ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.versusKRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI

                          [2017] I S.C.R. 389


                   ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.                                     A
                                    v.
                   KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARl
                    (Civil Appeal No.7600 of20 14)
                         JANUARY 02,2017                                     B
      [T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.J
        Service Law : Disciplinary enquiry - High Court~ power to
interfere - Respondent-employee removed from service by
Disciplinary Authority - Departmental appeal by respondent
                                                                             c
dismissed by Appe//ate Authority - High Court noted that neither
Disciplinary Authority nor Appellate Authority applied their mind
nor recorded reasons in support of their conclusions - It quashed
the order of punishment and directed release of service benefits -
On appeal, held: 11 is true that a writ court is very slow in illlerfering
with the findings offacts recorded by a Departmental Authority on            D
the basis of evidence on record - But, it is equally true that in a
case where Disciplinary Authority records a finding unsupported
by any evidence or a finding which no reasonable person could
arrive at, the writ court is justified to examine·the matler and grant
relief.,.. In the instant case, Disciplinary Authority did not appreciate
                                                                             E
the evidence properly or recorded reasons in· support of its
conclusion - Appellate Authority instead of recording its own
reasons and independently appreciating the material on record,
simply reproduced the findings of Disciplinary Authority- Therefore,
 High Court was right in interfering with order of dismissal -
 Respondent elllitled to continuity of service till the date of his          F
superannuation, however with only 500A of the salary for the period
between the date of his removal till the dale of superannuation -
 Writ jurisdiction- Constitution of India- Art.226.
      Practice and Procedure: Procedural lapse i11 conducting
enquiry ill service matters - Held: Proper course is to remand the G
molters bock Jo concerned authority for fresh enquiry - However,
such a course is not justified in situatiolls where due to Jo11g time
lag or such other supervening circumstances directing.fr.esh enquiry
would be unfair. harsh or othenvise un11ecessary.              , · . . ., . ·

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                                   389
390            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [201 7] I S.C.R.



A           Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: I. lt is true that a writ court is very slow in
      interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental
      Authority on the basis of evidem:e available on record. But it is
      equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority
B     records a ftndlng that is unsupponed by any evidence whatsoever
      or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at,
      the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the
      matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will
      certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders
      passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry
c     itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural
      justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-
      application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary
      Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion
      arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are
D     justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High
      Court, in tbe present case, found all these infirmities in the order
      passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.
      The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without
      giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in
      defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More
E     importantly the Disciplinary Authority did not properly appreciate
      the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion.
      The Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and
      independently appreciating the material un record, simply
       reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry
 F     Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority
       faltered in the disdtarge of their duties resulting in miscarriage
      of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering
       with the orders pa~sed hy the Discirlinary Authority and the
       Appellate Authority. (Para 7) (394·G·H; 395-A·D)
G           l. In cases where High Court finds the enquiry to be
      deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course
      always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority.
      But that course may not be the only course open in a given
      situation. There may be situations where because of a long time
      lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court
H
       ALLAHARAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN                                  391
                       TEWARl

considers directing fresh e~quiry to be unfair, harsh or otherwise                A
unnecessary. That is prccis'ely what the High Court has don~··in
present case. The High Court took note of the fact the respondent
was placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dis~issed in  •    f   •'   •

