of natural justice, viz., Audi Alteram Partem
required to be followed and, if so, what was its scope and content? (2) H
    550                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A whether the appellant was under an obligation to provide permanent
    residence to the hutment dwellers and, if so, what would be the parameters
    in that behalf?

          Allowing the appeal, this Court

B         HELD: 1.1. Footpath, street or pavement are public property which
    are intended to sen•e the convenience of general public. They are not laid
    for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the
    very object for which they are carved out from portions of public roads.
    The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians
 C are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety
    and security. That facility which has matured into a right of the
    pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made
    on the pavements. The claim of the pavement dwellers to construct huts
    on the pavement or road is a permanent obstruction to free passage of
 D traffic and pedestrians' safety and security. Therefore, it would be imper-
    missible to permit or to make use of the pavement for private purpose.
    Pavement dwellers should allow passing and re-passing by the pedestrians.
    No one has a right to make use of a public property for the private purpose
    Without the requisite authorisation from the competent authority. Every
    municipal Corporation has statutory obligation to provide free flow of
 E traffic and pedestrians' right to pass and re-pass freely and safely; as its
    concomitance, the Corporation/Municipality have statutory duty to have
    the encroachments removed. It would, therefore, be inexpedient to give any
    direction not to remove, or to allow the encroachments on the pavements
    or footpaths which is a constant source of unhygenic ecology, traffic
. F hazards and risk prone to lives of the pedestrians. Encroachment of public
    property undoubtedly obstructs and upsets planned development, ecology
    and sanitation. Public property needs to be preserved and protected. It is
    but the duty of the State and local bodies to ensure the same. It would,
    therefore, be necessary to permit the Corporation to exercise the statutory
    powers to prevent encroachment of the pavements/footpaths and to
  G prevent construction thereon and to remove encroachments on the pave-
    ment or footpath of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or
    passing or re-passing by the pedestrians.

        Sadan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Anr., [1989] 2 SCR
 H 1038 and Olga Tellies v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, [1985)
      AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWAB KHAN GULAB KHAN                 551

3 sec 545, followed.                                                       A

       1.2. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. The com-
petent authority should ensure constant vigil on en.croachment of the
public places. Sooner the encroachment is removed when sighted, better
would be the facilities or convenience for passing or rt-passing of the
pedestrians on the pavements or footpaths facilitating free flow of regu-
                                                                            B
lated traffic on the road or use of public places . On the contrary, the
longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of permitting the
encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the
encroachment. If the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow
the procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no C
one has a right to encroach upon the public property and claim the
procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tedious and time-
consuming process leading to putting a premium for high-handed and
unauthorised acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. On the other
hand, if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time D
for reasons best known to them, and reasons are not far to seek, then
necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks or
10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by
fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not
removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at
liberty to have it removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure and E     1


principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by
the encroachers. On their resistance, necessarily appropriate and
reasonable force can be used to have the encroachment removed. The
Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life
or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according to the F
procedure, in the given circumstances, fair and reasonable. To become fair,
just and reasonable, it would not be enough that the procedure prescribed
in law is a formality. It must be pragmatic and realistic to meet the given
fact-situation. No inflexible rule of hearing and due application of mind
can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its own
backdrop.                                                                   G

      2.1 • Article 19(1 )(e) of the Constitution provides to all citizens
fundamental rights to travel, settle down and reside in any part of the
Bharat and none have right to prevent their settlement. Any attempt in
that behalf would be unconstitutional. The preamble of the Constitution H
    552                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A assures integrity of the nation, fraternity among the people and dignity of
    the person tO make India an integrated and united Bharat in a socialist
    secular democratic republic. The policy or principle should be such that
    everyone should have the opportunity to migrate and settle down in any
    part of Bharat where opportunity for employment or better living condi-
B lions are available and, therefore it would be unconstitutional and imper-
    missible to prevent the persons from migrating and settling at places
    where they find their livelihood and means of avocation. The Preamble is
    the arch of the Constitution which accords to every citizen of India socio-
    economic and political justice, liberties, equality of opportunity and of
    status, fraternity, dignity of person in an integrated Bharat. The fun-
C damental rights and the directive principles and the Preamble being trinity
    of the Constitution, the right to residence and to settle in any part of the
    country is assured to every citizen. In a secular socialist democratic
    republic of Bharat hierarchical caste structure, antagonism towards
    diverse religious belief and faith and dialectical difference would be
D smoothened and the people would be integrated with dignity of person only
    when social and economic democracy is established under rule of law. The
    difference due to caste, sect or religion pose grave threat to affinity equality
    and fraternity. Social democracy means away of life with dignity of person
    as a normal social intercourse with, liberty, equality and fraternity. The
    economic democracy implicits in itself that the inequalities in income and
E inequalities in opportunities and status should be minimised and as far
    as possible marginalised. Due to want of facilities and opportunities, the
   ·right to residence and settlement is an illusion to the rural and urban
     poor. Articles 38, 39 and 46 mandate the State, as its economic policy, to
     provide socio-economic justice to minimise inequalities in income and in
F opportunities and status. it positively charges the State to distribute it's
     largesse to the weaker sections of the society envisaged in Article 46 to
     make socio-economic justice a reality, meaningful and fruitful so as to
   , make the. life worth living with dignity of person and equality of status and
     to constantly improve excellence. That apart, Section 284(1) of the Act also
  . imposes a statutory duty on the Corporation to make provision for accom-
G modation. This duty is a part of the Constitutional mandate. Under the
     Urban Ceiling Act, the excess urban vacant land is earmarked to elongate
     the above objective.


           2.2. The right to life enshrined under Article 21 includes meaningful
H    right to life and not merely animal existence. Right to life would include
          AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWAB KHAN GUI.AB KHA."1               553

    right to live with human dignity. Right to life has been assured as a basic A
    human right under Article 21. Though no person has a right to encroach
    and erect structures or otherwise on footpath, pavement or public streets
    or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose, the State
    has the Constitutional duty to provide adequate facilities and oppor-
    tunities by distributing its wealth and resources for settlement of life and
                                                                                 B
    erection of shelter ovt"r their heads to make the right to life meaningful,
    effective and fruitful. Right to livelihood is meaningful because no one can
    live without means of his living, that is the means of livelihood. The
    deprivation of the right to life in that context would not only denude life
    of effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life miserable
    and impossible to live.                                                      c
          Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, [1985) 3 SCC
    545; Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., [1996) 2 SCC 549;
    Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khim/al Totame, [1990) 1SCC520 and P.G.
    Gupta ~· State of Gujarat, [1995) Supp. 2 SCC 182; followed.                 D

           3.1. Empirical study of urban and rural population in India discloses
    that due to lack of civic facilities and means of livelihood people from rural

-   areas constantly keep migrating to the urban areas resulting in mushroom
    growth of slums and encroachment of the pavements/footpaths etc. There-
    fore, it would be for the Union of India, all the State Governments and the E
    planning Commission, which are Constitutional functionaries, to evolve
    such policies and schemes as are necessary to provide continuous means
    of employment in the rural area so that in the lean period, after agricul-
    tural operations, the agricultural labour or the rural poor would fall back
    upon those services to eke out their livelihood. The middle class and upper p
    middle class people in the rural areas, due to lack of educational and
    medical facilities, migrate to the nearby urban areas resulting in constant
    increase in urban population. Once infrastructural facilities are provided
    by proper planning and execution, necessarily the urge to the migrate to
    the urban areas would no longer compel the rural people for their
    transplantation in the urban areas. It would, therefore, be for the executive G
    to evolve the schemes and have them implemented in letter and spirit.

