Holding

The Railway Board's reservation and promotion schemes for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are constitutionally valid under Article 16(4) and do not violate Article 16(1) or Article 335, provided the carry‑forward rule does not cause reserved appointments to exceed 50% of vacancies in any given year.

Summary

The Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh and other petitioners challenged a series of Railway Board circulars that provided reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in recruitment and promotion, introduced a "carry forward" rule for unfilled reserved vacancies, allowed lower qualification standards, and granted higher grading to SC/ST candidates. They argued that these measures violated Articles 16(1), 16(2) and 335 of the Constitution, that SC/ST could not be treated as a "class" under Article 16(4), and that the policies threatened administrative efficiency. The Court held that the circulars were a valid exercise of the State's power under Article 16(4) and Article 46, that the classification of SC/ST is constitutionally permissible, and that the policies do not infringe Article 16(1) provided the carry‑forward rule does not result in more than 50% of vacancies being filled by reserved candidates in any year. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Railway Board's reservation and promotion policies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes violate Article 16(1) equality of opportunity.
Whether Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constitute a "class" within the meaning of Article 16(2) and can be favoured under Article 16(4).
Whether Article 16(4) applies to promotional posts and to the "carry forward" of unfilled reserved vacancies.
Whether the policies contravene Article 335 by compromising administrative efficiency.
Whether the extent of reservation (including the 66⅔% ceiling) exceeds the permissible limit.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15, s. Article 16(1), s. Article 16(2), s. Article 16(4), s. Article 33, s. Article 335, s. Article 338, s. Article 341, s. Article 342, s. Article 366(24), s. Article 366(25), s. Article 38, s. Article 39, s. Article 46
Indian Railway Board Act, 1905
Indian Railways Act, 1890

Subjects

reservationScheduled CastesScheduled TribesArticle 16public employmentaffirmative actionpromotioncarry forward ruleadministrative efficiencyrailway service

Judgment

185

AKHJL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI SANGH (RAIL- A
WAY) REPRESENTED BY ITS ASSISTANT GENERAL
SECRETARY ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
B
November 14, 1980
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J

Cvnstztution of India, 1950-Arts. 16, 46 and 335-Scope of-Reseri.·ation
of posts under the St11te in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribts-
Car1y fonvard of unfilled posts for three years-validity of-- c
Jn so far as the initial recruitment and later promotion to classes II, III and
IV are concerned, the Railway Administration provided for reservation of cer-
tain percentage of vacancies for candidates belonging ito the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. Since, despite the special provision the intake of these
comrnunities into the Railway Services continued to be negligible further con-
cessiom and relaxations were offered from time to time to members belonging D
to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Even So, in ma.ny cases the
vacancies reserved for them remained unfilled. Yet another step taken by 'he
Railway Administrotion to lteep open the reserved vacancies was to adopt a
policy of "carry forward" of, the unfilled reserved vacancies for at least three
years.
Jn obedience to the policy decisi0n of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the E
Railway Board issued certain directives designed to protect and promote the
interest of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled rfribes in the matter
of their employment in the· Railway Administration. The policy directive· of
reserving certain percentage of posts in favour of these communities having not
proved effective, the Railway Board altered the rules "with a view to securing
increased representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the
Rail\vay Services" (Annexure D). The Railway Board authorised the recruit- F
ing bodies to slur over low places obtained by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes candidates except where it was fotlnd that the minimum standard
~necessary for the maintenance of efficiency 1 of the administration has not been
,- reached. The appointing authorities were directed to give additional training
and coaching to the recruits so that they might come up to the standard of
ot~1er recruits appointed alongwith them. Likewise where direct recruitment,
otherwise than by examination, was provided for, the Railway Board directed G
the selection of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates fulfilling
a lower standard of suitability than from other communities, so Jong as the
canc.Tidates had the prescribed minimum educational and technical qualifiootion111
and the appointing authorities were satisfied that the lowering of standard5
would not unduly affect the maintenance of efficiency of administmtion.

ln the case of selection posts the Railway Board decided that promotions
from class IV to class ID and from class Ill to class II were of the nature of H
direct recruitment and the prescribed quota of reservation for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes should be provided as in direct recmitment. This reser-
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.

A. vation was confined to 'selection posts'. In regard to filling of "general posts"
in class Ill it was stated that they were in the nature of direct recruitment and
the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as applicable ta
din~...:t recruitment should be applied. (Annexure F).

In 1969 the Railway Beard further revised their policy in regard to the
rescr,,:arion and other concessions to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
B candidates in posts filled by promotion (Annexure H). The circular statt:d
tbnt in promotion by selection from class III to class II, if a member of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was within the zone of eligibility the
employee would be given one grading higher than the grading otherwise assign-
able to him on the basis of his record of service.

c Jn April, 1970 the percentage of vacancies to be reserved for Scheduled ~--
Castes and Scheduled Tribes was raised from 12-!-% and 5% to 15% and
7to/o reipectively (Annexure I). By the same order the 11carry forward" rule
\.Vas altered from 2 to 3 years.

In 1973 the Railway Board issued a directive stating that the quota of 15%
and 7!% for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may be provided in pro-
D ri.1otion to the categories and posts in classes I, II, III and rv filled on the
basis of the seniority:cum-suitability provided the element of direct recntitment
to those grades does not exceed 50% (Annexure K).

In Au,iust, 1974 the Rail11;'RY Board further directed that if the requisite
nan1ber of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates were not available
for being: placed on the panel in spite of the various relaxations the best among
E thetn i.e. those who secure highest marks should be earmarked for being placed
on the panel to the extent vacancies had been reserved in their favour. The
Scheduled C«stes and Scheduled Tribes candidates so earmarked might be pro-
moted ad hoc for a period of six months against the vacanci~s reserved for
them. During the period of six months the administration was asked to give
them all facilities for improving their knowledge and for coming upto the
requisite standard. This procedure \Vas required to be applied in cases of pro-
F motion to the posts filled on the· basis of seniority-cum-suite.bility (Annexurc
Nl.

A further modification to the then existing rules was made by Annextue--.
'O' which stated that "restrvations in posts filled by promotion under the
existing scheme would be applicable to all grades or services where the element
of direct recruitment, if any, does not exceed 66 2/3% as against 50% as at
G present".

It \.Vas contended on behalf of the petitioners the.t Scheduled Castes cannot
be a favoured class in the public services because (i) they are "castes" and
cannot claim preference qua castes unless specially saved by Article 16(4)
which speaks of "class" and not "castes", (ii) tho.t Article 16(4) could not
apply to promotional levels and (iii) efficiency of administration envisaged
H by Article 335 had been jeopardised by the impugned circulars which fomented
frustration atnong the civil services and produced inefficiency by placing men
of lower efficiency and less experience in higher posts.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHAR! v. UNION 187

A preliminary objection was raised that since the first petitioner was an • A
unrecognised union, it was not a "person aggrieved" and so its petition was
unsustainable.
Dismissing the petitions
[Per majority Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ, Pathak J. concurring
in the result with reservation on certain questions]
B
There is nothing Hlegal or unconstitutional in the impugned orders.
[Per Krishna Iyer, J]
The argument that since the first petitioner was an un-recognised association
the petition is not sustainable must be overruled because whether the petitioners
• btlonged to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of
r-crsons with a common grievance exists and they approached this Court under C
Article 32. Our current processual jurisprudence is broad-based and people-
oriented and envisions access to justice through "class actions", "public interest
litigation" and "representative proceedings". The narrow concept of cause of
action and per!on aggrieved and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent
in some jurisdictions. [224 G-HJ

The well settled position in law is that the State may classify, based upon D
substantial differentia, groups or classes and this process does not necessarily
bfJCll violation of Articles 14 to 16. Therefore, in the present case if the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes stand on a substantially different footing
they may be classified groupwise a.nd treated separately. [232 B-C]

The fundamental right of equality of opportunity has to be read as justify-
ing the categcrisation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes separately for E
the purpose of "adequate representation'' in the services under the State. The
object is constitutionally sanctioned in terms as Article 16(4) and 46 specificate.
The classification is just and reasonable. [233 G-Hl

Apart from Article 16(1), Article 16(2) expressly forbids discrin1ination on
the ground of caste and here the question- nrises as to whether the Scheduled
Castes and Tribes are castes wit'hin the meaning of Article 16 (2). Assuming
rhat there is discrimination, Article 16(2) cannot be invoked unless it is predi-
F
cate:d that the Scheduled Castes are "castes 1'. There are sufficient indications
in the Constitution to suggest that the Scheduled Castes are not mere castes.
They may be something less or something more and the time badge is not the
fact that the members belong to a caste but the circumstance that they belong
to an indescribably backward human group. [234 A-CJ

.i\rticles 14 to 16 form a Code by thcm5elves and contain a con~titutional G
fundamental guarantee. The Directive Principles which are fundamental in the
f;JVernance of the country enjoin upon the State the duty to apply that princi-
ple in making laws. Article 46 obligates the State to promote with special care
the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the peuple
and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article
46 read with Article 16(4) makes it clear that the exploited lot of the harijan
gr~ups in the past shall be extirpated v;'ith special care by the State. [210 E; H
21 J A-€1
J3·--128JSCl/80
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A At the s<1n1e time reservations under Article 16(4) and promotional <>tratc
gies under Article 46 should not be used to imperil administrative efficiency in
the name of concessions to backward classes. The positive accent of Article
335 is that the claims of these communities to equalisation of representation in
se11lices under the State shall be taken into considerarion. The neg.ative element
of this Article is that measures taken by the State pursuant to the mandate of
Arti cles 16(4), 46 and 3 3 5 shall be consistent with and not subversive of the
B maintenan� of efficiency of a.drninistration. [211 D-F]

Under Article 341, Scheduled · Castes become such only if the President
SjJecifies any castes, races or tribes or parts or groups within castes, races or
tribes for the purpose of the Constitution. It is the socio-economic backward
ness of a social bracket that is decisive and not mere birth in a caste. [212 A]

C A nnexu rc F relates only to selection posts and has been expressly upheld in
Rt�ny,achari's case. The quantum of reservation is not excessive; the field of
)
eligibility is not too unreasonable; the operation of the reservation is limited to
selection posts and no relaxation of qualifications is written into the circu1ar
c�\cept that candidates of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes com
munities should be judged in a sympathetic rrmnner. Moreover administrative
efficiency is secure because there is a direction to give such staff additional
D training and coaching , to bring them upto the standard of others. [239 F-G]
Thcr.:: is no vice in giving one grade higher than is otherwise assignabl� t.o
an cmp!oyee. based on the record of bis service rendering the promotional
prospects unreasonable because this concession is confined to only 25% of the
t'o��1l number of vacancies in a particular grade· or post filled in a year and there
is no rampant vice of every harijan jumping over the heads of others. More

E i n1portantly, thi:5 i5 only an administrative device of showing a concession or
furtherance of prospects of selection. Even a5 under Articles 15(4) and 16(4)
!c�<>c-r marks are prescribed a:5 sufficient for these communities or extra marks
ate ndded to give them an advantage, the regrading is one more method uf
boc�ti ng the chances of selection of these communities. The prescribed mini -
1num qualification and standard of fitness are continued even for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Annexure H. [240 B-D]

F
A.nncxurc I is un-exceptionable since all that it does is to readjust the pro
pcrtion of reservation in conformity with the latest census. [240 E-F]

Simi1<1rly "c:1rry forw-ard" raised from two years to three years cannot be
'i.._ruck down. There is no prospect, even if the vacancies are carried forward ,
of sufficient nun1bcr of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates turn-

·G ing out to fill them. Moreover, there is a provision that if a sufficient number
of cnndidate:5 from these communities are not found, applioonts from the un
;eserved communities \Vould be given appointment provisionafly. After !bree
years these vac<l<ncies. cease to be reserved. [240 G-A]

EYen in D�va.dasan's case, this Court hM laid down the proposition that
llnder Article 16(4) reservation of n reasonable percentage of posts for mem
hers of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tn'bles is within the competence
H
of the State. What was struck down was that the reservations should not be
so e�cessive as to create a monopoly or to disturb unduly the legitimate claims
'
o! otner communities. By this rule there is no danger of the total vacancies

I
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 189

being gobbled up by the harijan/girijan groups virtually obliterating Article A
16(1). The problem of giving adequate representation to backward classes
under Article 16(4) is a matter for the Government to consider, bearing in
mind lhe need for a reasonable balance between the rival claims. [241 B-F]

Su.bject t'o the condition that the carry forward rule shall not result in .-ny
given year in the selection or appointment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
·rribes; candidates considerably in excess of 50%, the Annexure I is upheld. B
[242 El
There is nothing unreasonable or wrong in Annexure J. Once the para-
meters of reservation are within the framework of the fundamental rights,

- minute 'Scrutiny of every administrative measure is not permissible. [242 F]

1.1.nnexure K is beyond reproach. As between seleotion and non-selecti,in
po~ts the role of merit is functionally more relevant in the former than in the C
IJ.Uer. If in selecting top officers, posts could be reserved for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes with lesser merit it cannot rationally be argued that for
the posts of peons, or lower division clerks reservation would spell calamity.
The port that efficiency plays is far more in the case of higher posts than in
the appointments to the lower posts. [243 DJ

Dilution of efficiency caused by the minimal induction of a small percentage D
of reserved candidates cannot affect the over-all administrative efficiency signi-
ficantly. Moreover, care has been ta.ken to give in-service training and coaching

- 1o correct the deficiencies. [244 B-C]

[Cninnappa Reddy, l concurring]
The preamble to the Constitution of India proclaims the resolution of the E
people to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political, equality
of status and opportunity and to promote fraternity assuring the dignity of the
inC!.ividual. The right to equality before the law and equality of opportunity
in the n1atter of public employment are guaranteed as fundament::il rights. The
State is enjoined upon by the Directive Principles to promote the welfare of the
people, to endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportu-
nitie~ and special provisions have been made, in particular~ for the protection
F
and advancement of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in recognition
. of their Jow social and economic status and their failure to avail themselves of
~ny opportunity of self-advancement. Jn short the constitutional goal is the
estab~ishment of a socialist democracy in which justice-economic, social and
politiool is secure and all men are equal and have equal opportunity. InequaJitY
whetl.er of status, facility or opportunity is to end, privilege is to cease and
exploHation is to go. The under-privileged, the deprived and the exploited are G
10 he protected and nourished so as to take their place in an egalitarian society.
State action is to be towards those ends. It is in this context that Article 16
has to be interpreted when State action is questioned as contravening Article
16. [255 A-Fl

A. Constitution, such as ours, must receive generous interpretation so as to
give alt its citizens the full measure of justice so proclaimed. While interpret-
ing tile Constitution the expositors must concern themselves not so much with H
-.vord' as with the spirit and sense of the Constitution which could be found in
the Preamble the Directive Principles and other such provisions. [256 G]
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A At one time it W..s assumed that because the fuAdamental rights are enforce·
obJe in a court of law while Directive Principles are not, the former were
superior to the latter, that way of thinking has become obsolete. The current
thin king is that while Fundamental Rights are primarily aimed at assuring poli-
tical freedom to the citizens against excessive State action, the Directive Princi·
ples nre aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate State
action. The Directive Principles are made un..enforceabte in a limited sense,
B because no Court can compel a Legislature to make laws. But that does not
mean that they are less important than Fundamental Rights or that they are
not binding on the various organs of the State. They are all the same funda·
mental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State
to npply these principles in making laws. The Directive Principles should serve
lbe Courts as a Code of Interpretation. Every law attacked on the ground of
infringement of Fundamental Right should be examined to see if the impugned
c law does not advance one or other of the Directive Principles or if it is not
in the discharge of some of the undoubted obligations of the State towards its
citizens flowing out of the Preamble, the Directive Principles and other provi-
sions of the Constitution. [257 A-0]

Reservation of posts and all other measures designed to promote the parti·
cipation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in public services at
D an levels are a necessary consequence flowing from the Fundamental Rights
r,110ranteed by Article 16 (I). This very idea is emphasized further by Article

-
lt(4) which is not in the nature of an exception to Article 16(1) but a facet
of that Article. In the State of Kerala v. NM. Thomas the court has repudia·
ted the theory propounded in earlier cases that Article 16(4) is in the nature
of an exception to Article 16(1). It is no longer correct to say that laws
aimed at achieving equality as permissible exceptions. Such laws are neceMary
E incidents of equality. [258 D-F]

Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1979]3 All E.R. 21, State of Kerala &
Anr. v. N.M. Thomas & Ors. [19761 1 S.C.R. 906 @ 930-933 and The General
Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari [1962]2 S.C.R. 586 referred to.

F The fignres quoted from the report of the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes for the year 1977-78 reveal how slow and insignificant
the progress achieved by the members of these communities in the matter of
participation in the Railway Administration had been. Far from acquiring any --1
monopolistic or excessive representation over any category of posts these com-
munities are nowhere near being adequately represented. Neither the reserva~
tion rule nor the "carry forward" rule for these years has resulted in any ~ucb
G disastrous consequence. Therefore, the complaint of the petitioners that the
circulars had resulted in excessive representation of these communities is without
foundation generally or with reference to any particular year. [246 D-G]

There is no substance in the argument that efficiency of administration
would suffer if the Railway Board's directives were followed in the matter of
re!lervations and promotions. The Railway Board had stated that minimum
H standards were insisted upon for every appointment and in the case of candidates
wanting in requisite standards of efficiency those with higher marks were given
special intensive training to enable them to come up to the requisite standards.
In the case of posts which involved safety of movement of trains there was no

- ' . ,..,_,,,,_ ~-
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARJ; V. UNION 191

relaxation of standards in favour of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes A
and Scheduled Tribes and they were required to pass the same rigid tests as
others. [265 A·Bl

There is no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential treatment in favour
uf ;he Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes though generally reservation
may not be far in excess of 50% about which there is no rigidity. Every caso
must be decided on its own facts. [265 E] B

There is nothing illegal or unconstitutional in any one of the impugned
orders and circulars. [265 G]

,< [Pathak J concurring in the result '~rith reservation on certain questions.]

Article 46 of the Constitution enjoins upon fhe State to treat with special c
care the educational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the people
and in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. One of tho
modes in which the economic interest of these communities can be promoted
is by reservation of appointments or posts in their favour in services under
the State where they are not adequately represented. By virtue of Article
16(4), when the State intends to ma.ke reservation of appointments or posts
in favour of these communities in services under it nothing in Article 16 D
prevents it from doing so. Article 335 provides that claims of the membera
of these communities shall be taken into consideration in the making of
• appoir.t111ents to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or
a State. But such consideration must be consistent with the maintenance of
efficiency of administration which is regarded as paramount. It is dictated by
the common good and not of a mere section of the people. Therefore, what-
ever is done in considering the claims of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled E
Tribes must be consistent with the need for maintenance of efficiency of admi-
nistration. This Article contains a single principle, namely, the advancement
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes but through modes and avenues
which must not detract from the maintenance of an efficient administra-
tion. [250 B-H]

F
For securing an efficient administration the governing criterion in the me.tter
~ of appointments to posts under the State is: excellence and the emphasis is
5olely on quality. The selection is made regardless of religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, place of birth or residence. However, a quota of the posts
may be reserved in favour of backwe.rd citizens. But the interests of efficient
administration require that at least half the total number of posts be kept
open to attract the best of the nation's talent. If it was otherwise an excess G
of the reserved quota would convert the State service into a collective mem-
bership predominantly of backward classes. The maintenance of efficiency of
administration is bound to be adversely affected if general candidates of high
merit are correspondingly excluded from recruitment. Viewed in that light the
maximum of 50% for reserved quota appears fair and reasonable, just
and equit•ble violation of which would contravene Article 335. [251 B-D]

M. R. Balajf v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 439, 470, T. Deva- H
dasan v. Union of lndia [1964]4 S.C.R. 680 and State of Kera/a v. N. M.
Thomas [1976]1 S.C.R. 906 referred to.
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1041-1044 of 1980.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)
Shanti Bhushan, K. K. Venugopal, A. T. M. Sampath, P. N.
Ramalingam and R. Satish for the Petitioner.
B Lal Narain Sinha, Att. General of India, M. K. Banerjee, Addi.
Sol. Genl. and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents Nos. 1-5.
P. R. Mridul, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh, B. L. Verma, Rajan
Karanjawal and Miss Vineeta Caprihan for the Intervener.
K. B. Rohtagi and Praveen Jain for the Intervener.
c R. K. Garg and P. K. Jain for the Intervener.
S. K. Bagga for the Intervener.
Alta/ Ahmed for the Intervener.
S. Ba/akrishnan for the Intervener.
D
P. Ii. Parekh for Respondent No. 6 in W.P. No. 1042/79.
The following judgments were delivered :
•
KRISHNA IYER, J.

