Supreme Court of India
ALL DELHI CYCLE RICKSHAW OPERATORS UNION ETC.versusMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 1
- Decided
- 6 January 1987
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- E S VENKATARAMIAH
Holding
Bye‑law No.3(1) is within the statutory power of the Delhi Municipal Corporation and does not contravene Article 19(1)(g).
Summary
The petitioners, owners of multiple cycle rickshaws, challenged Bye-law No.3(1) of the Cycle‑Rickshaw Bye‑laws, 1960, which limited the issuance of licences to a single licence per person and only to those who themselves operated the rickshaw. They argued that the bye‑law exceeded the powers granted under Section 481(1)(l)(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and violated their right to practice a trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court examined the language of the statutory provision and held that the corporation was within its authority to impose such a restriction in the public interest, namely to prevent exploitation of rickshaw pullers. The restriction was deemed a reasonable condition on licensing, not prohibited by the Act, and therefore not unconstitutional. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and the bye‑law upheld, with the Court also directing banks to provide financial assistance to rickshaw pullers.
Issues considered
- Whether Bye‑law No.3(1) of the Cycle‑Rickshaw Bye‑laws, 1960 falls within the scope of the power conferred by Section 481(1)(l)(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
- Whether the bye‑law violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Legislation cited
- Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 481(1)(l)(5)
Subjects
Bye‑lawLicensingCycle rickshawMunicipal corporationArticle 19(1)(g)Public interestExploitationFinancial assistance
Judgment
ALL DELHI CYCLE RICKSHAW OPERATORS UNION ETC.
A
v.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS. ETC.
JANUARY 6, !987 B
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,
JJ.]
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, section 481(J)(L)(5),
scope of-Power to make bye law regulating the keeping or plying for
hire a cycle rickshaw in De/hi-Whether, the Bye-law 3(1) of the Cycle
c
Rickshaw Bye-laws, 1960 restricting the number of licence to only one
and the grant only to the owner of a cycle rickshaw either to keep or to
ply for hire, is within the scope of the power conferred on the autho-
rity-Whether the said bye-law is opposed to Article 19(J)(g) of the
Constitution. D
Section 481(1) of the Delhi Mnnlcipal Corporation Act, 1957 em-
powers the Corporation to mBke additional bye-laws to the existing
ones. Under the power so conferred the Corporation introduced Bye-
law No.J(i) in the Cycle -Rickshaw Bye-laws, 1960, under which only an
owner of the cycle rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rick- E
shaw or to ply for hire and only one such licence would be ~ued to a
person. By necessary implication it excludes persons who own a. number
of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences and prohibits the hiring
out of the cycle rickshaw by the owner in favour of a rickshaw puller
against payment of consideration.
F
The Writ Petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some of them
own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out by them to rick-
shaw pullers under a contract under whicli the rickshaw pullers have to
pay some amount to the owners of the cycle rickshaws at the end of the
day out of their earnings during the day. Being aggrieved by the intro-
duction of Bye-law No.J(i), they have moved the Supreme Court under G
Article Ji of the Constitution that the said Bye-law is opposed to Article
19( I )(g) of the Constitntion and aisO outside the scope of section
481(1)L(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court,
H,
905
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 1 S.C.R.
)
HELD: l. l On a consideration of the language of clause (5) in
A section 481(!) L of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, it is
clear that Bye·law 3(1) falls within the scope of the power conferred on
the Corporation to frame bye-laws for the issue of licences in respect of
cycle-rickshaws which are kept or used for plying in the Delhi Municipal
Corporation area. While framing bye-laws under the above statutory
B provision it is pennlssible for the Corporation to restrict the is.'1Je of
licences only to the owners of the rickshaws who themselves act as
rickshaw pullers. This is apparently done to prevent exploitation of the
rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rickshaws. A licensing
authority may impose ·any condition while is.'1Jing a licence which is in
the interest of the general public unless it is either expressly or by
necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the
C law which confers the power of licensing. The restriction imposed by
the Corporation in the present case is in the interest of the general
public. [910C-E]
!.2 The Bye-law No.3(1) cannot therefore be said to be either
D outside the scope of section 481 of the Corporation Act or opposed to the
provisions ofthe Constitution. [911D]
Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union ( Regd) Ch. Town Hall, Amritsar
& Ors. etc. v. State of Punjba & Ors., [!981] l SCR 366 and Nanhu & --'
Ors. etc. v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1981] I SCR 373, referred
E to.