          3.2. The Gram Panchayats, the Zilla Parishads and municipalities
    are local bodies. Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution have brought,
    through Articles 243 to 243ZG, the Panchayats,, Zilla Parishads and H
    554                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A municipalities as constitutional instrumentalities to elongate the socio-
  economic and political democracy under the rule of law. Article 243G and
  243W enjoin preparation of plans for economic development and social
  justice. The State, i.e., the Union oflndia and the State Governments and
  the local bodies constitute an integral executive to, implement the directive
B principles contained in Part IV through planned development under the
  rule of law."The appellant-Corporation, therefore has Constitutional duty
  and authority to implement the directives contained in Articles 38, 39 and
  46 and all cognate provisions to make the fundamental rights available to
  all the citizens as meaningful. It would, therefore, be the duty of the
  appellant-Corporation to enforce the schemes in a planned manner by
C annual budgets to provide right to residence to the poor.

         3.3. Courts cannot give direction to implement the scheme with a
  particular budget as it being the executive function of the local bodies and
  the State to evolve their annual budget. As an integral passing annual
D budget, they should also earmark implementation of socio-economic jus-
  tice to the poor. The State and consequentially the local authorities, are
  charged with the Constitutional duty to provide the weaker sections, in
  particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with socio-
  economic and political injustice and to prevent their exploitation and to
  protect them from injustice. When the State, namely, Union of India or the
E appropriate State Government or the local bodies implement these
  schemes for housing accommodation of the Scheduled Castes and
  Scheduled Tribes or any other schemes, they should, in compliance with
  mandates of Articles 46, 39 and 38 annually provide housing accommoda-
  tion to them within the allocated budget and effectively and sincerely
F implement them using the allocations for the respective schemes so that
  the right to residence to them would become a reality and meaningful and
  the budget allocation should not either be diverted or used for any other
  scheme meant for other weaker sections of the society. Any acts in violation
  thereof or diversion of allocated funds, misuse or misutilisation, would be
  in negation of constitutional objectives defeating and deflecting the goal
G envisioned in the Preamble of the Constitution. The executive forfeits the
  faith and trust reposed in it by Article 261 of the Constitution. Similarly
  separate budget would also be allocated to other weaker sections of the
  society and the backward classes to further their socio-economic advance-
  ment. As a facet thereof, housing accommodation also would be evolved
H and from that respective budget allocation the amount needed for housing
       AHMEDABADMUN.CORPN.v. NAWABKHANGULABKHAN                              555

a~commodation for them should also be earmarked separately and imple-               A
mented as an on-going process of providing facilities and opportunities
including housing accommodation to the rural or urban poor and other
backward classes of people.

       4.1. The policy of the Government in executing the policies of provid-
                                                                                    B
ing housing accommodation either to the rural poor or the urban poor,
should be such that the lands allotted or houses constructed/plots allotted
be in such a manner that all the sections of the society, Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and other poor are integrated as
cohesive social structure. The expenditure should be met from the respec-
tive budgetary provisions allotted to their housing schemes and in the              C
respective proportion be utilised. All of them would, therefore, live in one
locality in an integrated social group so that social harmony, integrity,
fraternity and amity would be fostered, religious and caste distinction
would no longer remain a barrier for harmonised social intercourse and
integration. The facts in this case do disclose that out of 29 encroachers          D
who have constructed the houses on pavements, 19 of them have left the
places, obviously due to such pressures and interests of rest have come
into existence by way of purchase. When such persons part with possession
in any manner known to law, the alienation or transfer is opposed to the
Constitutional objectives and public policy. Therefore, such transfers are
void ab initio confering no right, title or interest therein. In some of the        E
States law has already been made in that behalf declaring such transfers
as void with power to resume the property and allot the same to other
needy people from these scheme. Other States should also follow the suit
and if necessary the Parliament may make comprehensive law in this
behalf . The Union Law Commission would examine this question.                      F

       4.2. It is for the Court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power
of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a
given case is by procedure which is reasonable, fair and just or it is
otherwise. Judicial review is the basic structure of the Constitution. Every
citizen has a fundamental right to redress the perceived legal injury               G
through judicial process. The Constitutional Court, therefore, has a Con-
stitutional duty as sentinel quivive to enforce the right of a citizen when
he approaches the Court, the Court is required to examine whether the
encroacher had any right and to what extent he would be given protection
and relief . In that behalf, it is the salutory duty of the State or the local      H
    556                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A bodies or any instrumentality to assist the Court by placing necessary
    factual position and legal setting for adjudication and for granting/refus-
    ing relief appropriate to the situation. Therefore, the mere fact that the
    encroachers have approached the Court would be no ground to dismiss
    their cases. The contention of the appellant-Corporation that the interven-
B   tion of the Court would aid impetus to the encroachers to abuse the
    judicial process is untenable. If the appellant-Corporation or any local
    body or the State acts with vigilance and prevents encroachment immedi-
    ately, the need to follow the procedure enshrined as an inbuilt fair proce-
    dure would be obviated.

C       5.1. It is true that in all cases it may not be necessary, as a condition
  for ejectment of the encroacher, that he should be provided with an
  alternative accommodation at the expense of the State which if given due
  credence, is likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute
  principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. Each case
D is required to be examined on the given set of facts and appropriate
  direction or remedy be evolved by the Court suitable to the facts of the
  case. Normally, the Court may not, as a rule, direct that the encroacher
  should be provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment
  when they encroached public properties.

E         5.2. Since the Municipal Corporation has a constitutional and
   statutory duty to provide means for settlement and residence by allotting
   the surplus land under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and if necessary by
   acquiring the land and providing house sites or tenements, as the case may
    be, according to th1! scheme formulated by the Corporation, the financial
F condition of the Corporation may also be kept in view but that would not
    be a constraint on the Corporation to avoid its duty of providing
   residence/plot to the urban weaker sections. It would, therefore, be the duty
    of the Corporation to evolve the schemes. In the light of the schemes now
    in operation, opportunity should be given to the 10 named petitioner-
   encroachers to opt for any one of the three schemes and the named two
G persons who are carrying on commercial activities should immediately
    stop the same. If they intend to have any commercial activity or hawking,
    it should be availed of as per the directions already issued by this Court
    in Maha Gujarat Hawkers Vyapar Mahajan's case and no further modifica-
  , tion or any directions contra thereto need to be issued. Out of these 1()
H persons, if they are eligible within the terms of the schemes and would
    AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWABKHAN GULABKHAN [K RAMASWAMY, J.)     557

satisfy the income criterion, they would be given allotment of the sites or A
the tenements, as the case may be, according to their option. In case they
do not opt for any of the schemes, 21 days' notice would be served on them
and other encroachers and they may be ejected from the present encroach-
ment. As regards other persons who have become encroachers by way of
purchase either from the original encroachers or encroached pending writ
                                                                              B
petition/appeal in this Court, they are not entitled to the benefits given to
the, 10 encroachers. As regards those who are eligible according to the
guidelines in the schemes and also fulfil the income criterion, it may be
open to the Corporation to extend the same benefits in either of the three
schemes, if they ,so desire. It is, however, made clear that no specific
direction is being given in this behalf lest it would amount to encouraging C
the people to abuse the judicial process to avail of such a remedy by
encroaching public property.