E The Root Thought
The abolition of slavery has gone on for a long time. Rome
abolished slavery, America abolished it, and we did, but only the words
were abolished. not the thing.(')
This agonising gap between hortative hopes and human dupes
F vis a vis that serf-like sector of Indian society, strangely described as
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs and STs, for short), and
the administrative exercises to bridge this big hiatus by processes like _...,
reservations and other concessions in the field of public employment,
is the broad issue: that demands constitutional examination in the Indian
setting of competitive equality before the law and tearful inequality in
G life. A fasciculus of directions of the Railway :Soard has been
attacked as ultra vires and the court has to pronounce on it, not philo·
sophically but pragmatically. "The philosophers have only interpret-
ed the world in various ways; the point is to change it"( 2 )-this was
the founding fathers' fighting faith and serves as perspective-setter for
the judicial censor.
H
(I} Leo N. Tolstoy.
(2) Theses on Feuerbach (1888) xi.
!
I
~ AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, !.) 19 3
'
The Backdrop A
The social backdrop to the forensic problem raised in this litiga-
tion is best projected by lines of poetry quoted in Nehru's Autobio-
graphy : (')
Bowed by the weight of centuries he leans
Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground, R
The emptiness of ages on his face,
And on his back the burden of the world.
The Problem
The dynamics and dialectics of social justice vis a vis the specia~
provisions of the Constitution calculated to accelerate the prospects of
employment of the harijans and the girijans in the civil services with
c
particular emphasis on promotions of these categories! in the Indian
Railways-that, in all these cases, is the cynosure ofl judicial scrutiny,
from the angle of constitutionality in the context ofl the guarantee of
caste-free equality to every person.
Petitioners' Challenge D
The gravamen of the constitutional accusation levelled in this bunch
of quasi-class actions under Art. 32 of the Constitution and argued
by a battery of counsel led by Shri Shanti Bhushan, with heat and
light, passion and reason, is the heartless discrimination shown against
vnst numbers of members employed by the Railway Administrati011,
through its policy directives, by bestowal of unconscionably 'pamper- E
ing' concessions, at promotion levels, on these social brackets belong-
ing to the historically suppressed SCs & STs, .heedless o-f over-all
administrative efficiency in the Indian Railways and frustrating the
promotional hopes of the larger human segments of economically down-
trodden senior members. The fall-out of this 'benign Ji>crimination'
F
. of helping out the weakest sections has been to blow up, out of all
~, proportion to the social realities, the' 'backwardness' syndrome so as to
embrace many politically powerful castes disguised as Backward
Classes. This constitutional amulet, rooted largely in ~aste, the peti-
tioners lament, has heen misused and applied in educational and
employment fields 0'11 an escalating scale. The perverted result is that
G
a caste-riven nation is a spectre that haunts the land, pushing back
the patriotic prospect of a homogenised Indian Society of casteless
equality and projecting instead the divisive alternative cf a heteroge-
neous caste map of Bharat. The fundamental failure of this sterile
scheme of reservation-wise circumvention of the fundamental right to •
equality, ideologically and pragmatically speaking, has deepened the H
pathological cc ndition of communalism besetting the Indian polity
1

(I) Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. 1962 Edn., p. 439.
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
and split the have.nots into snarling camps-a consummation disas-
trously contrary to the constitutional design of abolition of socio-
economic inequality through activist stratagem of equalisation geared
to actual attainment of integrated equality.
Logically. the argument leads to the formulation that each caste
B and community is bargaining politically for bigger bites of the educa-
tional-and-employment cake so much so merit becomes irrelevant or
takes a back seat and 'backward' birth brings1 a boon. The constitu-
tional stultification of an integrated India through misuse of 'reserva-
tion' power provided for in' Arts. 15 and 16 meant for the direct 'dalits',
the pollution, by the political Executive, of our founding creed o~ an
egalitarian order by playing casteification politics and the morbid dilu-
tion of 'hackwardness' marring the dream of a secular republic by the
nightmare of a feudal vivisection of the people--if this picture drawn:
by some counsel be true, even in part, the basid task of transforming
the economic order through social justice will be baulked through des-
tructive communal disputes among the masses. Maybe, this may
D weaken the social revolution, leave an indelible stain and incurablel
wound on the body politic and justify the censure by history of the
engineers of our political power and electoral processes. Hearing the
arguments of the petitioners one wonders, "Is caste the largest political
party T' Has protective discrimination, so necessary in an insuffer-
ably unequal society, created a Frankenstein's monster?
E
Have we no dynamic measures to drown social, e~onomic and
educational backwardness of whole masses except the traditional self-
perpetuating qnasi-apartheidisation called 'reservation'? Surely, our
democratic, secular socialist republic is no wane moon but a creative
power rooted in equal manhood, an egalitarian reservoir of vast human
ll' potential, a demographic distribution of talent benumbed by brahman
centuries of soda! injustice but now seeking human expression under
a new dispensat;on where 'chill penury' shall no longer 'repress their
noble rage'.
Caste, undoubtedly, in a deep-seated pathology to eradicate which
G the Constitution took care to forbid discrimination based on caste,
especially in the field of education and services under the State. The
rulings of this court, Interpreting the relevant Articles, have hammered
home the point that it is not constitutional to base identification of
backward classes on caste alone qua caste. If a large nnmber of castes
masquerade as backward classes and perpetuate that division Jn edu-
H cational campuses and public offices, the whole process1 of a caste.free
sodety will be reversed. We are not directly concerned '>'ith back-
ward classes as such, hut with the provisions ameliorative of ~he
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 19 5

~cheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Nevertheless, we have! A
to consider seriously the social consequences of our interrretation of
Art. 16 in the light of the submission of counsel that a vested interest
in the caste system is being created and perpetuated by over-indulgent
concessions, even at promotional levels, to the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes, which are only a species of castes. "Each
B
according to his ability" is being substituted by "each according to hi$
caste", argue the writ petitioners and underscore the unrighteous march
of the officials belonging to the SCs & STs over the humiliated head~
of their senior and more meritorious brothers in service. The after-
math of the caste-based operation of promotional preferences is stated
to be deterioration in the over-all efficiency and frustration in the ranks'. c
. of members not fortunate enough to be born SCs & STs. Indeed, the
'inefficiency' bogie was so luridly presented that even the railway acci-
dents and other operational cala~ities and managerial failures were
attributed to the only villain of the .piece viz., the policy of re9~rvation
in promotions. A constitutionally progressive policy of advantage in
educational and ofljcial career based upon economic rather than social D
backwardness was commended before us by counsel as more in keep·
i'ng with the anti-caste, pro--egalitarian tryst with our constitutional
destiny. And, Shri Shanti Bhushan, at one stage, helped the court
realise the consequences of its verdict if it upheld the pampering
package of promotional preferences by warning us of running battles
in the streets, a sort of caste-war, against birthbased 'privileges' for the E
harijan-girijan millions.

Our Approach
Of course, judicial independence has one dimension, not fully
realised by some friends of freedom. Threats of mob hysteria shall
not deflect the court from its true accountability to the Constitution,, F
its spirit and text belighted by all the sanctioned materials The other
invisible sacrifice of judicial independence relevant to this case is the.
unwitting surrender ta "the spirit of the group in which the accidents
of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us (judges)
a place. No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly
and at all times the empire of these subconscious loyaltiea." (') We G
quote what the great Justice Cardozo has courageously confessed : (2)
I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly
avml to shape the form and content of their judgments.
Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousnesG. They
he so near the surface, however, that their existence and
H
(1) Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process p., 175.
(2) Ibid p. 167, 169, 173-74.

~ ;--
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 198 !] 2 S.C.R ..

A ini!uence are not likely to be disclaimed. But the subjf.ct is
not exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dis-
likes, t11: predilections and the prejudices, the, complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions. which
make the man whether he be litigant or judge .... The great
8 tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn
aside in their course and pass the judges by .... We shall
never be able to flatter ourselves, in any system of juJicial
interpretation, that we have eliminated altogether the per-
sonal measures of the interpreter. In the moral sciences,
there is no method or procedure which entirely supplants that
c subjective reason. We may figure the task of the judge, if
we please, as the task of a translator, the re<iding ot signs
and symbols given from without None the less, we will not
set men to such a task, unless• they have absorbed the spirit,
and have filled themselves with a love, of the language they
D must read.
The British ,echo of this judicial weakness is heard in Prof. Griffith's'
words : (')
These judges have by their education and training and
the pursuit of their profession as barristers, acquired a strik-
ingly homogenous collection of attitudes, beliefs and princi-
E
ples, which to them represents the public interest
The emphasis on the subtle invasions from within upon functional'
autonomy and forensic objectivity mentioned by Cardozo will be evi-
dent when we turn lo the pathetic saga of the depressed cl..tsses, even
today, painted by tbe other side. The learned Attorney General, less.
i' militant but not less firm in his submissions, called all this :~ caricature
of the poignant facts of life and called upon us to assess the facts with -.t!
cold objectivity and warm humanity casting aside pcssiblc sympathies
suggested by Justice Cardczo and Prof. Griffith.
We. as judges dcoling with a socially charged issue of constitutional
G law, must never forget that the Indian Constitution is a National Char-
ter pregnant with social revolution, not a Legal Parchment barren of
militant values to usher in a democratic, secular, socialist society which
belongs eqUlllly to the masses including the hnrijan-girijan millions
hungering for a humane deal after feudal colonial history's Jong night.
Granville Austin(') quotes profusely from the Constituent Assem-
H bly proceeding' to rrove the goal of the Indian Constitution to be
(1) The Politics of th~ J~diciary, p. 193. . . .
(2) The Indian Constitution-Cornerstone of a Nation, Granville Austin.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 19 7

social revolution. Radhakrishnan, representing the broad consensus,
said that(')
J;ndia n1ust have a 'socio-econon1ic revolution' designell
not only to bring about the real satisfaction of the fundamen-
tal needs of the C<'mmon man, but to go' rm;ch dcep;'1 and
bring about '2 tui1dan1enta] change in the ~trlicturc uf Indian It.
sodety'.

The Cultural Core of the Constitutional Protection :
Let us get some glimpses of history to get a. hang of the problem.
'In thy book record their groans' may be the right quote to begin with.
We cannot blink at the agony of the depressed classes over the cen- c
turies condemned by all social reformers as rank irreligion and social
injustice. Swami Vivekananda, for instance, stung by glaring social
injustice, argued(') :
The same power is in every man, to the one manifesting
more, the other less. Where is the claim to privilege . All
knowledge is in every soul, even in the most ignorant, he has
not manifested it, but, p~rhaps he has not had the opportunity
the environments were not, perhaps, suitable to him. When
he gets the opportunity he will manifest it. The idea that
one man is born superior to another has no meaning in
Vedanta; that between two nations one is superior and the I
other inferior has no meaning whatsoever.

Men will be born differentiated; some will have more
power than others. We cannot stop that. ... but that on
account of this power to acquire wealth they should tyran-
nise and ride roughshod over those, who cannot acquire so
much wealth, is not a part of the law, and the fight has been
against that. The enjoyment of advantage over another is
privilege, and throughout ages the aim of morality has been
its destruction ....... .

Our aristocratic ancestors went on treading tne common
masses of our country under foot till they became helpless,
till under this torment the poor, poor people nearly forgot
that they were human beings. They have been compelled to
be merely hewers of wood and drawers of water for centuries,
so much so, that they are made to believe that they are born
(I) Ibid p. 27. ff<
(2) Socio-Political Views of Vivekananda by Binoy K. Roy pp. 9, II, 26, 30-31
and 34.
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A as slaves, born as hewers of wood and drawers of water.
With all our boasted education of modern times, if anybody
says a kind word for them, I often find our men shrink at
once from the duty of lifting them up, these poor downtrodden
people. Not only so, bnt I also find that all sorts of most
demoniacal and brutal arguments, culled from the crude
B ideas of hereditary transmission, and other such gibberish
from the western world are brought forward in order to
brutalise and tyrannise over the poor, all the more ..... .
Aye, Brahrnins, if the Brahrnin has more aptitude for
learning on the ground of heredity than the Pariah, spend
no more money on the Brahmin's education, but spend all
on the Pariah. Give to the weak, for there all the gift is
needed. Our poor people, these down-trodden masses of
India, therefore, require to hear and to know what they
really are. Aye, let every man and woman and child, without
respect of caste or birth, weakness and strength, hear and
D learn that behind the strong and the weak, behind the high
and the low, behind everyone, there is that Infinite Soul,
assuring that infinite possibility and" the infinite capacity of
all to become great and good. Let us proclaim to every
soul-'Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached.'
Arise, awake! Awake from the hyprotism of weakness. None
E is really weak; the soul is infinite, omnipotent and omniscient.
Stand up, assert yourself, proclaim the God within you, do
not deny Him! Too much of inactivity, too much of weak-
ness, too much of hypnotism has been and is upon our
race. . . . . . . . Power will come, glory will come, goodness
will come, purity will come, and everything that is excellent
F will come, when this sleeping soul is roused to self-conscious
activity ..... .

Our proletariat are doing their duty. . . . . . is there no
heroism in it? Many turn out to be heroes, when they
have some great task to perform. Even a coward easily
G gives up his life, and the most selfish man behaves disinte-
restedly when there is a multitude, to cheer them on but
blessed indeed is he who manifests the same unselfishness
and devotion to duty in the smallest of acts. unnoticed by
all-and it is you who are actually doing this, ye ever-
trampled labouring classes of India ! I bow to you.
H
There was the Everest presence of Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of
the Nation, who staked his life for the harijan cause. There was Baba
- AKHIL HHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 199

Saheb Ambedkar-a mahar by birth and fighter to his last breath
against the hJina/ayan injustice to the harijan fellow millioru, stigmatised
A

by theiI genetic handicap-who was the Chairman of the drafting
committee of the Constituent Assembly. There was Nehru, one of the
foremost architects of Free India, who stood four square between caste
suppression by the upper castes and the socialist egalitarianism impli-
cit in secular democracy. B
(

These forces nurtured the roots of our constitutional values among
which must be found the fighting faith in a casteless society, not by
obliterating the label but by advancement of the backward, particularly
that pathetic segment described colourlessly as Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. To recognise these poignant realities of social his- c
tory and so to interpret the Constitution as to fulfil itself, not eruditely
to undermine its substance through the tyranny of literality, is the
task of judicial patriotism so relevant in Third World conditions to
make liberation a living fact.

The learned Attorney General drew our attention to the yawning D
gap between the legitimate expectations of the socially depressed
SC&ST and their utter under representation in the Public Services ex-
cept in such mean jobs as of scavengers and sweepers where no other
caste was forthcoming. Equality of opportunity would be absent so
long as equalisation strategy was not put into action, and the State,
stage by stage and with great care and experimental eye, took steps to E
secure the euds of Arts.16 (1) and 16 ( 4) , read in the light of the
Preambular promise of equality, fraternity and dignity, the Part. IV
diJective of promotion of educational and economic interests of the
SC&ST and the Special Chapter, especially Art. 336, devoted to better
representation of the SC&ST in the services and posts in connection
F
with th0 affairs of the Union and States. We could not apprehend the
social dimension of the stark squalour of SC&ST by viewing Art. 16
( 4) through a narrow legal aperture but only by an apercu of the
broader demands of social democracy, without which the Republic
would cease to be a reality to one-fifth of Indian humanity.
The final address to the Constituent Assembly by Dr. Ambedkar G
drives home this point, not to interpret but to illumine the scheme of
the equality code and the casteless society plea : (')
The third thing we must do is not to be corrtent with
mere political democracy. We must make our political demo-
cracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy can-
D
(1) Keer, D. Ambedkar : Life1 id Mission, Popular Prakashan Bombay Second
Edn. p. 412.
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

not last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy.
What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life
which recognises liberty, equality and fraternity as the prin-
ciples of life. These principles of liberty. equality and frater-
nity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They
form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from
B the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty
cannot be divorced from equality, equality cannot be divom.:d
from liberty. Nor can liberty and equality be divorced from
fraternity. Without fraternity, liberty and equality could
not become a natural course of things. lt would require a
constable to enforce them. We must begin by acknowledg-
c ing the fact that there is complete absence of two things in
Indian society. One of these is equality. On the social
plane. we have in India a society based on the principles of
graded inequality which means elevation of some and degra-
dation for others. On the economic plane, we have a society
in which there are some who have immense wealth as against
D many who Jive in abject poverty. On the 26th January 1950,
we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In poli-
tics we will have equality and in social and economic life we
will have inequality. In politics we will be recognizing the ' 'II
principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In
our social and economic structure, continue to deny the
E
principle of one man one value. How Jong shall we conti-
nue to live this life of contradictions ? How Jong shall be
continue to deny equality in our social and economic life ?
If we continue to deny it for long, we will do so only by put-
ting our political democracy in peril. We must remove thi~
F contradiction at the earliest possible moment or else those
who suffer from ineqaulity will blow up the structure or poli-
tical democracy which this Assembly has so labor!-Ously built
up (emphasis added). Jndeed from another angle of vision,
Art. l 6 ( 4) serves to correct a gross social distortion . and
denial of human rights tu whole groups ostracised by feudal
G history. A holistic concept of human rights includes
among its components socio-economic rights for, without
basic conditions of social justice, survival with human
dignity is an impossibility. Thus, a great socio-economic
plan to uplift the harijan-girijan groups is a must for living
equality, proclaimed by Arts. 14 to 16, to become an
H active reality. It mnst be stated that the petitioners did not
contest the need for State action to raise the lot of these
backward most social sectors bnt objected, its widespread
AKHIL IlHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.)201

erosion of the right to basic equality which belongs to the A
have-nots in the country. Where do we draw the line?

These are the disturbing issues going to the root of progressive
nationalism raised by the writ petitioners and turned against them by
the State, but we are not inclined or entitled to venture into the politi-
B
cal wisdom of governmental policies vis a vis 'backward' community,
calculus save where constitutionality, falling within the judicial juris-
diction, confronts us. We must therefore confine the forensic focus to
the specific issue of profound import projected by the aggrieved peti-
tioners whose chief attack is against being passed over, seniority and
superior merit notwithstanding, in favour of alleged neophites or nit- c
11'.its merely because, by birth, the latter belong to the SC&ST species,
trampling underfoot, in,the process, the fundamental rights of 2qual
opportunity entrenched in Arts. 14 and 16(i) of the Constitution.

The dimensions of the problem, the human numbers involved and
the agitational potential said to be simmering in the civil >ervices were D
vividly drawn at the bar by one side. The tragic tale of die-hard
decades of inequality even after Freedom, the socio-economic 'miles
to go' and the constitutional 'promises to keep' (over which judges
will not legally sleep) before the da/it brethren may break their chains
and become at least distant neighbours to the less socially handicapped
sector, were highlighted pragmatically, statistically, hierarchically, I
even desperately, by the proponents of the impugned circulars (An-
nexures F to 0 cowred by Prayers I to X). Th~se submissious serve
as poignant backgrou'nd but the decision on the vires of the Railway
Board's directives will depend on constitutional interpretation applied
to Indian actualities, not to idealised abstractions or theoretical possi-
F
bilities. True, the politicisation of casteism its infiltration into unsus-
pected human territories and the ihjection of caste-consciousness in
Yschools and colleges via backward class reservation are a canker in the
rose of secularism. More positive measures of levelling up by construc-
tive strategiei; may be the developmental needs. But the judicial pro-
cess while considering constitutional questions, must keep politics and
G
administrative alternatives as out of bounds except to the exteht econo-
• mics, sociology and other disciplines bear scientifically upon the pro-
position demanding court pronouncement. Here the sole issue, spread
• out into the validity of the supposed sinful circulars (Annexures F to
0 covered by Prayers I to X) is whether Art 16, in its sweep and
savings, does permit State action in favour of socially and economically II
backward classes, especially the constitutionally favoured category
called the SC & ST, to the point of liberal concessions slurring over
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A 'age', 'merit' and the like, not merely at the initial entrance gate but
even at the higher promotional docks.

Whether alternative policies should have been chosen by Govern·
ment or would have served better to remove the handicaps of the SC
& STs, whether the advantag:Js conferred on these class~ are too
B generous and overly compassionate and whether the considerable num·
•
bers of the economically destitute receive the same sympathy as social
have-nots categorised as SC & ST these and other speculative maybes,
are beyond the courts orbit save where Art. 16 is hit by these omis·
sions and commissions. Nor is it the court's province to question the
conscionableness or propriety of constitutional provisions which dis·
c play ultra concern for members of the SC & ST. The court functions
under the Constitution, not over it, interprets the Comtitution, not
amends it, implements its provisions, not dilutes it through personal
philosophy projected · as constitutional construction. Objective tuned
to constitutional wavelengths is our function and if-only if-consti-
tutional guarantees have clearly been violated will the court declare
D
as non est such governmental projects as go beyond the mandates of
Part III read in harmony with Part IV. If, on a reasonable construc-
tion, the Administration's special provisions under Art. 16(4) exceed
constitutional limits, it is the duty of the court to strike dead such
project. Even so, while viewing the legal issues we must not forget what
is elementary that Jaw cannot go it alone but must function as a mem-
E
ber of the sociological ensemble of disciplines.

If one out of a few reasonably tenable constructions of the consti-
tutional provisions vis a vis the impugned executive directives may
sustain the latter, the court should and would refrain from using the
F judicial guillotine. There is a comity of coordinate constitutional in-
strumentalities geared to shared constitutional goals which persuades
the judicature to sustain rather than slay, save where the breach is
brazen, the transgression is plain or the effective co-existence of the~
fundamental right and the administrative scheme is illusory. Thls
Court has, on former occasions, upheld executive and legislative action
G hovering "perilously near" but not plunging into unconstitutionality
(see In re: Kerala Education Bill (1959 SCR 995 at 1064). It is
a constant guideline which we must vigilantly remember, as we have
•
stated earlier, that our Constitution is a dynamic document with
destination social revolution. It is 'not anaemic nor neutral but vigo- •
rously purposeful and value-laden as they very descriptive adjectives
H of our Republic proclaim. Where ancient social injustice freezes the
'genial current of the soul' for whole human segments our Constitution
is not non-aligned. Activist equalisation, as a realistic strategy of
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 203

producing human equality, is not legal anathema for Alts. 14 and 16. A
To hold otherwise is constitutional obscurantism and legal literalism,
allergic to sociologically intelli_gent interpretation.
The Preamble which promises justice, liberty and equality of status
and opportunity within the framework of Secular, Socialist Republic
• projects a holistic perspective. Art. 16 which guarantees equal oppor- B
tunity for all citizens in matters of State Service inherently implies
equalisation as a process towards equality but also hastens to har-
monize the realistic need to jack up 'depressed' classes to overcome ini-
tial handicaps and join the national race towards progress on an equal
footing and devotes Art. 16 (4) for this specific purpose. In a given
situation of large social categories being submerged for long, the c
guarantee of equality with the rest is myth, not reality, unless it is
combined with affirmative State action for equalisation geared to pro-
motion of eventual equality. Article 16( 4) is not a jarring note but
auxiliary to fair fulfilment of Art. 16(1). The prescription of Art.
16(1) needs, in the living conditions of India, the concrete sanction
of Art. 16( 4) so that those wallowing in the social quagmire are en- D
abled to rise to levels of equality with the rest and march together with
their brethren whom history had not so harshly hamstruni;:;. To bury
this truth is to sloganise Art. 16(1) and sacrifice the facts of life.

