Holding

The circumstantial evidence, together with the handwriting expert’s opinion and the sister’s testimony, forms a complete chain that points unequivocally to the accused’s guilt, and the conviction is upheld.

Summary

Alamgir, a Pakistani national, travelled to Delhi with his wife Halima and stayed at a hotel. He left her locked in the room on 19 September 1991 and failed to return; her body was later found strangulated. Two slips of paper near the body bore handwriting identified by an expert as Alamgir's. He was arrested in Bombay, and a key and a ticket dated 19 September were recovered from him. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, a handwriting expert’s opinion, and the testimony of Shamim Bano (the deceased’s sister), who, though an interested witness and whose statement was not recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., told police that the deceased had died in a bus accident. The defence argued that there was no direct identification, the chain of circumstantial evidence was broken, and the expert opinion required corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the totality of the circumstantial evidence, together with the expert’s opinion and the sister’s testimony, formed a complete, unbroken chain pointing to Alamgir’s guilt; an interested witness’s testimony is admissible if credible, and expert opinion need not be absolutely corroborated. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was upheld.

Issues considered

The circumstantial evidence must be examined to see if it forms a complete chain pointing to the accused’s guilt without any reasonable doubt.
Whether the testimony of an interested witness (Shamim Bano) is admissible despite not being recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
Whether the handwriting expert’s opinion is admissible without independent corroboration.
Whether the lack of direct identification by hotel staff defeats the conviction.

Legislation cited

Subjects

circumstantial evidenceinterested witnesshandwriting expertidentificationmurderSection 302 IPCadmissibilitychain of eventsreasonable doubt

Judgment

A ALAMGJR
v.
ST ATE (NCT. DELHI)

NOVEMBER 12, 2002

B
[UMESH C.. BANERJEE AND B.N. AGRA WAL, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Section 302-Murder-Circumstantial evidence-
Conviction by Courts below-On appeal, held, the chain of events of the
C present case pointedly point out to the guilt of the accusei-Evidence Act,
1872-Circumstantial evidence.

Criminal Trial:

Interested witness-Evidentiary value of-Held, interested witness by
itself cannot be a ground to reject the evidence on record-Test of its
' D creditworthiness or acceptability ought to be the guiding factor.
Expert opinion-Evidence of Handwriting expert-Reliability on-Jn
absence of corroboration-Held, there is no rule of law or rule of prudence
that opinion must never be a~ted upon unless substantially corroborated

E The appellant-accused came to visit Delhi alongwith his wife
(deceased) and stayed in a hotel on 18th September, 1991. On 19th
September appellant left the hotel, locking his wife in the.room. When the
appellant did not return and there was no response from the room, PW1
in the presence of PW3 opened the room with duplicate key and found
F the deceased dead in the room. There were two slips of paper, handwriting
whereon was identified by the handwriting expert as that of the appellant.
The appellant, thereafter was arrested at Bombay and key of the room
and ticket from Delhi to Bombay dated 19th September, 1991 was
recovered from him. During trial PW6 in her evidence deposed that the
appellant had telephonically informed her that the deceased had died in
G a bus accident and had been hurried at Nizamuddin. However, this
statement of hers was not in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Trial
Court convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC. The conviction was
confirmed by High Court.

In appeal to this Court it was contended by appellant that the present
H 88
ALAMGIR v. STATE (NCT. DELHI) 89
case was a case of blind murder and the prosecution has fabricated the A
case against the appellant; that prosecution has failed to link up the chain
of events; that the evidence of PWs I and 23 could not be relied on as
none of them had identified the appellant; that evidence of PW6 could not
be relied on since she was interested witness and since her evidence was
not available in her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.; and that opinion
of handwriting expert was not admissible. B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. In view of the law as regards acceptability of
circumstantial evidence and in view of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the events pointedly point out the guilt of the accused. The C
circumstances of the instant case, if read with the evidence of PW.6, as to
the date of departure of the accused with his wife from Bombay to Delhi
and the telephonic message after two days that the deceased had died in
a bus accident and that she had been cremated at a cremation ground in
Nizamuddin-would form a chain without there being any snap. D
[93-E; 94-G]

Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR (1952) SC 343; MG Agarwal and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
(1963) SC 200; Pawan Kumar v, State of Haryana, [2001] 3 SCC 628 and
Sudama Pandey and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [2002[ I SCC 679, relied on. E
2.1. Interested witness by itself cannot possibly be a ground to reject
the evidence on record. The test of creditworthiness or acceptability, ought
to be the guiding factor and if so, question of raising an eye - brow on the
reliability of witness being an interested witness would be futile-in the event
F
. the evidence is otherwise acceptable, there ought not to be any hindrance
in the matter of prosecutor's success. The evidence must inspire confidence
and in the event of unshaken credibility, there is no justifiable reason to
reject the same. [95-A-CJ

2.2. Though the piece of evidence of PW6 was not available in the G
statement of the witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C., but it does not take
away the nature and character of the evidence in the event there is some
omission on the part of the police official. This cannot be taken recourse
to as amounting to rejection of an otherwise creditworthy and acceptable
evidence. The evidence of PW.6 ought to be treated as creditworthy and
acceptable. H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A J . TIJ~re i~ _11() nile of Jaw, nor any rule of prudence which has
cryst;11ljzqd Into !I rule pf law tft~t opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert
must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. Since human
judgment cannot be sai<I to be totally infallible, due caution shall have to
be exerci5ed and the approacb ought to be that of care and caution and it
B is only upon probe amt ex~unination the acceptability or creditworthy of
the same d.epends. The coyrts below did place, upon consideration of all
relevant facts and material on r~conl, reliance on the opinion of the
handwriting expert and there is no reason to record a contra finding.
1100-B-q
Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1198011 SCC 407, relied on.
c
Magan Bihwi Lal v~ State of Punjab, 1197712 SCC 210, distinguished

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
202 of 2001.

D From the Jµdgme11t ~nd Order dated 7.4.2000 of the Delhi High Court
in Crl. A. No. 9 of 1995.

Jaspal Singh and Ms. Mimjula Gupta, for the Appellants.

Ashpk. Bhan, R.l\.. Rathore, Ms. Varuna B. Gugnani and D.S. Mehra,
for the Re~pon<,ient,
E
The JuQgment of the Col!rt was delivered by

BANERJ~J:, J, The matter under consideration pres~m!Y befi:m~ thi& •
Court stan4~ out to be sjn~~d!!:rly sing1.1lar on the plea of fabrication by the
t1@f@11ce against the prose<:Utpr. Tfle High Cgurt o.f Dell)j n~~~tet;i th@ ~ame
F an<I dismissed th~ appeal agaiqst the conviction µnder Section 302 IPC and
th!'! sentence of imprisonment for life along with fine.
It is at this j1.1n~tµre 1;1onv1mient to advert briefly to tfle prosecution case
iis belpw :

G Aliim~ir, the appellant herein beipg a resident of Pakistan was married
to Ms. Hai:rn (known b.y the qame P.f Halima after marriage). The factual
score depit:!t§ t~Ett Pn Pth S~ptemtm, 1991, the ~ppellant came to Delhi
along witlt tiis wife Hazra @ Halima and they checked in a hotel at Darya
Oanj (Rpyal Inn Guest House) on 18th September, 1991 at about 8.50 p.m.
Upon registration in the guest registration boqk, the f!ppellant and his wife,
H who was in Burqa, were allotted Room No.1(>7 and the key was handed over
ALAMGIR v. STATE (NCT. DELHI) [BANERJEE. J.] 91

to Alamgir. On 19th September, 1991, Alamgir, however, went out and brought A
some break-fast and at or about I0.15 in the morning, he repo11ed at the
counter infon11ing there\vith that the \vife being left alone in the hotel roo1n
ought not to be disturbed and that he would be back soon. Alamgir, however,
the factual score depict, did not return till 20th and the Manager of the hotel
by reason of not being able to get any response fro1n the roorn after several B
attempts, opened the room with the duplicate key in the presence of one
Dinesh Chand and found that the deceased was lying on the bed covered with
a red dupatta. Immediately thereafter, however, the police was informed and
Sub-inspector Rajbir Singh reached at the hotel and recorded the statement
of the Manager of the hotel. The Crime Branch was called along with
photographer and upon completion of all necessary formalities, the dead C
body was sent for post-mortem and the FIR being No.357/91 was registered
around 12.25 in the afternoon.