     Maha Gujarat Hawkers Vyapar Mahajans v. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, SLP Nos. 47-51/96, referred to.
                                                                              D
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 12992 of
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 20.2.91 of the Gujarat High
Court in S.C.A. No. 5351 of 1982.
                                                                              E
        Arun J aitley, Shakil Ahmed Syed and Ms. Kirti Raval for the Appel-
!ant.

     D. Dave, Mrs. K. Sharda Devi, T.R. Andhyarujina and Yashank
Adhyaru for the Respondents.                                                  F
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

     This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order          G
made on February 20, 1991 by the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil
Application No. 5351 of 1982.

      The admitted facts are that 29 persons had filed the writ petition in
the High Court. They are pavement-dwellers in unauthorised occupation
of footpaths of the Rakhial Road in Ahmedabad which is a main road. H
    558                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A They have constructed huts thereon. When the Corporation sought to
    remove their encroachments on December 10, 1982, they approached the
    High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court granted
    interim stay of removal of the encroachment. By the impugned judgment,
    the High Court directe_d the Municipal Corporation not to remove their
B   huts until suitable accommodation was provided to them. The High Court
    also further held that before removing the unauthorised encroachments the
    procedure of hearing, consistent with the principles of natural justice
    should be followed.

          We requested Shri Dushyant Dave, the learned senior counsel of the
C Bar to assist the Court as amicus curiae and Smt. K. Sharda Devi has been
    assigned as legal Aid counsel to argue on the behalf of the respondents
    since they are not appearing either in person or through counsel. By order
    dated September 11.1995 this Court directed the appellant thus :

            "We think that the Municipal Corporation should frame a Scheme
D           to accommodate them at the alternative places so that the hutmen
            can shift their residence to the places of accommodation provided
            by the Corporation to have permanent residence. Corporation is
            accordingly directed to frame a scheme and place before this Court
            within two months from today".
E         Pursuant thereto, a Scheme has been framed and placed before this
    Court. It would appear that only 10 persons out of original petitioners in
    the High Court whose names have been mentioned in the supplementary
    affidavit are residing there; of them Nurmahommad Samsuddin and
    Hakimuddin Karimudin have converted their huts into commercial units
F   run on the pavement. This road is 80 feet wide with 10 and 8 feet wide
    foot-paths on two sides of the road. At present 56 persons, obviously
    including 10 original encroachers are in occupation of hutments erected on
    the footpaths and whereabouts of 19 original petitioners who have left the
    area in consideration of money they have accepted, are not known. In their
G   place, others have occupied the huts by making payments.

           Shri Dushyant Dave has also further submitted proposals as alterna-
    tive to the Scheme. Having heard the counsel on both sides, we reserved
    the case for consideration. At the outset, we express our deep apprecia-
    tion for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri Dushyant Dave and also
H   for the fair arguments advanced by Shri Arun J aitley, learned senior
     AHMEDABADMUN.CORPN.v. NAWABKHANGUIABKHAN(K.RAMASWAMY,J.]          559

. ·counsel appearing for the Corporation.                                    A

         The 'questions for consideration are: (1) whether the respondents are
  liable to ejectment from the encroachments of pavements of the roads and
 whether the principle of natural justice, viz., audi alteram partem requires
 to be followed and, if so, what is its scope and content? (2) whether the B
 appellant is under an obligation to provide permanent residence to the
 hutment dwellers and, if so, what would be the parameters in that behalf?
 The questions are dealt with later. on the first question, Sections 63(1)(19)
 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (as applicable to Gujarat)
 or Section 231 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act
 (BPMC Act) empowers the Commissioner to remove any wall, fence, C
 rail,post, step, booth or other structure or fo.ture, permanent or moveable,
 which shall be erected or set up in or upon any street or upon or over any
  open channel, drain, well or tank, contrary to the provisions of sub- section
 (1) of Section 312 after the same came into force in the city of Ahmedabad
 or in the Super-bazars after the Bombay Municipal (Extension of Limits) D
 Act, 1950 came into force or in the tended suburbs after the date of the
 coming into force of the Bombay Municipal Act, 1955 (for short, the "Act").
 The power to remove encroachments on street, pavement or footpath was
 conferred upon the Commissioner, the highest officer of the Municipal
 Corporation, who acts with high degree of responsibility and duty to
 implement the provisions of the Act. Every citizen has a right to pass or E
 repass on the pavement, street, footpath as general amenity for convenient
 traffic. A constitution Bench of this Court in Sadan Singh Etc. Etc. v. New
 Delhi Municipal Committee & Anr. Etc., (1989) 2 SCR 1038 was confronted
 with and had considered the question "can there be at all a fundamental
 right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he F
 can squat and engage in trading business? We have no hesitation in
 answering the issue against the petitioners. The petitioners do have the
 fundamental right to carry on a trade or business of their choice, but not
 to do so on a particular place. Hawkers cannot be allowed to, or be
 permitted to, carry on trade or business on every road in the city. If the
 road is not wide enough to conveniently accommodate the traffic on it, no G
 hawking may be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only once a week,
 say on Sundays when the rush considerably thins out." Thereby, this Court
 has minimised the hardship to pedestrians and the hawkers in doing their
 business by hawking on the public street and at the same time has protected
 the public from free passes or re-passes of the traffic on the road, pavement H
                                                                                    '-",I




    560                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A or footpath. In Olga Tellis v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,
    (1985) 3 SCC 545, another constitution Bench had held that "we are,
    therefore of the opinion that the procedure prescribed by Section 314 of
    the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act for removal of the encroachment
    on the footpath over which the public has right of passage cannot be
    regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust. There is no static measure of
B   reasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. Indeed, the
    question "Is this procedure reasonable?" implies and postulates the inquiry
    as to whether the procedure prescribed is reasonable in the circumstances
    of the case."

c        It is for the Court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power of
  judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given
  case is by procedure which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise.
  Footpath, street or pavement are public property which are intended to
  serve the convenience of general public. They are not laid for private use
  and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for
D which they are carved out from portions of public roads. The main reason
  for laying out pavement is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go
  about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security.
  That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be
  set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements.
E The claim of the pavement dwellers to construct huts on the pavement or
   road is a permanent obstruction to free passage of traffic and pedestrians'
   safety and security. Therefore, it would be impermissible to permit or to
   make use of the pavement for private purpose. They should allow passing
   and re-passing by the pedestrians. No one has a right to make use of a
   public property for the private purpose without the requisite authorisation
F
   from the competent authority. It would, therefore, be but the duty of the
   competent authority to remove encroachments on the pavement or foot-
   path of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or passing or
   re-passing by the pedestrians.