This is not mere harmonious statutory cdnstruction of Art. .16(!)
and ( 4) but insightful perception of our constitutional culture, reflect-
ing the current of resurgent India bent on making, out of a sick and
stratified society of inequality and poverty, a brave new Bharat. If
freedom, justice and equal opportunity to unfold ohe"s own persona-
lity, belong alike to bhangi and brahmin, prince and pauper, if the
panchama proletariat is to feel the social transformation Art. 16(4)
promises, the State must apply equalising techniques which will enlarge F
their opportunities and thereby progressively diminish the need for
props. The success of State action under Art. 16 ( 4) consists in the
sperd with which result-oriented reservatioh withers away as, no

- longer a need, not in the everwidening and everlasting op~ration of
an exception [Art. 16(4)] as if it were a super-fundamental right to
continue backward all the time. To lend immortality to the reserva-
G
tion policy is to defeat its raison de' etre; to politicise this provision for
communal support and Party ends is too subvert the solemn undertak-
ing of Art. 16(1), to costeify 'reservation' even beyond the dismal
groups of backward-most people, euphemistically described as SC &
ST, is to run a grave constitutional risk. Caste, ipso facto, is Bot B'
class in a secular State.
14-l281SCI/80

--.·•..-·1e-·----,--,-.·-·-----------,____________
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A The authentic voice of our culture, voiced by all the great builders
of modern India, stood for abolition of the hardships of the pariah,
the m/echa, the bonded labour, the hungry, hard-working half-slave,
whose liberation was integral to our Independence. To interpret the
Constitution rightly we must understand the people for ~horn it is
B made-the finer ethos, the frustrations, the aspirations, the parameters •
set by the Constitution for the principled solution of social disabilities.
This synthesis of ends and means, of life's maladies and law's remedies
fa a part of the know-how of constitutional interpretation if alienation
from the people were not to afflict the justicing process. (1)
A statute rarely stands alone. Back of Minerva was the
c brain of Jove, and behind Venus was the spume of the
ocean.
These broader observations are necessary to set our sights right,
to appreciate that our Constitution lays the gravestone on the old un-
just order and the cornerstone of the new humane order. This consti-
D tutional consciousness is basic to interpretative wisdom. We may now
start with the facts of the case and spell out the particular problems
demanding our consideration. Constitutional questions can'not be
viewed in vacuuo but must be answered in the social milieu which
gives it living meaning. After all, the world of facts enlivens the
world of words. And logomachy is not law but a fatal, though fasci-
E nati'ng, futility if alienated from the facts of life. So, before pronoun-
cing on the legality of the impugned ten orders we must sketch the
social setting in which they wern issued and the socio-economic facts
which clothe Art. 16(4) with flesh and blood.
'The wisest in conncil, the- ab>est in debate and the most
F agreeable companion in the commerce of humau life, is that
man who has assimilated .to his understanding the greatest
number of facts.' (2)

-
The facts
The Indian Railways, with an impressive rec'li'd of expansion,
G employs colossal numbers of serva'nts in various typically hierarchical
classes and grades. While the Indian Railways Act, 1890, substan-
tially regulaD,s many of the functions of the railway administration in
India, the Railway Board is constituted under the Indian Railway
Board Act, 1905, with a view more effectively to control the adminis-
tration of railways. The Central Government is statutorilv empowered
H (1) J. Landis, "A Note on Statutory Interpretation," 43:Harv. L. ' ~86, 891
(1930).
(2) Edmund Burke.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION. (Krishna Iyer, J.) 205

to invest the Railway Board with all or any of the powers and func A
tions of the Central Governmeht under the Indian Railways Act, 1890.
Power is also given by s. 2 t o vest in the Railway Board the capacity
to make general rules for railways administered by the Gov,ornment.
Of course, the investment of powers upon the Railway Board is, broad
ly speaking, subject to the condition that the Central Government re
tains the ultimate authority in all matters connected with the Railway
B
Administration. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in the Governn1ent
of India, deals usually with all matters of personnel, conditions of
5CIYice of the Central Government staff and the like. Policy decisions
regarding matters covered by Art. 16(4) apparently origihate from the
Ministry of Hom;, Affairs and emanate to the various institutions like
c
� the Railway Board which responsively implement them. In the present
case, ten directives were issued by the Railway Board on diffe1>::n l
occasions, which disclosed 'benign discrimination' in favour of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and are chalknged by the
petitioners as 'reverse discrimination', if \\'C inay use that expression
popularised in American legalese. These directives were designed to D
protect and promote the interests of members of the SC & ST in the
matter of their employment under the Indian Railway Administration
and they 5p'ccially related to the softer criteria for promotion. The
Railway Board acted, as is discernible from the relevant orders, in
obedience to the pol icy decisions of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Some argument was address•ed on the validity of the Railway Board's E
orders on procedural and other technical grounds. We see 110 subs
tance in them. The Board was bound to carry out the Cchtral
Government's directives under Art. 1 6 (4) and did it. The broader
issue of 'benign discrimi nati on' deserves close study.

F
The meat of the matter, to put it that way, is the gross discrimina
) tion alleged to be implicit in the s•everal Circulars of the Railway
( Board and the non-applicability of Art. 16( 4) to save these circulars.
The focus of this litigation must primarily turn oi;i that issue and the
court must navigate towards egalitarian justice at the level of promo
tion posts in the public services, keeping the land-mark rulings of this G
Court as mariner's compass. The disturbing perpetuation of socio
'
ecoiiomic suppression of a whole fifth of Indian manhood-the dalits
f -and the righteous resistence to prolonged 'reverse casreism' resulting
in deepening demoralisation of the economically oppressed-the
sos/zits-have been projected by counsel on the forensic screen as a
conflict between equalisation and equality. Our fonnding fathers, Il
familiar with social dialectics and socialist enlightenment, surely would

have in\ended lo bring both these have-not categod�s together as a
206 SUPREME. COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R,

A broad brotherhood against the die-hard Establishment and would
never have contemplated a fratricidal strategy which would blind and
divide brothers in distress-the dalits and the soshits-and harm the
integration of the nation and its developmental march. Unless by dia-
lectical approach sociologists lay bare this false dilema of dalits versus
soshits, the growing distrust in democracy will deepen, the 1urispru-
B •
dence of constitutional revolution and egalitarian justice will fade in
. the books and the founding hopes of January 26, 1950, will sour into
cynical dupes of the masses, decades after! Wider perspectives must,
therefore, inform our study of the. equality code (Arts. 14 to 16) to
rid it of social contradictions and read into it the need for a dalit-
soshit partnership in demanding social justice. Felix Frankfurter s~
c the judicial function when he said : (1)
A Judge should be compounded of the faculties that are
demanded of the historian and the philosopher and the
prophet. The la<t demand upon him-to make some fore-
cast of the consequences of his action-is perhaps the
D heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the future, to give shape
an(j visage to mysteries still in the womb of time, is the gift
of the imagination. It requires poetic sensibilities with which
judges are rarely e'ndowed and which their education does
not normally develop. These judges must have something
of the creative artist in them; they must have antennae re-
E
gistering feeling and judgment beyond logical, Jet alone
quantitative, proof.

Be that as it may, the court must go to the constitutional basics
for guidance, decode the articles indifferent to agitatioual portents and
ideological speculations, but responsive to the urgent implementation
F
of Art. 38 into the reality of Indian life. Article 38 reads :
38(1). The State shall strive to promote the welfare of
the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may
a social order in which justice, social, economic and political
shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
....
G.
(2) The State shall in particular, strive to minimise the
inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequali-
ties in staius, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst
'
individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in
different areas or engaged in different vocations.
H (emphasis added)
(I} Felix Frankfurter : Address ; N. Y. Times Magazine, November 28, 1954.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHAR! v. UNION (Krish11a Iyer,!.) 207

The learned Attorney General, while emphasising !he egalitanan A
commitment of the Constitution owr !he whole range of publlc ser-
vices throughout their career, defended the impugned orders by law
and logic, pragmatics and statistics, and countered the hypothetica!s
of the petitioners by the actuals furnished by official facts and figures.
He also relied on a few precedents, in particular, Ra11gachari's case(')
and Thomas's case(') both of which bind this Bench. He also B
sought to explain away the effect of Balaji's case(') and Devadason's
case(') on which the other side had heavily relied to nullify some of
-~e circulars.

The Union of India placed before us its case that notwith~tauding
measures for bringing the gap in the matter of gross under-representa-
c
tion in the Administrafion, no adequate improvement had been regis-
tered and, and so, more dynamic State action, to fulfil its constitutioltal
tryst with the frustrated fifth of the people described as SC & ST, be-
came necessitous. The raw reality pf meagre harijan and girijan
presence in the public services conscientised the Administration into D
taking a series of cautions steps to catalyse the prospects of these
categories entering the many Departments of Government not merely
at the initial stage but also at promotional points and in appointments
to supervisory posts so as to become members of the higher echelons.
The learned Attorney General contended that such affirmative action,
slurring over fanatical and finical insist•<nce on so-called merit and E
seniority, was in conformity with Art. 16(1) itself and, in any case,
was protected by Art. 16(4). Maybe, the human numbers outside
the SC & ST honestly suffer some meyhem in their career especially
at the higher notches of promotion after long stagnation and are bitter
that the shudra or panchama steals a march over him now, althongh
the poignant pages of earlier history have been a negation of person- F
~ then for millions of the dregs of society, desperately driving Dr.
Ambedkar to vow "I shall not die a Hindu". But the synthesis of Art.
16, not the antithesis between Art. 16 (1) and Art. 16 ( 4), gives the
clu~ to creative constitutional construction.

The learned Attorney General's plea was. that in a society of G
chronic inequality and scarcity of employment, actual equality could
never be midwifed without birth pangs, and discriminatory unconsti-
tutionality conld not vitiate programmes meant to achieve real-life

(I) General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari [1962] 2 SCR 586.
(2) Kerala v. Thomas [1976] 1 SCR 906. H
(3) Balaji v. State of Mysore [1963] Supp. I SCR439.
(4) Devadasan v. Union of!ndia 1964 SC 181.
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A equality, U11less we took a pragmatic view. This approach is permissi-
ble if we follow Chief Justice Warren: ( 1 )
Our judges are not monks or scientists, but participants
in the living stream of our national life, steering the law •
between tbe dangers of rigidity on tbe one hand and of form-
B lessness on the other. Our system faces no theoretical dilemma
but a single continuous problem : how to apply to ever-
changing conditions the never-changing principles of
freedom.
Let us draw the precise battle Jines to contain tbe constitutionaj)___
conflict within the actual limits. Equality of opportunity in matbs of
c State employment is a constitutional guarantee and no citizen can be
discriminated against on the score only of sex, caste, descent, place of
birth or residence. So, one point pressed before us is that Scheduled
Castes cannot be a favoured class in the public services because tbey
f!re 'castes' and cannot claim preference qua castes unless specially
saved by Art. 16 ( 4) . And Art. 16 ( 4) speaks of class, not caste and
D the two are different, however, politically convenient the confusio!l may
be. Another vital contention put forward by counsel for the peti-
tioners was that Art. 16 ( 4) could not apply to promotional levels. A
third basic plea was that efficiency of admi·nistration was a consti-
tutional consideration under Art. 335 and could not be a sacrificial
goat to propitiate the backward class Kali. The impugned circulars
offended against efficiency, both by fomenting frustration among the
Civil Services indirectly producing inefficiency and by manning higher
posts which demand higher skills with men of lower competitive
calibre and less experience in service thns posting 'efficiency risks' in
strategic positions violating Art. 335.
F The contentious issue is now clear. Are SC & ST mere castes
within the sense of Art. 16(2) ? If so, can Art. 16(4) help the~
castes through rule of promotional partiality ? And, in any case, can
Art. 16 ( 4) rescue rules of benign discrimination if tbe impact thereof
is generation of gross inefficiency ill administration ? Is not eco'.nomic
'have notism' a better yardstick of backwardness in secular India'?
G
A brief resume of the structure of the Railway Services may help
understand the rival arguments in tb•:eir precise setting. The pyramid
begins, at the base, with Class IV posts and rises to the apex, by stages,
through Cla~s III, Class II and Class I. True to our hierarchical
culture, pervasive in Indian Services, there are further sub-divisions,
H consisting of many categories in each class and many grades in each
category. The agencies for recruitment are the Union Public Service
(I) Earl Warren : Fortune, November 1955.

- - - - - - - - -...M
.........,.,"'"""'_ _ _ _ ,_,,,,11:1:1mnm1111111a11im 1mim•maa -.,;a-r"nr- "
AKH!L BHARA11YA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 209 "

Commission, the Railway Service Commission and the top officers A
authorised by the Railway Board in this behalf. Ordinarily the first
entry into each category is filled by direct recruitment, if we may .use
language loosely. Thereafter, appointments to higher grades/categories
are usually by promotion. The promotional processes are traditionally
two-fold, viz., (a) by departillental selection based on merit-cum-
seniority, and (b) by escalation, in the order of seniority, from the B
lower to the higher grade/category, subject, of course to being weed-
ed out if found unfit. Candidates belonging to Sc&ST n~ceive certain
pronounced advantages both at the stage of initial recruitment and later
f \
at the promotion stage. The Indian Railway Establishment Manual
a compendious collection of rules and directions bearing on the condi-
tions of employment of railway personnel, sets out all the information. c
Speaking population-wise and in approximate terms, the Scheduled
Castes constitute about 15% and the Scheduled Tribes 71%. Broadly
based on the ratio of the strength of SC&ST to the whole population,
the Railway Administration provided for reservation for candidates
belonging to the SC&sT. This percentage of reservation applied to
D
Class IV, Class III, Class II and, in a limited way, to Class I posts. The
reservation is worked out by the method known as 40-point roster.
These special provisions notwithstanding the intake of these commu-
nities, stagnating at the bottom of the Indian policy, continued to be
chronically niggardly. To i'ncrease the rate of absorption of SC&ST
into the services, further facilities, concessions and relaxations were E
offered from time to time. Despite these seemingly attractive employ-
ment opportunities the dismal backwardness in the matter of represen-
tation in administration from among the SC&ST was such that the
vacancies reserved for them remained, in many cases, unfilled by SC
&ST candidates. Lest the overall representation of the members of
the SC&ST should continue deplorably negligible Government adop- F
ted a policy of "carry forward", for upto three recruitment years, of
reserved vacancies if enough number of candidates from the said
groups did not get selected. The "carry forward" rule was calculated
to keep open reserved vacancies for at least three years so that the
under representation could be made up at least in part. Homogenisa·
tion of the dalits into the ·national mainstream was regarded as vital G
to our democracy by the State and these positive strategies of special
opportunities vis a vis SC&ST had, as its raison d'etre, - only the impe-
rative need to exercise the haunting specJre of the socially and econo-
mically suppressed species and to abolish the utter squalour of SC&
ST so that the community at large could march ahead without haggard
groups dragging their feet. Social conscience considers balanced demo- H
cratic development as the humane justification for selective discrimi-
nation.

e·w·wa. .1111m1111m1111m1111m1111m1111m1111m1111m1111m. . . . .. -................_...._._._.~~~-
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
With this backdrop, we may epitomise the ten 'tainted' directives
an~ scan them for their nnconstitutionality.

Special provisions for depressed classes and even other castes have
a pre-constitution history. After the Constitution was enacted the •
legality of old rules based on caste became moot and the Central
B
Government revised its policy. The post-Constitution re-incarnation
of the communal G.O. concentrated not on caste orientation but on
elimination of socio-economic suppression and the diverse ways to
achieve thi~ objective.

c We must remember, in this context, not merely !he four classes
of Service but also the broad division of the staff into selection and
non-selection posts. The first policy statement of the Union of India
on the issue of better representation of SC&ST in Government Service
begins with Resolution No. 42/21/49-NG 8 of September 13, 1950.
To understand the functional compulsions, purpose, orientation and
D constitutional parameters releva'nt to such a policy formulation we
have to refer to a few articles of the Constitution.

Articles 14 to 16 form a code by themselves and embody the
distilled essence of the Constitution's cask,less and classless egalitaria-
nism. Nevertheless, our founding fathers were realists, and so did not
ceclare the propositio11 of equality in its bald universality but sub-
ject•ed it to certain special provisions, 'not contradicting the soul of
equality, but adapting that never changing principle to the ever-chang-
ing social milieu. That is how Arts. 15 ( 4) and 16 ( 4) have to be
read together with Arts. 15 ( 1) and 16 (1) . The first sub-article
speaks of equality and the second sub-article amplifies its. content by
expressly interdicting caste as a ground of discrimirfatio'n. Article
16(4) imparts to the seemingly static equality embedded in Art. 16(1)
a dynamic quality by importing equalisation strategies geared fo the
eventual achievement of equality as permissible State action, viewed
as an amplification of Art. 16(1) ·or as an exception to it. The same
G observation will hold good for the sub-articles of Art. 15. Thus we
have a constitutional fundamental guarantee in Arts. 14 to 16; but it
is a notorious fact of our cultural heritage that the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes have been in unfree Indian nearly dehumanis-
ed, and a faoet of the struggle for Freedom has been the. restoration of
full personhood to them together with the right to share in the social
H and economic development of the country. Article 46 is a Directive
Principle contained in Part IV. Every Directive Principle is funda-
mental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,!.) 211

the State to apply that principle in making law. Article 46, in em- A
phatic terms, obligates the State.
"to promote with special care the educatioual and econo-
mic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in
particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes,
and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of B
exploitation.
Reading Art. 46 together with Art. 16 ( 4) the luscent intent of the
Constitution-framers emerges that the exploited lot of the harijan-
glrijan grou~ in the past shall be extirpated with special care by the
Staie. The inferrence is obvious that administrative participation by
SC&ST shall be promoted with special care by the State. Of course c
reservations under Art. 16(4) and promotional strategies envisaged by
Art. 46 may be important but shall not run berserk and imperil
administrative efficiency in the name of concessions to backward
classes. Article 335 enters a caveat in this behalf :
335. The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes D
and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration
consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administra-
tion, in the making of appointments to services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the :Union or of a State.
The positive accent of this Article is that the claims of SC.tST to E
equalisation of representation in services under the State, having regard
to their sunken social status and impotence in the power system, s.hall
be taken into consideration. The negative element, which is part of
the Article, is that measures taken by the State, pursuant to the man-

·-
. <late of Arts. 16(4), 46 and 335, shall be consistent with and not
subversive of "the maintenance of efficiency of administration". F
. Within this broad constitutional framework the Central Govern-
- ment worked out its policy, way back in 1950, an<;! made subsequent
· alterations in keeping with the needs of the situation, the poor progress
registered, the militant impatience of the affected SC&ST and the
improved tactics to hasten abolition of the depressed status of these G
groups by effective equalisation with the rest.
EV'en here, it may be noticed that the Constitution has given a
special position for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
Article 341 makes it clear that a 'Scheduled Cas~~, need not be a
'caste' in the conventional sense and, therefore, may not be a caste H
within the meaning of Arts. 15(2) or 16(2). Scheduled Castes be-
.come such only ifthe President specifics any castes, races or tribes or
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

A
parts or groups within castes, races or tribes for the purpose of the
Constitution. So, a group or a section of a group, which need not be
a caste and may even be a hotch-potch of many castes or tribes or
even races, may still be a Scheduled Caste under Art. 341. Likewise, •
races or tribal communities or parts thereof or part or parts of groups
B within them may still be Scheduled Tribes (Art. 342) for the purpose
of the Constitution. Under this definition, one group in a caste may
be a Scheduled Caste and another from the same caste may not be. It
is the socio-economic backwardness of a social bracket, not mere birth
in a caste, that is decisive. Conceptual errors cr~ep in when tradi-
tional obsessions obsfuscate \he vision.
c This aspect has been referred to in the State of Kerala v. N. M.
Thomas by me, and dealt with at more length by Ray, C.J.: (')
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not a caste
within the ordinary meaning of caste. In Bhaiya/al v. Hari-
kishcm Singh and Ors. ( 2 ) this Court held that an enquiry
D whether the appellant there belonged to the Dohar caste
which was not recognised as a Scheduled Caste and his decla-
ration that he belonged to the Chamar caste which was a
Scheduled Caste could not be permitted because of the provi-
sions contained in Article ~41. No Court can come to a find-
ing that any Caste or any tribe is a Scheduled Caste or Sche-
E duled Tribe. Scheduled Caste is a caste as notified under
Article 366(25). A notification is issued by the President
under Article 361 as a result of an elaborate enquiry. The
object of Article 341 is to proYide protection to the members
of Scheduled Castes having regard to the economic and edu-
cational backwardness from which they suffer.
F
The President notifies Scheduled Castes not with reference to any~~
caste characteristics but their abysmal backwardness, as is evident from
the scheme of Part XVI. He appoints, under Art. 338, a Special.
Officer whose duty is to investigate into all matters relating to safe-
G guards for the SC&ST. The Constitution provides not merely for ade-
quate representation of SC&ST to services ahd posts under the Union
and States, but also provides for reservation of seats for SC&ST in the
Legislatures. The cursory study of the Articles relating to the stafus
and safeguards of SC&ST puts it beyond doubt that the founding
fathers have assigned to them a special place and shown towards them
H special concern and charged the State with special mandates to redeem
(1) [1976] 1 SCR906at932.
(2) [1965] 2 SCR 877.
AKHIL BHARAT!YA SOSH!T KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 213

these handicapped human s~ctors from their grossly reta.rded situation. A
Indeed, they are not merely backward, bnt are the backwardmost and
cannot be equated with just any other caste in the Hindu fold. It is,
therefore, problematic whether Art. 16(2) when it refers to equality
among castes deals with the Scheduled Castes which, as shown above,
may even be made of a plurality of castes or groups or races and may
vary from State to State. Also, a caste, subjected qua caste, to the B
most humiliating handicaps 1l);ly be a backward class althougli~the Co.urt
will hesitate to equate caste with class except where the degree of dis-
malness is dreadful. The relevance of this point will be clear when we
deal with the legal submisskms of counsel.

