ALLAHABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusNASIRUZZAMAN AND ORS.

             ALLAHABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY                                    A
                            v.
                  NASIRUZZAMAN AND ORS.

                           SEPTEMBER 2, 1996

             (K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)                              B

        Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

       Sections 4(1 ), 6(1), 11, 11-A, 16, 17, 17( 1-A), 17(d}--Notification
issued-Enqui1y under S.17(1-A) as amended by U.P. State-Possession
taken and transfelTed to the Transport Nagar Sclzeme-High Cowt declming
                                                                                 c
that the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed and directing delive1y of posses-
sion to the respondents--On appeal held: The Amendment has to be relied
upon only in pending proceedings-Once possession was take11 in exercise of
power under S.17(4) the lands stood vested in the State under S.16 ji'ee from
all e11cumbrances--Proceedings of 11otification imder S.4( 1) and declaration D
under S.6 would not lapse-'-P1inciple of estoppel or res judicata does not
apply where, to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory
direction or prohibitio11---Respo11dents entitled to il'terest at 9% for one year
from the date of taki11g possession and thereafter at 15% till deposit into
Court.                                                                            E
      Lt. Govemor of H.P. v.Avinash Shanna, [1971) 1 SCR 413; Sate11dra
Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1993) 4 SCC 369; Awadh Bihmi
Yadav & Ors. Etc. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1995) 6 SCC 31 and Municipal
Committee, Anuitsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1969) 3 SCR 447,
relied on.                                                                       F
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 12032 of
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.93 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 31398 of 1992.                                            G
        Milan Banerjee and R.B. Mishra for the Appellants.

        In-person for the Respondents.

        The following Order of the Court was delivered :                        H
                                    435
    436                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          Leave granted.

          We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as respon-
    dent-in-person who is also a practising advocate.


B           Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1
      of 1894) (for short, the 'Act') was published on June 18, 1977 acquiring the
      large extent of land admeasuring 23 bighas and 19 biswas for Transport
    · Nagar Scheme. Enquiry under Section 5(1) of the Act was dispensed with
      in exercise of the power under Section 17(1-A), as amended by the Legis-
      lature of the U .P. substituting the Act. Possession thereof was taken on
c     November 2, 1977 and transferred to the Transport Nagar Scheme. Those
      lands stood vested in the State under Section 16 of the Act free from all
      encumbrances and stood transferred to the beneficiary.

           The question that arises for consideration is: whether the High Court
D was right in passing the order dated December 15, 1993 and the order
  dated January 29, 1990 declaring that the acquisition proceedings by opera-
  tion of Sectionll-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, stood lapsed and
  direction given for delivery of possession to the respondents would be in
  accordance with law? The controversy is no longer res integra. In Lt.
  Govemor of H.P. v. Avinash Shanna, [1971] 1 SCR 413 this Court had laid
E down that once the lands stood vested in the State free from all encumbran-
  ces there is no question of divesting the land and res-vesting the land in
  the erstwhile owners. The only right the erstwhile owner has is as to the
  determination of compensation in accordance with the provisions of the
  Act. In view of the fact that there was inordinate delay in passing the award
F after the declaration under Section 6(1) was published, the Parliament in
  the Amendment Act introduced Section 11-A and directed that the Col-
  lector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years
  from the date of the publication of the declaration. If no award is made
  within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land
G shall lapse. Under the proviso, it was said that where the declaration has
  been published before the commencement of the Amendment Act, the
  award shall be made within a period of two years from the commencement
   of the Amendment Act. In the impugned judgment, it would appear that
   the learned Judges asked the counsel to verify whether the award came to
   be made within two years, as indicated. The counsel on verification had
H stated that the award was not made within two years from the commence-
          ALLAHABAD DEV.AUTHORITYv. NASIRUZZAMAN                         437

ment of the Amendment Act, namely, September 24, 1984. Consequently,            A
the declaration was given that the notification under Section 4(1) and the
declaration under Section 6 stood lapsed. This question was examined by
thi~ Court in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1993] 4
SCC 369 and Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. Etc. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,
(1995] 6 SCC 31 at 38 and held that Section 11-A does not apply to cases
                                                                                B
of acquisitions under Section 17 where possession was already taken and
the land stood vested in the State. The notification under Section 4 (1) and
declaration under Section 6 do not lapse due to failure to make award
within two years from the date of the declaration. The view of the High
Court is erroneous in law.
                                                                                c
       It is no doubt true that there was no appeal filed against the said
order except the one now filed with application for· condonation of the
delay. The question, therefore, is : whether the view taken by the High
Court is correct in law? As early as in 1971, this Court had held that once
the lands stood vested in the State, the question of divesting and re-vesting   D
the acquired land in the erstwhile owner did not arise. The Amendment
Act has to be relied upon only in the pending proceedings. But once the
possession was taken pursuant to the exercise of the power under Section
17(4) of the Act, the lands stood vested in the State under Section 16 free
from all encumbrances. Thereby, the question of lapse of the proceedings
of notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 does not     E
arise. Therefore, the view of the Division Bench was clearly erroneous. In
that perspective, this Court has considered in Municipal Committee, Am-
1itsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1969] 3 SCR 447 at 454, and held
thus.:
                                                                                F
        "The Order made by the High Court in Mohinder Singh Sawhney's
        case striking down the Act was passed on the assumption that the
        validity of the Act was liable to be adjudged by the test of "due
        process of law". The Court was plainly in error in so assuming. We
        are also unable to hold that the previous decision operates as res
        judicata even in favour of the petitioners in whose petitions an G
        order was made by the High Court in the first group of petitions.
        The effect of that decision was only that the Act was in Jaw,
        non-existent, so long as there was no definition of the expression
        "cattle fair" in the Act. That defect has been remedied by the
        Punjab Act 18 of 1968. We may hasten to observe, that we are H
    438                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A            unable to agree that the Act as originally enacted was unenforce-
             able even on the ground of vagueness."

            In view of the above ratio, it is seen that when the Legislature has
    directed to act in a particular manner and the failure to· act results in a
    consequence, the question is, whether the previous order operates as res
B   judicata or estoppel as against the persons in dispute. When the previous
    decision was found to be erroneous on its face, this Court held in the above,
    judgment that it does not operate a res judicata We respectfully follow the
    ratio therein. The principle of estoppel or tes- judicata does not apply
    where to give effect to them would be to counter some statutory direction
C    or prohibition. A statutory direction or prohibition cannot be over-ridden
     or defeated by a previous judgment between the parties. In view of the fact
     that land had already stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances,
     the question of divesting does not arise. After the vesting has taken place,
     the question of lapse of notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration
     under Section 6 would not arise. Considered from this perspective, original
D    direction itself was erroneous and the later direction with regard to delivery
     the possession of the land, in consequence, was not valid in law. Further,
     it is made clear that the respondents are entitled to interest at 9% for one
     year from the date of taking posession and thereafter at 15% per annum
     till the date of deposit into court. The respondents are not entitled to
E    market value as on the date of award.                                            [
         With these modifications, the appeal is allowed but, m the cir-
    cumstances, without costs.

    G.N.                                                         Appeal allowed.