G          This view firmly laid down by this Court in Olga Tellis case thus :

             "No person has a right to encroach by erecting a structure or
             otherwise on footpaths and pavements or other place reserved or
             earmarked for a public purpose like (for e.g. garden or
H            playground) and that the provision contained in Section 314 of the
     AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NA WAB KHAN GUIAB KHAN [K. RAMASWAMY, J.)    561

          Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the             A
          circumstances of the case."

         The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the depriva-
  tion of life or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according
  to the procedure; in the given circumstances, fair and reasonable. To           B
  become fair, just and reasonable, it would not be enough that the
  procedure prescribed in law is a formality. It must be pragmatic and
  realistic to meet the given fact-situation. No inflexible rule of hearing and
  due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each
  case depends upon its own backdrop. The removal of encroachment                 C
  needs urgent action. But in this behalf what requires to be done by the
  competent authority is to ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the
  public places. Sooner the encroachment is removed when sighted, better
  would be the facilities or convenience for passing or re-passing of the
  pedestrians on the pavements or footpaths facilitating free flow of             D
  regulated traffic on the road or use of public places. On the contrary,
  the longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of permitting the
  encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the
  encroachment. If the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow
  the procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no
  one has a right to encroach upon the public property and claim the              E
  procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tedious and time-
  consuming process leading to putting a premium for high-handed and
  unauthorised acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. On the other
  hand, if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time
  for reasons best known to them, and reasons are not far to seek, then           F
  necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks
  or 10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service
  by fixing notice on the property is necessary. If the encroachment is not
  removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at
  liberty to have it removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure           G
. and principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment by the
  encroachers. On their resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable
  force can be used to have the encroachment removed. Thus considered,
  we hold that the action taken by the appellant-Corporation is not violative
  of the principle of natural justice.                                            H
    562                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A          It is not in dispute that Rakhial Road is one of the important main
    road in the city of appellant-Corporation and it needs removal of encroach-
    ment for free passing and re-passing of the pedestrians on the pave-
    ments/footpaths. But the question is: whether the respondents are entitled
    to alternative settlement before ejectment of them?

B
           Article 19(1)(e) accords right to residence and settlement in any part
 . of India as a fundamental right. Right to life has been assured as a basic
    human right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 25(1) of
    the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone has the
    right to standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
C and his family; it includes food, clothing, housing, medical care and neces-
  . sary social services. Article 11(1) of th~ International Covenant on
    Economic, Social and Cultural Rights lays down that State parties to the
 ' Covenant recognise that everyone has the right to standard of living for
    himself and his family including food, clothing, housing and to the con-
D tinuous improvement of living conditions. In Chameli Singh & Ors. v. State
    of U.P. & Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 549, a Bench of three Judges of this Court
    had considered and held that the right to shelter is a fundamental right
    available to every citizen and it was read into Article 21 of the Constitution
    of India as encompassing within its ambit, the right to shelter to ma.ke the
    right to life more meaningful. In paragraph 8 it has been held thus :
E
             "In any organised society, right to live as a human being is not
             ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured
             only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and is
             freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights
F            are designed to achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any
             civilised society implies the right to food, water, decent environ-
             ment, education, medical care and shelter. These are basic human
             rights known to any civilised society. All civil, political, sociel and
             cultural rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
G            Rights and Convention or under the Constitution of India cannot
             be exercised without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human
             being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is
             home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, _
             intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes
H            adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent
    AHMED ABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NA WAB KHAN GUIAB KHAN (K RAMASWAMY, J.)   563

        surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanita- A
        tion and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy
        access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does
        not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all
        the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as
        a human being~ Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite B
        to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as
        a fundamental right. As is enjoined in the Directive Principles, the
        State should be deemed to be under an obligation to secure it for
        its citizens, of course subject to its economic budgeting. In a
        democratic society as a member of the organised civil community C
        one should have permanent shelter so as to physically, mentally
        and intellectually equip oneself to improve his excellence as a
        useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties and to be a
        useful citizen and equal participant in democracy. The ultimate
        object of making a man equipped with a right to dignity of person D ·
        and equality of status is to enable him to develop himself into a
        culture being. Want of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the
        very object of the Constitutional animation of right to equality,
        economic justice, fundamental right to residence, dignity of person
        and right to live itself."                                               E
       Socio-economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity and
dignity of person to foster the fraternity among all the sections of the
society in an integrated Bharat is the arch of the Constitution set down in
its preamble. Articles 39 and 38 enjoins the State to provide facilities and
opportunities. Articles 38 and 46 of the Constitution enjoin the State to F
promote welfare of the people by securing social and economic justice to
the weaker sections of the society to minimise inequalities in income and
endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status. In that case, it was held that
to bring the Dalits and the Tribes into the mainstream of national life, the
State was to provide facilities and opportunities as it is the duty of the State G
to fulfil the basic human and constitutional rights to residents so as to make
the right to life meaningful. In Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal
Totame, (1990] 1 SCC 520, another Bench of three Judges had held that
basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to be three-food,
clothing and shelter, The right to life is guaranteed in any civilised society. H
    564                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing,
  the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live
  in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for
  shelter has to be kept in view. For an animal, it is the bare protection of
  the body; for a human being, it has to be a suitable accommodation which
B would allow him to grow in every aspect-physical, mental and intellectual.
  The surplus urban-vacant land was directed to be used to. provide shelter
  to the poor. In Olga Tellis case (supra), the Constitution Bench had
  con~idered the right to dwell on pavements or in slums by the indigent and
  the same was accepted as a part of right to life enshrined under Article
  21; their ejectment from the place nearer to their work would be depriva-
C tion of their right to livelihood. They will be deprived of their livelihood if
  they are evicted from their slum aod pavement dwellings. Their eviction
  tantamounts to deprivation of their life. The right to livelihood is a tradi-
  tional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life
  would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of
D abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denudes life of its effective
  content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. The
  deprivation of right to life, therefore, must be consistent with the procedure
  established by law. In P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, [1995] Supp. 2 SCC
  182, another Bench of three Judges had considered the mandate of human
E right to shelter and read it into Article 19(1)(e) and Article 21 of the
  Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
  Convention of Civic, Economic and Cultural Rights and had held that it is
  the duty of the State to construct houses at reasonable cost and make them
  easily accessible to the poor. The aforesaid principles have been expressly
  embodied and in-built in our Constitution to secure socio-economic
F democracy so that everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of the
  person. Article 22 of the Declaration of Human Rights e11_visages that
   everyone has a right to social security and is entitled to its realisation as
  the economic, social and cultural rights are indispensable for his dignity
   and free development of his personality. It would, therefore, be clear that
G though no person has a right to encroach and erect structures or otherwise.
   on footpath, pavement or public streets or any other place reserved or
   earmarked for a public purpose, the State has the Constitutional duty to
   provide adequate facilities and opportunities by distributing its wealth and
   resources for settlement of life and erection of shelter over their heads to
H make the right to life meaningful, effective and fruitful. Right to livelihood
    AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWABKHAN GULAB KHAN [K. RAMASWAMY,J.)    565

is meaningful because no one can live without means of this living, that is A
the means of livelihood. The deprivation of the right to life in that context
would not only denude life of effective content and meaningfulness but it
would make life miserable and impossible to live. It would, therefore, be
the duty of the State to provide right to- shelter to the poor and 'i~digent
weaker sections of the society in fulfilment of the constitutional object~ves. B