We will now state, in an abbreviated form, the various measures of c
the Railway Board (in response to decisions of the Ministry of Home
Affairs) for reservation in s•crvices of SC&ST.

After noting the policy of communal representation in the Services
before the Constitution and the constitutional ba'n on discrimination
by way of reservation on the ground of caste save in the case cf SC& D
ST (and in some cases Anglo-Indians with whom we are unconcerned
here) the Home Ministry proceeded to spell out the new stance :
Pending the determination of the figures of population
at the Census of 1951 the Government of India have decided
to make the following reservations in recruitment to · posts E
and services under them :
(a) Scheduled Castes :-The existing reservation of
12:!-% of vacancies filled ·by direct recruitment in favour of
the Scheduled Castes will continue in the case of recruitment
of posts and services made, on an all-India basis by open
comp•,tition, i.e. through the Union Public Service Commis-
F
sion qr by means of open competitive test held by any other
• authority. Where recruitment is made otherwise than by
open competition the reservation for Scheduled Castes_ will be
16-2/3 as at present.
(b) Scheduled Tribes :-Both in recruitment by open G
competition and in recruitment made otherwise than by open
competitioh there will be a reservation in favour of m~mbers
of Scheduled Tribes of 5 % of the vacancies filled by direct
recruitment .
. . . . . . Under the Constitution all citizens of Indiu are H
eligible for consideration for appointment to posts and s~r-
vices under the Central Government irrespective of their
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A domicile or place of birth and there can be no recruitment
to any Central Service which is confined by rule to the inha-
bitants of any specified area. In practice however recruit-
ment to class I and II services and posts is likely to attract
candidates from all over India and will be on a truly all-
India basis, while for the majority of Class III
B services & posts which are filled otherwise than through the
Union Public Service Commission only those residing in the
area or locality in which the Office is located are likely to
apply. In the latter class of cases the percentages of reserva-
tions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes will be
c Jbced by Government taking into account the population of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in that area.

Reservations were ·~xcluded for promotions and minimum qualifications
were a 'must'. But age relaxation by 3 years (from the maximum
fixed for others) was allowed. This policy is not challenged as un-
D constitutional and rightly so.

However, this special provision showed only minimal concessions
to SC&ST, being the first cauti'()US, conservative, post-constitutional
measure under Art. 16(4). But law is what law does. Did this
relnctant relaxation only on a few grounds work? Constant monitor-
E ing of law-in-action, with an eye on the end result, is social engineering.
The goal here was to awaken the sleeping soul and harness the harifi1n
resource by mainstreaming techniques constitutionally sanctioned. The
policy proved non-viable and a change of strategy was called for and
by A nnexure D the Railway Board altered the rules "with a view to
securing increased representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled ·
F Tribes in the Railway Services". At the instance of the Home Minis-
try the Railway Board decided on 5-10-1955 that more realistic relaxa-
tions were needed and authorised recruiting bodies to slur over low
places obtained by the SC&ST candidates :
..... except where such authority considers that the mini-
G mnm sta!)dard necessary for the maintenance of efficiency of
the administration has 'not been reached. Whenever candi-
dates ar~ selected in this manner, the appointing authorities
will make necessary arrangements to give additional train-
ing and coaching to the recruits so that they might come up
to the standard of other recruits appointed along with them.
H
The anxiety to level up the lowly human layers by special training so
as to maintain administrative efficiency is evident in this directive .

•
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSH!T KARAMCHAR! v. UNION' (Krishna Iyer, J.) 215

Likewise, where direct recruitment, otherwise than by examination wa~ A
provided for, t~king of SC&ST candidates
' ..... fulfilling a lower standard of suitability than from
other communities, was permitted so long as the candidates
have the prescribed minimum education and techniCjtl quali-
fications and the appointing authorities are satisfied that 8
the lowering Of standards wilf not unduly affect the main-
tenance of!he efficiency of administration.'

Here again, obsession with 'efficiency' is manifest. Then comes what
is called the 'carry forward' rule :
(3) (a) if a sufficient number of candidates considered c
suitable by the recruiting authorities, are not available for
the communities for whom reservations are made.in a parti-
cular year, the unfilled vacancies should be treated as un-
reserved and filled by the best available candidates. The
number of reserved vacancies thus treated as unreserved will
be added as an additional quota to the number that would be D
reserved in the following year in the normal course, and
· to the extent to which approved candida!es are not available
in that year against this additional quota, a corresponding
• addition should be made to the number of reserved vacancies
in the second following year.
E

• • •
(b) In the event of suitable Scheduled Caste candidate
not being available, a Scheduled Tribe candidate can be ap-
pointed in 'the subsequent reserved vacancy and vice versa
subi!:ct to adjustment in the subsequent points of the roster. F

•The quota for two years, if carried forward, would not materially
affect the stream of 'merit-worthy' candidates, nor substantially dimi-
nish the proseects of non-SC&ST candidates in a given year. So the
Railway Board introduced the principle consistently with Art. 335.
G
Government moved further because real power could be shared by
the weakest sections only if the doors of the higher decks were pened
to them. The higher echelons are the real controllerales, not the me- d
nial levels, hierarchically structured as our society ·is. Obviously, Art.
16 ( 4) was not designed to get more harijans into Government as
scavengers and sweepers but as 'officers' and 'bosses', so that adminis- H
trative P?Wer may. become t~e common property of the high and low,
homogemsed and mtegrated mto one community. Social stratification
. '
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C.R.

A the bane of the caste system, conld be undone and vertical mobility
won not by hortative exercises but by experience of shared power.
Viewed thus, the 'open sesame' strategy for entry into superior
cadres could only be by extending concessions at higher levels .of 'pro-
motions'. Annexure D did not make reservations for SC&ST for pro-
motion posts, but merely asked for sympathy on the part of. promoting
authorities. Lachrymal exercises, even in government directives, are in
practice, little more than skin-deep; and elitist alibis, when the ancient
angnish of the lowliest & the lost besieges the citadels of the status quo,
readily checkmate ameliorative moves. The harijan Jot, in admi-
nistrative services at the promotional levels, remained a paper hope, a
c leasing illusion and a promise of unreality. Article 46, whether we like
it or not, ordains that the State shall 'with special care' promote the
·interests of the SC&ST. And so long as the harijan-girijan remained
an alien to the Civil Service and the janitors for the higher chambers
of Administration were themselves non-harijan-girijan gentlemen, he
would be a naive sociologist who thought that mere plea for more
D sympathy made in official orders would work magic. Government, on
a performance audit of its policy of 'no reservation' for promotion
posts, discovered that the harijan could hardly reach higher positions.
More effective methods were needed.
•
A radical change in policy was effected by the Railway Board
E through Annexure F of April 27, 1959. 'Merit', sanctified by tradition,
lost the battle. 'Tradition is a great retarding force, the vis inertiae of
history;' and so, heroic measures of progressive thrust, the Railway
Board realised, alone could effect the break-through and bring the
harijan-girijan groups into the higher brackets of Administration
Annexure F ·was promulgated providing for reservation,in promotion.<.
F This has been challenged before us.
The tepid provision opening up promotion posts for 'reserved'
categories was first confined to Class III and Class II, Class I being .~
too sacrosanct to be soiled by meritless members. Annexure F
reads :
G Sub : Reservation for members of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in posts filled by promotion in
·Railways.
Reference is invited to Board's letter No. E55CMI/3
dated 5-10-55. The Railway Board have, in partial modi-
H fication of para IV of the above letter, decided as follows :-
(a) Promotion from Class IV to Class Ill and from
Class Ill to Class II.
AK!IIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI '" UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 217

The Railway Board have decided that promotions from A
Class IV to Class lII and from Class III to Class II service
are of the nature of direct recruitment and the prescribed
, qnota of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes should be provided as in direct recruitment. The
field of eligibility in the case of Scheduled Castes and Sche-
duled Tribes candidates should be four times the number B
of posts reserved without any condition of qualifying period
of service in their case, subject to the condition that such
consideration· should not normally extend to staff beyond
· two grades immediately below the grade for which the
selection is held.
J c
This reservation was confined to 'selectioµ posts' and the circufar
was explicit that "there will be no quota for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes candidates in respect of promotion to "non-selection"
posts. For "general posts" of certain types in Class III, it was laid
down ·
D
( c) "General Posts" in Class Ill.
There are certain other types of posts on Railways such
as Passenger Guides, Welfare Inspectors, Safety Inspectors
Platform Inspectors, Publicity Inspectors, Vigilance Ins-
pectors, etc., which are ex-cadre posts filled by drawing
E
staff from more than one branch. Filling of these posts is
in the nature of direct recruitment and the re~ervatfon for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as applicable to
direct recruitment should be applied."
More chances to pass tests, additional training and coaching to
raise the standard of the sub-standard were also provided for in the F
Board's order. Homage was thus paid to the 'admi!Jistrative efficiency'
component of Art. 335.
t..-·· This departure regarding reservation at the promotion tier for
selection posts was challenged before this Court but upheld in Ranga-
chari'a case.(') We will dwell at some length on that ruling later
G
but we may merely mention than an appeal was made to us by
• counsel for the petitioners that we should reconsider bv reference
to a larger bench, the ratio of Rangachari which has be~n ~pprovingly
referred to for nearly two decades by this Court, acted upon by
Government throughout and enjoys, if we may say so with great res-
pect, our full concurrence. Constitutional propositions on which a H
.whole nation directs its destiny are not like Olympic records to be
(I) The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari [1962] 2 SCR 586.
-
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A periodically challenge and broken by fresh exercises in excellence but
solemn sanctions, with judicial seal set thereon, for the country to
navigate towards the haven of human development for everyone. To
play cross-word puzzle with constitutional construction is to profane •
it, unless, of course, a serious set-back to the progress of human
rights or surprise reversal of constitutional fundamentals has happen-
B •
ed. We find the question discussed, decided and consistently follow-
ed since Rangachari and see no reason to open the Pandora's box.
So it was that we rejected the plea for reconsideration.

Even so, the alternative method of containing Art. 16 ( 4) within f-
the contours of Rangachari was open to counsel and that has been
c done in argument as will be evident from the discussion on the vires ·'t__
of the subsequent orders of the Board. All the fire was turned by
petitioners' counsel on promotion 'excesses' through Railway Board
circulars. Annexure H of August 27, 1979 is one such :

Annexure H
D
The Railway Board have now revised their policy in
regard to reservation and other concessions to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in posts filled by promotion ....
The particular concessions are concretised thus :
E (B) Promotion by selection method (i) Class II appoint-
ments :
In promotion by selection from Class III to Class II, as a
measure of improving representation of Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes, it has now been decided that, if they are
F within the zone of eligibility the Scheduled Caste and Sche-
duled Tribe employees will be given, by the Selection/Depart-
mental promotion Committee, one grading higher than the
grading otherwise assignable to them on the basis of their
record of service i.e. if any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe employee bas been categorised by the Committee, on
G the basis of his record of service as "Good", he should be
recategorised by the Committee as "Very Good". Likewise, if
any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe employee is grades •
as "Very Good" on the basis of his record of service, he will
be recategorised by the Committee as "Outstanding". Of
course, if any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe employee
H has already been categorised by the Committee as "Outstand-
ing" on tbe basis of his record of service, no recategorisation
will be needed in his case. This recategorisation will then
-
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krfylzna Iyer,].) 219

form the basis of allotment of marks in respect of 'Record A
of service'.
The above concession would be confined to ouly 25 per
cent of the total number of vacancies in a particular grade
or post filled in a year. · .
In the matter of selection to Class ill and Class IV posts the con- B
cession runs thus :
There will be reservation of 12t per cent and '5 per cent
of the vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
respectively in promotions made by selection in or to Class. ·
III and Class IV posts, in grades or services in which the c
element of direct recruitment, if any, does not exceed 50 per
cent. Promotion against reserved vacancies will continue to
be subject to the candidates satisfying the prescribed mini-
mum qualifications and standards of fitness.
II. It has also been decided that in respect of promotions
to selection posts in Class ill where safety aspect is not in- D
volved, the qualifying marks under "Professional ability"
in respect of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candi-
dates should be 25 out of 50 instead of 30 out of 50 as appli-
cable to the candida1Jes belonging to the unreserved groups.
Similarly, qualifying marks in aggregate in respect of Sche-
duled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should be 50 out of 100 E
instead of 60 out of 100 for others.
It must be noticed that while grading has been modified and qualify-
ing marks reduced as indicated above, for SC&ST, care has also been
taken to exclude from these concessions, posts which involve "safety
aspects" and not to relax prescribed minima of qualifications and F
· standards of fitness. Article 335 has been honoured, making a margin
~on merit inevitable when choosing the second best.
The next Order assailed by counsel is that of 20th April 1970
( Annexure I) and its highlighUi are revealed by relevant excerpts:
, ANNEXURE I
The policy of the Gcmmment of India in regard to ~
servations for Scheduled Castes. and Scheduled Tribes in
posts and services under the Government of India was laid
down in the Ministry of Home Affairs Resolution No.
42/21/49 /NGS dated 13th September, 1950 circulated with H
Railway Board'• letter No. E47CMI/49/3 dated 23rd
December, 1950. The question of revising the percentage»
IS-1281SCI/80
-
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in
post and services under the Government of India in the light
of the population of these communities as shown in the
1961 census has been under consideration of the Govern-
ment for some time. It has now been decided in modifica-
tion of the decisions contained in paras 2 and 4 (1) of the
B
Ministry of Home Affairs' Resolution dated 13th September
1950, that the following reservations will hereafter be made
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in posts and
services which are filled by direct recruitment;

What !Ire they? 12!% and 5% are raised to 15% and 7t% respec- ·')._
c lively for SCs and STs, ccinsequent on the census picture and population
ratio. Likewise, in local or regional recruitments (presumably, they
are inferior posts) the population ratio prevalent in the concerned
States was to be the basis for reservation quota for SC&ST.

By the same order, the "carry forward" rule was carried a little
further forward by increasing it, in the absence of suitable candidates
from SC&ST, from 2 to 3 years. It was also provided that the re-
served vacancies, if candidates were available {and vice versa) could
well be filled by them, instead of being thrown open to the general
community.
E The Board's letter dated April 29, 1970 made a further change by
revising the roster. Positions Nos. 1, 4, 8, 14, 17, 22, 28, 36 were
to go to SC/ST candidates. The Note takes care to avoid total de-
privation of changes for a particular year for general candidates when
the vacancies are few :

N OTB : If there are only two vacancies IQ· be filled in
a particular year, not more than one may be trfa.ted as re-
served and if there be only one vacancy, it should be treated -..ii
as unreserved. If on this account, a reserved pojnt is treated
as unreserved the reservation may be carried fOJ/ward to the
subsequent three recruitment years. 1

' I

Similar provisions, though somewhat different in detab, were made for
posts filled by direct recruitment otherwise than by Open competition.

A big break with the past was next made by th~ Board's proceedc
ings of 11-1-1973 {Annexure K) which hurt thei lower classes of
·-
H employees whose promotion was regulated by seniopty-cum-suitability
{i.e., non-selection posts, according to official jargon). That directive
~tales :

,_
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION (Pathak, J.) 221

ANNEXCRE K A

After cs r rsideration the Board have now decided
that a quu,� . , ,a and 7t% for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes .�spectively may also be provided in pro
motion to the categories and posts in Class I, II, Ill and IV
filled on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability provided the B
element of direct recruitment to those grades, if any, does not
exceed 50% .

The number of reserved vacancies in a recruitment year
( m., financial year on the Railways) should be determined
under Board's letter No. E(SCT) 70CM15/10 dated
c
20-4-70 . . . . . . . .
In the case of reserved community candidates equal to
the number of reserved vacancies are not found suitable for
promotion even with relaxed standard, the reserved vacan
cies may be dereserved after following the procedure pres
cribed for dereservation as in the case of selection categories. D
The quota so dereserved will be carried forward to three sub
sequent recruitment years; the year in which no panel is
formed is not to be taken into account for this purpose.

This order has been fiercely attached as unconstitutional. The order
attached in Rangachari's
case (supra) related to selection posts E
at the promotion level but Annexure K ( 1 1-1-1973) covers promo
tion to non-Se/ec<tion posts. The whole gamut of promotions in
Classes II, III and IV areas thus comes under the reservation
formula.

Annexure I extended the principle of reservation to lower ranks F
of Class I services (i.e. Junior Class I scale) . The 'carry forward'
r- project, calculated to ensure adequate representation by broadening the
time zone to three years, was applicable to all cases of reservations in
promotion posts.

One of the major broadside attacks made on the validity of the G
Railway Board's circulars was the serious peril to administrative effi
ciency, a non-negotiable value under Art. 335. The hazards to
railway travel, it was urged, would so increase because of the harijan
component and its sub-standard performance that rail-road accidents
would escalate and threaten human life ! We must, by way of anti-
dote to this caricature, notice, however, that provisions for special H
training and coaching where the recruit was somewhat sub-standard,
wwi. ��.dall� insisted on and this, at least partially, o¥ercame the
..

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

'A 'awesome' deficiency. No factual material to blame all the ills of the
Indian Railways on the reservation policy was placed before ns except
a hnnch in a Report to be referred to later. If harijans were excluded
would railway accidents have a long holiday ? Courts are not cre-
dnlity in robes ! "
8 A comprehensive programme of balancing administrative compe-
tency with adequacy of SC&ST representation was attempted by the
Railway Board in Annexure M which provided for in-service training
for candidates who were below standard. This letter of the Board
dated 31st August 1974 recalled the earlier letter of 27-4-1959 which

c provided : ' · l-
, While filling the posts on promotion, however, candidates
of three communities should be judged in a sympathetic
. manner and arrangements made where necessary to give to
such staff additional training and coaching, to bring them
upto the standard of others.
D
In the light of actual experience and the complex of considerations
implied in Arts. 16(4), 46 and 335 the Board directed, with disturb;
ing concern for the continued exclusion of .SC&ST candidates, as
follows :
The matter has been further considered by the Board ·
E and it has been decided that if, during the selection proceed-
ings it is found, that the requisite number of Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe candidates are not available for being
placed on the panel in spite of the various relaxations, al-
ready granted, the best among them ·i.e. who secure highest
marks, should be earmarked for being placed on the panel
to the extent vacancies have been reserved in their favour. l
The panel excluding the names of such persons may also be -.If
declared provisionally. Thereafter the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe candid.ates who have been so earmarked
may be promoted ad hoc for a period of six months against
G the vacancies reserved for them. During the said six months
period, the Administration should give them all facilities for
improving their knowledge and coming upto the requisite
standard, if necessary by organising special coaching classes.
At the end of the six months period, a special report should
be obtained on the working of these candidates and the case
put up by the Department concerned to the .General Manager
H ibrough SPO(RP) for a review. The continuance of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates in the
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,!;) 223

higher grades would depend upon this review. If the candi- A
dates are found to have come upto the requisite standaid,
their names would be included in the panel and the vacancies
dereserved and filled in the usual manner by candidates from
other communities.
The procedure indicated in the preceding para would B
also apply to promotion to the posts filled on the basis of
seniority-cum-suitability, with the only difference that the
Review at the end of the six months period would be earned
. . out · by the authority competent to approve the Select List.
J This directive takes good care of harijan-girijan obtu8eness, if any. c
We move on to Annexure N of February 21, 1976 which relates
to carrying forward of reserved vacancies remaining unfilled. We
need not go into its details except to state that further facilities are
offered to SC&:ST promotees, on account of unsatisfactory intake as
a fact.
D
Although on paper what might appear to be pampering conces-
sions were offered to SC&sT candidates, the painM reality, according
to the Union of India, was alarming under-representation and utter
inadequacy of SC&sT personnel in the Railway Services. Arithme!lcal
manipulations and national concessions incorporated in government
proceedings did not impact on the raw life of depressed classes unless
activist tactics of upgrading the competence and awareness of those
human sectors were fruitfully carried QUt in a result-oriented manner.
The Union of India and the Railway Board apparently pinned their
faith on increasing the percentage hoping that thereby more harijans
would be attracted. The twin reservations of 15 % and 7t % for the
SCs and STs to be filled by promotion in Class I, II, III and IV scr- I'
F• whereby seniority-cum-suitability or selection on the strength
of competitive examinations, had all along been limited in such n;ianner
as not to exceed 50%, even on the application of the 'carry forward'
formulae. Since this did not ensure fair representation, a change Wlli
contemplated by Annexure 0 :
G
The question of enlarging the scope of' the existing scheme
of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
in the aforesaid cases has been under the considei;ation of the
Government of India for some time past and in partial modi-
fication of the instructions contained in the above letters it
has now been decided that henceforth the reservations in posts H
filled by promotion under the existing scheme as indicated
above would be applicable to all grades or services where
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A the element of direct recruitment, if any, does not exceed
66-2/3% as against 50 per cent as at present.

