Holding

The Court held that respondents 1‑5 did not willfully disobey the order and cannot be held guilty of civil contempt, and respondent 6 cannot be held guilty of criminal contempt due to lack of admissible evidence.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined contempt petitions filed by the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) alleging that senior Tamil Nadu officials (respondents 1‑5) willfully disobeyed a Court order restraining political parties from calling a bandh on 1 October 2007, and that Union Minister T.R. Baalu (respondent 6) scandalised the judiciary through a speech. The Court held that the injunction was expressly directed at political parties, not at the officials, and that the petitioners failed to produce any evidence showing that the officials deliberately violated the order; consequently, no civil contempt could be established. Regarding the minister, the Court found that only newspaper extracts and an edited television clip were offered, which were not admissible primary evidence of the alleged contemptuous remarks, so no criminal contempt could be proved. Both contempt petitions were therefore dismissed.

Issues considered

The question whether respondents 1‑5 willfully disobeyed the Supreme Court's 30‑09‑2007 order restraining political parties from a bandh, thereby attracting civil contempt under s.2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Article 129 of the Constitution.
The question whether respondent 6 (Union Minister T.R. Baalu) committed criminal contempt under s.2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by making scandalising remarks against the judiciary.
The admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence (newspaper copies, edited TV tape) offered to prove the alleged contemptuous speech.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 129
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(b), s. 2(c)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 3

Subjects

contempt of courtcivil contemptcriminal contemptwillful disobedienceinjunctionbandhessential servicesevidence admissibilityArticle 129Contempt of Courts Act

Judgment

[2009] 6 S.C.R. 583

ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM A
v.
L.K. TRIPATHI AND OTHERS
(Contempt Petition (C) No. 262 of 2007)
IN
SLP (C) No. 18879 of 2007 B
APRIL 1, 2009
[B.N. AGRAWAL AND G.S. SINGHVI, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: c
s. 2(b) - Civil contempt - Order of Supreme Court
restraining political parties from proceeding with the call for
bandh in State - Allegation of willful disobedience of
·.-. directions by Chief Secretary of State and other officers - 0
Held: Cannot per se be held guilty of contempt - Language
of restraint order unambiguous - Prohibitive injunction was
explicitly directed against political parties and not against
government officials - No directions issued to them to take
specific steps with regard to calf for bandh - No evidence E
produced to show that transport services did not operate at
all due to action of government officials - More so, they took
.. all necessary steps for preventing any disruption of public
services and inconvenience to general public - Constitution
of India, 1950 - Article 129.
F
s. 2(b) - Civil contempt- Call for bandh in State - Order
of Supreme Court restraining political parties from calling for
bandh - Pursuant thereto, withdrawal of bandh by Chief
Minister - Allegation that CM guilty of contempt as
'- Government did not issue written instructions to officers for G
maintaining essential services and normal public life and his
party workers coerced people to close commercial and
business establishments - Held: Not sustainable - Except
newspaper reports no material to show that CM directly or
583 H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2009] 6 S.C.R.

A indirectly encouraged party members to enforce call for
bandh.

s. 2(c) - Criminal contempt - A/legation that Union
Minister made unwarranted remarks to scandalize judiciary
8 in general and order of Supreme Court restraining bandh in
general - Held: Charges cannot be framed against him - No
legally admissible evidence produced to prove the contents
of speech allegedly made by the Minister - Material
produced was only in form of zerox copies of newspapers and
C tape edited version of speech telecasted on T. V.
Evidence - Tape reordered version - Admissibility of.

The question which arose for consideration in these
contempt petitions are whether respondent no. 1 to 5
o willfully disobeyed order dated 30.09.2007 passed by this ;
Court in SLP and thereby made themselves liable to be
proceeded against under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 read with Article 129 of the Constitution of India and
whether respondent no. 6 is guilty of criminal contempt
E within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act.

Dismissing the contempt petitions, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The language of the order by this Court _,,
restraining the political parties from proceeding with the
F call for bandh in the State of Tamil Na du on 1.10.2007
pursuant to resolution dated 24.9.2007 or any other day,
is unambiguous. The prohibitive injunction contained
therein was explicitly directed against the political parties
and not against respondent nos. 1 to 3. The Court did not
G direct respondent nos. 1 to 3 to act in any particular
manner or take certain specific steps to meet the
challenge likely to be posed by implementation of the call
given by Democratic Progressive Alliance. This was so
because the Court could not have presumed that the
H restraint order passed by it would be disregarded or
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 585

... .. v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS .
flouted by the political parties. Therefore, respondent A
nos.1 to 3 cannot, per se, be held guilty of disobeying
or violating the Court's order dated 30.09.2007 and
punished for committing contempt of court as defined in
s. 2(b) of the 1971 Act. [Para 27] [617-A-C]
B
1.2. The petitioners did not place on record any
evidence to show that despite restraint order passed by
~

t· the Court on 30.9.2007, the political parties constituting
Democratic Progressive Alliance resorted to strike or
bandh. They have not even disputed that after coming
to know about the Court's order, respondent no.4 made c
a statement at 1.30 p.m. withdrawing resolution dated
24.9.2007 which contained a call for cessation of work
on 1.10.2007. If, despite statement of respondent no.4,
which was made known to the public, the shops and
·t business establishments remained closed and the D
private transport operators did not consider it proper to
operate their services on 1.10.2007, respondent nos.1 to
3 cannot be held to have deliberately disobeyed the
Court's order. [Para 29] [618-C-E]
E
1.3. The only material produced by the petitioner
against respondent no.6 in Contempt Petition is in the
form of zerox copies of newspapers and tape of the
... • edited version of speech which is said to have been
telecast on Jaya T.V. on 1.10.2007 and 2.10.2007. The F
respondent no.6 claimed that the newspapers reported
something by putting in his mouth which he did not
speak; and that what was telecast on Jaya T.V. was the
doctored version of his speech. The petitioners were
duty bound to produce some primary evidence to prove
G
the contents of the speech made by respondent no.6
scandalizing judiciary in general and this Court's order
dated 30.09.07 in particular. Thus, no charge can be
framed against respondent no. 6 with reference to
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 because
the petitioners did not produce any legally admissible
evidence to prove the contents of the speech allegedly
made by the respondent. [Paras 31 and 42) [619-C-E, 631-
B-C]
8
Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 442; A.
Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 443; Azhar
Ali Khan v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(1984) 3 SCC 549; Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh 1962
C (Supp) 3 SCR 127; T.N. Godavannan Thirumulpad v. Ashok
Khot (2006) 5 SCC 1; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose
1953 SCR 215 and E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.
Narayanan. Nambiar (1970) 2 SCC 325, held inapplicable.

Ram Singh and Ors. v. Col. Ram Singh 1985 (Supp)
D SCC 611; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan
Ramdass Mehra and Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 17; Mrityunjoy Das
and another v. Sayed Hasibur Rahman and others (2001) 3
SCC 739; Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and another (2001)
7 SCC 530; Anil Ratan Sarkar and others v. Hirak Ghosh and
E Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 21; Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v.
Dharam Godha and Ors. (2003) 11 SCC 1; Delhi
Development Authority v. Skipper Construction (1995) 3 SCC
507 and Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. v. State of Bihar and
Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 569, referred to. . '

F
M. v. Home Officer (1993) 3 All ER 537; Re,
Bramblevale Ltd. (1969) 3 All ER 1062; William G. Cooper,
Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock v. John
Aaron 358 US1 : 3 L Ed 2d 5 : 78 S Ct 1401 (1958), referred
to.
G
New Oxford Illustrated Dictionary 1980 Edn; Black's Law
Dictionary Vol.II 8th Edn; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Vol.5
4th Edn; Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, referred to.

H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 587
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS .
.,
.;,·
Case Law Reference: A

-- (1994) 6 sec 442

(1993) 3 All ER 537
Held inapplicable.

Referred to.
Para 15, 41

Para 15
(1970) 1 sec 443 Held inapplicable. Para 15
B
(1984) 3 sec 549 Held inapplicable. Para 15
.~ 1962 (Supp)
~
3 SCR 127 Held inapplicable. Para 15 ·

(2006) 5 sec 1 Held inapplicable. Para 15 c
1953 SCR 215 Held inapplicable. Para 15, 42
(1970) 2 sec 325 Held inapplicable. Para 15, 42
(2003) 11 sec 1 Referred to Para 24 D
....
(1995) 3 sec 507 Referred to. Para 25
(1999) 1 sec 569 Referred to. Para 26
1985 (Supp) sec 611 Referred to. Para 32
E
(1976) 2 sec 11 Referred to. Para 33
(1969) 3 All ER 1062 Referred to. Para 34
... " (2001 > 3 sec 739 Referred to . Para 35
F
(2001 > 1 sec 530 Referred to. Para 36
(2002) 4 sec 21 Referred to. Para 37
358 us 1 Referred to. Para 38
(1994) 6 sec 442 Distinguished. Para 41 G

- L
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition (c)
No. 262 of 2007,

IN
·' H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 6 S.C.R.
..
A S.L.P. (C) No.18879 of 2007.

From the Judgment & Order dated 28.09.2007 of the High ·•
Court of Judicature at Madras in M.P. No. 1 of 2007 in Writ
Petition No. 31435 of 2007.
B WITH

Contempt Petition (c) No. 327 of 2007 in S.L.P. (c) No. 18879
of 2007. ..'
S. Guru Krishna Kumar, Subramonium Prasad and Srikala
c Gurukrishna Kumar for the Appellant.

In CP 327/2007 in person (N/P).