       That apart, Section 284(1) of the Act also imposes a statutory duty
on the Corporation to make provision for accommodation enjoining upon
the Commissioner, if it is satisfied that within any area or any part of the
City it is expedient to provide housing accommodation for the poor classes
and that such accommodation can be conveniently provided without C
making an improvement scheme, it shall cause such areas to be defined on
a plan. The Corporation is required to pass a resolution authorising the
Comrrii:ssioner who shall thereupon have power to provide such an accom-
modation either by erecting buildings or in any other manner on any land
belonging to the Corporation or any land acquired by the Corporation for D
the purpose or by conversion of any building belonging to the Corporation
into dwelling for poor classes or by enlarging, altering or repairing or
improving any buildings, which have, or an estate or interest which has
been acquired by the Corporation. This duty is apart of the Constitutional
mandate, Under the Urban Ceiling Act, the excess urban vacant land is
earmarked to elongate the above objective.                                   E

      The appellant-Corporation has stated that in its resolution No. 544
dated August 17, 1976 it was resolved that no pavement dwellers/hut
dwellers existing as on May 1, 1976 would be removed by the corporation
without providing alternative accommodation. This cut off date was intro- F
duced for the reason that they had conducted a detailed survey of slum-
dwellers residing in the city and had identified 81,255 hutments/pavements
comprising of 4,15,000 slum dwellers. They were photographed and identity
cards were given to them so that they could get the protection from
removal until alter accommodations were provided to them. Out of 81,255
hutments, 1864 are pavement dwelling units. In furtherance thereof, they G
evolved several schemes. Of them three schemes are in operation. The first
scheme relates to the open plots at Narol. As per that scheme plots of
land each admeasuring 25 square metres had under Urban Land Ceiling
and regulation Act, 1976 comprised in the total land of an extent of 38,749
square metres in Survey No. 41, were directed to be allotted to the urban H
   566                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A poor. The Government by its resolution has decided that an urban poor
  family whose annual income is below Rs. 18,000 is entitled to the allotment
  of said plots. They have suggested in their affidavit filed by Rasikbhai,
  Deputy Commissioner of the appellant-Corporation that they had ad-
  dressed the Collector of allotment regarding 35 plots reserved for hut-
B ments. It is further stated that if the 10 persons who were original
  petitioners in the writ petition are willing to vacate the present encroach-
  ments they are prepared to have the 25 sq. mtr. plots in Naro! Scheme
  allotted to them. The second alternative scheme suggested was the Vinzol
  Site and Services Scheme evolved by the Gujarat Slum Clearance Board.
  Under the scheme, plots were available at Vinzol and Vivekananda Nagar
C respectively. At Vinzol, cost of a plot admeasuring 32 sq. metres. of land
  is Rs. 9,468. The initial payment to be made is Rs. 3,941 and thereafter
  monthly instalment of Rs. 107 for 11 years is required to be paid. The
  accommodation provided in that scheme includes plinth area plus W.C. In
  the Slum Clearance Scheme of Vivekananda Nagar, plots admeasuring
D 19.52 sq. mtr. of land would be available at a cost of Rs. 8,910. The initial
  payment is Rs. 5,282 and the monthly instalment payable thereafter is of
  Rs. 145 for a period of 11 years. It includes plinth area plus W.C. and
  Chokadi. There are around 700 to 1000 unallotted units available and if
  the respondents are willing they would be provided with the accommoda-
   tion in the said Scheme. Thirdly, it was stated that there are hutment
E dwelling units at Vinzol/Lambha Part I and Lambha Part II of Economi-
  cally Weaker Sections Scheme operated by Gujarat Slum Clearance Board.
  Therein, at Vinzol plot admeasuring 15.50 sq. mtrs. or 14.76 sq. mtrs. of
  land at Lambha with facility of one room, W.C. and Chokadi are available.
  142 tenements are available at Vinzol. 140 tenements are available at
F Lambha Part I and 150 tenements are available at Lambha part II. This
   was the information furnished by the Gujarat Slum Clearance Board. The
   schemes are floated for economically weaker sections of the society and
   the cost of each tenement at Vinzol is Rs. 16,187 and of tenement at
   Lambha Part I and Part II is Rs. 17,094 and Rs. 18,030 respectively. The
   initial payment to be made for the accommodation at Vinzol is Rs. 6604
G and in respect of tenement at Lambha Part I is Rs. 7,476 and for Part II
   it is Rs. 7,200. The monthly instalment for Vinzol tenement is Rs. 131 to
   be paid for 9 years 7 months and for Lambha Part I, the instalment is of
   Rs. 141 per month to be paid for 10 years and for Part II it is Rs. 142 per
   month to be paid for 14 years. The annual family income limit for these
H tenements is also Rs. 18,000. Those family units of Vinzol who qualify the
    AHMEDABADMUN.CORPN.v. NAWABKHANGUIABKHAN[KRAMASWAMY,J.]           567

income criteria are eligible for allotment.                                 A

       In the statement made on behalf of the hutment dwellers, Shri
Dushyant Dave has stated that the aforesaid units are situated at a far away
place and direction to vacate the 'pavements and occupation of the
premises thereat would deprive the respondents C'f their livelihood and B
render them without shelter and means of livelihood. A further affidavit
was filed on behalf of the Corporation wherein it is stated that all in-
frastructural facilities are available at the respective places. They are fully
developed areas with all basic amenities. They are at a distance of about 8
kms. from the city. Near about those places are many factories and other
commercial organisations where the respondent-encroachers can find out C
their livelihood by working in the factories. Public transport is also avail-
able there. It was also stated, that Vinzol, Vivekanand Nagar and Lambha
are developed areas and, therefore, it is easy to find out work in the vicinity
of those areas. About 15,000 persons are at present living in each of the
three Schemes, with all basic amenities. Shri Dave has given suggestions D
and submitted that the Corporation should be directed to evolve the
scheme under Section 284 (i) of the Act to discharge the constitutional
obligations and to provide near about the place in Rakhial Road so that
the respondents would work in the neighbourhood and would eke out their
livelihood. To this it was stated by the appellants that the open lands
available near Rakhial Road were earmarked for the schools, park/public E
amenities and there is no vacant land in the nearby place.