What was done was to raise the maximum from 50% to 66-2/3%
its vice, writ on its face-according to counsel's argument-being
promotion of inefficiency along with promotion of Sc&ST appointees.
B The furious charges of inefficiency in Administration,. injected by in-
competence imported through SC&ST candidates and by frustration
anJi demoralisation of the non-SC&ST members who were passed
over by their less compe.tent juniors, was sought to be supported by
reliance. on the Report of the Railway Accidents Enquiry cofumittee, '')..._
1968. There was reference in it to discontent among supervisors
c inter alia on account of the procedure of reservation of posts for Sc&
ST. It is true that the Report has a slant against the Sc&ST promo-
tion policy notwithstanding the assurance given by the Railway Board
to the Committee that instructions had been issued not to relax stan-
dards in favour of SC&ST members where safety was involved. We
D need hardly say that it is straining judicial gullibility to breaking point
to go that far. This is an argumentum an absurdum though urged by
petitioners with hopeful ingenuity. Nor are we concerned with certain
newspaper items and representations about frustration and stagnation.
On the other hand, the plea, forceifully put forward that economic back-
. wardness should be the touchstone of any reservation policy in a secu-
E lar, socialist republic may merit better examination. Surely, extrane-
ous factors, however passionately projected, cannot shake or shaoe
judicial conclusions which must be founded on constitutional criteria
and relevant facts only. What then is the defence of the Union to the
charge of departure from equal treatment for all citizens alike ? What
is the principle derivable from the precedents on the points raised ?

A technical point is taken in the counter affidavit that the 1st petiFi/
tioner is an unrecognised association and that, therefore, the petitionec
to that extent, is not sustainable. It has to be overruled. Whether the·
petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a
G large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have •
approached this Court under Art. 32. Our current processual jurispru-
dence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based
and people-oriented, and envi~ons access to justice through 'class
actions', 'public interest litigation', and 'representative proceedings'.
Tu.deed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts
H through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive·
plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our
democracy. We haye no hesitation in holdi!lg that the narrow concept'
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 2 2 5

of 'cause of action' and_'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is A
becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated
• that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-
recognised association maintaining the writ petitions.

The case of the Union of India is that Arts. 46, 335, 16(1)
and 16(4) must be taken as a constitutional package and not read B
in isolation. In that view, the policy of reservation is gear¢

.. to equalisation of opportunities for employment and, therefore,
a fulfilment of Art. 16 ( 1 ) . Reading the two sub-articles as com-
plementary to each other and giving a wider conno\ation to the
expression "appointment", the learned Attorney General sought to
include in its semantic circle appointments by way of promotion,
c
deputation, transfer and on contract. On this footing, it was urged
that Art. 16(4) completely protected the various directives regaro-
ing appointments by promotion. It is the case of the Government
that SC&ST have all along suffered social and economic deprivation
and utter under-representation in the Government service. Natnral- D
ly, reservation to boost the chances of the SC&ST in Government
services had to be resorted \o as a pragmatic policy of levelling up.
Having regard to administrative efficiency and other social factors,
Government had been reviewing the position from time to time and
had tailored its reservation policy to fit the needs of a given service
or state of affairs. The stand of the State is that- E
.... once the Government have decided after review-
ing the overall position of representation of Scheduled
CastesfScheduled Tribes in ·Government Services that the
reservation principles should continue in certain types of
appointments, the reservation of a certain number of vacan-
cies have to be provided, irrespective of whether Sche-
F
duled Castes/Scheduled Tribes are already duly represented
or not in specific cadres of the Services.

Although Rangachari's case covered only selection posts, the
Union of India took the view that the same principle held good for
non-selection posts also. In fact, if at all the prospects of SC&STs G
•
in Government Service were to be improved, it had to begin with
non-selection poots. They are the lower categories where the
members of the SC&ST have a chance. Provision of reservation in
Class I services would be theoretically attractive to SC&STs but not
so much in practice.
H
.... reservation in promotional appointments made by
means of seniority-eum-suitability is necessary because the

•
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes who generally occnpy
the lower positions in the recruitment/promotional panels
cannot get further promotion at all or as per the requisite
percentage alongwith other employees because of their very
low position in the seniority list. : ...

B The snbmission of the Central Government is that notwithstanding
the extension of the principle of reservation, the presence of harlfans
and girijans is sparse.
. . . . In this connection, an extract from the half year-
ly report of the Ministry of Railways for the period ending
31-3-1978 showing the representation of the Scheduled
c Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the various Railway Services
presented to the Parliament by the °t>vemment i! repro-
duced below ....
The table furnished as in 1978 shows that Scheduled Castes have in
Class I around 7% representation, in Class Il 9.5%, in Class ID
D 11.1 % and even in Class IV (excluding safaiwalas) only 18%.
Safaiwalas, who are menials like scavengers and sweepers, are mostly
drawn from harijans since other communities consider such jobs
infra dig. So, there is 83 % representation of SCs among safaiwalas.
This is not because of representation hut because no one else is
forthcoming for such 'untouchable' jobs. The Scheduled Tribee
E have a more pathetic tale to tell. In Class I services they have
1% representation, in Class n, 1.8%. in Class m, 2.2% and In
Class IV (excluding safaiwalas) 5.1 % 'and even among safaiwabs
only 1.5 % . On the basis of these statistics the Railway Board's
case is that adequacy of representation for SC&STs even according
to their population (forgetting centuries of total exclusion) is a l q
way o:l'f.
These official figures culled from tho Reports of the Commis-___,j;]
sioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are for employ-
ment in Central Govt. not confirmed to the Railways, and reveal how
a square deal to SCs and STs may take centuries, observing the
G current snail's pace in the intake.
•
Social realists will read these pessimistic figures of the last ten
years which prove the myth and negate the neurotic rhetoric about
the sc&ST communities having cornered all the posts in the Central
Government from Chaprasi to Secretary, accelerating thereby the
H impending calamity of administrative collapse due to the dispropor·
tionate presence of the 'inefficient' social components! A mere
formula of reservation is not the factum of recruitnient. That IS
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.)221

morbid fancy. The truth is that more aggressive policies than A
paper reservations are the need if equality and excellence are the
• -Ol"eed. Reservation is but one strategy and historically has esta-
blished itself. More must be done by a complex of processes by
,, .·
which harijans/girijans will get boosted in 'capabilities', and main-
itreamed to share in the Civil Service cake. The poor annual assimi-
lation into the public employment sector of the weakest social B
segments makes a tragic m<ickery of the statistical jugglery of harijan
monopoly. Any theory or formula is best tested by how it works,
not by how it is worded. Nikita Kruschev once remarked : " .•• a
theory isolated from practice, is dead, and practice which is not
illumined by .... theory is blind". The theoretical attack on over-
representation flowing from the reservation rule must be tried out in
c
practice, as the figures for the last 10 years show; and the justifica-
tion for more facilities and higher percentage in public employmen•
must be validated by the thesis of social justice. Assertions either
way end in a blind alley. That is why we have been at pains to
project the constitutional theory and resultant representation of SC D
and ST reservations under Art. 16 ( 4).
Percentage of reservations made in favour of Scheduled Castes (SC) and
Scheduled Tribes (ST).

Class I Class II Class III Class IV
Alon
SC ST SC ST SC ST SC ST

1-1-70 2·36 0·40 3·84 0·37 9·27 1·47 18·09 3·59

1-1-71 2·58 0·41 4·06 0·43 9·89 1·7018·37 3·65

1-1-72 2·99 0·50 4·13 0·44 9·77 1·7218·61 3·82· II'
1-1-73 3·14 0·50 4·52 0·49 10·05 1·95 18·37 3·92

1-1-14 3·25 0·57 4·59 0·49 10·33 2·13 18·53 3·84

1-1-75 3·43 0·62 4·98 0·59 10·71 2·27 18·64 3·99
1-1-76
G
3·46 0·68 5·41 0·74 11·31 2·5118·75 3·93
1-1-'1'/ 4·16 0·77 6·07 0·77 11·84 2·78 19·07 4·35

1-1-78 4·50 0·85 6·44 0·88 12·22 2·86 19·13 4·66

1-1-79 4·75 0·94 7·37 1 ·03 12·55 3·11 19·32 5·19
B
'The facts, in the statement we have digested from the Reports
«If the Collllllissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
228. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c:1t.

A conclusively show the long distance to travel before the SC&ST mem-
bers in the civil services can be said to have had a fair or at least
a proportional deal. Classes II and III for the whole of the central
services have a range of 3.84% to 7.37% and 9.27% to 12.55% for
Scheduled Castes and 0.37% to 1.03% and 1.47% to 3.11 % for
Scheduled Tribes while their eligibility is of the order of 15 % and ...
B 7:!-% respectively. What a grievous beeway after 33 long years may
be the acid comment of the victim sector (i.e. the harijans and the
girijans).

The Central Government has countered the submission of the
petitioners, presented persuasively by Shri Venogopal, that reservation ·~ ..
c compounded by the carry forward rule has ended up almost in cent
per cent reservation to SC&STs (thus wholly excluding others from
job opportunities). The counter-affidavit states thus :
I do not admit that the Government is giving 100 %
reservation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
D I submit that normally ouly 15% and 7!% of the vacancies
by means of a roster mechanism are reserved for the Sche-
duled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively. However,
in the following cases, it may look as if 100% of the avail-
able vacancies are being given to the Scheduled Castes/
Scheduled Tribes ....
E Of course, based on Rangachari (supra) the State contends that entry
even at the promotional points is constitutionally permitted and
protected. The grievance that junior harijans steal a march over
other senior members of service is exceptional rather than general,
according to the Railway Board, and, in any case, is inevitable
I' where reservation is permissible. Furthermore, the Ministry of
Railways, having regard to Art. 335 had taken special care to give
training, coaching and the like, to prevent inefficiency and to promote
competency of SC&ST members in service. The. deponent on behalf.

!)
of the Union of Jndia has explained the position thus :
I submit that the Ministry of Railways, in 1974 after
reviewing the position of intake of Scheduled Castes and
-
Scheduled Tribes in groups of posts filled by promotion in
Railway Services, and on the basis of a recommendation
made by the Parliamentary Committee on the Welfare of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, introduced a
scheme of training of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
B Tribes employees on the jobs of the posts to which they
are to be promoted. According to this scheme, if, during
selection proceedings, it is found that the Scheduled Castes/

/
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, l.}2z9
.,.·
.Scheduled Tribes of requisite standards are not available for
beingJ placed on the panel, the best among them numbering
to the extent of reserved vacancies i.e. who secure
the highest marks, are provided with in-service training..
For this purpose, such candidates are promoted on ad hoc
basis for a period of six months to the grade of the post on
· the jobs of which they are to receive training. During the B
said six months' period, the administration give them all
facilities for impl"OVing their knowledge and coming upto
the requisite standard, if necessary by organising special
coaching classes. At the end of six months' period, a
special report is obtained on the working of such candidate
which is reviewed by the General Manager or other compe- c
tent authority. If, as a result of this review, they are found
to have come upto the requisite standard of fitness to hold
the post on regular basis, they are included in the panel and
are promoted to the grade regularly. If, however, the said
review reveals that such candidates, even after receiving the
D
training on the jobs to which they are to be promoted regu-
larly, have not come upto requisite standard of suitability,
such candidates are immediately reverted to the grade from
which they were given ad hoc promotion for the purpose of
training.
A further plea is taken that temporary promotions on ad hoc E
basis are sometimes given to SC&ST members purely for shorli
durations "for the purpose of imparting them with in-service training
on th' jobs of the post to which they aspire for promotion". This
had to be treated as' a training period rather than an unconstitutional
prcimotion over the heads of seniors. In short, the factual submis-
sion of massive infiltration of incompetent harijans/girijans into
'.!if- the Railway Service vertically all along the line is refuted by facts
and figures. Secondly, the legal contentions of the petitioners have
also been· contested by the Unioo of India (given earlier) .
In this background, we may formulate the following points
• round which arguments have ranged and then deal with some mini- G
submissions and technical objections put forward before us.

(1) Does Art. 16(1) insist on absolute equality or permit realis-
tic and rati\)lllll classification of unequal classes and treatment of
such classes differently ?
H
(2) Do SC&STs stanq in a different class frdm the rest of the
Indian community ?
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A (3) Are SC&ST castes, within the scope of Art. 16(2) ? If so,
doea Art. 16(4) save special provisions in their favour in matters of
promotion and allied matters ?
( 4) Do the <lirectives under attack impair administrative effi-
ciency to a degree that it is violative of Art. 335 ?
:a ( 5) Do the ten circulars reduce the fundamental right under
Art. 16(1) to a husk or cipherise it altogether?

We must state certain constitutional fundamentals and societal
elementals before we make a dialectical study of the ' basic issues
thrown up by these cases. Most of the submissions made by coun-
c sel for petitioners cannot survive Rangachari and Thomas (supra)
and our task is simplified by abiding by the propositions laid down
therein, because these t.win rulings bind us being of benches of fiYe
and seven judges. Even though we would, we could not and even
though we could, we would, not depart from the holdings in these
D twin land-mark cases which set the gravestone on many· of tbe con-
tentions.

What are the constitutional fundamentals bearing on egalite
vis a vis backward classes, especially the SC&STs ? What are the
~ial essentials afflicting the life-style of the SCs&STs? What is

• economic backwardness as distinct from social injustice and how does
the Constitution strike the path of remedial jurisprud~ce harmonis-
ing the demands of both categories ?
A luminous prefuce to the constitutional values nullified by social
realities is found in Dr. Ambedkar's address to the Constituent
Assembly earlier extracted, which draws poignant attention to the life
F of contradictions between the explosive social and economic inequalities
and· the processes of political democracy. "How long shall we continue
to live this life of contradictions ? How long shall we continue to
deny equality in our social and economic life?" Was the interrogation
before the framers of the Constitution and they wanted to enforce the
G principle of 'one man, one value'. This perspective must Inform the
code of equality contained in Arts. 14 to 16. Equality being a
dynamic concept with flexible import this Court has read into Arts.
14 to 16 the pragmatic doctrine of classification and equal treatment
to all" who fall within each class. But care must be taken to see that
classification is not pushed to such an extreme point as to make the
H fundamental right to equality cave in and collapse. (See observatious
in Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors. v. State of !ammu and Kashmir(')
(1) [1974] 1 SCR 771.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCliARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.)231

Ray, C.J. in Kera/a v. Thomas (') epitomised the position in a few A
p1111Sages :
Articles 14, 15 and 16 from part of a string of consti1n-
tionally guaranteed rights. These rights supplement each other.
,, Article 16 which ensures to all citizens equality of opportu-
nity in matters relating to employment is an incident of
· ·guarantee of equality contained in Article 14. Article 16(1) Jl.
gives effect to Article 14. Both Articles 14 and 16(1) permit
reasonable classification having a nexus to be the object to
be achieved.
Discrimination is the essence of classification ...... .
Classification is, therefore, to be founded on substantial
differences which distinguish persons grouped together from c
those left out of the groups and such differential attributes
must bear a just and rational relation to the object sought ~o
be achieved ....
There is no denial of equality of opportunity unlCSIJ the
person who complains of discrimination is equally situated D
with the person or persons who are alleged to have been
favoured. Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classifica-
tion of employees or reasonable tests for their selection. State
of Mysore v. V. P. Narasinga Rao('). This equality of
opportunity need not be confused withl absolute
equality ..... .
Under Article 16(1) equality of opportunity of employ-
ment means equality as between members of the same
class of employees and not equality between members of
separate, ind.ependent class ....
The rule of parity is the equal treatment of equals in
equal circumstances. The rule of differentiation is enacting
laws differentiating between different persons or things in
different circumstances. The circumstanceii which govern on•
set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same aa
governing ,another set of persons or objects so that the
question of unequal treatment does not really arise between
persons governed by different conditions ·and different sets
of circumstances. . . . A classification in order to be consti-
tutional mus! rest upon distinctions that are substantial and
not merely illusory. The test is whether it has a reasonabl1
basis free from artificiality and arbitrariness embracing
all and omitting none naturally falling into that catego17,
I (I) [1976]1SCR906 at 926-29.
(2) [1968j 1 SCR 407,
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 2 S.C."R.

Therefore, in the present case if the SC&STs stand on a substan-
tially different footing they may be classified group-wise and treated
separately since there is' a Great Divide between the SC&STs on the
one hand and the rest of the Indian community on the other. This is
no matter of speculation or investigation because the Constitution
itself has recognised the direst soci~conomic backward status of
these species of humanity. We may quote Ray, C.J. where he
observed : (')
D
The Constitution makC"S a classification of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in numerous provisions and
gives a mandate to the State to accord special or favoured
treatruent to theru. Article 46 contains a Directive Principle
of State Policy-fundamental in the governance of the coun-
try enjoining the State to promote with special care educa-
tional and economic interests of the "Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes and to protect them from any
special injustice and exploitation. Article 335 enjoins that
the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes to the services and posts in the Union and
F the States shall be taken into consideration. Article 338
provides for appointment by the President of a Special
Officer for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to
investigate all matters relating to the safeguanls provided for
them IJ.nder the Constitution. Article 341 enables the
CG President by public notification to specify castes, races or
tribes which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in the
States and the Union Territories. Article 342 contains pro-
vision for sirui!ar notification in respect of Scheduled Tribes.
Article 366(24) and (25) defines Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. The classification by the impugned rule
and the order is with a view to securing adequate representa-
(I) [1974] 1 SCR 771.
(2) [1976] 1 SCR 906 at 931.
AfOilL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna lyer,J.)233

lion to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in th\\ A
services of the State as otherwise they would sl:agnate in the
• lowest rung of the State services .
Article 335 of the Constitution states that claims of
• members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall
be taken into consideration in tlre making bf appointments B
to the services and posts in connection with affairs of the
State consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of aclminis-
tration.

I had made similar observations in the same case : (')
The Directive Principles of State Policy, fundamental in
c
the governance of the country, enjoin on the State the promo-
tion 'with special care the educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in parti-
cular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes ...
and protect them from social injustice'. To neglect this D
obligation is to play truant with Art. 46. Undoubtedly,
economic interests of a group-as also social justice to it-
are tied up with its place in the services under the State. Our
history, unlike that of some other countries, has found a
zealous pursuit of government jobs as a mark of share in State
power and economic position. Moreover, the biggest-and E
expanding, with considerable Sl:ate undertakings, employer
is Government, Central and State, so much so appoint-
ments in the public services matter increasingly in the prose.
perity of' backward segments. The Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes have earned special mention in Art. 46
and other 'weaker sections' in thi3 context meam not every ll
'backward class' but those dismally depressed categories
comparable economically and educationally to Scheduled
Castes· and Scheduled Tribes.
,.
Proceeding on this footing, the fundamental right of equality of
opportunity has to be read as justifying the categorisation of SC&STs G
' separately for the purpose of "adequate representation" in the services
under the State. The object is constitutionally sanctioned in terms, as
Arts. 16 ( 4) and 46 specificate. The classification is just and reason-
able, We may, however, have to test whether the means used to
reach the end are reasonable and do not outrun the purposes. of the
classification. Thus the scope of the case is narrowed down. B
(!) [1976] l SCR 906 at 974.
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A Of course, apart from Art. 16(1), Art. 16(2) expressly forbids
discrimination on the ground of caste and here lhe question ariscs
as to whether the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are castes within •
the meaning of Art. 16(2). Even assuming that th 're is discrimination,
Art. 16(2) cannot be invoked unless it is predicated that the
•
• Scheduled Castes are 'castes', Te minological simi1arities are au illu-
sory guide ahd we cannot go by verbal verisimilitude. It is very doubt-
ful whether the expression caste will apply to Scheduled Castes. At any
rate, Scheduled Tribes are identified by their tribal denomination. A
tribe cannot be equated with a caste. As stated earlier, there are suffi-
cient indications in the Constitution to suggest that the Scheduled
c Castes are not mere castes. They may be something less or some thing
more and the time badge is not the fact that the members belong to a
caste but the circumstance that they belong to an indescribably back-
ward human group. Ray, C.J. in Kera/a v. Thomas (supra) made cer-
tain observations which have been extracted earlier to make out that
"Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not a caste within the
D ordinary meaning of caste". Since a contrary view is possible and has "' T
been taken by some Judges a verdict need not be rested on the view 1-
that SCs are not castes. Even assuming they are, classification, if
permitted, will validate the differential rules for promotion. Moreover,
Art. 16(4) is an exception to Art. 16(2) also.