A. Mariarputham, M.N. Rao, R. Nedumaran, Promila and
D S. Thananjayan for the Respondents.
:"'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Whether respondent Nos.1 to 5 have
willfully disobeyed order dated 30.9.2007 passed by this Court
E in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18879 of 2007 and thereby
made themselves liable to be proceeded against under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the 1971 Act') read
with Article 129 of the Constitution of India and whether
respondent No.6 is guilty of criminal contempt within the ~

F meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1971 Act are the questions
which arise for determination in this petition filed by All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam through its Presidium
Chairman Shri E. Madhusudhanan.

2. Background facts:
G
2.1. In an apparent bid to pressµrize the Central
Government to expedite implementation of Sethu Samudram
Project, Democratic Progressive Alliance comprising Dravida
~

-
Munnetra Kazhagam, Indian National Congress, Communist ,
,,
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 589
4'"
.. v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India and Pattali A
Makkal Katchi, passed a resolution on 24.9.2007 to resort to
total cessation of work and closure of shops on 1.10.2007 and
to conduct a general meeting of the leaders of all parties on
30.9.2007 at Chennai. The relevant portions of the resolution
are extracted below: 8
_,. "... in order to make understand the fact that the support
.. of the people is only to implement the Sethu Samudram
Project expeditiously to the Central Government, it is
resolved to conduct total cessation of work and closure
of shops on the 1st of October, and to conduct a general c
meeting of the leaders of all parties on the 30th day of
September, at Chenn_ai."

2.2. The petitioner challenged the afore-mentioned
• resolution in Writ Petition No.31435 of 2007 filed before
Madras High Court and prayed that the call given by the political
D

parties for organizing bandh in the State of Tamil Nadu either
on 1.10.2007 or any other day may be declared as violative of
Articles 19 and 21 and the Directive Principles of the State
Policy and fundamental duties embodied and enumerated in E
the Constitution of India. Shri Subramanfa Swamy of Janta
Party, Shri K.R. Ramaswamy @ Traffic Ramaswamy (founder
... ~ Chairman of the Tamil Nadu Social Workers Association,
Chennai) and Shri R. Balasubramanian also filed Writ Petition
Nos.31478, 31462 and 31631 of 2007 with similar prayers. F
2.3. Along with the writ petition, the petiti0ner filed two
miscellaneous petitions with the prayer that a direction be
issued to Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam represented by its
President M. Karunanidhi (Respondent No.4 in the contempt
...
4.-
petition) to deposit a sum of Rs.100 crore with the Chief G
Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu on or before 28.9.2007
which could be utilized to compensate the damage caused to
the general public and the five political parties be restrained
'
J from proceeding with the call for bandh in the State in terms of
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A resolution dated 24.9.2007.

2.4. After hearing counsel for the parties, the High Court
admitted the writ petitions and issued the following directions
to the Chief Secretary, Director General of Police, District
Collectors and other officers of the State:
8
"(i) To ensure that no political party, organization,
association, group or individual can, by organizing
'bandh/ hartal' or by force or intimidate, stop or
interfere with the road and rail traffic or free
c movement of the citizens in the State of Tamil Nadu
on the day of 'Bandh' i.e. 01.10.2007.

(ii) To ensure that the public transport in the State
including the Civil Aviation run smoothly on the day
D of the 'Bandh' i.e. 1.10.2007.

(iii) To take appropriate action against the person(s)
indulging in stoppage or interference with the road
and rail traffic or free movement of the citizens in
the State of Tamil Nadu.
E
(iv) Chief Secretary to the Government shall issue a
Press Note to the Print Media and also the
Electronic Media on 29/30.9.2007 informing about
the preparation made by the Police to deal with the
F 'Bandh' and to make people secured."

2.5. Feeling dissatisfied with the High Court's order, the
petitioner filed S.L.P. (C) No.18879 of 2007 in this Court. The
same was heard on 30.9.2007. The counsel representing
respondent nos.1 to 3, who volunteered to appear, also made
G their submissions. After considering the respective
submissions, this Court passed a detailed order, the relevant
portions of which are reproduced below:

"From a bare perusal of the aforesaid decision, it would .
;

H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 591
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
be clear that neither anybody can give a call for Bandh nor A
the same can be enforced. The High Court, in the present
case, has recorded a, prima facie, finding that, in the
present case, the call was given for Bandh and not strike/
hartal.
B
Ordinarily, High Court as well as this Court refrains from
passing an interim order the effect of which would be
granting the main relief. But in cases where a party
approaches court without loss of time, there are no laches
on its part, it is not possible to give notices to all the
necessary parties and hear them because of paucity of C
time and in case interim order is not passed in a case like
the present o.ne, which, prima facie, in the opinion of court
is concluded by judgment of this court, the main case
would become infructuous, different considerations would
arise and appropriate interim order should be passed. In D
-t. the present case, apart from the State of Tamil Nadu, out
of the political parties, namely, Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam, Indian National Congress, Communist Party of
India (Marxist), Communist Party of India and Pattali
Makkal Katchi, only Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has E
appeared before us, whom we have heard at length.

After taking into consideration the entire matter, prima
facie, we are also of the view that the call given by the
aforesaid political parties is a call for Bandh and not strike/ F
Hartal. Accordingly, we have no option but to issue notices
to the non-appearing respondents and pass interim order.
Issue notice.

Until further orders, Respondent Nos.3 to 7 are restrained G
from proceeding with the call for Bandh in the State of
Tamil Nadu on 1st October, 2007 pursuant to resolution
dated 24th September, 2007 or any other day."
2.6. Even before filing of writ petition by the petitioner, the H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A then Chief Secretary of the State - Shri L.K. Tripathi
(respondent no.1 herein) directed that the concerned officers
be asked to take steps necessary for maintaining essential
services and for providing protection to important offices and
establishments apart from markets and business places. The
B instructions given by the Chief Secrdary were circulated vide
telefax No.SR.11/50641/2007 dated 27.9.2007, the relevant
portions of which are extracted below:-

"1. Essential services like Telephone and
Telecommunication, water supply, milk distribution,
c power supply, fire services, newspapers, hospitals,
shall be ensured to function and protection given.

2. Provide adequate protection to vital installations
such as power stations/grids, sub-stations,
D important Government buildings, telecommunicc:tion
and bridges, oil installations, railway bridges, etc.

3. Arrange open line patrol with immediate effect.

4. Arrange for regular supply of milk and other
E essentials.

5. Provide adequate protection to the High Court and
other Courts.

6. Action to be taken against anti-social elements and
F persons indulging in acts of violence and
vandalism.

7. A visible police presence shall be maintained
throughout the city.
G
8. A visible bandobast outside railway stations, bus
depots, main roads, main junctions, hospitals,
courts, schools and colleges will be maintained.

9. Necessary protection to market and business
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 593
v L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
1
places shall be given. A
10. All police control rooms will be fully activated to
follow up incident to take proper stern and timely
action.

11. Ensure that the 'Hartal' passes off peacefully. B

12. Collectors may requisition and spare other
department vehicles if required by the District
Superintendent of Police.

Any incident of law and order and other matters of
c
significance should be informed to Chief
Secretary's Control Room Telephone
Nos.26571388 and 26570372, followed by FAX-
25677128. Bi-hourly report commencing from 0600
hours on 01.10.2007 about the 'Hartal' should be D
given to Chief Secretary's Control Room even if
there is no incident. First Report should commence
from 0600 hours on 01.10.2007."

2.7. On coming to know of this Court's order through E
electronic media, respondent No.1 directed that telephonic
instructions be given to all the Collectors to convene meetings
with the respective Superintendents of Police for ensuring that
law and order and public tranquility are maintained.
F
2.8. The Court's order was officially communicated to
respondent no.1 on the same day i.e., 30.9.2007 at about
10.30 p.m. by fax. The latter immediately forwarded the same
to respondent no.2 for taking necessary action. In turn,
respondent No.2 directed the concerned police officers that
steps should be taken for facilitating unobstructed movement G
of public transport and maintenance of essential services like
water and electricity supply, milk distribution, telephone and
telecommunication service, fire service, hospitals and
protection be given to Central Government offices, courts, bus
stands, railway stations, banks, market places, shops, industrial H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A establishments, etc. These directions were conveyed to Zonal
..
~

Inspector Generals of Police and Commissioners of Police by -~
Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order) vide fax
dated 1.10.2007 which was sent between 11.28 p.m. on
30.9.2007 and 6.30 a.m. on 1.10.2007. The contents of that
8 fax are reproduced below:-
Date 30.09.2007
..
J.
"From

c ADGP (L&O)
Chennai -4.

To

All Zonal IGPs
D and COPs

All unit officers are instructed to strictly follow the
following instructions,

1. The Depots Managers of the State Transport
E Corporation will decide about running the buses
subject to availability of crew. Sufficient Bandobust
must be provided to all Bus Depots under their
jurisdiction. • ••
F 2. Anyone who obstructs the movement of Public
transport should be picked up.

3. Bandobust should be provided to all essential
services like Hospital, Electricity, Offices, Bus
stands and railway stations etc.
G )
4. Bandobust must be provided to all Central
Government offices, Courts and Banks.
5. Beats and Patrol should be provided to all market
H places, shops and industrial establishments.
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 595
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
....•
6. All anti-social elements should be picked up. A

7. Sufficient Bandobust arrangements should be
provided at the places where Hunger strike is
scheduled to be held.
Sd/- D.S.P.C.O.S.R. B
For ADGP (L&O)
Chennai-4
30.9.2007

C.No.D1/17566/IGP/NZ/2007 DATED 1.10.2007
c
COPY COMMUNICATED TO ALL SsP. AND DlsG. IN
NORTH ZONE AND ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE
NECESSARY ACTION AND REPORT COMPLIANCE.
\

Sd/- 1.10.2007
For IGP/NZ/CNl-16" D
2.9. The Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department
also sent fax No.SR.11/5064-5/2007 dated 1.10.2007 to all the
District Collectors at 11.25 a.m. requiring them to send hourly
reports to the Chief Secretary's Control Room regarding the E
law and order situation, movement, transport, functioning of
essential services, functioning of schools and colleges, opening
of shops, hotels and other public utilities, attendance in
.. " Government offices etc .