Man Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [!985] 4 SCC 146,
followed.
(The Court approved the two schemes of financial assistance, put
F forward, at its instance, by the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of
India and the wlllingness of the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
(Small L(lllllS) to guarantee the repayment of the loans advanced to the
rickshaw pullers and directed, accordingly, the several branches of the
Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India
operatlng in Delhi to give financial assistance to rickshaw pullers who
G wish to own cycle rickshaws and ply them under licences issued by the
Corporation snbject to their producing the necessary eligibility certifi·
cate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other terms of the
Schemes, namely (i) the scheme for financial to cycle rickshaw pullers;
and (ii) self employment programme fm· urban poor (SEPUP). The
court also directed the Delhi Administration to comply with the direc·
H lions issued in Nanhu & Ors., [1981] l SCR 373.)
C.R.O.U. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 907
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 13688 of 1983
etc.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) ·
T.U. Mehta and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.
B
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, V.C. Mahajan, R.B. Datar, Miss
Bina Tamta, S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua, Aman Vachhar, H.S. Parihar,
Vipin Chandra, G.D. Gupta, M.L. Kaicker and V.B. Saharya for the
~ ''>.{· Respondents.
-, f
I
t
,J ~
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
VENKA T ARAMIAH, J: In these petitions the petitioners have
questioned the validity of bye-law No. 3( 1) of the Cycle-Rickshaw
Bye-Laws, 1960 framed under section 48 l of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'). Bye-law No.
3( I) reads as follows: D
"3( l). No person shall keep or ply for the hire a cycle
rickshaw in Delhi unless he himself is the owner thereof
).. and holds a licence granted in that behalf by the Commis-
sioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to time,
be fixed under sub-section (2) of section 430.
E
Provided that no person will be granted more than one such
licence.
No person shall drive a cycle rickshaw for hire unless he
holds a driving licence granted in that behalf by the Com- F
missioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to
time be fixed under sub-section (2) of section 430."
The petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some of them own
two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out by them to rickshaw
pullers under a contract under which the rickshaw pullers have to pay G
some amount to the owners of the cycle rickshaws at the end of the day
out of their earnings during the day. In order to eliminate the exploita-
tion of rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rickshaws the Delhi
Municipal Corporation amended the Cycle-Rickshaw Bye-laws, 1960
by introducing bye-law No.3. Under that bye-law only the owner of the
cycle rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 1 S.C.R.
for hire and only one such licence would be issued to a person. By
A
• necessary implication it excludes persons who own a number of cycle
rickshaws from applying for licences and prohibits the hiring out of the
cycle rickshaw by the owner in favour of a rickshaw puller against
payment of consideration. The contention of the petitioners is mainly
dependent upon section 481( l)L(5) of the Act which reads thus:
B
"481( I). Subject to the provisions of this Act the Corpora-
tion may, in additition to any bye-laws which it is
empowered to make by any other provision of this Act,
make bye-laws to provide for all or any of the following
matters, namely:-
r,
c
L. Bye-laws relating to miscellaneous matters-
D
(5). the rendering necessary of licences-
(a) for the proprietors or drivers of hackney-car-
riages; cycle rickshwaws, the/as and rehries kept or plying J.
for hire or used for hawking articles;
E
"
F
It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the above provision
in the Act does not permit the Corporation to make a bye-law which
prohibits the issue of licences to the owners of cycle-rickshaws who are
not themselves rickshaw-pullers. It is also urged that the bye-law is
violative of Article 19( l)(g) of the Constitution. The respondent-
'
t
Corporation contends that the impugned bye-law No. 3.is within the
scope of the authority conferred on it by the Act to make the bye-law
in question and that it is not opposed to Article 19( l)(g).