       Shri Dave further suggested that the Corporation would relax their
census of 1976 and adopt 1991 census and all those who are residing in the
city for at least 10 years prior to January 1, 1995 should be provided with F
built up accommodation so that it would provide an alternative viable right
to residence. If the land belonging to the Corporation is available, the same
could be implemented by constructing the houses. If it is not available,
lands could be acquired and houses could be constructed and accommoda-
tion provided in terms of the directions given by this Court so that pave- G
ment dwellers would have right to residence and the planned construction
could not be affected. It was stated in the additional affidavit of the
respondents in this regard that in 1991 they had identified 5 lakhs slum
dwellers or pavement dwellers out of population of 29 lakhs and for
acquisition and construction of the houses, the budget estimates would be
Rs. 220 crores. The Government has stopped giving assistance to the H
    568                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A Corporation for construction of houses.
         This Court in SLP No. 47-51/96 titled Maha Gujarat Hawkers Vyapar
    Mahajans Etc. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had given directions
    to regulate hawking. The Corporation has regulated, in terms of the said
    order, the hawking business on the pavements by dwellers in the city of
B   AhmedaMd within the specified areas aqd identified some as non-hawking
    zones in the Scheme which is operated in the city of Ahmedabad. No
    direction in derogation the.reof would be given permitting the pavement
    dwellers to convert the hutments for commercial purpose. It is also sug-
    gested that with the co-operation of the Non-Governmental Organisations
C   and financial participation of the slum dwellers and industrialists the    .
    Corporation has introduced Slum networking Project. Under the scheme,
    they have provided 35,000 built up individual toilets in the slum areas.
    Subsidy component to the hutment dwellers has been raised to 90 per cent
    w.e.f. April 1, 1996.

D        As per the scheme, the following are the benefits provided in the
    slum areas for the hutment dwellers:

            "(i) House-to-house water supply;

            (ii) House-to-house drainage connection;
E
            (iii) Full pavement of internal street;

            (iv) Individual toilet;

            (v) Provision of storm water drain;
F
            (vi) Solid waste management services;

            (vii) Street light, etc.

              Besides the physical services, a package of community develop-
G           men! services is also offered which includes:

            (i) Primary education;

            (ii) Primary health care;

H           (iii) Income generating activities etc.
,..HMFDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWABKHAN GUIAB KHAN (K. RAMASWAMY,J.]    569

       This project is estimated to cost Rs. 326 crores. A photocopy A
    of the said Project Report dated July 1995 and prepared by H
    Parikh Consulting Engineers..... .

        The aforesaid benefits of the Project are proposed to be ex-
    tended to all the slums except those situated on lands which are        B
    required for public purpose by the Corporation. With a view to
    provide these services in the slums and chawls situated on private
    lands, an amendment has also been proposed to the State Govern-
    ment in the BPMC Act to enable the Corporations to provide all
    essential services in the slums situated on the private lands without
    prejudice to the right, title and interest of the owner of the land     C
    and without affecting their rights to remove such hutments by
    following due process of law. This amendnient is considered neces-
    sary to maintain health and sanitation in the slums situated on
    private lands and for improving the quality of life of the slum
    dwellers till they exist on the private lands. This project having      D
    partnership concept of slum dwellers is now in the process of
    implementation. Efforts are being made to give priority to the
    unserved/underserved areas under the Project. It is believed that
    through this project, a large number of slum dwellers will be in a
    position to avail of the essenti.al services at the place they are
    situated and improve their quality of life. However, it is beyond       E
    the present means of the Corporation to provide rehabilitation to
    every slum dweller by providing alternate accommodation.

        However, this is not to say that the Corporation has permitted
    section 261(1) to remain on the statute book only. 9754 houses have     F
    been duly constructed by the Corporation under the Slum
    Clearance Scheme for accommodation slum dwellers and allotted
    to them and another 2220 houses have been constructed under the
    HUDCO Scheme for economically weaker sections and low in-
    come group people and allotted. Besides this, the Corporation has
    also provided land with necessary infrastructure to 315 hutment         G
    dwellers under the site and service scheme and has constructed
    another 2260 houses for the flood affected hutment dwellers under
    the Integrated Urban Development Programme.

       So far 733 hutments which existed prior to May 1976 (cut off H
     570                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

·A           date) have been shifted from their earlier location in the interest
             of public and all of them have been given alternate site by the
             Municipal Corporation which includes 709 pavement dwelling
             families also. This protection is not available to those who have
             come up after 1-5-1976 (cut off date)".

B          The Corporation has been further subsidising 80% cost of construc-
     tion of individual latrines by slum dwellers and under this scheme over
     35,000.individual toilers have been built up in the slums and chawls in past
     few years and this subsidy component has been further raised to 90% with
     effect from 1st April, 1996. As per the government's resolution dated May
C    30, 1987 State level and District/City level officers are nominated to
     monitor the working of the scheme.

            In view of the above factual background the question that arises is:
      whether there is compliance with the directions issued by this Court
D    ·referred to hereinbefore and whether any further modulation .is needed in
      that behalf?

         Empirical study of urban and rural population in India discloses that ·
  due to lack of civic facilities and means of livelihood people from rural
  areas constantly keep migrating to the urban areas resulting in mushroom
E growth of slums and encroachment of the pavements/ footpaths etc. Every
  municipal Corporation has statutory obligation to provide free flow of
  traffic and pedestrians' right to pass and re-pass freely and safely; as its
  concomitance, the Corporation/Municipality have statutory duty to have
  the encroachments removed. It would, therefore, be inexpedient to give any
p direction not to remove, or to allot the encroachments on the pavements
  or footpaths which is a constant source of unhygienic ecology, traffic
  hazards and risk prone to lives of the pedestrians. It would , therefore, be
  necessary to permit the Corporation to exercise the statutory powers to
  prevent encroachment of the pavements/footpaths and to prevent construc-
  tion thereon. As held earlier, the Corporation should always be vigilant and
G should not allow encroachments of the pavement and footpaths. As soon
  as they notice any encroachment they should forthwith take steps to have
  them removed and not allow them to settle down for a long time. It is
  stated in their affidavit that they are giving 21 days notice before taking
  action for ejectment of the encroachers. That procedure, in our view, is a
H fair procedure and, therefore, the right to hearing before taking action for
        AHMEDABADMUN.CORPN.v.NAWABKHANGUJABKHAN[K.RAMASWAMY,J.]                 571

    ejt:ctment is not necessary in the fact- situation. But the Commissioner A
    should ensure that everyone is served with a notice and as far as possible
    by personal service and if it is not possible for reasons to be recorded in
    the file, through afixture of the notice on the hutment, duly attested by two
    independent panchas. This procedure would avoid the dispute that they
    were not given opportunity; further prolongation of t.he encroachment and
                                                                                  B
    hazard to the traffic and safety of the pedestrians.