3. On 3.10.2007, the petitioner filed this petition under F
Article 129 of the Constitution of lndi.a read with the 1971 Act
and prayed that the respondents be punished for violation and
disobedience of the Court's order dated 30.9.2007. The
gravamen of the petitioner's allegation is that in complete
disregard of the restraint order passed by this Court, the G
concerned political parties including Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagahl enforced the bandh in the entire State by ensuring
that buses owned by the State Transport Corporation are kept
off the road and shops and other business establishments
H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A remain closed; that 45,000 private buses were also not allowed
to ply on that day; that shops and other business establishments
were forcibly closed by the cadres of Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam party and that the State machinery did not take any
action
I
to ensure functioning of public transport system and
B opening of the shops etc. It is also the petitioner's case that
even though 50,000 employees of the State Transport
Corporation came forward to carry out their duties but they were ...
prevented from entering the b.us depots by the Depot Managers, J_

Supervisor, etc. on the instructions of higher authorities and
C even the main gates of many bus terminals were closed and
locked. To substantiate these allegations, the petitioner has
placed on record the photographs collectively marked as
Annexure P-5 and the telegrams which are said to have been
sent by Shri K.K. Madeswaran, C. Sengottaiyan and M.A.
Paneerselvam to Tamil Nadu State Road Transport
0
Corporation, representation made by A.J. Selvaraj, Anna Trade
Union Secretary, Radhapuram Taluk. In paragraph 14 of the
Contempt Petition, it has been averred that several workers of
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party moved in various vantage
areas of the State with deadly and lethal weapons to ensure
E that no business or commercial activity was done on 1.10.2007
and whoever opened the shop was forced to down the shutters.
It has been further averred that in Chennai, a restaurant at
Arterial Mount Road was attacked and looted and many other
shops and restaurants were ransacked and eatables were
F thrown out and bottles were broken, but the police remained
mute spectators. In support of these averments, the petitioner
placed on record copies of various newspapers. In paragraph
23, a reference has been made to the speech allegedly made
by respondent No.6, Shri T.R. Balu, Union Minister for Shipping
G and Surface Transport, at the venue of the hunger strike on
1.10.2007 and it has been averred that the same was calculated ·
to scandalize judiciary in general and order dated 30.9.2007
in particular./ The relevant portions of the speech allegedly
made by respondent no.6, which is said to have been published
H in the newspapers and also telecast on the television channels
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 597
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
are extracted below:- A
"If we want to conduct a Bandh in a democratic manner to
ensure speedy implementation of this Project, the Supreme
Court is injuncting the same. Are judgments being
delivered correctly in the Courts? If that is so, why are
8
higher courts granting stay of orders of lower Courts?

If judges are not making mistakes why are there conflicting
judgments? Today there are many complaints against
many judges. Corruption charges are appearing everyday.
What does that mean? If they were upright yesterday, does C
it mean that they are not upright now? When was a sitting
ever held on a Sunday? Unprecedented things are taking
place.

We are expressing our feelings. How many complaints are
0
received against judges? There is provision in law for
impeachment of sitting judges. The MPs' sitting here
should also think about it. Nothing wrong about it. Our
MPs, including the ministers should know about it.
Everyone including the ministers can sign it."
E
4. In paragraph 7 of the reply affidavit filed by him,
respondent no.1 has averred that after telecast of the news
about the restraint order passed by the Court, telephonic
instructions were issued to the District Collectors to maintain
law and order and public peace. In para 8 of the affidavit, F
respondent no.1 has averred that immediately on receipt of the
Court's order, a copy thereof was sent to respondent no.2 with
suitable instructions to take necessary action and within the
available time the police force was mobilized and bandobust
was provided to all vital installations, State and Central G
Government offices, educational institutions, Tamil Nadu State
Transport Corporation depots, bus stands, railway stations,
airports, markets, places of worship, hospitals, important
junctions, business areas and other places where people used ,
to congregate and bandobust was also provided to the H
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.

A industrial establishments for their smooth functioning and
pickets were posted at all sensitive places to avert law and
order problems. According to respondent No.1, effective
patrols and mobiles were organized for ensuring free flow of
traffic in the State and open line patrols were deputed for
8 keeping watch on the railway tracks; all the courts including the
Madras High Court were given sufficient protection; vehicle
checks were organized to prevent the movement of anti-social
elements and trou.ble mongers and rowdy elements were
detained under preventive measures. Respondent No.1 has
C claimed that on 1.10.2007 all the Courts functioned normally
and movement of trains and other essential services were
maintained without any obstruction. As regards transport
services., respondent no.1 has averred that less number of
Government transport services operated in the early morning
but with the passage of time around 2749 routes were made
0
operational.

5. In his affidavit, respondent no.2, Shri P. Rajendran, has
detailed the steps taken for ensuring presence of police at
various important places for maintaining law and order and
E movement of transport services. He has denied that workers
of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party had forcibly closed
business establishments and shops by wielding lethal and
deadly weapons for the purpose of conveying threats to the
public.
F
6. In his affidavit, respondent no.3 - Shri Debendranath
Sarangi has given an account of the steps taken for ensuring
normal operation of State Transport Services. In paragraphs
11 of the affidavit, respondent no.3 has averred that senior
officers, i.e., Branch Managers and Divisional Managers of
G various State Transport Undertakings were instructed to ensure
normal operation of buses on 1.10.2007. Respondent No.3 has
then averred that the officers were on duty on 1.10.2007 and
adequate police bandobust was provided at the Depots, but
most of the crew did not turn up in the morning on 1.10.2007
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 599
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
.......
and even those who came did not enter the Depot premises, A
did not sign the duty chart and dispersed after holding
demonstration in front of the Depots; that the Branch Managers
and Divisional Managers made efforts to operate the bus
services with the help of available crew and with the passage
of time the number of services substantially increased. B
Respondent No.3 has denied that the Drivers and Conductors
were prevented from carrying out their duties or that the
conductors did not issue tickets or that the main gates of bus
terminals were closed and locked. He has also denied receipt
of any representation or telegram. In para 15 of the affidavit, C
respondent No.3 has referred to the call given by the trade
unions to abstain from work in the wake of decision taken by
the political parties and averred that even though the latter
withdrew the call for cessation of work, there was no
corresponding response from the trade unions due to paucity
0
of time and also due to the fact that most of the workers had
left for outside places taking advantage of the impending strike
and two days' holidays. Respondent No.3 has also stated that
the crew members who did not attend the duty on 01.10.2007
have not been paid the wages as per the policy "no work no
pay". Respondent No.3 has controverted the petitioner's E
assertion that daily collection of the Transport Corporations is
over Rs.10 crores. According to him, the average collection
of-the Transport Corporations is Rs.7.5 crores per day, which
is reduced to half on any holiday and less than half in the event
of continuous holidays for 3-4 days. According to respondent F
No.3, total collection on 1.10.2007 was Rs.483 lakhs. Lastly,
respondent no.3 has averred that in observance of the order
of this Court necessary instructions were given to Managing
Directors of all the State Transport Corporations to ply buses
and send reply by Fax. G
7. Respondent No.4, Shri M. Karunanidhi, has come up
with the plea that initially he was advised to adopt the counter
affidavits of respondent nos.1 and 2 and a statement to that
effect was made before the Court on 4.8.2008 by the advocate H
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
•....
A representing the State of Tamil Nadu but, later on, he decided
to file a separate counter affidavit. In paragraph 3 of the
affidavit, respondent no.4 has given the background in which
decision was taken by Democratic Progressive Alliance
comprising major political parties in Tamil Nadu to demonstrate
B their concern on the delay in implementation of Sethu
Samudram Project by observing cessation of work between 6
a.m. to 6 p.m. on 1.10.2007. Respondent No.4 has then
averred that on the basis of reports appearing in the TV news .
channels and after verifying the facts from counsel appearing
- c on behalf of respondent no.3 in the special leave petition, he
gave a call at about 1.30 p.m. for withdrawal of resolution dated
24.9.2007 and this was conveyed to the concerned political
parties. According to respondent no.3, instructions were given
to the government officials to carry out the Court's order and
ensure that the bandh did not take place on 1.10.2007 and the
D fast undertaken by political parties should not, in any way, affect
the general public or hinder their routine life. For the sake of
convenience, paragraph 7 of the affidavit of respondent no.4
is reproduced below:-

E "7. The order passed by this Hon'ble Court was
communicated to the Chief Secretary to Government of
Tamil Nadu by FAX at 10.30 PM by the Registrar of this
Court on 30.09.2007. Even before the order was officially
communicated, it was flashed in the TV News channels.
F After verifying with counsel at New Delhi and without waiting
for any fonmal communication from this Hon'ble Court, at
about 1.30 PM I immediately called for the withdrawal of
the resolution dated 24.09.2007 passed by the Democratic
Progressive Alliance for cessation of work. This was also
G conveyed to all political parties, which vvere part{to the said
Resolution. However, Democratic Progressive Alliance
decided to hold a day long fast on 1st October, 2007 to
draw attention to the importance of the Sethu Samuthiram
Project and for early implementation of the same. I made
H
it clear at that time that the fast was not against the order
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 601
v. LK. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
,,~
~• of this Hon'ble Court. I annex an extract from the Hindu A
newspaper 1st October, 2007 reporting this (Annexure
-R1). I also gave instructions to Government officials to
carry out the order of this Hon'ble Court and to ensure that
the Bandh did not take place on 1st October, 2007, and
that the day long fast undertaken by political parties should 8
not in any way affect the general public or hinder their
routine life."
>
... 8. Respondent No.5 has taken the stand that at the time
of passing of order by this Court, he was in his constituency
(Trichy) and on receipt of information about the Court's order,
c
he instructed respondent no.3 to take steps to maintain
normalcy in transport serv.ices on 1.10.2007. Respondent No.5
has also stated that he had been continuously monitoring the
operation of transport services from Trichy and also made
efforts to contact the trade unions and instructed them to direct D
f the workers to report for duty in view of withdrawal of call for
cessation of work given by Democratic Progressive Alliance.

9. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of affidavit dated 26th August,
2008 filed by him, respondent no.6 - Shri T.R. Baalu has E
resorted to the rhetoric that he has highest respect for the
judiciary and he is a strong believer in the independence of the
judiciary. In paragraph 7 of the affidavit, respondent no.6 has
'# • made a mention of his electoral achievements and averred that
the contempt petition has been filed with the sole object of F
tarnishing his political image in the State and position as
Minister in the Central Government. In paragraph 8, respondent
no.6 has alleged that by filing petition before this Court, the
petitioner which is the main opposition party in the State is try!ng
to indirectly achieve which it could not achieve in the political G
... arena. Respondent No.6 has then given his own interpretation
of the term bandh and averred that he did not participate in any
activity which can be described as a bandh. In paragraph 11
of the affidavit, respondent no.6 has averred that nothing in the
quoted speech constitutes participation in bandh or instigating
H
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A others to do so and whatever he said was legitimate exercise
•+- ,
'
of freedom of speech. In paragraph 12, respondent no.6 has
claimed that the newspaper report regarding his speech is not
accurate and words have been put in his mouth which were not
uttered by him.
B
10. Arguments in the case were heard on 11.11.2008 and
concluded on 12.11.2008 qua the alleged contemnor nos.1
to 5. However, the case was adjourned to 10.12.2008 to enable
the petitioner to file additional affidavit in relation to respondent •"""
no.6 with liberty to the latter to file reply within two weeks. On
c the next date, i.e., 10.12.2008, the Court considered an
application made on behalf of the petitioner for summoning the
tapes of the speech allegedly made by re.spondent no.6 on
1.10.2007 at Chennai and ordered issue of notice to the
Resident Managers of Times Now Channel and Jaya T.V.
D requiring them to produce the tapes and original chips of the
speech. Notices were also issued to Dhanya Rajendran and
M. Ramasubramanian (reporters) and Manish Dhanani, Y.
Jayaprakash and S. Ravikumar (camera persons of limes Now
Channel and Jaya T.V. respectively).
E
11. In response to the Court's notice, Shri M. Vasudev Rao,
authorised signatory of limes Global Broadcasting Company
Limited, which is running limes Now Channel, sent letter dated ;
16th January, 2009 stating therein that the company is unable '
F to provide the original tapes and news clips of the speech
delivered by respondent no.6 because in terms of the Uplinking
and Downlinking Guidelines issued by the Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, the company
maintains a record of the contents uplinked and downlinked by
G its channel for a period of 90 days from the date of its telecast.
After taking note of that letter, the Court allowed further time to ~

the parties to file affidavits.

12. In furtherance of the liberty given by the Court, the
petitioner filed affidavits of S/Shri M. Ramasubramanian, S.
H Ravikumar and R. Thillai, who were working as Reporter,
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 603
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Assistant Camera Person and Senior Sub-Editor respectively A

- with Jaya T.Y. on 1.10.2007. In his affidavit, Shri M.
Ramasubramanian has claimed that he was deputed to cover
the hunger strike organized by DMK and other allied parties
on 1.10.2007 in front of the State Guest House, Chepauk,
Chennai. He has then averred that he along with Shri B
Ravikumar (camera person) and Shri Satish (camera assistant)
went to cover the events and that he was present at the venue
where respondent no.6 made speech and Ravikumar recorded
the speech which was in Tamil with sentences/phrases in
English. According to Ramasubramanian, speeches of c
respondent no.6, Shri D. Raja of C.P.I. and Shri K. Veeramani
of Dravida Kazhagam only were recorded and the original
tapes were handed over to Shri R. Thillai. According to Shri
S. Ravikumar, he accompanied by Shri Satish went to the venue
of the hunger strike and recorded the speeches made by three
0
persons and, thereafter, original tapes were handed over to
Shri R. Thillai. In his affidavit, Shri R. Thillai has stated that Jaya
T.V. shoots visuals on cameras using DY tapes and so far the
channel has not shifted to the digital format and whenever -
visuals are brought by the reporting team, the same are
ingested into the visual editing system called Avid and, E
thereafter, the tapes are reused for recording other events.
Paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of the affidavit of Shri R. Thillai,
contain the following statements:

"d. It may be noted that the original tapes on which the F
visuals are recorded upon being ingested into the
avid system as aforesaid and after the necessary
visuals are taken, are re-used for recording other
subsequent events. In the process, the left out
visuals of a previous recording are erased since G
new recordings are made over the same. The tapes
are re-cycled in this manner and not retained in view
of commercial and operational compulsions.

e. Some of the original recordings are transferred on
H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A to separate DV tapes or DVDs for archival " 1'-

purposes as for example, file shots of certain
important events so that they could be used for
future purposes. The news bulletins, as telecast
over the channel, are stored in the DVD format in
B the library.

f. That the protests organized by the DMK and its
allies on 1.10.2007 by way of the hunger strike at ...
Chennai was covered by the reporting team of Mr. •
Ramasubramanian and Mr. S. Ravikumar and
c Camera assistant Satish. They had handed over
to me the original tapes containing the events
recorded including the. speech made by Mr. T.R.
Baalu, Union Minister for Shipping and of certain
other speakers during the afternoon on 1.10.2007.
D On my instructions, the news branch technicians
ingested the contents of the original tapes
containing the events covered including the speech
of Mr. T.R. Baalu, into the Avid system. From this,
I selected the portions in the speech of Mr. Baalu
E which were most objectionable and found
appropriate to be telecast. Accordingly, the
portions were selected and telecast in the news
bulletin carried by the channel on 1.10.2007 at 7.30
PM and on 2.10.2007 at 7.30 PM. The portions
.)
. '
F of the speech as telecast on the news bulletins
clearly show the speech made by Mr. T.R. Baalu
and the objectionable statements made by him, the
translations of which read as follows:

'~Judge is a judge till yesterday. Today there are
G
a/legations against him. Every day a list of j

corruption charges are coming out from Delhi. ~
What does that mean? Is a person who was honest
till yesterday dishonest today? The nation has not
forgotten the fact that such people are also judges.
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 605
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
....•
When has there been [hearing] on a Sunday? A
I
Something unprecedented is happening. Why is
there a provision for impeachment in the
Constitution? Our M.Ps are all sitting here. We
should also think about it. There is nothing wrong
about it. Our MPs must know about it. Including B
Ministers. Everybody can sign it."
>" The news bulletins as telecast is submitted before
...
this Hon'ble Court in the form of a DVD which is
filed as Annexure A/1 to this affidavit."
c
In the last paragraph of his affidavit which is again marked
as (f), Shri R. Thillai has stated as under:

"f. That I submit therefore that the original tape
containing the speech of Mr. T.R. Baalu is not D.
available. Nevertheless, the news bulletins telecast
by the channel containing the objectionable portions
of his speech are presented before this Hon'ble
Court."

13. To the above noted 3 affidavits, respondent no.6 has E
filed a reply on 21.3.2009. The thrust of his reply is that Jaya
T.V. is controlled by AIADMK party on whose behalf the
-4
.. contempt petition has been filed and, therefore, it cannot be
treated as an independent media and that failure of the
management of Jaya T.V. to produce tapes and original chip F
of the speech allegedly made by respondent no.6 should be
treated as sufficient for rejecting the affidavits. In paragraphs
7 to 12 of the reply, it has been averred that the petitioner has
produced before the Court a truncated, edited and doctored
version of the telecast made by Jaya T.V. channel, and the G
4
..... same is liable to be discarded because the full and correct
version of the speech made by respondent no.6 has been
erased and the original tape containing tbe speech has not been
produc~d.

H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
•!-
A 14. In the light of 3 affidavits f~ed on behalf of the petitioner
and counter filed by respondent no.6, further arguments were ""~

heard on 25.3.2009 and judgment was reserved.