Incidentally, the police found two slips near the dead body. one of the
papers indicated "7 A Jaitkar House Tande) Street Room No.3, Mal Bazar,
Bombay 3" and something was written in Urdu thereon. The other paper slip D
was a photo of receipt A.V. 187318, 18.7.90 bearing photo and signatures of
Alamgir. On its backside 50690, 235472, and Assistant Director, D.R.0.
Karachi (West) was printed and sealed respectively. Some injury marks were
noticed on the neck of the deceased.

The further factual score depicts that on 21st September, 1991 on receipt E
of some secret information at about 2.20 p.m. by the CID, Bombay Unit, at
2.45 p.m. Inspector Naresh Talvalkar along with Inspector Dhoble and other
Constables reached in front of Caf Rahim Restaurant and found a person
standing opposite Caf Rahim Restaurant. They arrested that person, namely,
the accused Alamgir. On his personal search the accused was found holding F
a brown colour rexine pouch in his hand containing a key ring with a brass
·"'
letter 'R' and No.107 written on it along with passport of the accused,
residential permit as well as Pakistani I card of the accused and Pakistani
passport of Ms. Halima Noor Jamal, her residential permit and one copy of
I. Card form of the Halima and ticket from Delhi to Bombay along with I 00
rupee notes in Indian currency and Pakistani currency. Assistant Police G
Commissioner, Darya Ganj, Delhi was contacted and it was confirmed that
accused Alamgir was wanted in the case under Section 302 /PC in FIR No.
357 of 1991.

On 21st September, 1991 Delhi Police received the information of H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A arrest of accused Alamgir. SI Rajbir Singh was deputed to leave for Bombay .
for investigMiQn. The post mortem examination was also conducted on 21st
September, 199 ! , However, the body was directed to be preserved. Necessary
formalities were completed by the Bornbay Police. Accused was produced on
22nd September, l 99 l before the Additional CMM, Bombay. On 24th
B September, 1991 Delhi Police arrived in Bombay. All the articles which the
Bombay Police had recovered from the accused were handed over to Delhi
Police. SI Rajbir Singh met Inspector Talvalkar on 24th September, 1991,
formally arrested accused Alamgir, conducted his personal search, produced
before MM Mr. Shinde and obtained the remand. He interrogated the accused,
who made certain disclosure statements.
c According to the prosecution, accused Alamgir from Delhi had given
a telephonic call to Shamim Bano, sister of the deceased at Bombay and
asked her to call his father who had come from Pakistan. But his father was
not available in the house. Alamgir also told that Hazra had qied in bus
accident. Shamim Bano told all these facts to the police after three-four days
D at Bombay.

Smt. Safiya Tazim Ali, mother of the deceased stated that Hazra was
married six-seven months prior to murder. Alamgir, accused told her (mother-
in-law) and other members of her family that Hazra had died in a bus accident
and she had been cremated at the cremation ground in Nizamuddin. About
E 3 or 4 days prior to the arrival of the police at the house of Smt. Safiya Tazim
Ali, he had come to her house in Bombay. He had kept two bags in her house
which were recovered by the police. Both the bags contained clothes of her
deceased daughter.

F It is on these state of facts, the charge was framed and as noticed
above, the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Delhi found accused guilty and
sentenced imprisonment for life which stands confirmed by the High Court
and hence the appeal by the grant of special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution.