E
The constitutional enquiry is whether the harijan/girijan fold is so
sharply marked off from the rest of the Indian human family as to
justify classification for considerate treatment in the field of public
employment ?

p
Let us be sure of the social facts. Mark Twain cynically remarked
once : "Get your facts first, and then you can distort them as much
as you please." By that token, let us scan the status of the SC&STs,
the result of reservations in habilitating them into State services and
the depressment impact on efficiency by supersession of meritorious
seniors. It is a fact of our social history and a blot on our cultural
heritage that 135 million men and women, described as SC&STs, havo •
-
been suffering as "suppressed classes", denied human dignity and
languishing as de facto bonded labour. They still arc. in several
places, "worse than the serf and the slave" and "their social standard
ii lower than the social standard of ordinary human beings"
B (Ambedkar). Tortured, violated and even murdered, the saga of tbs
SC&STs is not only one of economic exploitation but of social ostra-
cisation. Referring to the sorrowa of the suppressed shudras (what I
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 235

• prefer to call the panchama proletariat) Swami Vivekananda demanded A
shudra raj and refuted the incapabilities of the groaning untouchables :
"Aye, Brahmins, if the Brahmin has more aptitude for
learning on the ground of heredity than the Pariah, spend no
• more money on the Brahmin's education but spend all on
the Pariah. Give, to the weak, for there all the gift is B
needed . . . Our poor people, these downtrodden masses of
India, therefore, require to hear and to know what they
really are. Aye, let every man and woman and child, with-
out respect of caste or birth, weakness and strength, hear
and learn that behind the strong and the weak, behind the
high and the low, behind everyone, there is that Infinite .c
Soul, assuring that infinite possibility and the infinite capacity
of all to become great and good. Let us proclaim to every
soul 'Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached.'
Arise, awake ! (1)

To make democracy functional and the republic real the social and D
economic personality of these backwardmost sections had to be
restored. From this angle, the ancient injustice on the shudras among
the shudras has to be liquidated by effective equalising measures.
Power, material power, is the key to socio-economic salvation and the
State being the nidus of power the framers of the Constitution have
made provision for representation of these weaker sections both in the E
legislature and the executive.

More poignant is the fact that all the welfare programmes have
been only on paper, not in practical life. With all the 'pampering'
complained of, we find that these downtrodden millions remain at the
bottom of the socio-economic scale and totter in the administrative F
services surviving with difficulty and securing some promotion here
~,or there amidst a hostile milieu. If the concessions, reservations,
relaxations and other partisan provisions had actually brought into the
Services a considerable percentage 'at least commensurate with their
population, maybe, the grievance voiced may ring true. But as late as
1971, a former Minister, B. S. Murthy, in his book "Depressed and G
Oppressed (Forever in Agony)" has given a sombre picture of the
actual plight of the harijans of India and the figures of employ-
ment in Government Services of Scheduled Castes and Tribes as on
1-1-1970 (20 years after the Constitution) furnished by him (p. 74)
are tell tale. In Classs I services percentage-wise these castes which
B
constitute 22.5 % of India's population bad 0.40% in Gass II, 0.40, in
(1) Socio-Political views of Vivekananda, Binoy K. Roy p. 30.
l6-1281SCI/80
•

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

Class III, 1.47 and in Class IV, 3.41. This was socio-economic demo-
cracy in reverse gear and a callous picture of under-representation in
administration as if harijans and girijans were still untouchable and
unapproachable, vis-a-vis Services under the State. Once we realise
with John Tyndall that "It is as fatal as it cowardly to blink facts
because they are not to our taste'', the wind is taken out of the sails •
B of the case of the petitioners. For, in truth and actual life whatever the
Railway Board's arders may say the representation of the .SC&STs
remains substantially below the sanctione<l level although fair repre-
sentation, at least in proportion to their population is what is demo-
graphically just, ignoring for the moment the neutralisation' of the
iniquitions past.
c We must remember that Art. 14 speaks of equality before the law
and Art. 16 vouchsafes equality of opportunity. The social dynamics
of equality involve the strategy of equalisation in a society of strati-
fication through casteification. One of us did observe : ( 1)
"In a spacious sense, 'equal opportunity' for members of
D a hierarchical society makes sense only if a strategy by which
the under privileged have environmental facilities for deve-
loping their full human potential. This consummation is
accomplished only when the utterly depressed groups can
claim a fair share in public life and economic activity,
including employment under the State, or when a classless
E and casteless society blossoms as a result of positive State
action. To help the lagging social segments, by special care,
is a step towards and not against a larger and stabler
equality. . . . .
It is a statistically proved social reality in India that
the depressed employment position of harijans is the master
F
problem in the battle against generations of retardation, and
'reservation' and other solutions have made no significant
impact on their employment in public services. In such an
unjust situation, to maintain mechanical equality is to per-
petuate actual inequality. A battery of several programmes
G to fight down this fell backwardness must be tried out by the
State." •
Subba Rao, J. in Devadasan's case(2) brought out the need for
equalisation to produce stable equality in society by a telling imagery.
Although he was in a minority on one point in that case, that did not
detract from the validity or force of the general o'bservations : (')
B (!) [1976] I SCR 906 at 979-80 at 983.
(2) T. Devadasan v. The Union of India and Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 080.
(3) Ibid p. 700•

. , ' - ·----
·-
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 237

Article 14 lays down the general rule of equality. Article A
16 is an instance of the application of the general rule with
special reference to opportunity of appointments under the
State. It says that there shall be equality of opportunity for
• all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the Stale. If it stood alone, all the back-
ward communities would go to the wall in a society of un- B
even basic social structure; the said rule of equality would
remain only an utopian conception unless a practical content
was given to it. Its strict enforcement brings about the very
situation it seeks to avoid. To make my point clear, take
the illustration of a horse race--one is a first classrace horse
and the other an ordinary one. Both are made to run from c
the same starling point. Though theoretically they are given
equal opportunity to run the race, in practice the ordinary
horse is not given an equal opportunity to compete with the
race horse. Indeed, that is denied to it. So a handicap may
be given either in the nature of extra weight or a start from
D
a longer distance. By doing so, what would otherwise has
been a force of a competilion would be made a real one.
The same difficulty had confronted the makers of the Consti-
tution at the time it was made. Centuries of calculated
oppression and habitual submission reduced a considerable
section of our community to a life of serfdom. It would be E
well nigh impossible to raise their standards if the doctrine of
equal opportunity was strictly enforced in their case. They
would not have any chance if they were made to enter the
open field of competition without adventitious aids till such
time when they could stand on their own legs.
F
A strikingly similar strain of justice thinking has been developed in
other jurisdictions in the field of equal protection and benign discrimi-
nation by Polyvos G. Polyviou in his book "The Equal Protection of
the Laws". It may be meaningful to notice the argument : (')
" .... focuses on the concepts of equal treatment and
equal opportunity, professes to construe them realistically, G
and declares that '(t)he minority applicant does not have
an opportunity "equal" to the white's because the discrimi-
natory denial of educational, 'professional and cultural
opportunities for generations past has severely handicapped
him in any contest of early intellectual attaimnent'. As
Professor Cox has well put the question, '(d)o we achieve B

(I) The Equa!Jprotection of the laws by G. Polyvlou p. 364, 361-63.
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A equality by pulting each individual on the same starting-
line today or by giving minority applicants head-starts
designed to offset the probable consequences of past discri-
mination and injustice against the group with which the
applicant is idenlified ?

B The same author deals with 'reverse discrimination' in school
admissions and refers to Prof. Dworkin's socio-jural defense of pre-
ferences:
Nor should it be forgotten in this connection that, at
least in terms of traditional theory, rights to equal treatment
and to freedom from discrimination, as normally conceived,
c are personal and individual, and that ' ( e) qua! protection is
not achieved through (the) indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities for the alleged benefit of groups, however dis-
advantaged. Benevolent quottts and reverse discrimination
on this view, fatally offend fundamental notions of indi-
D vidualism inherrent in the notion of equality. In answer, it
may be said that to regard the concept of equality simply
from this (traditionally) individualistic point of view is to
take an unduly restrictive view of its social function and to
ignore its allegedly multifaceted character. Or, to adopt
a somewhat different strategy, one may read the right to
E equal treatment (both the more general right to equality
and the right enshrined in _the con:;titutional guarantee of
equal protection) in a particularly abslract way and formu-
late it in such a manner that it is not necessarily violated
by the adoption of benign racial c'.assifications. In this way,
Professor Dworkin distinguishes between two 'different sorts
F of rights' which individuals may be said to have. The first is
the right to equal treatment, whicli is the right to an equal
distribution of some opportunity or resource, and the second
is the right to treatment as an equal, 'which is the right, not
to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit,
but to be treated with the same respect and concern as any-
G one else'. For Dworkin it is the right to treatment as an equal
that is fundamental, whilst the right to equal treatment is
only derivable, and it is the former that, as a general matter,
is given 'constitutional standing' by the Equal Protection
Clause. In other words, white applicants for admission to
Law School who may have been turned away because of the
H reservation of some places for members of disadvantaged
minority groups cannot (in a case like the one set out
above)· successfully complain:, the reason being that they
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,!.) 239

do not have a right to equal treatment in the assignment of A
plac!s, but they do have the right to be treated as equals,
that is, with equal respect, concern and sympathy, in the
making of decisions as to which admissions standards should
be used. More specifically, this right is viewed by
Dworkin as meaning that each candidate for admission has
a right that his interests should be looked at 'as fully and B
sympathetically' as the interests of any others when deci-
sions are being taken as to which of the many possible cri-
teria for admission to elevate to the status of the pertinent
ones. But if this condition is satisfied, rejected white ap-
plicants will fail in their· contention that the particular ad-
missions program was unfair and unconstitutional (even i£
c
they had been effcctivoly excluded from consideration as a
result of the adoption of racial criteria in determining the
allocation of some of the available places). The simple
question Dworkin would ask in these cases is whether the
particular admissions program 'serves a proper policy that
D
respects, the right of all members of the community to be
treated as equals, but not otherwise.
No debate is needed to uphold reservation in promotions as such. Not
only has Rangachari sustained it in regard to selection posts, Thomas'$
case decided by a Bench of seven Judges, has expressly approved
E
Rangachari. The only question bearing on reservation vis-a-vis pro-
motion is as, to whether it is unconstitutional if it is extended to
non-selection posts while it is constilutional in regard to selection
posts.
Anyway, Annexure F, one of the circulars sought to b.e quashed
by the P""titioners relates only to selection posts and has been expressly F
upheld in Rangachari' s case. The quantum of reservation is not
....._excessive; the field of eligibility is not too unreasonable, the operation
of the reservation is limited to selection posts and no relaxation of
qnalifications is written into the circular except that candidates of the
SC&ST communities "should be judged in a sympathetic manner".
Moreover, administrative efficiency is s·cc1ue because there is a G
direction "to give such staff additional training and coaching, to bring
them up to the standard of others". The rejection of the invalidatory
contention of the petitioners is inevitable.
Annexure H is bad for unconstitutionality according to the peti-
tioners for many reasons. , For one thing, an SC/ST employee gets H
one grading higher than otherwise assignable to him on the record of
his service. So much so, if he is 'good' he will be categorised as 'very
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A good'. This fiction or fraud in grading is said td be a vie~ rendering ihe
promotional prospects unreasonable. We do not agree. Superficially
viewed, this clumsy process of reclassifying ability may strike one as
disingenuous. Of course, this concession is confined to only 25% of
the total number of vacancies in a particular grade or post filled in a
year. So there is no rampant vice of every harijan or girijan jumping
8 over the heads of others. More importantly, we think this is only an
administrative device of showing a concession or furtherance of pros-
pects of selection. Even as under Art. 15(4) and Art. 16(4) lesser
marks are prescribed as sufficient for SC&STs or extra marks are added
to give them an advantage the re-grading is one m.ore method of boost-
ing the chances of se;ection of these depressed classes. There is nothing
c shady about it. If there is advaucemeut of prospects of SC&ST by
addition of marks or prescribing lesser minimum marks or by relaxing
other qualifications, I see no particular outrage in re-categorisation
which is but a different mode of conferring an advantage for the plain
and understandable reason that SC&STs do need some extra help. It
D is important to note that the prescribed minimum qualifications and
standards of fitness are continued even for SC&STs under Annexure H.
The other vice pointed out against Annexure H is that the qualify-
ing marks in respect of SC&ST candidates is somewhat less than is
applicable to candidates of unreserved groups. There is no merit in
this objection and no good ground exists which militates against the
E constitutionality of Annexure H.
Annexure I is also unexceptionable since all that it does : is to re-
adjust the proportion of reservation in conformity with the latest Cen-
sus. Posts for which recruitment, realistically speaking, takes place on
a regional basis are subjected to reservation taking into account
F the percentage of SC&ST population in the concerned State. This is
also reasonable. Likewise, the carry forward rule being raised from
2 years to 3 years also cannot be struck down. It must be realised that ~
law is not an abstraction but an actual prescription in action. So what
we have to be more careful about is to scrutinise whether the carry for-
ward rule by being increased to 3 years is going to confer a monopoly
G upon the SC&ST candidates and deprive others of their opportunity
for appointment. From the percentage furnished by the Railway Board
we find that even if we carry forward vacancies for any number of
years there is no prospect, within the reasonable future, of sufficient
number of SC&ST candidates turning up to fill them. There is a provi-
sion that if sufficient number of candidates from the SC&ST are not
H found, applicants from the unreserved communities will be given the
appointment provisionally. After 3 years those vacancies cease to be
reserved. Going by the actuals it is clear that no serious infraction of
~ BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION (Krishna ly'ir,,_:) 241

any individual's fundamental right under Art. 16(1) takes place a'nd A
no monopoly is conceivably conferred on SC&ST candidates, they are
not available in sufficient numbers to reach anywhere near the percen.
tage reserved.

Even going by the majority, Devadasan's case(') lays down the pro.
position that under Art. 16 ( 4) "reservation of a reasonable percentage B
of posts for members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes is within the
competence of the State. What the percentage ought to be must neces·
sarily depend upon the circumstances obtaining from time to time."
Madholkar, J. speaking for the majority has struck down only one res-
triction. "In orde~ to effectuate th_i;_gu~rantee each year of recruitment
will have to be by itself and the reservation for backward communities c
should not be so. excessive as to create a monopoly or to disturb unduly
the legitimate claims of other communities." (emphasis added). Un-
limited reservation of ,appointments may be impermissible because it
renders Art. 16 ( 1) nugatory. At the same time, Art. 16 (4), calcu-
lated to promote social justice and expressive of the deep concern of
the Constitution for the limping bracket of Indians, must be given full D
play. That is why the only restraint imposed by Mudholkar, J. is that
an exercise of power under Art. 16(4) "does not mean that the pro-
vil;ion made by the State should have the effect of virtually obliterating
the rest of the Article, particularly clauses (1) and (2) thereof."(')
By the three-year 'carry forward' rule one is unable to see how, in prac- E
tice, the total vacancies will be gob]lled up by the harijan/girijan groups
"virtually obliterating" Art. 16(1). The court has made it very clear
that the problem of giving adequate representation to backwiird classes
under Art. 16 ( 4) is a matter for the Government to consider, bearing
in mind the need for a reasonable balance between the rival claims as
pointed out in Balaji's case. (2 ) F

..._ It is true_ that in Balaji's case and Devadasan's case(1) 'the carry
forward' rule for backward classes for exceeded 50% and was struck
down. We must remember that the percentage of reservation for back-
ward classes including SC&ST was rather high in both the cases. In
Devadasan's case the court went into the actuals, not into the hypothe- G
ticals. This is most important. The Court actually verified the degree
of deprivation of the 'equal opportunity' right and discovered : (")

In the case before us 45 vacancies have actually been
filled out of which 29 have gone to members of the Scheduled
(I) [1964] 4 SCR 680 at 695. H
(2) [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439.
(3) Ibid at 693-94.
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R,

A Castes and Tribes on the basis of reservation permitted by the
carry forward rule. This comes to about 64.4 % of reserva-
tion. Such being the result of the operation of the carry for-
ward rule we must, on the basis of the decision in Balaji's
case hold that the rule is bad.
8 (emphasis added)
What is striking is that the Court did not take an academic view or
make a notional evaluation but checked up to satisfy itself about the
seriousness of the infraction of the right. On that footing, the petition-
ers have not demonstrated that in any particular year, virtually and
c in actual terms of promotion, there has been a substantial excess over •
50% in favour of the SC&ST promotees. Mathematical calculations,
departing from realities of the case, may startle us without justification,
the apprehension being misplaced. All that we need say is that the
Railway Board shall take care to issue instructions to see that in no
year shall SC'..&ST candidates be actually appointed to substantially
D more than 50% of the promotional posts. Some excess will not affect
as mathematical precision is different in human affairs, but substantial
excess will void the selection. Subject to this rider or condition that
the 'carry forward' rule shall not result, in any given year, in the selec-
tion or appointments of SC&ST candidates considerably in excess of
50%, we uphold Annexure I.
E
Heated arguments about the hurt caused by Annexure 'J' have been
addressed to us. It deals with the 40-point roster and the posts allotted
to the SC&ST allottees. Once the fundamental premises are accepted
there is nothing unreasonable or wrong in Annexures 1 and 2 to Anne-
xure J. It is significant that with a view to prevent total exclusion of
F o_thers there is .a provision that if there are only two vacancies in a
given year, not more than one may be treated as reserved and if there
js only one vacancy, it should be treated as unreserved. lmplementa- __.,
tion of reservations necessarily involves practical steps like evolving a
roster system. Once the parameters of reservation are within the frame-
work of the fundamental rights, minute scrutiny of every administrative
G measur~_and hunting for unconstitutionality is not permissible.

Far more serious is the criticism of Annexure 'K' on the basis of
which reservations were introduced even to promotion posts filled by
the 'seniority-cum-suitability' rule. Some other relaxations and con-
cessions also are granted under it to SC&ST candidates. But the maxi-
H, mum mayhem inflicted by Annexure K is in the extension of the opera-
tion of promotional reservation to non-selection posts. It was urged
that Rangachari (supra) did not cover non-selection posts and, there-

____,. __
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 243

fore, could not be an authority to sustain its validity. There is no
force in this submission.

The sting of the argument against reservation is that it promotes
inefficiency in administration by choosing sub-standards candidates in
preference to those with better mettle. Competitive skill is more rele-
vant in higher posts, especially those where selectiou is made by compe-
titive examinations. Lesser classes of posts, where promotion is
secured mechanically by virtue of seniority except where the candidate
is unfit, do not require a high degree of skill as in the case of selectkm
posts. (See 1968 1 SCR p. 721 at 734). It i~. obvious that as between
selection and non-selection posts the role of merit is fnnctionally more
relevant in the former than in the latter. And if in Rangachari reserva- c
tion has been held valid in the case of selection posts, such reservation
in nan-selection posts is an afortiori case. If, in selecting top officers
you may reserve posts for SC/ST with lesser merit, how can you
rationally argue that for the posts of peons or lower division clerks
reservation will spell calamity ? The part !hat efficiency plays is far
more in the case of higher posts than in the appointments to the lower
posts. On this approach Annexure K is beyond reproach.

One may easily sympathise with holders of non-selection posts.
They are many in number in the lower stations of life. They are eco-
nomically backward and burdened with the drudgery of life. That is
E
why·there is a ballyhoo raised by a larger number of people when some
categories in far more distressing social situations enter the arena with
preferential treatment. Looking at the problem from the point of view
of law and logic and the constitutional justification under Art. 16(4)
for reservatio'n in favourof the panchama proletariat there is nothing to
strike down in Annexure K. As between the socially, even economically
F
depressed and the economically backward, the Constitution has empha-
tically cast i1s preference for the former. Who are we, as Judges to
question the wisdom of provisions made by Government within the
parameters of Art. 16( 4)? The answer is obvious that the writ of the
court cannot quash what is not contrary to the Constitution however
tearful the consequences for those who may be adversely affected. The G
progressiw trend must, of course, be to classify on the have-not basis
but the SC/ST, category is, generally speaking, not only deplorabfy
poor but also humiliatingly pariah in their lot. Maybe, some of the
forward lines of the backward classes have the best of both the words
and their electoral muscle qua caste scares away even radical parties
from talking secularism to them. We are not concerned with that H
dubious brand. In the long run, the recipe for backwardness is not
creating a vested interest in backward castes but liquidation of handi-
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A caps, social and economic, by constructive projects. All this is in
another street and we need not walk that way now.
Trite arguments about efficiency and inefficiency are a trifle phoney
because,-after all, at the hig!ier levels the harijan/girijan appointees
are a misroscopic percentage and even in the case of Classes III and
B II posts they a_re negligible. The preponderant majority c001ing from
the unreserved communities are presumably efficient and the dilution
of efficiency caused by the minimal induction of a small percentage of
'reserved' candidates cannot affect the over-all administrative efficiency
significantly. Indeed, it will be gross exaggeration to visualise a collapse
of the Administration because 5 to lOo/o of the total number of offi- 'f
c cials in the various classes happen to be sub-standard. Moreover, care
has been taken to give in-service training and coaching to correct the
deficiency.
It is fashionable to say-and there is, perhaps, some truth in it-
that from generation to generation there is a deterioration in efficiency
D in all walks of life from politics to peda.J;\ogy to officialdom and other
professions. Nevertheless, the world has been going forward ~nd only
parties whose personal interest is affected forecast a doom on account
of progressive deficie!JCY in efficiency'. We are not impressed with the
misfortune predicted about governmental personnel being manned by
morons merely because a sprinkling of harijans/girijans happen to find
E their way into the Services. Their apathy and backwardness are snch
that in spite of these favourable provisions, the unfortunates have
neither the awareness nor qnalified members to take their rightful place
in the Administration of the country. The malady of modern !ndia
lies elsewhere, and the merit-mongers are greater risks in many respects
than the naive tribals and the slightly better off low castes. Nor does
F the specious plea that because a few harijans are better off, therefore,
the bulk at the bottom deserves no jack-up provisions merit scrutiny.
A swallow does not make a summer. Maybe, the State may, when social -~/
conditions warrant, justifiably restrict harijan benefits to the harijans
among the harijans and forbid the higher harijans from robbing the
lowlier brethren.
G
We have adverted to Annexure M earlier in this judgment which
shows the dete~mination of Government to impart in-service training
to those SC&ST candidates who are found to be below par. Even
temporary promotions on an ad hoc basis are limited to six months
only to give training and experience than the spoil permanently the
H efficiency of the system.
The Annexure has come under attack because the reservation quota
has been raised thereby from 50 to 66-2/3 % . We have earlier dis-
AKHIL BHARAT!YA S()SHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 245

cussed this aspect and pointed out that what is important is not so A
much the figures mentioned on paper but the facts and circumstances
in real life. We have also entered a caveat that in any particular year
there shall not, as a fact, be a substantial increase upon 50% of induc-
tion of 'reserved' candidates. It is true that Shri Venugopal, counsel
for some of the petitioners tried to demonstrate that on account of
B
reservation percentages coupled with the carry forward rule it is per-
fectly within tlJe realm of possibility that in some years a monopoly may
be conferred on the SC&ST candidates for certain categories or classes
of posts. The mystic "maybes" do not scare us. The actual "must
bes" will alert us. The Constitution deals with social realities, not
speculative possibilities. I have limited the physical operation of c
reservation in any particular year in such a manner that there will be
a real opportunity for the exercise of the right under Art. 16 ( 1) for
every candidate. of the unre5erved communities.