           In the additfonal affidavit of the appellant-Corporation, it raised and
    addressed four important questions of constitutional dimensions. The first
    question raised was to prevent the constant influx of the rural people to
    the urban areas and consequential growth of slums and encroachments; the          C
    second one relates to the need for preservation of the public property like
    road margin, street, place of public resorts like parks etc. to maintain
    ecological balance,sanitation and safety of pedestrians; the third question
    relates to fa.ck of resources in the budgetary provisions to construct and
    allot houses for the poor and migrants of urban areas; and the fourth one         D
    relates to interference by the courts protecting the encroachers from
    ejectment, the delay in disposal of the cases and resultant rights accruing
    to the encroachers. These questions bear vital dimensions which need
    careful examination and answers.

           As regards the first question, it is axiomatic that India lives in villages. E
    The traditional source of employment or avocation to the rural people
I
I
    generally is the agriculture. It is rather unfortunate that even after half a
    century from date of independence, no constructive planning has been
    implemented to ameliorate the conditions of the rural people by providing
    regular source of livelihood or infrastructural facilities like health, educa- F
    tion, sanitation etc. It would be for the Union of India, all the State
    Governments and the Planning Commission, which are Constitutional
    functionaries, to evolve such policies and schemes as are necessary to
    provide continuous means of employment in the rural area so that in the
    lean per·iod, after agricultural operations, the agricultural labour or the G
    rural poor would fall back upon those services to eke out their livelihood.
    The middle class and upper middle class people in the rural areas, due to
    lack of educational and medical facilities, migrate to the nearby urban
    areas resulting in constant increase in urban population. Once infrastruc-
    tural facilities are provided by proper planning and execution, necessarily
    the urge to migrate to the urban areas would no longer compel the rural H
    572                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A peopfo for their transplantation in the urban areas. It would, therefore, be
    for the executive to evolve the schemes and have them implemented in
    letter and spirit.

         Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution provides to all citizens fun-
B damental rights to travel, settle down and reside in any part of the Bharat
  and none have right to prevent their settlement. Any attempt in that behalf
  would be unconstitutional. The Preamble of the Constitution assures in-
  tegrity of the nation, fraternity among the people and dignity of the person
  to make India an integrated and united Bharat in a socialist secular
  democratic republic. The policy or principle should be such that everyone
C should have the opportunity to migrate and settle down in any part of
  Bharat where opportunity for employment or better living conditions are
  available and, therefore, it would be unconstitutional and impermissible to
  prevent the persons from migrating and settling at places where they find
  their livelihood and means of avocation. It is to remember that the
D Preamble is the arch of the Constitution which accords to every citizen of
  India socio-economic and political justice, liberties, equality of opportunity
  and of status, fraternity, dignity of person in an integrated Bharat. The
  fundamental rights and the directive principles and the preamble being
  trinity of the Constitution, the right to residence and to settle in any part
  of the country is assured to every citizen. In a secular socialist democratic
E republic of Bharat hierarchical caste structure, antagonism towards diverse
  religious belief and faith and dialectical difference would be smoothened
  and the people would be integrated with dignity of person only when social
  and economic democracy is established under rule of law. The difference
  due to caste, sect or religion pose grave threat to affinity, equality and
F fraternity. Social democracy means a way of life with dignity of person as
  a normal social intercourse with liberty, equality and fraternity. The
  economic democracy implicits in itself that the inequalities in income and
  inequalities in opportunities and status should be minimised and as far as
  possible marginalised. The right to life enshrined under Article 21 has been
  interpreted by this Court to include meaningful right to life and not merely
G animal existence as elaborated in several judgments of this Court including
  Hawkers' case, Olga Tellies case and the latest Chameli Singh's case and
   host of other decisions which need no reiteration. Suffice it to state that
   right to life would include right to live with human dignity. As held earlier,
   right to residence is one of the minimal human rights as fundamental right.
H Due to want of facilities and opportunities, the right to residence and
     AHMEDABADMUN.CORPN.v.NAWABKHANGUIABKHAN(KRAMASWAMY,J.]               573
 settlement is an illusion to the rural and urban poor. Articles 38, 39 and A
 46 mandate the state, as its economic policy, to provide socio-economic
 justice to minimise inequalities in income and in opportunities and status.
 It positively charges the State to distribute its largess to the weaker sections
 of the society envisaged in Article 46 to make socio-economic justice a
 reality, meaningful and fruitful so as to make the life worth living with B
 dignity of person and equality of status and to constantly improve excel-
 lence.

        The Gram Panchayats, the Zilla Parishads and municipalities are
 local bodies. Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution have brought, through
 Articles 243 to 243ZG, the Panchayats, Zilla Parishads and municipalities       C
 as constitutional instrumentalities to elongate the socio-economic and
 political democracy under the rule of law. Article 243G and 243W enjoin
 preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. The
 State, i.e., the Union of India and the State Governments and the local
 bodies constitute an integral executive to implement the directive principles   D
 contained in Part IV through planed development under the rule of law.
 The appellant-Corporation, therefore, has Constitutional duty and
 authority to implement the directives contained in Articles 38, 39 and 46
 and all cognate provisions to make the fundamental rights available to all
 the citizens as meaningful. It would, therefore, be the duty of the appellant
 to enforce the schemes in a planned manner by annual budgets to provide         E
 right to residence to the poor.

        As regards the question of budgeting, it is true that Courts cannot
  give direction to implement the scheme with a particular budget as it being
  the executive function of the local bodies and the State to evolve their F
  annual budget. As an integral passing annual budget, they should also
  earmark implementation of socio- economic justice to the poor. The State
  and consequentially the local authorities, are charged· with the Constitu-
  tional duty to provide the weaker sections, in particular the Scheduled
  Castes and Scheduled Tribes with socio-economic and political injustice G
  and to prevent their exploitation and to prevent them from injustice. The
  Union of India have evolved Indira Avas Yojna Scheme exclusively to
· provide housing accommodation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
· Tribes and separate annual budgets are being allotted in that behalf by the
  Parliament and the appropriate Legislatures in allied matters. In that
  behalf, in implementation of the housing scheme evolved for them, the H
    574                     SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996]SUPP. 7S.C.R.
A budgetary allocation should exclusively be spent for them and should not
    be diverted to any other projects or similar schemes meant for others. The
    Planing Commission has evolved the principle of allotment of a specified
    percentage for the overall developments of the Scheduled Castes and
    Scheduled Tribes.  As  a facet of it, the annual budget including for housing
B   accommodation is being prepared a11d passed by the Parliament. Similarly
    for other schemes covered by.the State budgets. Therefore, when the State,
    namely, Union of India or the appropriate State Government or the local
    bodies implement these schemes for housing accommodation of the
    Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or any other schemes, they should,
    in compliance with mandates of Articles 46, 39 and 38, annually provide
C   housing accommodation to them within the allocated budget and effectively
    and sincerely implement them using the allocations for the respective
    schemes so that the right to residence to them would become a reality and
    meaningful and the budget allocation should not either be diverted or used
    for any other scheme meant for other weaker sections of the society. Any
D   acts in· violation thereof or diversion of allocated funds, misuse or
    misutilisation, would be in negation of constitutional objectives defeating
    and deflecting the goal envisioned in the Preamble of the Constitution. The
    executive forfeits the faith and trust reposed in it by Article 261 of the
    Constitution.