G The learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Jaspal Singh, has been able to state
the proposition of law with due clarity. It has been contended that in the
event of there being only circumstantial evidence, it is well settled that those
circumstances must be proved to be such as to be conclusive of the guilt of
the accused and incapable of explanation on any hypothesis consistent with
the innocence of the accused. It has been contended further that it is on this
H score the law seems to be well settled as well, to wit that the Courts will be
ALAMGIR v. STATE (NCT. DELHI) [BANERJEE, .I.] 93

well advised in case of circumstantial evidence to be watchful and to ensure A
that conjectures and suspicions do not take place of legal proof. It has been
the appellant's contention that the prosecution has utterly failed to link up the
chain and as a 1natter of fact the snap in the chain is not very far to seek. thus
warranting an order of acquittal and the High Court has fallen into a manifest
error in regard thereto. The evidence of PW. I and PW.23 being Madan Singh B
and Dinesh Chand was taken recourse to. It is on this score, it has been
contended that (a) None of them has identified the appellant; (b) None of
them has stated that it was the appellant who had checked in on 18.9.1991;
(c) None of them has stated that it was the appellant who had checked out
on 19.9.1991at8.30 A.M.and (d) Rather both the witnesses have stated that
appellant was not the person Who had checked in on 18.9.1991 or who had C
checked out on 19.9.1991 at 8.30 A.M, and drawing inspiration therefrom,
Mr. Singh in ·support of the appeal contended that there is thus no direct
evidence available to prove that it was the appellant who had checked in on
18th September, 1991 or had left the hotel on 19th September, 1991.
Admittedly, ther< is no difficulty in appreciating the submissions of Mr.
Singh. Availability of direct evidence is not there but what about the D
circumstances ? Before doing so, be it noted that the evidence of PW.6,
Sahmim Bano as to the date of departure of the accused with his wife Hazra
@ Halima from Bombay to Delhi and the subsequent telephonic message that
Halima died in a bus accident and that cremation has taken place in
Nizamuddin stand out to be a rather significant component of the chain of E
evidence.

(a) The appellant came to visit Delhi along with his wife Hazra @
Halima leaving Bombay on 17th September, 1991.
(b) On 18th September, 1991 at about 8.50 p.m. both of them claimed
to be husband and wife. Alamgir, appellant entered his name and F
)I address in the guest register and received key of Room No. I 07
and stayed in Room No. I 07 in Royal Inn Guest House, Netaji
Subhash Marg, Daryaganj, Delhi.
(c) On 19th September, 1991 in the morning at 8.30 a.m., Alamgir
left the guest house locking his wife in the room and did not G
return thereafter.

(d) The appellant telephonically informed PW6, Shamim Bano that
the deceased died in a bus accident and was buried in Nizamuddin
and thereafter the appellant left Delhi for Bombay.
H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (e) The appellant's wife was found dead due to strangulation in
Room No.·107 on opening of the same with duplicate key on
20th September, 1991.

(f) The appellant was arrested at Bombay on 21st September, 1991
and key of the room was recovered from him along with ticket
B from Delhi to Bombay dated 19th September, 1991 proving that
he after killing his wife instead of taking her care, had left for
Bombay on 19th September, 1991. Only beyond the range of a
reasonable doubt, of course, the expression 'reasonable doubt' is
incapable of definition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view

c that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which
affords moral certainty to the judge.

The question for consideration is thus as to whether the circumstances
noticed above would form a complete chain of events without any snap and
pointedly point to the accused as the guilty person and to no-one else. In the
D event there is an answer in the affirmative, question of interference with the
order of the High Court would not arise. Incidentally, the High Court did
emphasize on the true and correct meaning of the phraseology 'reasonable
doubt' to be attributed thereon and it is on this score, the High Court records:

"Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a
E reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty
to the judge."

We are, however, not expressing any opinion with regard thereto. Suffice
it to say that sufficiency of moral certainty itself is a matter for deliberation
and since the matter has not been addressed to us on that score, expression
F of opinion. on the same would not arise.