Certain minor attacks such as that a candidate of the SC&ST com-
munities who has failed may st'11 be tried if other successful candidates D
from those communities are not forthcoming. This may seem strange
disbelief in examinations as measure of merit. But to read stray pro-
visions in isolation may be unfair to the scheme. Look at the desperate
State in which Qovernment is trying to give fair representation to
harijans/girijan:; in Administrafron. These miserables suppressed by
centuries of trampling are still slumbering despite inducements to E
awaken. It is a genetic calumny and unscientific assertion to castigate
the SC&ST communities as possessed of less intellectual potential what
with Valmiki and Vyasa to Baba Sahib Ambedkar. The darkening and
be numbing environment of ages in which shudras and panchamas have
suffered their mental powers to be chained accounts for their seeming
F
retardation. Once brighter atmosphere and better opportunity enliven
their talent their contribution. to the Indian treasury will raise the
~-,
human resources and democratic status of Bharat. A democracy of
talent is an marticulate major premise of our culture. The fundamental
question arises as to what is "merit" and "suitability''. Elitists whose
sympathies with the masses have dried up are, from the standards of G
the Indian people, least suitable to run Government and least merito-
rious to handle state business, if we envision a Service State in which
the millions are the consumers. A sensitized heart and a vibrant head,
tuned to the tears of the people, will speedily quicken the developmental
needs of the country, including its rural stretches and slum squalour. ·
Sincere dedication and intellectual integrity-these are some of the H
major components of "merit" and "suitabi!ity"-not degrees from
Oxford or Cambridge, Harvard or Stanford or simian, though Indian,
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A institutions. Unfortunately, the very orientation of our selection process
is distorted and those like the candidates from the SC&ST who, from
theiT birth, have had a traumatic understanding of the conditions of
agrestic India have, in one sense, more capability than those who have
lived under affluent circumstances and are callous to the human lot
of the sorrowing masses. Moreover, our examination system makes
B
memory the master of 'merit' and banishes creativity into exile. We
need not enter these areas where a fundamental transformation and a
radical re-orientation even in the assessment of the qualities needed
by the personnel in the Administration and the socialist values to be
possessed by the echelons in office is a consummation devoutly to be
c wished. This may have to be subjected to a national debate. The
colonial hangover still clings to our selection processes with supersti-
tious tenacity r.nd narrower concepts of efficiency and merit are rea-
dily evolved to push out Gandhis and J.Ps, AmJ:>edkars and Nehrus,
to mention but a few who knew the heart-beats of the people. I diva-
gate and make these observations only to debunk the exaggerated
D argument about harijans and girijans being sub-standard. We may
put aside this angle of vision and approach the problem traditionally
because every new idea has resistence to encounter before acceptance,
every original thought has been branded a hearsy. Be that as it may,
the constitutional merits of the various Board Circulars now discussed
do not warrant their judicial 'execution'--subject to certain cautionary
E Jil!'jtations already indicated.

The argument that there are rich and influential hariLans who rob
all the privileges leaving the serf-level sufferers as suppressed as ever.
The Administration may well innovate and classify to weed out the
creamy layer of SCs/STs but the court cannot force the State in that
F behalf.

For a comparative thought we may glance at Polyviou's 'The ~
Equal protection of the laws' : (')
"A third argument traditionally employed against the
use of preferential discrimination is that affirmative mea-
G sures of the kind discussed here may significantly curtail '
elficiency. It does indeed stand to reason that the imme-
diate result of benignity in admission and selection process
will almost certainly be the selection of those who are not
as competent or as able as some of those left out. 'Special
admission programmes, almost by definition, operate to in-
B
sure that students are placed in schoo1s for which they are
(I) The equal protection of the laws by G. Polyviou p. 360.
AKHIL IHIARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,!.) 247

not qualified ! The same objection applies with equal, if not A
more, force to the area of employment and elsewhere. One
possible answer is that the importance of efficiency must be
compared with and ultimately set against the significance
• of integration or the prevention of discrimination, and that
integration and the rectification af socially harmful depriva-
B
tion are the more pressing needs. Or one can fall back
on the very different arguments that traditional admission
processes are unfair because these are geared to the usual

".
type of applieant and that preferential treatment after all
only seek~ to counteract such inherent bias.
\
There is a human problem behind these writ petitions which we
c
clearly appreciate. Most of the Classes II, III and IV employees
are economically backward and struggle for survival what with price
spirals and other tribulations. They hope, after years of yeomen
service, to get some promotion and augment their poor resources in
the afternoon of their life. Then they find another class, with which D
the Constitution shows ultra sympathy, elbowing them out, not on
a massive scale, but minimally. Even this marginal push hurts
these species living at subsistence level and so they scream. The
economically backward and the socio-economically backward truly
belong to the 'have-not' camp and must jointly act to bring about a
transformation of the economic order by putting sufficient pressure E
and make Art. 38 a living reality. Estrangement between the two
· categories weakens the militancy of a joint operation to inject social
justice in the current economic order. The truth is that the employ-
ment market is distressingly a musical chair business and when star-
vation faces men their sympathy for their far weaker brethren
vanishes. The true solution for the country's problellls,. as reflected F
(_. in these writ petitions, is in developmental expansion involving the
millions, rather than denial to the weakest sector of Indian life the
morsel to which it is justly entitled. Even Administration will do
well to remember that Indian despair, after infinite patience, may augur
danger unless 'the sorry scheme of things entire' is remoulded nearer
to Art. 38. Even these observations are made only to emphasise G
that the legal content of the contentions put forward by the petition-
ers is less than presentable although their economic grievance may be
• agonisingly genuine. The Court has its limitations unlike the Admi-
nistration and can give justice only under the Constitution and not
over it. H
The human pressure behind these writ petitions is the chronic
drought of employment opportunities despite talent enough to make
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A deserts bloom. So long as this scarcity persists and power goes with
office, the jaundiced politics of snatching the jobs going, initially or
at promotion level, by hook or crook, is the only 'development' that '
takes place, whatever the National Plans proclaim. The vast human
potential of the harijans and girzVans, on-fifth of the Indian people,
goes to thistles and every communal effort to twist the politics of
B power for promoting chances of getting jobs becomes inevitable caste
being a deeprooted pathology in our country. Thus jobbery, politics,
casteism and elections make an unholy, though invisible, alliance
against national development which alone can liberate Indians from
social and economic privation. If democracy itself thus plays into
the hands of hostile forces, !he jurisprudence of keeping the back-
c ward as backward and perQ,etuation of discrimination as a vested
caste right may prevail as a rule of life.
The remedy of 'reservations' to correct inherited imbalances must
not be an overkill. Backward classes, outside the Scheduled Castes
and Tribes, cannot bypass Art. 16(2) save where very substantial
D cultural aud economic disparity stares at society. The dubious ob-
session with 'backwardness' and the politicking with castes labelled
backward classes may, on an appropriate occasion, demand judicial
examination. The politics of power cannot sabotage the principles of
one man, one value. . No sociological explanation for the flood of
ruinous writ petitions regarding service conditions can b.c found
E
except on this basis. Behind the writ petitions we deal with now is
caste clamour to keep all the jobs safe from being 'robbed' by
'reserved' communities. It is forward caste versus backward caste,
wearing the casteless caste-marks! And the political process is like-
wise caste-polluted Gunnar Myrdal writes in his Asian Drama : (')
F The type of appeal that can be made by politicians has
also changed greatly since the liberation movement. They
can no longer put the blame for poverty and stagnation on
colonial masters, but must explain why there is not great
progress no\v that IndiFJ is independent . .... .
G Thus a key to the understanding of the power of the
political bosses is the inherited social stratification of India
and, above all, its caste system. At election times the caste
groups function as political vote banks whereby the ballots
of their members are joined to the candidate with a party
label. For this reason alone the local political bosses have
H a vested interest in preserving the social and economic
status quo and exploiting it as a matrix for political action.
(I) Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I, pp,
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION (Pathak, J.) 24 9

M. N. Srinivas, the noted sociologist is more than right: (' 1) A
One cannot help wondering whether the drive to politi-
• cal maturity is, after all, a good thing in a country which
has still not had a proper social revolution. It may well
result in premature old age.
We need now, not stagnation wearing the mask of stability and scram- B
bling acrimoniously over the same shrunkan calce, but progress by
the conetructive process of explosive rural development and exploita-
tion of the untapped human potential of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Sterile 'reservations' will not help us go ahead
unless, alongside of it, we have heroic national involvell).ent of the c
masses in actual action, not paper-logged plan exercises. In the last
analysis, privation can be banished only by production, discontent
by distributive justice and litigation by socially relevant justice. The
writ petitions are, regrettably, negative, although the driving force of
penury deserves sympathy. This, perhaps, is a materialist interpre-
tation of 'service litigation' and a grim foot-note to these writ petitions. D
Before I conclude, I must strike a futuristic note. Excellence
and equality may cooperating fruitfully and need not compete destruc-
tively. Ultimately harijan/girijan militancy must find fulfilment in
effective main-streaming and creative contribution. While they have
miles to go, they have promises to keep. The poignant words of the E
Reverend Jesse Jackson come to my mind : (I)
"I don't see how, we can survive as a people if we clon't have
a great push for excellence now .... A lot of what we've done in
the past will be in vain if we don't. We can make one of the most
valid contributions to Western civilization, even more of a contri-
F
bution than slavery. Because slavery was our great contril)ution
against our will. Now it's time for us to make a great contribution
as an act of will."

- Given the opportunity and the environment, the Indian dalits can
make India great and give up crutches.
The writ petitions as well as the Special Leave Petitions cannot
G

but be dismissed.

PATHAK, J.-My brothers Krishna Iyer and Chinnappa, Reddy
are agreed that the writ petitions should be dismissed. They have
held against the petitioners on the several contentions raised in the H
(1) M. N. Srinivas, "Changing Attitudes in India Today" Yogana, October 1,
1961, p. 26. .

--------.- - .,.,. _...,. ________
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198!] 2 S.C.R.

A case. With respect, I find myself unable to agree with all that they
have said.
•
I intend to confine myself here to certain aspects of the case
which appear to possess a fundamental importance. .
Three' provisions of the Constitution relate to reservations for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. They are Art. 46, Art.
16(4) and Art. 335. The three form a single frame of reference.
Art. 46, a Directive Principle of State Policy, proclaims the principle
that the State shall promote with special care the. educational and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and,. in par-
c ticular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall
protect them from social injl!stice and all forms of exploitation. One
of the modes in which the economic interests of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes can be promoted is the reservation of
appointments or posts in their favour in services under the State
where they are not adequately represented. Art. 16(4) declares
D that when the State intends to make such provision nothing in Art. 16
shall prevent it from doing so. The equality of opportunity guaran-
teed to all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State will not restrain the State from making
such reservation. It is now well accepted that the "equality provisions
of Part III of the Constitution constitute a single code, illustrating I
E the multi-faceted character o( the central concept of equality. Art.
16(4) also is one facet. It enables a backward class of citizens, by
the process of reservation in Government service, to move along the
road to ultimate equality with the more advanced classes. It is part
of the process of equalisation. Then follows Art. 335.. It provides
F that the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes shall be taken into consideration in the making of appoint-
ments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union__..,
or a State, but-and this is imperative-such consideration must be
consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. The
paramount need is to maintain the efficiency of administration.
-
G That is dictated by the common good. It embraces the need of all, . I
the national good, and not of a mere section of the people. To its
primacy all else is subordinate. Therefore, whatever is done in con-
sidering the claims of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
must be consistent with that supreme need, the maintenance of
efficiency of administration. Art. 335, it must be clearly stated, does
8 not contain a positive principle, the advancement of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes, and a negative principle, the maintenance of
efficiency of administration. This analysis of the article does not
AKHIL BHARATJYA SOSIHT KARAMCHARI v. UNION (Palhak, J.) 2 51

truly comprehend its contents. It contains a single principle, the A
advancement of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but through
modes and avenues which must not detract from the maintenance of
an efficient administration. That limitation is imposed as a clear and
positive condition .
• B
A generally acknowledged and long established principle for
securing an efficient administration is throwing open the doors to
general recruifment, either directly or by promotion, wh.ere the gov-
erning criterion is excellence and the emphasis is solely on quality.
The net of selection is spread far and wide, and the competitive best
,.r are collected, regardless of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of c
' birth or residence. However, a quota of the posts may be reserved
in favour of a backward class of citizens, but the interests of an
efficient administration require that at least half the total number of
posts be kept open to attract the be•t of the nation·s talent and not
more than half be made the sum of reserved quotas. If it was other-
wise, an excess of reserved quotas would convert the State service D
into a collective membership predominantly of backward classes.
This, it is evident, will be inconsistent with the all-important goal of
maintaining t11e efficiency of administration. In considering the pro-
portion of reserved quotas in the context of college admissions. this
Court laid down in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore(') fhat broadly
a special provision providing for reservation should be less than 50%, E
and how much less than 50% would depend upon the relevant pre-
vailing circumstances in each case. And, in this connection, Gajen-
dragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, observed :

.. when the State makes a special provision for
the advancement of the weaker sections of society specified F
in Art. 15(4), it has to approach its task objectively and in
a rational manner. Undoubtedly, it has to take reasonable
and even generous step~ to help the advancement of weaker
elements; the extent of the problem must be weighed, the
requirements of the community at large must be borne in
mind and a formula must be evolved which woud strike a G
• reasonable balance between the several relevant considera-
tions."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court struck down the reservation of 68% as constitutionally
R
invalid. ! ••! ti I
(1) [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 439, 470.
16-1281SCI/80
252 SUPREME COURT REPO!lTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A The principle that reserved quota• should not together exceed
50% of the vacancies available in a year was affirmed by this Court,
by a majority of four learned judges to one, in T. Devadasan v. Union
of India,(') as the reason for striking down a "carry forward" rule
which, for promotions in the Central Secretariat Service, permitted a
B
carry forward for two successive years of the annual reserved quota. •
It was found in that case that observance of the rule had resulted in
65 % of the vacancies of the year being filled by reserved quotas,
current and carried forward. The "carry forward" rule was held
constitutionally invalid on the basis that for the purpose of Art. 16(1)
each year of recruitment had to be considered as a distinct unit for
applyin~ the 50% rule. Mudholkar, J., on behalf of the majority,
c said:

"We would like to emphasize that the guarantee con-
tained in Art. 16 (1) is for ensuring equality of opportunity
for all citizens relating to employment, and to appointments
to any office under the State. This means that on every
D occasion for recruitment the State should see that all citizens
are treated equally. The guarantee is to each individual
citizen and, therefore. every citizen who is seeking employ-
ment or appointment to an office under the State is entitled
to be afforded an opportunity for seeking such employment
or appointment whenever it is intended to be filled. In
E
order to effectuate the guarantee each year of recruitment
will have to be considered by itself and the reservation for
backward communities should not be so excessive as to
create a monopoly or to disturb unduly the legitimate claims
of other communities."

It seems to me that apart from the impact that an excessive re-
servation in a particular year is bonnd to have on the general com-
lllunity of citizens, there is the further far-reaching significance this__...
assumes in the context of Art. 335. The maintenance of efficiency
of administration is bound to be adversely affected if general candi-
G dates of high merit are correspondingly excluded from recruitment
because the large bulk of the vacancies, numbering anything over
50%, is allotted to the reserved quota. In view of a maximum age- '
limit invariably prescribed. so111e of such meritorious candidates may
be lost to the service altogether. Viewed in that light, a maximum of
50% for reserved q_uotas in their totality is a rule which appears fair
H and reasonable, just and equitable, and violation of- which would
contravene Art. 335.
(1) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 253
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
It has been urged by the respondents that Devadasan (supra) is A
no longer good law in view of the 7-Judge decision in State of Kerala
v. N. M. Thomas('). It does appear from some of the individual
judgments delivered in the latter case that although Devad011an
• (supra) has not been expressly overruled by a majority of the Bench
there are observations by the majority of Judges which throw doubt
B
on the validity of the principle enunciated by it and ultimately the
Court has upheld the promotion of 34 Scheduled Caste and Sche-
duled Tribe candidates among the total promotion of 51 candidates.
It would seem then that there is an apparent conllict between Deva-
dasan (supra) and N. M. Thomas (supra). The validity of Rule
l3AA of the Kerala State ~nd Subordinate Service Rules, 1058 was
questioned in N. M. Thomas (supm). That Ruic permitted the
c
exemption of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe membern
from passmg the promotion tests for a specified period. That
more than 50% of the promotions went to the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates was a consequence of the
operation of Rule 13AA. It is doubtful whether the petitioners' ()
challenge to the "carry forward" rule can avoid what has been said
in N. M. Thomas (supra) and, therefore, a conclusion in their favour
does not seem possible in this ·case. As the position is not clear, and
in any event as my learned brothers have taken a definite view in
favour of the "carry forward" rule, I have confined myself to express-
ing these observations. E

The petitioners have challenged other provisions prescribed in
favonr of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
have attempted to support their submissions by reference to data
purporting to prove that those measure~ have resulted in reverse dis-
crimination and are also inconsistent with the maintenance of effi- F
ciency of administration. We have been taken through charts and
statistics among other documentary material but the material placed
before us does not clearly and definitely establish what it seeks to
prove. In the circumstances, it is not possible to record a finding in
lavour of the petitioners on those points.
G
•• Accardingly, the writ petitions are dismissed but without any
order as to costs.

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-In the name of Equality (of opportunity),
we ar~ asked to deny Equality (of opportunity), in these Writ Peti-
tions. That we cannot do and that we will not do. If we do that we H
will be subverting the spirit and the sense of the Constitution. The
(I) [1976] I S.C.R. 901i.
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

petitioners claim that their Fundamental Right to Equality ol Opportu-
nity in the matter of public employment, guarant•ced by Art. 16(1) of
the Constitution has been flouted by a series of orders and circulars
issued by the Railway Board reserving posts at several levels and making
•
various concessions in favour of members of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes. This has been dohe, it is claimed, at the
I\ cost of efficiency, though forbidden by Art. 335 of the Constitution.
•
The plain answer of the re~pondents is that everyone of the orders and
circulars !ms the backing of Art. 16(1), 16(4) and other special provi-
sions of the Constitution and that the alarm of indllciency is nothing
but a bogey.
My brother Krishna Iyer, J. has considered the questions raised
c in his own characteristic, scintillating way and in scmc depth. Tho~h
respect for my brother would ordinarily preve'nt me from venturing
to write a separate opinion, especially when I agree whole heartedly
with his conclusions and the route traversed by him, I propose to
make, in this case, certain general observations because I expect the
0 ;ame questions to be raised repeatedly in different si!uations and in
different forms and it is just as well that I project my own prosaic and
pedestrian point of view, without going into the detail or depth already
explored by my brother.
The class of people known compendiously as 'the Scheduled
Castes', recognised and described as such in the Constitution of India
E have been treated as 'casteless' outcastes and untouchables and have
been oppressed and subjected to every manner of depreviation and
discrimination for centuries upon centuries by a unique system of
social and economic segregation, a system of "graded inequality"
(Dr. B.R. Ambedkar), of "gradation and degradation" (Dr. C.R.
Reddy) and of "gigantic cold-blooded repression" (Rabindranath
Tagore). And for ce\Jturies they were even prevented from protes-
ting their plight. Nor was any attempt made by the superior and ~
elitist classes to know anything about them. All that a Sclleduled
Caste parent could do was to lament :
"Hush, my. child; do'nt cry, my treasure;
G Weeping is in vain,
For the enemy will never
Understand our pain.
For the ocean has its limits
Prisons have their walls around
But our suffering and our torment
II have no limit and no bound."
Then, in 1950, came the Constitution rou~ing expectations, ramag
hopes, making promises and generally heralding a new, a better and
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 255
(Chinnappa Reddy, !.)
a more decent life for the underprivileged and the oppressed peopl11 A
of India. While the preamble to the Constitution proclaims the reso-
lution of the people to constitute India into a Sovereign (also,
'Socialist, Secular', since the 42nd Amendment) Democratic Republic
and to secure to all its citizens, "Justice, Social, economic and politi-
cal" and "Equahty of Status and opportunity" and to promote
B
"Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual", while the Right
to Equality before the Law (Art. 14) and Equality of Opportunity
in the ID/liter of pul}lic employment (Art. 16) are guaranteed as
Fuhdamental Rights and while the State is enjoyed by the
Directive Principles of State Policy to promote the welfare
;( of the pwple by securing a social order in which justice, c
social, economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the
national life Art. 38(1), to endeavour to eliminate inequalities
in status, facilities and opportunities Art. 38 (2), and, to direct its
policy towards securihg that the ownership and control of
the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to
subserve the common good Art. 39 (b) and that the operation of D
the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth
and means of production to the common detrim~nt Art. 39 ( c), pur-
suant to the very preamble and the provisions of the Constitution,
special provisions have been made, in particular, for the protection
and advancement of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
in recognition of their existing, low social and economic stat115 and E
the consequent inability and failure on their part to avail themselves
of any opportunity for self-advancement. It i~ recognised that the
failure of the State to create a climatic situation and provide the
necessary impetus for the increasing participation of the members of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the public services
would tentamount to a denial to them of equal opportunity in the F
matter of public employment. Art. 335 which is included in part
~ XVI of ihe Constitutioh dealing with 'special provisions relating to
certain classes' expressly provides:
"The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes
and the ScheduJP.d Tribes shall be taken into consi- G
deration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency
of administration in the making of appointments to ser-
l vices and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union
or of a State."