15. Shri S. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner in S.L.P.(C) No.18879 of 2007 representing the
B petitioner in Contempt Petition (C) No.262 of 2007 argued that
in view of the orders passed by the Division Bench of the
~
Madras High Court and this Court, the call given by Democratic ~
Progressive Alliance for cessation of work must be treated as
call for bandh in the State and even though respondent no.4 is
c said to have made a statement on 30.9.2007 at 1.30 p.m.
giving an impression that resolution dated 24.9.2007 was
withdrawn, no direction was given by the political establishment
to the concerned officers to ensure that the administration
moves on and respondent Nos.1 to 3 did not take steps to
D prevent disruption of normal life in the State. He further argued
that the so called withdrawal of the call given by the political
parties for cessation of work must be treated as sham because
the workers of the party headed by respondent No.4 indulged
in physical violence and ensured that bandh is observed
E throughout the State by forcing closure of shops and
commercial/ industrial establishments. Learned counsel relied
on the newspaper _reports to buttress his submission that the
workers of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party had, by wielding )
'>
deadly weapons compelled the shop keepers to down the
F shutters and general public to remain away from the streets and
argued that this should be treated as sufficient for drawing an
inference that respondent no.4 had deliberately manipulated
violation of the Court's order. Shri Guru Krishna Kumar
emphasized that the business, commercial/industrial
G establishments could not have remained closed without _..).
intimidation and use of force by the outfits of the political parties .
and argued that respondent no.4 should be held responsible
for the acts of his party.workers. Learned counsel then argued
that by sitting on hunger strike, respondent No.4 and other
political parties deliberately violated the Court's order
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 607
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
restraining them to organize bandh because out of fear the A
schools, colleges, business, commercial and industrial
establishme11ts were closed and people refrained from carrying
out their normal activities. Learned counsel submitted that if
respondent no.4 genuinely wanted to abide by this Court's
order then after making a statement in the afternoon of B
30.9.2007 that there will be no cessation of work, he would have
given written instructions to respondent nos.1 to 3 to ensure that
the public life is not disturbed but instead of doing so
respondent no.4 indirectly encouraged the officers to enforce
the bandh else there was no reason why majority of buses c
belonging to seven State Transport Corporations did not ply on
1.10.2007 putting the general public to great inconvenience and
acute hardship. Learned counsel referred to the.averments
contained in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the contempt petition, to
show that even as per the statement made by respondent no.1 D
in an interview given to a television channel during the mid day
on 1.10.2007, only 61 of the 18641 buses could be operated
on the date of bandh and argued that this should be treated as
a clear proof of abject failure of respondent nos.1 to 3 to ensure
that the normal life is not affected and the public is not
inconvenienced. Learned counsel pointed out that due to the E
bandh organized by Democratic Progressive Alliance, which
was indirectly supported by respondent nos.1 to 3, State
Transport Corporations suffered loss to the tune of Rs.10 crores
and submitted that all the respondents should be made to
compensate the State Transport Corporations. Learned F
counsel submitted that in a cabinet form of government, the
political party in power is responsible for the action and
omissions of the administrative officers and, therefore,
respondent no.4 should be held guilty of committing contempt
of Court. As regards respondent no.6, Shri Guru Krishna Kumar G
strongly relied on the speech made by the said respondent on
1.10.2007 and argued that he should be held guilty of committing
criminal contempt within the meanin~ of Section 2(c) of the
1971 Act and adequately punished. In support of his
arguments, Shri Guru Krishna Kumar relied upon the judgments H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A of this Court in Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC
442], M. v. Home Officer [(1993) 3 All ER 537], A. Sanjeevi
Naidu v. State of Madras [(1970) 1 SCC 443], Azhar Ali Khan
v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(1984) 3
SCC 549], Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh [1962 (Supp)
B 3 SCR 127], T.N. Godavarman Thi.'1-mulpad v. Ashok Khot
[(2006) 5 SCC 1], Aswini Kumar Gliose v. Arabinda Bose
[1953 SCR 215] and E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.
Narayanan Nambiar [(1970) 2 SCC 325].

C 16. Shri R. Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner in Contempt Petition No.262 of 2007
argued that respondent nos.1 to 5 are guilty of civil contempt
inasmuch as they willfully disobeyed the directions contained .
'

in order dated 30.9.2007 passed in Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.18879 of 2007 and ensured that total bandh is
D organized in the State. Learned counsel further argued that
respondent no.6 is guilty of criminal contempt because he
scandalized the Court's order dated 30.9.2007 by making
unwarranted remarks against the judiciary in general and
particularly against the Bench which passed the restraint order.
E
17. Shri Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing
for respondent nos.1 and 2 argued that his clients cannot be
held guilty of contempt of court because even before formal
receipt of the Court's order at 10.30 p.m. on 30.9.2007, .. ,
F respondent no.1 had issued detailed instructions to all the
officers to ensure that general public is not inconvenienced and
normal life is not disrupted on account of the call given by the
political parties for hartal. Learned senior counsel referred to
the instructions contained in telefax issued as per the directions
G of respondent No.1 and fax sent by Additional Director General
of Police (Law & Order) to show that respondent nos.1 and 2 ;.
had taken all measures for protection of hospitals, courts,
railways, airports, banks, schools, telecom installations,
transport services, shops and markets, industrial
establishments and for ensurino thcit essential services like
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 609
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
supply of milk and water and movement of trains are maintained A
without any obstruction and the police force was mobilized to
protect the lives and property of the people in addition to
Government and private establishments. Shri Desai
emphasized that proceedings under the 1971 Act are quasi
criminal and argued that respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot be B
accused of committing contempt within the meaning of Section
2(b) of the 1971 Act because the petitioner has not produced
any evidence to show that they willfully disobeyed order dated
30.9.2007. Learned senior counsel submitted that respondent
nos.1 and 2 cannot be held guilty of contempt merely because c
leaders of political parties sat on hunger strike on 1.10.2007
and the business community did not open the shops in view of
resolution dated 24.9.2007 passed by Democratic Progressive
Alliance for cessation of work. He submitted that the buses of
the State Transport Corporations could not be operated in the D
early part of the day on 1.10.2007 because trade unions
affiliated to political parties had decided to abstain from work
and large number of employees might have left their stations
in view of the call for cessation of work on 1.10.2007 given by
the Democratic Progressive Alliance and the coming holidays
on 29th and 30th September, 2007 and again on 2nd October, E
2007.

18. Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent no.4, extensively referred to affidavit
dated 22.8.2008 of his client to show that even before receipt. F
of the Court's order, he had made a statement for withdrawal
of resolution dated 24.9.2007 and argued that in the absence
of any evidence to show that respondent no.4 had instigated
anyone to disrupt the essential services or cause inconvenience
to the general public, he cannot be proceeded against under G
the 1971 Act. Learned counsel submitted that telefax dated
30.9.2007 sent at the instance of respondent no.1 also shows
that the administration had taken positive steps to ensure that
essential services are not disturbed due to call given by the
political parties for cessation of work etc. on 1.10.2007 and the H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 6 S.C.R.

A police bandobust was provided for all public and private
establishments and effective steps were taken for maintaining
transport services.

19. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for
8 respondent nos.3 and 5, argued that the concerned Minister and
Secretary had made genuine efforts to ensure that operation
of buses by the State Trans port Corporations is not jeopardized
due to the call given by the Democratic Progressive Alliance
for cessation of work or for hunger strike on 1.10.2007 and,
C therefore, they cannot be held guilty of contempt under Section
2(b) of the 1971 Act. Dr. Singhvi placed before the Court a
compilation of fax messages and circulars issued by
respondent no.3 and statements containing the details of buses
operated by seven State Transport Corporations on 1.10.2007
and collection of revenue to the tune of Rs.4.83 crores and
D argued that in the absence of any evidence or
contemporaneous record to show that respondent nos.3 and
5 were directly responsible for non-operation of bus services
for some time, they cannot be hauled up on the allegation of
committing contempt of Court. Shri Singhvi emphasized that
E unless intentional circumspection of the Court's order or positive
attempt to frustrate implementation thereof is proved, the
respondents cannot be proceeded under the 1971 Act.

20. Shri M.N. Rao, senior advocate argued that
F newspaper reports of the alleged speech made by respondent
no.6 on 1.10.2007 at Chennai cannot be relied upon for holding
him guilty of contempt of court because the petitioner has not
produced primary evidence of the so-called speech. Shri Rao
emphasized that newspaper reports merely represent the
G version given by the correspondent on the basis of his
understanding/impression of the speech made by respondent
no.6 and the same do not constitute primary evidence of what
was actually stated by respondent no.6 warranting initiation of
action for criminal contempt. Shri Rao further argued that the
H tape/CD of the telecast of the speech of respondent no.6 does
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 611
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
L
not represent the true and correct version of what was said and A
as the original version has been erased and tape has been
reused, the allegation made against respondent no.6 is liable
to be discarded.

21. In his rejoinder arguments, Shri S. Guru Krishna Kumar
B
highlighted discrepancies in the fax messages sent by
respondent no.3 as also the statement of income produced by
> Dr. A.M. Singhvi and submitted that these documents appear
~
to have been fabricated after issue of notice by this Court. He ·
then argued that these documents cannot be relied for
exonerating respondent nos.1 to 3 of the charge of highly c
contumacious conduct which resulted in violation of the Court's
order.

22. We have considered the submissions/arguments of
. learned counsel for the parties. Section 2(b) and (c) of the 1971 D
Act which define civil and criminal contempt read as under:

2(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
E
2(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by
words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing
• ~
of any other act whatsoever which-
F
-1 (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or
tends to lower the authority of, any court ; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
G
.. (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or
tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
other manner."
An analysis of Section 2(b) shows that willful disobedience H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court
constitutes civil contempt. If this definition is read with Article
129 of the Constitution of India, it becomes clear that being a
Court of record, this Court can punish a person for civil
s contempt if it is found that he has willfully disobeyed any
judgment etc. or violated undertaking given to the Court.