The circumstances noticed above, if read with the evidence of PW.6,
Shamim Bano as to the date of departure of the accused with his wife Hazra
@ Halima from Bombay to Delhi and the telephonic message after two days
G that Halima had died in a bus accident and that she had been cremated at a
cremation ground in Nizamuddin this piece of evidence, as noticed above, if
read along with the circumstances noticed above, would form a chain without
there being a,ny snap. Strenuous submissions have been made as regards the
admissibility of the Handwriting Expert's opinion as also a challenge thrown
to the non-admissibility of the entire evidence of Shamim Bano, PW.6. This
H evidence of Shamim Bano has been challenged on two counts: on the first
ALAMGIR v. STA TE (NCT. DELHI)[BANERJEE, .I.] 95
Shamim Bano, being the sister of Halima, was an interested witness and A
secondly, she did not say so in a statement before the police under Section
161 Cr.P.C. Interested witness by itself cannot possibly be a ground to reject
the evidence on record. The test of creditworthiness or acceptability, in our
view, ought to be the guiding factor and if so; question of raising an eye-
brow on the reliability of witness being att Interested witness would be futile
in the event the evidence is otherwise acceptable, there ought not to be any B
hindrance in the matter of prosecutor's success. The evidence must inspire
confidence and in the event of unshaken credibility, there is no justifiable
reason to reject the same. It is on this score the issue of interested witness
thus stands negated, as raised by the appellant. The second limb pertains to
the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Admittedly, this piece of evidence C
was not available in the statement of the witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,
but does it take away the nature and character of the evidence in the event
there is some omission on the part of the police official. Would that be taken
recourse to as amounting to rejection of an otherwise creditworthy and
accepta':Jle evidence the answer, in our view, cannot but be in the negative.
In that view of the matter, the evidence of PW.6 thus ought to be treated as D
creditworthy and acceptable and it is to be seen the effect of such an
acceptability.

Coming back to Mr. Jaspal Singh's submissions as regards prosecution's
fabrication of evidence, two redeeming features ought to be noticed, namely:
E
(a) PW.I Madan Singh after several knocks at the door and having
failed to obtain any reply therefrom, opened the room with a duplicate key
and found a person lying on the double bed covered with red cloth-the room
was locked and police was informed. The arrival of the police people at the
hotel led the opening of the door and the dead body of a female was recovered
F
with two slips of paper noticed hereinbefore. The handwriting and signatures
stand to be proved by the Handwriting Expert as that of the appellant herein.
The High Court did not find any reason to discard this piece of evidence,
neither we find any justifiable reason to discard the same either. It is on this
score that Mr. Jaspal Singh has been rather emphatic that Handwriting Expert's
opinion being a weak piece of evidence ought not to be relied upon and G
placed reliance in support thereof the decision of this Court in Magan Bihari
Lal v. The State of Punjab, [1977] 2 SCC 2 IO. Since detailed submissions
have been made on this score, we think it fit and proper to detail out the
observations of this Court in Magan (supra). This Court in para 7 of the
Report stated as below :
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A "7. In the first place, it may be noted that the appellant was at the
material time a Guard in the employment of the Railway
Administration with his headquarters at Agra and he had nothing to
do with the train by which Wagon No. SEKG 40765 was despatched
from Munda to Bikaner, nor with the train which carried that wagon .
from Agra to Ludhiana. He was not a Guard on either of these two
B trains. There was also no evidence to connect the appellant with the
theft of the blank Railway Receipt at Banmore Station. It is indeed
difficult to see how the appellant, who was a small employee in the
Railway Administration, could have possibly come into possession of
the blank Railway Receipt from Banmore Station which was not
c within his jurisdiction at any time. It is true that B. Lal, the handwriting
expert, deposed that the handwriting on the forgeJ Railway Receipt
Ex.PWIO/A was that of the same person who wrote the specimen
handwritings, Ex. PW 27/37 to 27/57, that is the appellant, but we
think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely
on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now
D well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great
caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of
a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority
which holds that it is unsafe co base a conviction solely on expert
opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been
E universally acted upon and it. has almost become a rule of law. It was
held by this Court in Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR (1957) SC
381) that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient
basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by .,