Art. 46, one of the Directive Principles of State Policy, enjoins:
H
"The State shall promote with special care the edu-
cational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the
18---1281 SCI/80
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social in-
justice and all forms of exploitation."

. Art. 16 ( 1) a~d 16 ( 4) which guarantee equality of opportunity
m matters of public employment read as follows :
"16 (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all
citizens i'n matters relating to employment or appointment
to any office under the State."
"16 (4) Nothing in this article shall pn;vent the State
from making any provision for the reservation of appoint-
c ments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represen-
ted in the services under the State."

Art. 16 (2) which bars discrimination on certain grounds is as
follows :
D "16 (2) No citize'n shall, on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, resid·~nce or any of
them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of,
any employment or office under the State."
Now, it has been said, very rightly, a Constitutional instrument is
.E sui generis and, obviously and necessarily, its interpretation cannot
.always run on the same lines as the interpretation of statutes made in
exercise of the powers conferred by it. A co'nstitution, like ours, born
of an anti-imperialist struggle, influenced by Constitutional instruments,
events and revolntions elsewhere, in s·~arch of a better world and
wedded to the idea of justice, economic, social and political, to all,
must receive a generous interpretation so as to give all its citizens the
full measure of justice so proclaimed instead of 'the austerity of ,J_,
tabulated legalism'(:'). And so, when the Constitutional instru-
ment to be expounded is a constitutian like the Indian Constitution,
the expositors am to concern themselves not with words and mere
words only, but, as much, with the philosophy or what we may call 'the.
spirit and the sense' of the Constitution. Hore, we do not have
to venture upon a voyage of discovery to find the spirit and the sense
of the Constitution; we do not have to look to any extraneous sources
'for ·inspiratidn and guidance; they may be sought and found in the
:Preamble to the Constitution, in the Directive Principles of State
H ·policy, and other such provisions.

-.·:see Minister of Honle Affairs v. Fisher :
~1979! (3) All E.R. 21.
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 25 7
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
Because Fundamental Rights are justiciable and Directive Princi- A
ples are not, it was assumed, in the beginning, that Fundamental
Rights held a superior position under the Constitution than the
Directive Principles, and that the latter were only of secondary
importance as compared with the Fundamental Rights. That way of
thinking is of the past and has become obsolete. It is now universally
recognised that the difference between the Fundamental Rights and B
Directive Principles lies in this that Fundamental Rights are
primarily aimed at assuring political freedom to the citizens by pro-
tecting them against excessive State action while the Directive Princi-
:;- pies are aimed at securing social and economic freedoms by appro-
. priat•e State action. The Fundamental Rights are intended to foster c
the ideal of a political democracy and to prevent the establishment
of authoritarian rule but they are of no value unless they can be en-
forced by resort to Courts. So they are made justiciable. But, it is
also evident that notwithstanding their great importance, the
Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in
a Court of law. It is unimaginable that any Court can compel a D
legislature to make a law. If the Court can compel Parliament to
make laws theu Parliamentary democracy would soon be reduoed to an

- oligarchy of Judges. It is in that sense that the Constitution says that
the Directive Principles shall not be enforceable by Courts. It does
not mean that Directive Principles are less important than Fundamen-
tal Rights or that they are not binding on the various organs of the E
State. Art. 3 7 of the Constitution emphatically states that Directive
Principles are nevertheless Fundamental in the governance of the
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles
in making laws. It follows that it becomes the duty of the Court to
apply the Directive Principles in interpreting the Constitution and
the laws. The Directive Principles should serve the Courts as a F
, code of interpretation. Fundamental Rights should thus be inter-
-...ik preted in the light of the Directive Principles and the later should,

- whenever and wherever possible, be r~ad into the former. Every Jaw
attacked on the ground of infringement of a Fundamental Right
should, among other considerations, be examined to find out if the
G
law d<>es not advance one or other of the Directive Principles or if
it is 'not in discharge of some of the undoubted obligations of the
State, constitutional or otherwise, towards its citizens or sections of
its citizens, flowing out of the preamble, the Directive Principles and
other provisions of the Constitution.
11
So, we have it that the Constitutional goal is the establishment of
a Socialist Democracy in which Justice, economic, social and political
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A is secure and all men are equal and have equal opportunity. Inequa-
lity, whether of status, facilitY, or opportunity, is to end, privilege is to
cease and exploitation is to go. The under-privileged, the deprived
and the exploited .are to be protected and nourished so as to take
their place in an egalitarian society. State ac\ion is to be towards
those ends. It is in this context that Art. 16 has to be interpreted
..
B
when State action is questioned as contravening Art. 16..

Let us now take a look at Art. 16 ( 1 ) and Art. 16 (4) . Art.
16 ( 1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citi=s in matters
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
To the class of citizens who are economically and socia!fy backward
c this guarantee will be no more than mere wishful thinking, and mere
"vanity .... wind and confusion", if it is not translated into reality
by necessary state action to protect and nurture such class of citizens
so as to enable them to shake off the heart-<:rushing burden of a:
thousand years' deprivation from their shoulders and to claim a fair
proportion of participation in the Administration. Reservation ·of
D
posts and all other measures designed to promote the participation
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the Public Services
at all levels are in our opinion necessary consequences flowing from
the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 16(1), This very idea
is emphasised further by Art. 16(4). Art. 16(4) is not in the nature
E of an exception to Art. 16 ( 1) . It is a facet of Art. 16 (1) which
fosters and furthers the idea of equality of opportunity with special
refeP~nce to an under privileged and deprived class of citizens to when
egalite de droit (formal or legal equality) is not egalite de fait (prac-
tical or factual equality). · It is illustrative of what the State must
do to wipe out the distinction between egalite de droit and egalite
F de fait. It recognises that the right to equality of opportunity inclu-
des the right of the underprivileged to conditions comparable to or
compensatory of those enjoyed by the privileged. Equality of oppor- ,.l.

-
tnnity must be such as to yield 'Equality of Results' and not that
which simply enables people, socially and economically better placed,
to win against the less fortunate, even when the competition is itself
G otherwise equitable. John Rawls in 'A Theory of Justice' demands
the priority of equality in a dist'nlmtive sense and the setting up of
the Social System "so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary
place in the distribution of natura} assets or his own initial position .l
in society without giving or receiving compensatory advantages in
return". His basic principle _of social justice is : "AU social primary
H goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases
of self-respect-are to be distribnted equally unless an unequal distri-
bution of any or all these goods is to the advantage of the least
AKHIL BHARATLYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION' 259
( Chinnappa Reddy, !. )
favoured". One of the essential elements of his conception of social A
justice is what he calls the principle of redress : "This is the princi-
• ple that undeserved jnequalities call for redress; anc\ since inequali-
ties of birth and natnral endowment are undeserved, these inequalities
are somehow to be compensated for". Society must, therefore, treat
more favonrably those with fewer native assets and those born into
B
less favourable social positions. If the statement that 'Equality of
opportunity must yield Equality of Results' and if the fulfilment of

- Articles 16(1) in Art. 16(4) ever needed a philosophical founda-
tion it is furnished by Rawls' Theory of Justice and the Redress
.:; - Principle.
c
The interpretation of Arts. 16(1) and 16(4) came up for consi-
deration in several cases before this Court. Perhaps the most
important of them is State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas &
Ors.,('.') which was decided by a Bench of seven Judges. The ques-
tion was whether a certain rule which gave a longer period of exemp-
tion to members belonging to Scj1eduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes D
than to others from passing certain departmental tests in order to be
eligible for promotion from the Post of Lower Division Clerk to that
of Upper Division Clerk was not viofative of Art. 16 (1) of the
Constitution. The Court by a majority of five to two upheld the rule
as valid. Ray, C. J., observed :
E
"The rule of equality within Articles 14 and 16(1) will
not be violated by a rule which will ensnre equality of repre-
sentation in the services for unrepresented classeg after satis-
fying the basic \leeds of efficiency of administration. Article
16(2) rules out some basis of classification iiic!uding race,
caste, descent, place of birth etc. Article 16(4) clarifies F
and explains that classification on the basis of backwardness
do"es not fall within Article 16(2) and is legitimate for the

- purposes of Article 16(1). If preference shall be given
to a particular under-represented community other than a
backward class or 11nder-represe\lted State in au All India
Service such a rule will contravene Article 16(2). A simi- G
lar rule giving preference to au under-represented backwa'rd
community is valid and will not contravene articles 14,
16(1) and 16(2). Article 16(4) removes any doubt in
this respect".

xx xx xx
e
(I) [1976] 1 SCR 906 @930-933.
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A "The classification of employees belonging to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes for allowing them an extended
period of two years for passing the special tests for promo-
tion is. a just and reasom1ble classification having r~tional
nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity for all
citizens in matters relating to employment or apgointment
B to public office."
xx l<X xx
''The Co'nStitution makes a classification of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in numerous provisions and -
c gives a mandate to the State to accord special or favoured
treatment to them."
l<X l<X l<X

"Article 335 of the Constitution states that claims of
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall
D be taken into consideration in the making of appointments
to the services and posts in connection with affairs of the
State consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of admi-
nistration. The impugned rule aud the impugned orders.
are related to this constitutional mandate."
E
"Our constitution aims at equality of status and oppor-
tunity for all citize'ns including those who are socially, eco-
nomically a'nd educationally backward. The claims of
members of back-ward classes require adequate representa-
tion in legislative and executive bodies. If members of
F Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who are said by this Court
to be backward classes, can maintain minimum necessary
requirement of administrative efficiency, not only represen-

-
tation but also preference may be given to them to enforce
equality and to eliminate inequality. Articles 15 ( 4) and
16( 4) bring out the position of backward classes· to merit
G equality. Special provi~ions are made for the advancement
of backward classes and reservations of appointments and
posts for them to secure adequate representation. These
provisions will bring out the content of equality guaranteed l

by Articles 14, 15(1) and 16(1). The basic concept of
equality is equality . of opportunity for appointment.
H Preferential treatment for members of backward classes
with due regard to administrative efficiency alooo can mea'n
equality of opportunity for all citizens. Equality under
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 2 61
(Chinnappa Reddy, l.)
Article 16 could not have a different content from eqnality A
under Article 14. Equality of opportunity for unequals
( can only mean aggravation of inequality. Equality of
opportunity admits discrimination with reason and prohibits
discrimination without reason. Discrimination with reasons
means rational classification for differential treatment having
nexus to the constitutionally permissible object. Preferen-
tial representation for the backward classes in services with
due regard to admi'nistrative efficiency is permissible object
·I
and backward classes are a rational classification recognis-
ed -by our Constitution. Therefore, diffurential treatment in
standards of selection are within the concept of equality". G
xx xx xx xx
"All legitimate methods a_re available for equality of
opportunity in servio~ under Article 16 (1 ) . Article 16 ( 1)
is affirmative whereas Article 14 is negative in language.
Article 16(4) indicates one of the methods of achieving
equality embodied in Article 16(1)".

Equally illuminating observations were made by Mathew, J.,
Beg., J., Krishna Iyer, J., and Fazal Ali, J., in their separate con-
curring opinions but I do not propose to extract them in the interests
of space. It is enough to mention that all five learned judges who E
constituted the majority were emphatic in repudiating the theory
(propounded in earlier cases) that Art. 16(4) was in the nature
of an- exception to Art. 16(1). All were agreed that Art. 16(4)
was a facet, a'n illustration or a method of application of Art. 16(1).
So, it is now no longer necessary to apologetically explain laws aimed
at achieving equality as permissible exceptions; it can now be boldly F
claimed that such laws are necessary incidents of equality.

It all began with The General Manager, Southem Railway v.
Rangacharf(I). Two circulars issued by the Railway Board reserv-
ing selection (promotional) posts in Class III of the Railway Service
in favour of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled G
Tribes, were questioned in that case as offending Art. 16. It was
contended that Art. 16 ( 4) applied only to reservation of posts at the
stage of initial appointment and not to promotional posts. The con-
tention was rejected and it was held that Art. 16 ( 4) applied at the
stage of initial appointment as well as at the Gtage of promotion by
selection. It was in this case that observations were made to the R

(1) [1962] 2 SCR 586.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A effect that Art. 16(4) was in the natnre of an exception to Art.
16(1), but, as we have seen such a view is no longer tenable in view
)
of State of Kera/a & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors. (supra).

Much of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners .•
B
was anchored to T. Devodasan v. Union of India & Anr. (') 17t%
of vacancies in an establishment were reserved for members of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Alongside the reser-
vation rule, there operated what is known as "the carry-forward rule"
familiar to all Govt. employees and those connected with 'service
problems'. The carry-forward rule so operated in the particular case
c that out of 45 appointments made by the Government 29 were from
among the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. In other words the reservation ctlme to 65%
which was far in excess of the 17t% originally contemplated by
the Reservation rule. In those circumstances, a Constitution Bench
of this Court (Subba Rao, J. dissenting) declared the carry-forward
D rule bad. The Court did not strike down the carry-forward rule
on the ground that it was inherently vicious or on the hypothetical
consideration that it was bound to lead to vicious results in the future
if permitted to operate without inhibition. The judgment of the Court
was founded upon the viciousness exposed by the actual working of
the rule in practice. The learned judges indicated that the repercus-
E sious of such a rule would have to be watched from year to year.

Another case upon which the petitioners placed reliance was
M. R. Balaii & Ors. v. State of Mysore( 2 ). In that case the percent-
age of seats reserved in the Engineering and Medical colleges for the
educationally and socially backward classes and Scheduled Castes
F and Scheduled Tribes came to 68 % leaving only 32 % of the seats
for the merit pool. The Court held that generally and broadly reser- .~
vation should not exceed 50%. The actual percentage was to depend
upon the relevant pr~vailing circumstances in each case. As the
reservation in that case for exceeded what was generally and broadly
permissible, the reservation was held to be bad. There again the
<; Court was concerned directly with the immediate, actual, practical
result of the Reservation rule.
In A. Peeriakaruppan, etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,(')
reservation of 41 % of the seats in medical collegis in the State of

H (I) [1964] 4 SCR 680.
(2) [1963] Suppl. I SCR 439.
(3) {1971] 2 SCR430 @ 441-442.
•

AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 263
(Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
Tamil Nadu for students coming from socially and educationally back- A
ward classes was upheld. Hegde, J., observed (at p., 441-442) :
(

"There is no basis for the contention that the reserva-
tion made for backward classes is excessive. We were not
told why it is excessive. Undoubtedly we should not forget
that it is against the immediate interest of the Nation to B
exclude from the portals of our medical colleges qualified
and competent students but then the immediate advantage6
of the Nation have to be harmonised with its Jong range
interests. It cannot be denied that 'unaided many sections
of the people in this country cannot compete with the
advanced sections of the Nation. Advantag~s secured due c
to historical reasons should not be considered as funda-
mental rights. Nation's interest will be ·best served-taking
a Jong range view-if the backward classes are helped to
march forward and take their place in line with the advanced
sections of the people. That is why in Balaqi's case [19311
D
Suppl 1 SCR ( 439), this Court held that the total of reser-
vations for backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes should not ordinarily exceed 50% of the avail-
able seats. In the present case it. is 41 % . On the mate-
rial before us w~ are unable to hold that the said reser-
vation is excessive". E

In State of Punjab v. Hiralal & Ors.,(,I) a rule reserving the first
out of every ten vacancies to a member of the Scheduled Caste_s and
Scheduled Tribes and providing for 'carry-forward' of the vac:>ncy if
siritable candidate was not available was struck down by the High
Court by visualising various hypothetical cases which could lead to F
anomalous situations in which a person getting the benefit of reserva-
"'- lion may jump over the heads of several of his seniors not only in his
own grade but even in higher grades. This Court reversed the deqi-
sion of the High Court observing :

, "The extent of reservation to be made is primarily a
matter for the State to decide. By this we do not mean to G
say that the decision of the State is not open to judicial re-
! ~iew. The reservation must be only for the purpose of giv-
mg adequate representation in the service to the Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes'.'.

xx xx H
(I) [1971] 3 SCR 267 @ 272, 273, 274.
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R •.

A "The mere fact that the reservation made may give
extensive benefits to some of the persons who have the bene-
fit of the reservation does not by itself make the reservation
bad. The length of the leap to be provided depends upon
the gap to be covered".

B xx xx
"There was no material before the High Court and there
is no material before us from which we can conclude that the
impugned order is violative of Art. 16 ( 1). Reservation of
appointments under Art. 16 ( 4) cannot be struck down on
hypothetical grounds or on imaginary possibilities. He who
c assails the reservation under that Art. must satisfactorily
establish that there has been a violation of Art. 16(1)".
The report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Sche--
duled Tribes for 1977-78 and the 'Reports on the progress made in
the intake of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes against vacancies
D reserved for them in recruitment and promotion categories in the Rail-
ways' for the half years ending March 31, 1974, March 31, 1975,
September 30, 1976, March 31, 1977 and September 30, 1979 were
placed before us. They reveal how painfully slow and woefully in-
significant !ms been progress achieved by the members of the Sche-
duled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of their participation
E in the Railway administration. My brother Krishna Iyer J has ex-
tracted some of the facts and figures. I do not.think it is necessary
for me to refer to them over again. It is sufficient to say that mem-
bers of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled. Tribes far from acquiring
any monopolistic or excessive representation over any category of
posts (other than sweepers) are nowhere near being adequately
F represented. Neither tl)e Reservation rule ·n9x the 'carry-forward
for three years' rule has resulted in any such 'disastrous' consequences.-->
The complaint of the petitioners that the Circulars and orders had
resulted in excessive representation of the Scheduled Castes and Sche-
duled Tribes is without foundation generally or with reference to any
particular year.
G
One of the contentions vehemently submitted by the learned coun-
sel for the petitioners was that efficiency of administration would
suffer and safety of the travelling pnblic would consequently be l
jeopardised if reservations were made and promotions affected inthe
manner sought to be done. by the Railway Board. This is claimed
H by the respondents to be no more than a bogey. In the counter-
affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway Board it has been pointed
out that minimum standards are insisted upon for every appointment

- - - - -------.-mnllhElffllEI me
AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI V. UNION 265
(Chinnappa Reddy, l.)
. and in the case of candidates wanting in requisite standards, those
with the highest marks are given special intensive training to enable
them to come up to the requisite standards. In the case of posts
which involve the safety of movement of trains there is no relaxation
of standards in favour of candidates belonging to Schednled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes and they are required ta pass the same rigid
tests as other candidates.
Therefore, we see that when posts whether at the stage of initial
appointment or at the stage of promotion are reserved or other prefer-
ential treatment is accorded to members of the Scheduled Castes,
Schedn!ed Tribes and other socially and economically backward
classes, it is not a concession or privilege extepded to them; it is in c
recognition of theiJ: undoubted Fundamental Right to Equality of
Opportuni~y and in discharge of the Constitutional. obligation imposed
upon the state to secure to all its citizens 'Justice, social, economic
and political' and 'Equality to status and opportunity', to \assure 'the
dignity of the individual' among all citizens, to 'promote with special
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker section of
D·
the people', to ensure their participation on equal basis in the adminis-
tration of the affairs of the country and generally to foster the ideal
of a 'Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic'. Every law-
ful method is permissible to secure the due rep_resentation of the Sche-
duled Castes and ·Scheduled Tribes in the public Services. There is E
no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential treatment in favour of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes though generally reserva-
tion may not be far in excess of fifty percent. There is no rigidity
about the fifty percent rule which is only a convenient gnideline laid
down by Judges. Every case must be decided with reference to the
prnsent practical results yielded by the application of the particular F
rule of preferential treatment and not with reference to hypothetical
resnlts which the application of the rule may yield in the future.
Judged in the light of this discussion I am unable to find anything
illegal or unconstitutional in any one of the impugn!!d orders and cir-
culars. Each order and circular has been individually discussed by
my brother Krishna Iyer J with whose reasoning and conclusions I G
agree and to which I wish to add no more.

PBR Petitions dismissed.