23. The term "wilful" (willful!) has not been defined in the
i·
1971 Act Therefore, it will be useful to notice dictionary
meaning of the said term. As per The New Oxford Illustrated
C Dictionary (1980 Edition), the term "willful" means "asserting or
disposed to assert one's own will against instruction,
. persuasion, etc. obstinately self-willed; deliberate, i_ntentional,
showing perversity or self-will". According to Black's Law
Dictionary, Vol.II (8th Edition) - Willful means "voluntary and
D intentional, but not necessarily malicious" and willfulness means
"the fact or quality of acting purposely or by design;
deliberateness; intention; willfulness does not necessarily imply
malice, but it involves more than just knowledge; the voluntary,
intentional violation or disregard of a known legal duty." As per
E the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol.5 (4th Edition), wilful
disobedience means "the willful disobedience of a SEAMAN
or apprentice is 'wilfully disobeying any lawful command
DURING the engagement': 'There may be many cases in which
desertion or absence without leave, would not amount to willful
F disobedience, and in these cases the seaman would only be
liable to the lesser penalty. Where, however, the seaman
deserts or is intentionally absent without leave after the time at
which he has been lawfully ordered to be on board, his
desertion or absence may amount to 'wilful disobedience', and,
G consequently, that he would be liable to imprisonment. The
words 'during the engagement' seem to suggest that the
contract between the employer and the employed should be
taken into account, and that if, having regard to that contract,
the order was one which the employed was bound to obey, his
H disobedience might be dealt with under clause (d}" In Shorter
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 613
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
Oxford English Dictionary, the term "willful" has been defined A
as, "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against
persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without
regard to reason; obstinately self-willed or perverse; 2. Willing;
consenting; ready to comply with a request, desire, or
requirement - 1598. 3. proceeding from the will; done or B
suffered of one's own free will or choice; voluntary - 1687. 4.
Done on purpose or wittingly; purposed, deliberate, intentional.
(Chiefly, now always, in bad sense of a blameworthy action;
freq. implying 'perverse, obstinate'.)

24. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and C
others [(2003) 11 SCC 1], this Court was called upon to decide
whether the respondents, i.e., Shri Dharam Godha, Chairman,
Nouveau Capital & Finance Ltd., Shri S. Jagadeesan, Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Policy
and Promotion, Government of India, Shri G.S. Kang, Secretary, D
+ Department of Industries, Government of Bihar, Shri S.N. Khan,
Chairman and Managing Director and Shri RP. Chabra, Chief
General Manager, Rehabilitation Finance Department,
Industrial Development Bank of India were guilty of contempt.
The facts of the case were that by an order dated 8. 7.1996, E
this Court approved the proposal made by the Government of
India for take over of M/s. Ashok Paper Mills by M/s. Nouveau
Capital and Finance Ltd. and disposed of the writ petition filed
by Ashok Paper Kamgar Union. Later on, by an order dated
1.5.1997, all concerned were directed to participate in F
implementation of the scheme and the Finance Secretary,
Ministry of Finance, Government of India was directed to ensure
that the legal requirements are fulfilled and the mill is
rehabilitated and both Phases I and II of the Scheme are given
effect to. Two more orders were passed by the court in the G
matter on 31.7.2000 and 1.9.2000. The petitioner alleged that
the respondents have failed to comply with the directions given
by the Court for implementation of the Scheme and, !herefore,
they are liable for contempt of court. This court took cognizance
of the fact that Mis. Nouveau Capital & Finance Ltd: had failed H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.

A to pay the consideration of Rs.6 crores; that IDBI had disbursed
term loan of Rs.15 crores towards Phase I of revival Scheme;
that the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry
of Commerce and Industry, Government of India in cooperation
with the Department of Banking obtained sanction for additional
B term loan of Rs.11 crores from IDBI and a working capital of
Rs.9.25 crores from United Bank of India; that NCFL had
invested Rs.20 crores towards promotion contribution which
was much more than amount contemplated in Phase I of the ~

Scheme and held that respondents cannot be held guilty of •
c contempt. Para 17 of the judgment which contains qiscussion
on the subject reads as under:

"Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Cou.rts Act defines "civil
contempt" and it means wilful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process
D of a court or wilful breach of undertaking given to a court.
~
"Wilful" means an act or omission which is done
voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent
to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that
E is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with
evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in
order to constitute contempt the order of the courl must
)>
be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the
F person charged in normal circumstances. It should not
require any extraordinary efforl nor should be dependent,
either wholly or in parl, upon any act or omission of a third
party for its compliance. This has to be judged having
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The
G facts mentioned above show that none of the respondents
to the petition can be held to be directly responsible if the
Scheme which had been formulated by the Government of
India on 28-6-1996 and had been approved by this Court
by the order dated 8-7-1996 could not be implemented in
H letter and spirit as many factors have contributed to the
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 615
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
same. The reasons given for non-inclusion of Shri A
Umadhar Prasad Singh in signing of the agreement
appear to be quite plausible. NCFL has undoubtedly not
discharged its liability of making payment of its entire
liability of Rs.6 crores. However, it has come out with a
case that some additional expenditure has been incurred B
in running the unit. It is not possible to get the complete
financial picture only on the basis of the affidavits filed in
the present petition. On the material on record, therefore,
it is not possible to hold that the charge of having
committed contempt of court on account of alleged non- C
compliance with the orders passed by this Court on 8-7-
1996, 1-5-1997 and 31-7-2000 has been established
against any one of the respondents."

[Emphasis added]
D
25. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper
Construction [(1995) 3 SCC 507], this Court highlighted
distinction between the civil and criminal contempt in the
following words:-
E
"Civil contempt is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act.
Thus, any wilful disobedience to the order of the court to
do or abstain from doing any act is prima facie a civil
contempt. Civil contempt arises where the power of the
court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to
orders of the court. F

On the contrary, criminal contempts are criminal in nature.
It may include outrages on the Judges in open court,
defiant disobedience to the Judges in court, libels on
" Judges or courts or interfering with the courts of justice or G
any act which tends to prejudice the courts of justice."

26. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah and others v. State of Bihar
and others [(1999) 7 SCC 569], the Court outlined the object
of its contempt jurisdiction in the following words:-
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2009] 6 S.C.R.

A "For holding the respondents to have committed contempt,
civil contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has
been wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the
court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to
when there is clear violation of the court's order. Since
B notice of contempt and punishment for contempt is of far-
reaching consequence, these powers should be invoked
only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's
order has been made out. Whether disobedience is wilful ... '
in a particular case depends on the facts and
c circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be
properly understood and complied with. Even negligence
and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly
when the attention of the person is drawn to the court's
orders and its implications. Disobedience of the court's
D order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which
our system of governance is based. Power to punish for
contempt is necessary for the maintenance of effective
legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the
course of justice.
E No person can defy the court's order. Wilful would exclude
casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or
genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. A
petitioner who complains breach of the court's order must i.
p

allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the
F court's order.
(Emphasis added]

27. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether
respondent nos.1 to 5 can be said to have willfully disobeyed
G order dated 30.9.2007. At the cost of repetition, we consider
it necessary to point out that while issuing notice in Special
Leave Petition (Civil) No.18879 of 2007, this Court restrained
the political parties from proceeding with the call for bandh in
the State of Tamil Nadu on 1.10.2007 pursuant to resolution
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 617
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
.t
dated 24.9.2007 or any other day. The language of the restraint A
order is unambiguous. The prohibitive injunction contained
therein was explicitly directed against the political parties and
not against respondent nos. 1 to 3. The Court did not direct
respondent nos. 1 to 3 to .act in any particular manner or take
certain specific steps to meet the challenge likely to be posed B
by implementation of the call given by Democratic Progressive
Alliance. This was so because the Court could not have
presumed that _the restraint order passed by it will be
disregarded or flouted by the political parties. Therefore, .
respondent nos.1 to 3 cannot, per se, be held guilty of c
disobeying or violating the Court's order dated 30th
September, 2007 and punished for committing contempt of
court as defined in Section 2(b) of the 1971 Act.

28. No doub,t, the petitioners have repeatedly asserted that D
the buses of State Transport Corporations and 45000 private
buses remained off the road on 1.10.2007 causing serious
inconvenience to the general public and loss of revenue to the
tune of Rs.10 crores, but their assertion is partly belied by the
counter affidavits of respondent nos.1 to 3, wherein all the
officers have detailed the reasons for operation of less number E
of buses in the initial hours on 1.10.2007 and the fact that
revenue collection of the day was to the tune of Rs.4.83 crores.
In his affidavit, respondent no.1 has categorically averred that
during the course of the day 2749 routes were made
operational. The affidavits of the official respondents also F
reveal that despite instructions issued to various functionaries,
normal transport services could not be made available on
account of the support extended to resolution dated 24.9.2007
by the trade unions affiliated to the political parties and the fact
that large number of employees. had gone on leave thinking that G
the services may not operate in the wake of the call given by
the political parties and three holidays. This has not been
controverted by the petitioners. The photographs produced by
petitioner - All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam do
show empty streets, but the same cannot be made basis for H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A recording a finding of guilt against respondent nos. 1 to 3, more
t
so because the petitioners have not produced any evidence to
prima facie establish that the transport services did not at all
operate in the State on 1.10.2007 and that too on account of
any action or omission on the part of respondent nos. 1 to 3.
B This being the position, it is not possible to record a finding that
respondent nos. 1 to 3 or for that reason respondent no.5
deliberately disobeyed or violated the direction given by this
Court.
..
C 29. The petitioners have also not placed on record any
evidence to show that despite restraint order passed by the
Court on 30.9.2007, the political parties constituting Democratic
Progressive Alliance res.orted to strike or bandh. They have
not even disputed that after coming to know about the Court's
order, respondent no.4 made a statement at 1.30 p.m.
D withdrawing resolution dated 24.9.2007 which contained a call
for cessation of work on 1.10.2007. If, despite statement of
respondent no.4, which was made known to the public, the
shops and business establishments remained closed and the
private transport operators did not consider it proper to operate
E their services on 1.10.2007, respondent nos.1 to 3 cannot be
held to have deliberately disobeyed the Court's order.