other items of internal and external evidence. This Court again pointed
out in /shwari Prasad Mishra v. Md. Isa, AIR (1963) SC 1728 that
F expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive because it is,
after all, opinion evidence, and this view was reiterated in Shashi
Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR (1964) SC 529
where it was pointed out by this court that expert evidence a~ to
handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place
G of substantive evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would
be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This Court had again
occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard
to handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of MP., AIR (1967) SC 1326
and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to
H found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert
ALAMGJR v. STATE (NCT. DELHI) [BANERJEE. J.] 97
and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to A
see whether it is corroborated by other evidence. direct or
circu1nstantial. It is interesting to note that the sa111e vie\V is also
~choed in the judgn1ents of English and A1nerican cou11s. Vide Gurney
v. Langlands, (1822, 5 Band Aid 330) and Matter of Alfred Foster's
Will (34 Mich 21). The Supreme Court of Michigan pointed out in
the last mentioned case :
B

Every one knows how very unsafe it is to rely upon any
one's opinion considering the niceties of penmanship Opinions
are necessarily received, and may be ·valuable, but at best this
kind of evidence is a necessary evil.
c
We need not subscribe to the extreme view expressed by the Supreme
Court of Michigan, but there can be no doubt that this type of evidence,
being opinion evidence is by its very nature, weak and infirm and
cannot of itself form the basis for a conviction. We must, therefore,
try to see whether, in the present case, there is, apart from the evidence D
of the handwriting expert B. Lal, any other evidence connecting the
appellant with the offence."

In our view, however, reliance in Magan (supra) is rather nusplaced in
the contextual facts since no conviction is based on the opinion of the
handwriting expert but admittedly it can be relied upon when supported by E
other items of internal and external evidence. The handwriting expert's opinion
simply corroborates the circun1stantial evidence and as such we are unable to
record our conc·urrence with the sub1nissions of Mr. Singh on this score.

Significantly, this Court in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
[ l 980) I sec 704 in no uncertain terms observed that the hazard in acceptance F
of opinion of an expert is not because it is unreliable evidence, but because
human judgment is fallible. Needless to record that the signs of identification
of handwriting have attained more or less a state of perfection and the risk
of an incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. This Court went on further
to record that doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert ought to be a far
l cry and insistence upon further corroboration as an invariable rule does not G
seem to be a justifiable conclusion. In continuation of the above noted
principle, this Court went on to further examine as regards judicial precedence
and in that vein stated in paragraph 7 of the Report as below :

"7. Apart from principle, let us examine if precedents justify H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A invariable insistence on corroboration. We have referred to Phipson
on Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on Criminal Evidence,
Archibald on Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice and
Halsbury's Laws of England but we were unable to find a single
sentence hinting at such a rule. We may now refer to some of the
decisions of this Court. In Ram Chandra v. UP. State, AIR (1957)
B SC 381, Jagannadhadas, J. observed : "It may_ be that normally it is
not safe to treat expert evidence as to handwriting as sufficient basis
for conviction" (emphasis ours). "May" and "normally" make our
point about the absence of an inflexible rule. In Ishwari Prasad Misra
;
v. Mohammad Isa, AIR (1963) SC 1728 Gajendragadkar, J. observed: p
c "Evidence given by experts can never be conclusive, because after all
it is opinion-evidence", a statement which caries us nowhere on the
question now under consideration. Nor, can the statement be disputed
because it is not so provided by the Evidence Act and, on the contrary,
Section 46 expressly makes opinion-evidence challengeable by facts,
othe,rwise irrelevant. And as Lord President Cooper observed in Davis
D v. Edinburgh Magistrate, (1953) SC 34: "The parties have invoked
thP. decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement
by an expert."