E         Similarly separate budget would also be allocated to other weaker
    sections of the society and the backward classes to further their socio-
    economic advancement. As a facet thereof, housing accommodation also
    would be evolved and from that respective budget allocation the amount
    nee4ed for housing accommodation for them should also be earmarked
    separately and implemented as an on-going process of providing facilities
F
    and opportunities including housing accommodation to the rural or urban
    poor and other backward classes of people.

        It is common knowledge that when Government allows largess to the
  poor, by pressures or surreptitious means or in the language of the appel-
G !ant-Corporation "the slum lords" exert pressures on the vulnerable sections
  of the society to vacate their place of occupation and shift for settlement
  to other vacant lands belonging to the State or municipalities or private
  properties by encroachment. The Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes
  who are settled in the allotted Government properties/houses/plots of lands
H are compelled or driven by pressures to leave the places to settle at some
    AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWAB KHAN GULABKHAN [K RAMASWAMY, J.]     575
other place. This would have deleterious effect on the integration and A
social cohesion and public resources are wasted and the constitutional
objectives defeated. It would, therefore, be of necessity that the policy of
the Government in executing the policies of providing housing accom-
modation either to the rural poor or the urban poor, should be such that
the lands allotted or houses constructed/plots allotted be in such a manner
                                                                               B
that all the sections of the society, Schedules Castes, Scheduled Tribes,
Backward Classes and other poor are integrated as cohesive social struc-
ture. The expenditure should be met from the respective budgetary
provisions allotted to their housing schemes and in the respective propor-
tion be utilised. All of them would, therefore, live in one locality in an
integrated social group so that social harmony, integrity, fraternity and     c
amity would be fostered, religious and caste distinction would no longer
remain a barrier for harmonised social intercourse and integration. The
facts in this case do disclose that out of 29 encroachers who have con-
structed the houses on pavements, 19 of them have left the places, obviously
due to such pressures and interests of rest have come into existence by way D
of purchase. When such persons part with possession in any manner known
to law, the alienation or transfer is opposed to the Constitutional objectives
and public policy. Therefore, such transfer are void ab initio conferring .no
right, title or interest therein. In some of the States law has already been
made in that behalf declaring such transfer as void with power to resume
the property and allot the same to other needy people from these scheme. E
Other States should also follow the suit and if necessary the Parliament
may make comprehensive law in this behalf. It would take care of the third
question raised by the appellant. The Union Law Commission would
examine this question.
                                                                               F
       Encroachment of public property undoubtedly obstructs and upsets
planned development, ecology and sanitation. Public property needs to be
preserved and protected. It is but the duty of the State and local bodies to
ensure the same. This would answer the second question. As regards the
fourth question, it is to reiterate that judicial review is the basic structure G
of tfe Constitution. Every citizen has a fundamental right to redress the
perpeivcd legal injury through judicial process. The encroachers are on
exceptions to that Constitutional right to judicial redressal. The Constitu-
tional. Court, therefore, has a Constitutional duty as sentinel qui vive to
enforce the right of a citizen when he approaches the Court for perceived
legal injury, provided he establishes that he has a right to remedy. When H
    576                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7S.C.R.

A an encroacher•approaches the Court, the Court is required to examine
  whether the encroacher had any right and to what extent he would be given
  protection and relief. In that behalf, it is the salutory duty of the State or
  the ·local bodies or any instrumentality to assist the Court by placing
  necessary factual position and legal setting for adjudication and for grant-
B ing/refusing relief appropriate to the situation. Therefore, the mere fact
  that the encroachers have approached the Court would be no ground to
  dismiss their cases. The contention of the appellant-Corporation that the
  intervention of the Court would aid impetus to the encroachers to abuse
  the judicial process is untenable. As held earlier, if the appellant-Corpora-
  tion or any local body or the State acts with vigilance and prevents
C encroachment immediately, the need to follow the procedure enshrined as
  an inbuilt fair procedure would be obviated. But if they allow the
  encroachers to remain in settled possession sufficiently for long time, which
  would be a fact to be established in an appropriate case, necessarily
  suitable procedure would be required to be adopted to meet the fact-situa-
D tion and that, therefore, it would be for the respondent concerned and also
  for the petitioner to establish the respective claims and it is for the Court
  to consider as to what would be the appropriate procedure required to be
  adopted in the given facts and circumstances.

         It is true that in all cases it may not be necessary, as a condition for
E ejectment of the encroacher, that he should. be provided with an alternative
  accommodation at the expense of the state which if given due credence, is
  likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute principle
  of universal application would be laid in this behalf. Each case is required
  to be examined on the given set of facts and appropriate direction or
F remedy be evolved by the Court suitable to the facts of the case. Normally,
  the Court may not, as· a rule, directs that the encroacher should be
  provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment when they
  encroached public properties, but, as stated earlier, each case requires
  examination and suitable direction appropriate to the facts requires
  modulation. Considered from this perspective, the apprehensions of the
G appellant is without force.

        As regards the direction given by the High Court to provide accom-
  modation as a condition to remove the encroachment, as held earlier, since
  the Municipal Corporation has a constitutional and statutory duty to
H provide means for settlement and residence by allotting the surplus land
     AHMEDABAD MUN. CORPN. v. NAWAB KHAN GULAB KHAN (K. RAMAsWAMY, J.]   577

  under the Urban Land ceiling act and if necessary by acquiring the land A
  and providing house sites or tenements, as the case may be, according to
  the scheme formulated by the Corporation, the financial condition of the
  Corporation may also be kept in view but that would not be a constraint
  on the Corporation to avoid its duty of providing residence/plot to the
  urban weaker sections. It would, therefore, be the duty of the Corporation
  to evolve the schemes. In the light of the schemes now in operation, we are
                                                                                B
  of the view that opportunity should be given to the 10 named petitioner-
  encroachers tc opt for any one of the three schemes and the named two
  persons who are carrying on commercial activities should immediately stop
  the same. If they intend to have any commercial activity or hawking, it
  should be availed of as per the directions already issued by this Court in C
  the aforesaid judgment and no further modification or any directions
  contra thereto need to be issued. Out of these 10 persons, if they are
  eligible within the terms of the schemes and would satisfy the income
· criterion, they would be given allotment of the sites or the tenements, as
  the case may be, according to their option. In case they do not opt for any D
  of the schemes, 21 days' notice would be served on them and other
  encroachers and they may be ejected from the present encroachments. As
  regards other persons who have become encroachers by way of purchase
  either from the original encroachers or encroached pending writ peti-
  tion/appeal in this Court, they are not entitled to the benefits given to the
  10 encroachers. As regards those who are eligible according to the E
  guidelines in the schemes and also fulfil the income criterion, it may be
  open to the Corporation to extend the same benefits in either of the three
  schemes,if they so desire. It is, however, made clear that we are not giving
  any specific direction in this behalf lest it would amount to encouraging
  the people to abuse the. judicial process to avail of such remedy by
                                                                                F
  encroaching public property.

        Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is
 modified as indicated above. The writ petitions stand disposed of accord-
 ingly. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as
 to costs.                                                                     G
 v.s.s.                                                    Appeal allowed.