2005 and the dismissal order was challenged in the High Court
in 2006 till it was finally decided in 2013. During the intervening
                                                                                  B
period the respondent superannuated on 30'h November; .ZOlL
Not only that he suffered a heart attack and ~stroke tha~ rendered
hini physically disabied. The respondent may by now ha-ve turned
65 yearS of age. Any remand for a fresh enquiry or orde~ would
thus be very harsh and deny the respondent any relief whatsoever.
[Para 8] [395-E-.H; 396-A-8]                                                      c
       3. The High Court is ambivalent with regard to the fact
whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of
salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or in pa'rt. While
the High Court directed release of sertice/retirafbene.fit~, it is
not dear whether the· same included salary for the period between · 0
the date· of removal arid the date of superannuation. It is assumed
that the High ·court's' direttion for release of service benefits
included the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned .
above, however, grant of full salary for the period between the
date of dismissal and· the date of superannuation would not             be
justified. (Para·9J [396-D-E]                                         E
  ·'   Roop· Singh Negi v. Punjab Nationai Bank & Or.~. (2009) .
     I 2 set S70': "[2008J17 SCR 147~; Kuldeep SiJ,7gh v.       .
       Commissioner of Police' & Or.~. (1999) 2 SCC 10.:
       [1998] J Suppl. SCR 594; Nand KfshoJ.'e '~ State ofBihar
       (1978) 3· SCC 366 : (1978] 3 SCR 708; Kai/ash Nath                         F
       Gupta v. Enquiry :Officer. ·Allahabad Bank & Ors.
       (2003) 9. SCG 480; State Bank of Bikcmer & Jaipur v.
      ·Ncmi Ghand Nalwaya (lOll) 4 SCC 584 : (2011] 3
     . SCR 589; Mohd; Yimus Khwn~ ·Staie of U.P & Ors.
   · -,~2010) 10 SCC 539 : lliOIO] 12 SCR 448 .:.. refe'rred                      G
 . , to.
                      · Case Law Reference
   ..
[2008}17 SCR 147.6             referred to            · Pa•·a 4·
[1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 594        referred to             Para4
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392.              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A      f 197~1 3 SCR 708                 referred to              Para4
       (lOO~) 9   sec 480                referred to              Para4
       JlOUJ 3 SCR 589                   rererred to              Para4
       flOlOI 1l SCR 448                 referred to              Para4
B            CIVIL APPELlATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7600 .
       of2014.
              from the Order dated 28.1 0.2013 by the High Court ofJudicature
       at Allahabad, Lu~know Bench in Service Single No. 2867 of2006.
            Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Kumar Singb, Rakesh Chaurasia, Anant
c      Gautam, Vashraj Singh Deora, Advs. for the Appellants.
             Pranab Prakash, Chandra Prakash, Advs. for the Respondent.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             T. S. THAKUR, .cJI I. In this appeal by special leave the
D      ai)P.ellant tails in question the correctness ofa judgment and order dated
       28th October, 2013 passed by the High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad,
       Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition No.2867 of2006 filed by the
       respondent has been allowed and an order dated 29th July, 2005 passed
       by the Disciplinary Authority and that dated 5th January, 2006 passed by
       the Appellate Authority directing removal of the respondent from the
       service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court has as a result
       directed the appellant bank to provide all service/retiral benefits to the
       petitioner within ninety days ofthe order. The challenge mounted by the
       appellant arises.in the following circumstances:
F            2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank and
    was during the relevant period posted as Officer in-charge at the appellant-
    bank's Sultanpur branch in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar
   .Pradesh. He was, by an order dated 1oth December, 2004, placed
    urider suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was
    initiate~ against him with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th
G February, 2005. The respondent pleaded not guilty but the Enquiry
    Officer .concluded the enquiry proceedings rather quickly within a span
  . of just about forty-five days and submitted a report dated 27th May,
    2005 holding that the respondent was guilty on all counts except two
    which were -~eld proved but only partially. The Disciplinary Authority
H
     ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN                                 393
                    TEWARI fT.S. THAKUR, CJJ]

accepted the findings and passed an order imposing upon the respondent        A
the major penalty of removal from service.
      3. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal
which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its order dated sth
January, 2006. The respondent then questioned the said two orders
before the High Court in a writ petition which as noticed earlier has         B
been allowed by the High Court in terms of the order impugned in this
appeal.
      4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the
Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority had applied their mind
or recorded reasons in support of their conclusions. Relying upon the c
decisions of this coun in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank
& Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570, Kuldeep Singh l( Commissioner of Police
& Ors. ( 1999) 2 SCC I 0, Ndnd Kishore '~ State of Bihar ( 1978) 3 -
SCC 366, Kai/ash Nath Gupt~ v_ Enqu~ry Officer, Allahabad Bank
& Ors. (2003) 9 SCC 480, Slate Bank of Bikcmer & Jaiptw '~ Nemi
Chand Nalwaya (20 II) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd Ytmus Kha, ·v. State of D
U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539. the High Court held that the order
passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were
unsustainable in Jaw. The High Court found that the findings recorded
by the Disciplinary Autbority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority
were perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The High E
Court observed that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind
independently and's imply cut and pasted the findings of the Disciplinary
Authority while dismissing the appeal.
       5. On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended before us
that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in re-apprcciating the       F
evidence and holding the respondent not guilty. It was argued that so
long as there was some evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority
could rest its findings, sufficiency or insufficiency ofsuch evidence could
not be gone into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was submitted that
even ifthere was any infirmity in the orders passeCJ by the Disciplinary
Authority or the Appetlate Authority, on account of absence or                 G
insufficiency ofthe reasons in support ofthe. findings recorded by them,
the proper course for the High Court was to remand the matter back to
the Appellate Authority or the Disciplinary Authority as the case may be
for doing the needful afresh. The High Court could not, on account of
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394             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017)1 S.C.R.