As regards the decision of Magan (supra) this Court in paragraph stated
E as below:
"10. Finally, we come to Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab
[1977] 2 sec 210), upon which Sri R.C. Kohli, learned counsel,
placed great reliance. It was said by this Court :

. . .. but we think it would be extremely hazardous
F to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion
evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that
expert opinion must always be received with great caution
and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of
a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential
authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction
G
solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration.
This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost
become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram
Chandra v. State of UP., AIR (1957) SC 381 that it is
unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis
H
ALAMGIR v. ST ATE (NCT. DELHI) [BANERJEE. J.] 99
for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by A
other items of internal and external evidence. This Cou1t
again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad Mishra v. Md Isa, AIR
(1963) SC 1728 that expert evidence of handwriting can
never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence,
and this view was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. B
Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR ( 1964) SC 529 where it was
pointed out by this court that expert evidence as to
handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take
the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such
evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is
corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by C
circumstantial evidence. This Court had again occasion to
consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to
handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of MP., AIR (1967) SC
1326) and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it
would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence
of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, D
the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated
by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
The above extracted passage, undoubtedly, contains some sweeping
general observations. But we do not think that the observations were E
meant to be observations of general application or as laying down
any legal principle. It was plainly intended to be a rule of caution and
not a rule of la1.v as is clear from the statement "it has almost become
a rule of law'. "Almost", we presu1ne, means "not quite". It was said
by the Court there was a "profusion of precedential authority" which
insisted upon corroboration and reference was made to Ram Chandra F
v. State of UP., lshwari Prasad v. Mohammad Isa, Shashi Kumar v.
Subodh Kumar and Fakhruddin v. State of MP. We have already
discussed these cases and observed that none of them supports the
proposition that corroboration must invariably be sought before
opinion-evidence can be accepted. There appears to be some mistake
in the last sentence of the above extracted passage because we are G
unable to find in Fakhruddin v. State of MP. any statement such as
the one attributed. In fact, in that case, the learned. Judges acted upon
the sole testimony of the expert after satisfying themselves about the
correctness of the opinion by comparing the writings themselves. We
do think that the observations in Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, H
I 00 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A must be understood as referring to the facts of the particular case."

In fine in Murari Lal (supra) this court stated that there is no rule of
law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law that
opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless
substantially corroborated. We feel it expedient to record our concurrence
B therewith, though, however, we hasten to add that since human judgment
cannot be said to be totally infallible, due caution shall have to be exercised
and the approach ought to be that of care and caution and it is only upon
probe and examination the acceptability or creditworthy of the same depends.
The learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court did place, upon
C consideration of all relevant facts and material on record, reliance on the
opinion of the handwriting expert and we do not see any reason to record a
contra finding.

(b) Misleading telephonic information about the death of the deceased
to sister and mother of the deceased and the evidence on this score seems to
D be rather categoric and creditworthy. It is on this score, the High Court also •
placed reliance and did not think it fit to discard the testimony of PW.6,
Shamim Bano on this score.

The two counts mentioned above have in fact cemented the fate of this
appeal. Identity of the accused person stands challenged by Mr. Jaspal Singh
E and while recording acceptance of a factum of murder, it has been the definite
contention that it is a blind murder if that be so then why the misleading
information to the famiiy members of the deceased is it to obviate a detection
so as to enable him to escape the rigors of law or a genuine and innocent
statement of the accused : if the death had been caused, as reported to the
F. family members of the deceased or the burial there would have been some
documentary evidence in support thereof : the street accident must have been
rather fatal and burial also cannot take place without proper documentation
unfortunately, there is no documentary support. This is, however, on the
opposition that the evidence of PW.6 stands accepted. At this juncture we,
however, feel it expedient to record that in fact on a plain look at the evidence
G one would take to conclude its acceptability in creditworthiness rather than
its rejection. It is on this score, the High Court was pleased to record its
opinion upon detailing out the circumstances and we do also feel it inclined
to record that the circumstances noticed above cannot but lenci concurrence
to the observations of the High Court that the matter in issue cannot but be
H termed ·to be a brutal and gruesome murder of Hazra by the accused person.
I
l\
ALA MG JR v. STA TE (NCT DELHI) [BANERJEE. J.] I0 I

Before proceeding with the matter furlher, It would be convenient to A
note the well established rule i.11 9rimin~I Jurisprudence as regards the
acceptability of the circumstantial eviden~e and the rule of the law courts in
regard thereto.