30. The argument of Shri S. Guru Krishna Kumar that
respondent no.4 should be held guilty of contempt because the
F Government did not issue written instructions to the officers to
take steps for maintaining the essential services and to ensure
that public life is not disrupted on account of the call for bandh
and the workers of his party coerced the people to close the
commercial and business establishments is being mentioned
G only to be rejected. The bald statement contained in the
contempt petitions that violence and coercion was resorted to
by members of the party headed by respondent no.4 has
remained unsubstantiated because except the newspaper
reports no material has been produced before the Court giving
H . the names and other relevant particulars of the persons who are
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 619
,,_ v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
...
said to have indulged in forced closure of shops and business A
establishments on 1.10.2007 and no other evidence has been
produced to show that respondent no.4 had, directly or
indirectly, encouraged the members of his party to enforce the
call for cessation of work which has been prima facie treated
by the Courts as call for bandh. Therefore, respondent no.4 8
cannot be accused of having engineered violation of the Court's
.- order.
,j
31. Insofar as respondent no.6 is concerned, we find that
the only material produced by the petitioner in Contempt Petition
No. 262 of 2007 is in the form of zerox copies of newspapers c
and tape of the edited version of speech which is said to have
been telecast on Jaya T.V. on 1.10.2007 and 2.10.2007. The
petitioner in Contempt Petition No. 327 of 2007 has also
produced zerox copies of some newspapers. In his first
affidavit, respondent no.6 has claimed that the newspapers have D
reported something by putting in his mouth which he did not
speak. In his second affidavit filed in the form of reply to the
affidavits of S/Shri M. Ramasubramanian, S. Ravikumar and
R. Thillai, respondent no.6 has alleged that what was telecast
on Jaya T.V. was the doctored version of his speech. This E
being the position, the petitioners were duty bound to produce
some primary evidence to prove the contents of the speech
~
made by respondent no.6 scandalizing judiciary in general and
•• this Court's order dated 30th September, 2007 in particular.
The zerox copies of the newspapers in which the contents of F
speech made by respondent no.6 have been published cannot
be relied upon because the petitioners have not filed affidavits
of those who covered the meeting held by the political parties
in front of Chepauk Guest House on 1.10.2007 and heard the
speech made by respondent no.6. If such affidavits had been G
~. filed, respondent no.6 could have been called upon to explain
=o
his position. Likewise, the original tape containing telecast of
the speech made by respondent no.6 has not been made
available to the Court.
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
....
~

A 32. The law on the admissibility of tape recorded versions
is well settled. In Ram Singh and others v. Col. Ram Singh
(1985 (Supp) SCC 611] Fazal Ali, J with whom Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J. agreed, laid down the following tests for
determining the admissibility of tape recorded version:
B 1. The voice of the speaker must be identified by the
maker of the record or other persons recognizing his voice. ...
Where the maker is unable to identify the voice, strict proof ~
will be required to determine whether or not it was the
voice of the alleged speaker.
c
2. The accuracy of the tape-recorded statement must be
proved by the maker of the record by satisfactory evidence:
· direct or circumstantial.

3. Possibility of tampering with, or erasure of any part of,
D
the tape-recorded statement must be totally excluded.

4. The tape-recorded statement must be relevant.

5. The recorded cassette must be sealed and must be
E kept in safe or official custody.

6. The voice of the particular speaker must be clearly
audible and must not be lost or distorted by other sounds
or disturbances. •......
F 33. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan
Ramdass Mehra and others ((1976) 2 sec 17], a three-Judge
Bench while considering the question whether the appellant was
guilty of promoting feeling of enmity between two sections of
the society, examined the question of admissibility of tape
G recorded speech, referred to the judgment in R. v. Maqsud -~
Ali ((1965) 2 All ER 464] and observed : '
"We think that the High Court was quite right in holding that
the tape-records of speeches were "documents", as
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 621
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which stood on A
no different footing than photographs, and. that they were
admissible in evidence on satisfying the following
conditions:

(a) The voice of the person alleged to be speaking 8
must be duly identified by the maker of the record
or by others who know it.
~

(b) Accuracy of what was actually recorded· had to be
proved by the maker of the record and satisfactory
evidence, direct or circumstantial, had to be there C
so as to rule out possibilities of tampering with the
record.

(c) The subject-matter recorded had to be shown to be
relevant according to rules of relevancy found in the o
Evidence Act."

34. We may now notice some judgments in which the
Courts have considered the question relating to burden of proof
in contempt cases. In Re, Bramblevale Ltd. [(1969) 3 All ER E
1062], Lord Denning observed:

"A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character.
A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily
proved. To use the time-honoured phrase, it must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not proved by F
showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told
lies. There must bf some further evidence to incriminate
him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be
thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some
other evidence. .... Where there are two equally consistent G
possibilities open to the court, it is not right to hold that the
offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt."

35. In Mrityunjoy Das and another v. Sayed Hasibur
Rahman and others [(2001) 3 SCC 739], the Court referred to H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.
.......
.....
A a number of judicial precedents including the observations
made by Lord Denning in Re, Bramblevale Ltd. and held:

"The common English phrase "he who asserts must prove"
has its due application in the matter of proof of the
8 allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As
regards the "standard of proof", be it noted that a
proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court ...
in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act ~

is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof
required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach l·
c shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt."

36. In Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and another [(2001)
7 SCC" 530], a two-Judge Bench observed :

D "As regards the burden and standard of proof, the common
legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due
application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to
be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the
"standard of proof', be it noted that a proceeding under
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the
E
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal,
and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a
criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be
~

established beyond all reaso.nable doubt." ....
F 37. In Anil Ratan Sarkar and others v. Hirak Ghosh and
others ((2002) 4 SCC 21], the Court referred to the judgment
in Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati and another (supra) and
observed:

G "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced ).
in the statute-book for the purposes of securing a feeling
of confidence of the people in general and for due and
proper administration of justice in the country -
undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the law
courts but that by itself operates as a string of caution and
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 623
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
unless thus otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would A
neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise
jurisdiction under the statute."

38. The judgments on which reliance has been placed by
Shri S. Guru Krishna Kumar do not have any direct bearing on
8
this case. In A. Sanjeevi Naidu's case, the Court interpreted
the provisions of Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
and held that when a civil servant takes a decision, he does
j
not do it as a delegate of his Minister but on behalf of the
Government, though it is always open to a Minister to call for
any file in his office and pass order or issue directions to the C
officers. in his Ministry regarding the disposal of Government
business generally or as regard~ any specified case. In Azhar
Ali Khan's case, the Court held that compliance of orders or
directions given by Court to Government or its instrumentalities
cannot be avoided merely on ground of inability to comply D
with its own resolution passed in the face of those clear orders
or directions. In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad's case it was
found that the Minister and Principal Secretary, Department of
Forests, Government of Maharashtra have brazenly and willfully
flouted the Court's directions and granted permission to certain E
sawmills to recommence their operations and, therefore, they
were punished under the 1971 Act. In Mohd. Aslam's case, this
Court considered the question whether the State and its
ministers can be proceeded against in contempt for failure to
obey the judicial pronouncements. The facts of the case were F
that during the month of July, 1992, land measuring 2.77 acres
situated in Ayodhya was acquired by the State Government
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for developing an amenity
for pilgrims at Ayodhya. Writ Petition No.1000 of 1991 was
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court G
questioning the acquisition proceedings. On 15.11.1991, the
Court noted that the Chief Minister of the State has made
statements in the meeting of the National Integration Council
held on 2.11.1991 against the making of construction at the site
and accordingly, resolution was passed by the Nationcfl H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A Integration Council and directed that no construction be made
-
....
at the site. However, despite the Court's order, construction
activities were allowed to be undertaken at the site by Sadhus.
It was urged on behalf of the respondents that any coercive/
preventive action in the matter of construction of the platform
B would have triggered an advf'rse reaction endangering the
safety of disputed 'Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid' structure
which was situated in immediate vicinity and for whose ~

protection Government stood committed and, therefore, the
respondent who was holding the office of the Chief Minister,
•
c cannot be held guilty of contempt. While rejecting the plea, this
Court relied upon the observations contained in William G.
Cooper, Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock
v. John Aaron [358 US1 : 3 L Ed 2d 5: 78 S Ct 1401 (1958)]
and observed:-
D "The use of force to further obedience to law is in any
+
event a last resort and one not congenial to the spirit of
our Nation .... Violent resistance to law cannot be made a
legal reason for its suspension without loosening the fabric
of our society. What could this mean but to acknowledge
E that disorder under the aegis of a State has moral
superiority over the law of the Constitution?

The'historic phrase 'a Government of laws and not of men'
epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political ••
F society. When John Adams put that phrase into the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging
in a rhetorical flourish. He was expressing the aim of those
who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence
and founded the Republic.
G Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the
constitutional organ of the supreme law of the land, has
often, throughout our history, depended on active support
by State and local authorities. It presupposes such support.
To withhold it, and indeed to use political power to try to
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 625
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
,_.
l paralyse the supreme law, precludes the maintenance of A
our federal system as we have known and cherished it for
one hundred and seventy years.