G The constitutional validity of a similar provision in the Punjab
Cycle-Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 (Punjab Act 41 of --+
1975) came up for consideration before this Court in Azad Rickshaw
Pullers Union (Regd) Ch .. Town Hall, Amritsar & Ors., etc. v. State
of Punjab & Others, [1981] 1 SCR 366. In the cour.;e of its
judgment the Court approved a scheme framed for providing financial
H assistance to the richshaw-pullers for acquiring cycle rickshaws. The
/.
C.R.O.V. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. [YENKATARAMIAH, J.] 909
provision of the Act which was impugned in that petition was, however,
A
left untouched. On the same date this Court pronounced another judg-
ment in Nanhu & Ors., etc. v. Delhi Administration & O,rs., [1981]
1 SCR 373 in which the very same bye-law with which we are con-
cerned in these cases came up for consideration. That case was dis-
posed of by this Court by a short order whiCh reads thus:
B
"We have disposed of today applications from cycle rick-
shaw pliers of Amritsar Municipality where a scheme has
been worked out to help them become owners of cycle
rickshaws. A similar scheme, says the Solicitor-General ap-
pearing for the Delhi Administration, will be extended to
the Delhi territory. We, therefore, annex a copy of the C
judgment in Writ Petitions Nos. 839 of 1979 and 563 of
1979-Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union, Amritsar and others
v. State of Punjab & Others and Nanak Chand and
Others v. State of Punjab and Others, respectively to
this judgment.
D
There· is another problem which arises in these two cases
and that is that the Delhi Administration has put a ceiling
on the total number of cycle rickshaws permissible to be
plied wi_thin its territory perhaps-we do not know for·
certain-this number may not accommodate all the applic-
ants for cycle rickshaws plying li~encees. We are told that E
apart from the applicants in this Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution, there are numerous petitioners who have
approached the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of
the Constitution and yet others who have filed suits in civil
courts for the same relief. All that we can do is to accept
the suggestion made by the learned Solicitor-General that F
the Delhi Administration will effectively publicize and
notify applications for. llcencees for plying of cycle
rickshaws and all those who apply will be considered on
. their merits including length of service as cycle rickshaw
pliers. The criteria that the Delhi Administration will adopt
must be reasonable and relevant; otherwise it will be open G
to the aggrieved parties to challenge the selection. Like-
+ wise we do not want to fetter the rights of parties aggrieved
if the ceiling upon the total number of rickshaws permissi-
ble within the Delhi territory is arbitrary.
On the basis of reasonable criteria the Delhi Administra- H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 1 S.C.R.
ti6n will direct the concerned Municipal authorities to )'
A grant licences for plying rickshaws and if the applicants so
chosen are not owners themselves all the facilities we have
indicated in the Amritsar order will be extended to such
cycle rickshaw pliers fixing reasonable time limits. With
these directions we dispose of the applications. Until fresh
B licences are issued by the Delhi Administration and the \.
Municipal authorities the present petitioners will be
allowed to ply their cycle rickshaws."
It is clear from the above order that this Court did not say any-
thing about the constitutional validity of bye-law No. 3. We, however,
C find on a consideration of the language of clause (5) in section 481( l)L
of the Act that the bye-law falls within the scope of the power confer- }
red on the Corporation· to frame bye-laws for the issue of licences in
respect of cycle-rickshaws which are kept or used for plying in the
Delhi Municipal Corporation area. While framing bye-laws under the
;!bove statutory provision it is permissible for the Corporation to re·
D strict the issue of licences only to the owners of the rickshaws who
themselves act as rickshaw pullers. This is apparently done to prevent
exploitation of the rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rick-
•shaws. A licensing authority may impose any condition while issuing a
licence which is in the interest of the general public unless it is either j
expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a
E condition by the law which confers the power of licensing. The restric-
tion imposed by the Corporation in the present case is according to us
in the interest of the general public. In Man Singh and Others v.