The word of caution intruduced In the judgment of this Court about
five decades ago in that direction however still stands as an acceptable guide. B
This Court in Hanwnant Govirid N«rg11rnlkt1r and Anr. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 34) stated:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the cir1:umstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should ln the first instance be fully established, C
and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the ~ullt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as
to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In
.other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not D
to !eave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within
all hm11an probability the act must have been done by the accused."
Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in MG Agarwal and
Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1963) SC 200 in the similar vein and E
without any contra note stated the law with utmost lucidity in the manner
noted below:

"It is a well established rule in criminal jurisprudence that
circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused
person's convlctlon if it is of such a character that it is wholly F
inconsistent With the innocence of the accused and is consistent only
with his guilt. If the circumstances proved in the case are consistent
either with the Innocence of the accused or with his guilt, then the
accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. There is no doubt or
dispute about this position. But in applying this principle, it is necessary ·G
to fatln11ulsh between facts which may be called primary or basic on
the une hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the
other. In rei.iard to the proof of basic or primary facts, the Court has
to Juctjle the evidence in the ordinary way, and in the appreciation of
evklence In respect of the proof of these basic or primary facts there
is no scope for the application of the doctrine of benefit of d.oubt. The H
I
,I
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A court considers the evidence and decides whether that evidence proves
a pa1ticular fact or not. When it is held that a certain fact is proved,
the question arises whether that fact leads to the inference of guilt of
the accused person or not, and in dealing with this aspect of the
problem the doctrine of benefit of doubt would apply and an inference
of guilt can be drawn only if the proved fact is who.lly inconsistent
B with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only with his
guilt."

Similar however is the opinion of this Court in Pawan Kumar v. State
of Haryana, [2001] 3 SCC 628 in which one of us (U.C. Banerjee, J.) was
C a party. The opinion of the Court runs as under:

"Incidentally, success of the prosecution on the basis of circumstantial
evidence will however depend on the availability of a complete chain
of events so as not to leave any doubt for the conclusion that the act
must have been done by the accused person. While. however, it is
D true that there should be no missing links, in the chain of events so
far as the prosecution is concerned, but it is not that every one of the
links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these
links may only be inferred from the proven facts. Circumstances of
strong suspicion without, however, any conclusive evidence are not
sufficient to justify the conviction and it is on this score that great
E care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence. In any
event, on the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the
accused must be accepted and the law is well settled on this score, as
such we need not dilate much in that regard excepting, however,
noting the observations of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v.
Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR (1992) SC 840 wherein this Court in
F
paragraph 9 of the report observed:-

"This Court has, time out of number, observed that while
appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt a very
0

cautious approach and should record a conviction onlY, if all the
links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused
G
and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of beillg negatived
on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial
evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of
two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted.
The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully
H established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established
ALAMGIR v. STATE (NCT. DELHI) [aANERJEE. J.] ] 03

must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is A
not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis
put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it
might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be
rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection
if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise."
B
The other aspect of the issue is that the evidence on record,
ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to justify the inferences of the·
guilt from the incriminating facts and circumstances which are
incompatible with the Innocence of the accused or guilt of any other
person. The observations of this Court in the case of Ba/winder Singh C
v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350 lends concurrence to the
above."

In a more recent decision of this Court in Sudama Pandey and Ors. v.
State of Bihar, [2002] I SCC 679 the law as noticed above and to the same
effect stands very felicitously expressed.
D
On the basis of the law and the factual score as above, in particular the
circumstances tabulated hereinbefore, the issue thus arises as to whether
involvement of the accused can be doubted in any way or the events pointedly
point out the guilt of the accused person. The High Court answered it in the
second alternMlve and upon consideration of the entire matter we do feel it E
expedient to reQord ow concurrence with the reasons and conclusions as put
forlh in the judgment impugned,

In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and is dismissed.

K.K.T Appeal dismissed. F