Lincoln's appeal to 'the better angels of our nature' failed
to avert a fratricidal war. But the compassionate wisdom
B
of Lincoln's First and Second Inaugurals bequeathed to the
Union, cemented with blood, a moral heritage which, when
• drawn upon in times of stress and strife, is sure to find
• ,J.
specific ways and means to surmount difficulties that may
appear to be insurmountable."
c
Dicey, in his Law of the Constitution, (10th Edn., pp.193-
94) said:

When we speak of the 'rule of law' as a characteristic of
our country, (we mean) not only that with us no man is D
above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every
man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction
of the ordinary tribunals. In England the idea of legal
equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes to one
E
law administered by the ordinary courts, has been pushed
to its utmost limit. With us every official, from Prime Minister
down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the
same responsibility for every act done without legal
-4 >!--
justification as any other citizen. The reports abound with
cases in which officials have been brought before the F
courts, and made, in their personal capacity, liable to
punishment, or to the payment of damages for acts done
in their official character but in excess of their lawful
authority. A colonial governor, a secretary of State, a
military officer, and all subordinates though carrying out the G
commands of their official superiors, are as responsible
for any act which the law does not authorise as is any
private and unofficial person."

39. The Court then referred to the reports of Chief H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
~--
I.
A Engineer, District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent of
Police and proceeded to observe:-

"The next question is whether these activities were carried
on by a congregation of Sadhus at the site and not by the
State Government and despite Government's efforts. Apart
B
from a glib suggestion that any attempt to prevent the work
would have created a violent situation endangering the
•
safety of the "Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid structure"
itself, nothing is indicated as to what was sought to be done
.. ..
at all to prevent constructional material coming in. There
c is no mention in any of the affidavits of any of the officers
as to what reasonable measures the Government took to
prevent the inflow of constructional n:iaterial such as large
quantities of cement, mortar, sand, constructional
equipment, water-tankers etc. that were necessary for the
'
D work. The report of the Expert Committee has indicated
that constructional machinery was indispensable having
regard to the nature and magnitude of the work carried out.
While it is understandable that the prevention of the
gathering of Sadhus might have created some resentment,
E it is un-understandable why large quantities of building
materials were allowed to be brought on the land unless it
be - and that must be the reasonable presumption - that
the Government itself was not too anxious to prevent it. It _..
is not merely positive acts of violation but also surreptitious ... -·
F and indirect aids to circumvention and violation of the
orders that are equally impermissible. If reasonable steps
are not taken to prevent the violation of the orders of the
Court, Government cannot be heard to say that violation
of the orders were at the instance of others. The
G presumption is that the Government intended not to take
such preventive steps. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, we are unable to persuade ourselves to the view
that the Government was helpless and the situation that had
developed was in spite of all reasonable steps taken by
H the Government. Indeed there is no indication that the
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 627
,_ v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
--"'
Government bestirred itself to take any steps, reasonable A
or otherwise, to prevent large-scale building material
getting into the site. The Chief Minister having given ~
solemn assurance to the National Integration Council and
permitted the terms of that assurance to be incorporated
as his own undertaking to this Court and allowed an order B
to be passed in those terms cannot absolve himself of the
A responsibility urlless he placed before the Court sufficient

"' material which would justify that he had taken all reasonable
steps and precautions to prevent the occurrence. Indeed,
if such reasonable steps had been taken he could not be c
faulted merely because he did not do the best by the
standards of others. In this case, we find no explanation
at all apart from the fact that the Sadhus had congregated
in that place in large number, as to what steps the
Government took to prevent the constructional equipment
D
from getting into site. If any reasonable effort had been ,,
made and evidence of that placed before Court, it might
have been possible for the Court to assess the situation
in the light of that explanation to find out whether such
steps had been taken. In the absence, we are constrained
to hold that the Government failed to take steps to prevent E
the grossest violation of the order of this Court. We record
a finding accordingly."
..,.
4
40. On the question whether the undertaking furnished by
the Chief Minister was a personal undertaking or was on behalf F
of the State of U.P., the Court held:

"The last question is whether the undertaking furnished by
the Chief Minister was a personal undertaking or was on
behalf of the State of U.P. It was both.
G
J.
There is no immunity for any authority of Government, if a
personal element is shown in the act of disobedience of
the order of the Court, from the consequence of an order
of the Court. Even in England where the maxim "Crown can
H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
_..
....
A do no wrong" has had its influence, a distinction is made
between the Crown as such and the Executive.

In a recent pronouncement of far-reaching impact, the
House of Lords in M. v. Home Office observed (as per
B Lord Templeman):

"My Lords, Parliament makes the law, the executive
carry the law into effect and judiciary enforce the ~

\,..
law. The expression 'the Crown' ·has two meanings;
namely the monarch and the executive. In the
c seventeenth century Parliament established its
supremacy over the Crown as monarch, over the
executive and over the judiciary. Parliamentary
supremacy over the Crown as monarch stems from
the fact that the monarch must accept the advice
D of a Prime Minister who is supported by a majority
of Parliament. Parliamentary supremacy over the
' Crown as executive stems from the fact that
Parliament maintains in office the Prime Minister
who appoints the ministers in charge of the
E executive. Parliamentary supremacy over the
judiciary is only exercisable by statute. The judiciary
enforce the law against individuals, against
institutions and against the executive. The judges
cannot enforce the law against the Crown as
..,.
..
F monarch because the Crown as monarch can do
no wrong but judges enforce the law against the
Crown as executive and against the individuals who
from time to time represent the Crown. A litigant
complaining of a breach of the law by the executive
G can sue the Crown as executive bringing his action
against the minister who is responsible for the ~
department of State involved, in the present case
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. To enforce
the law the courts have power to grant remedies
H
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA. MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 629
• v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
-.
-4 including injunctions against a minister in his official A
capacity. If the minister has personally broken the
law, the litigant can sue the minister, in this case
Mr. Kenneth Baker, in his personal capacity. For the
purpose of enforcing the law against all persons
and institutions, including ministers in their official B
capacity and in their personal capacity, the courts
are armed with coercive powers exercisable in
... proceedings for contempt of court.
-"
* * *
c
My Lords, the argument that there is no power to
enforce the law by injunction or contempt
proceedings against a minister in his official
capacity would, if upheld, establish the proposition
that the executive obey the law as a matter of grace D
and not as a matter of necessity, a proposition
which would reverse the result of the Civil War. Foe
the reasons given by my noble and learned friend
Lord Woolf and on principle, I am satisfied that
injunctions and contempt proceedings may be E
, brought against the minister in his official capacity
and that in the present case the Home Office for
which the Secretary of State was responsible was
.. -.;. in contempt. n
F
In the State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari this Court
approved the following view of Chakravartti, C.J., in
Tarafatu/lah Manda/ v. S.N. Maitra:

"I do not say that in fit cases a writ for contempt may. not
be asked for against a corporation itself, or against a G
{ Government. In what form, in such a case, any penal order,
if considered necessary, is to be passed and how it is to
be enforced are different matters which do not call for
decision in this case. In England, there is a specific rule
· providing for sequestration of the corporate property of the H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.

"-
A party concerned, where such party is a corporation. I am
not aware of any similar rule obtaining in this country, but
I do not consider it impossible that in a fit case a fine may
be imposed and it may be realised by methods
analogous to sequestration which would be a distress
8 warrant directed against the properties of the Government
or the Corporation."

(emphasis supplied) ,..
.
The State Government is, therefore, liable in contempt. A
c Minister or Officer of Government is also either in his official
capacity or if there is a personal element contributing to
contempt, in his personal capacity, liable in contempt."

41. In the case before us fact situation is entirely different.
D As mentioned above, on coming to know of the restraint order
passed by this Court, respondent no.4 made a statement for
wittJdrawal of resolution dated 24.9.2007 vide which call was
given by five political parties for cessation of work. It is also
borne out from the affidavit of respondent no. 1 that on
24.9.2007 itself the said respondent had issued instructions to
E
all the officers to ensure that law and order and essential
services are maintained and the general public is not '
inconvenienced due to the call given by political parties for
cessation of work. On 30.9.2007, respondent nos.1 to 3 gave .... ,..
detailed instructions to all the officers to ensure that the public
F is not put to harassment, the government and private properties
are not damaged, supplies of essential services like water,
electricity, telecom, railways etc. are not disrupted, supply of
milk etc. is maintained and business and other commercial
establishments are provided protection. Efforts were also made
G to ensure that operation of transport services is not affected.
Respondent no.5 had monitored operation undertaken by the
departmental authorities for restoring normal operation by the
State Transport Corporation. It is, thus, evident that respondent
nos. 1 to 5 did not disobey the restraint order passed by this.
H Court and respondent nos. 1 to 3 took all the steps necessary
ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 631
--~
v. L.K. TRIPATHI AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
../
for preventing any disruption of public services and A
inconvenience to the general public. It is a different thing that
in the wake of hunger strike by leaders of political parties, the
business community did not consider it proper to open shops
etc. Therefore, the ratio of Mohd. Aslam's case and other
precedents referred to in that judgment cannot be applied to B
this case for framing charges against respondent nos.1 to 5
.4' on the premise that they have committed contempt within the
>I meaning of Section 2(b) of the 1971 Act.

42. Insofar as respondent no.6 is concerned, charge cannot
be framed against him with reference to Section 2(c) of 1971
c
Act because the petitioers have not produced any legally
admissible evidence to prove the contents of the speech
allegedly made by the said respondent. The judgments in
Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (supra) and E.M.
Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar (supra) D
do not have any bearing on this case and, therefore, we do not
consider it necessary to deal with the same.

43. In the result, the contempt petitions are dismissed.
However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. E
-..f'
N.J. Contempt Petitions dismissed.

~
-.-