State of Punjab and Others, [1985] 4 SCC 146 the petitioners con-
tended that the provision in the Punjab Cycle Rickshaw (Regulation of
Licence) Act, 1976 was violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the
F Constitution as also Articles 14 and l6 of the Constitution. This Court
negativing the said contention observed thus:
"In the instant case, section 3 of the Punjab Act has the
effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply
the rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the
G full owner of the income earned by him. No longer will he
be obliged to part with an appreciable portion of that in-
come in favour of another who.owns the vehicle. The Pun-
jab Act is beneficial legislation bringing directly home to
the rickshaw puller the entire fruit of his daily toil. The
enactment is intended as a social welfare measure against
H the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious
C.R.O.U. v. MUNICIPAL CORPN. [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 911
.~ cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior fi-.
A
nancial resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil
of rickshaw pullers. Even if we look at the impugned legis-
lation from the point of view of its impact on the fundamen-
tal right of rickshaw owners who give them on hire to rick-
shaw pullers for plying, it is plain that the legislation consti-
lutes a reasonable restriction on the right of such rickshaw B
owners to carry on the business of hiring out cycle rick-
shaws inasmuch as the exercise of the right is excluded by
legislation designed for the economic and social welfare of
rickshaw pullers, who constitute a significant sector of the
1 people, a sector so pressed by poverty and straitened by the
economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of
c
.... their full day's wages to them seems amply justified."
We do not, therefore, find any ground to set aside the bye-law in
question either on the ground that it is outside the scope of section 481
of the Act or on the ground that it is opposed to the provisions of the
Constitution. The above contentions, therefore, fail. D
During the pendency of these proceedings the Court issued
notices to the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the
State Bank of India and also the Credit Guarantee Corporation of
>- India (Small Loans) to ascertain whether the banks are willing to ex-
tend financial assistance to the rickshaw pullers to acquire the owner- E
ship of cycle rickshaws and to ply them within the Corporation area
and also to ascertain whether the Credit Guarantee Corporation of
India Small (Loans) would guarantee the loans advanced to the rick-
shaw pullers. The learned counsel for these banks and the Credit
~
Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) have submitted that
the banks ·are willing to advance upto Rs.2,000 by way of loan at F
reasonable rate of interest to the rickshaw pullers on the security of the
cycle rickshaws owned by them in order to assist the rickshaw pullers
r to acquire the cycle rickshaws. The banks have put forward before the
Court two schemes: (1) the scheme for finance .to cycfe rickshaw pul-
lers, and (2) Self-employment programme for urban poor (SEPUP)
under which it is possible for them to give financial assistance to the G
rickshaw pullers. The Credit Guarantee Cooporation of India (Small
+ Loans) is agreeable to guarantee the repayment of loans advanced to
the rickshaw pullers. The Corporation authorities are agreeable to
issue necessary eligibility certificates to the rickshaw pullers to obtain
the loan.
H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] I S. C.R.
A In view of the above submissions, we direct the several branches
of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank
of India operating in Delhi to give financial assistance to rickshaw
pullers who wish to own cycle rickshaws and ply them under licences
issued by the Corporation subject to their producing the necessary
eligibility certificate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other
B
terms of the Schemes referred to above. We also direct the Delhi
Administration to comply with the directions issued by this Court in
Nanhu & Others (supra).
In the course of the argument the learned counsel for the l
petitioners incidentally made a oomplaint about the seizure of cycle
C rickshaws by the Corporation officers without issuing an acknowledg-
ment to the owners whenever they found that the cycle rickshaws were +
being used on the roads contrary to the rules. The learned counsel for
the Corporation stated that whenever the cycle rickshaws are seized
written acknowledgments will be issued to the owner if he is found
D near the cycle rickshaw at the time of its seizure. We record the above
statement made on behalf of the Corporation.
These petitiones are accordingly· disposed of. No costs.
S.R. Petitions disposed of. J
~
I
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Bye‑law"Sign in to search