A     absence of reasons or unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them,
      quash the order of punishment and direct release of the service benefits
      due to the respondent.
             6. On behalf ofthe respondent it was on the other hand contended
      that the enquiry conducted against the respondent and the conclusion
B     arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
      Authority suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry
      conducted by the Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulled in gross
      miscarriage ofjustice on account ofthe failure of the Enquiry Officer to
      provide a reasonable opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence in
      his defense. In the second place the findings recorded by the Enquiry
c     Officer and so also the Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any
      evidence whatsoever and were perverse to say the least. ln the third
      place, the orders were unsustainable also for the reason that the same
      did not disclose due and proper application of mind by the Disciplinary
      Authority and the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate
D     Authority was, in particular, bad in law as the same did not examine the
      material on record independently and had simply relied upon the findings
      of the Disciplinary Authority without adverting to the points which the
      respondent had raised in support ofhis challenge. It was lastly submitted
      that the respondent has since superannuated and was a physical wreck
      having suffered a heart attack and a debilitating stroke which had confined
E     him to bed. Any remand of the proceedings to the Appellate Authority
      to pass a fresh order or the Disciplinary Authority for re--examination
      and fresh determination ofthe respondent's guilt would not only be harsh
      but would tantamount to denial ofjustice to him. The High Court was in
      that view justified in taking a pragmatic view ofthe matter and in directing
F     continuity of service to the respondent and release of all service and
      retiral benefits to him upto the date of his superannuation.
             7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at
      the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the
      findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of
G     evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where
      the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any
      evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could
      have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to
      examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ
      court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant
H
     ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. v. KRISHNA NARAYAN                                  395
             TEWARI [T.S. THAKUR, CJI]

orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry          A
itseIf was vitiated on account ofviolation of principles of natural justice,
as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of
mind by the Enquiry Officer.orthe Disciplinary Authority, non-recording
ofreasons in support ofthe conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds
on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of
                                                                               B
punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these
infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the
Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was
conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading
evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant.
More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have             c
properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of
his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of
recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material
on record, simply reproduced the findings ofthe Disciplinary Authority.
All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in          D
miscarriageofjustice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering
with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority.
       8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where
the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or         E
otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the
concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have
been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded
back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper
enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been         F
the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where
because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the
writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a
fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely
what the High Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has
taken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed under                G
suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal
order was challenged in the High Court in the year 2006 but the writ
petition remained pending in the High Coun for nearly seven years till
2013. During the intervening period the respondent superannuated on
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396            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 1 S.C.R.


A     30•" November, 20 ll. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack and
      a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and confined to bed.
      The respondent may by now have turned 65 years of age. Any remand
      either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary
      Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority would
      thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the respondent any
B
      relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High Court
      has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to show the
      extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged
      misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High Court·
      in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised.
c             9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled
      to claim arrears of salary as part of scrvice/rctiral benefits in full or
      part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We
      say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/
      rctiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for
D     the period between the date of removal and tbe date of superannuation.
      Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court's
      direction tor release of service henefits would include the release of his
      salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the
      opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh sta·rt
      from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date
E     of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified.
      We, therefore. allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that.
      while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
      Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent entitled to continuity
      of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on
F     that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period
      between the date of his removal from service ti 11 the date of
      superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour."
      The order passed by the High Court shall, to the extent indicated above,
      stand modified. The parties shall bear their own costs.
G     Divya Pandey                                          Appl!~l   panh· allowed.